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Introduction 
 
On the 30th April 1956, an important Florentine conference concluded, in which the 
most outstanding Italian historians of philosophy had convened to discuss the best 
method to adopt in doing History of Philosophy. In his closing speech, Mario Dal 
Pra offered some advice to the “filosofo storicista” who hoped to draw a faithful and 
useful picture of historical facts:  
 
La dimensione del tempo, anche se le si toglie ogni integrazione ideale, è ben 
ricca per se stessa d’una varia complessità; si tratta appunto di ricostruire le 
dottrine nei loro vari legami, di studiare l’influsso ed i nessi d’una dottrina sulle 
altre, di configurare nella loro ampiezza le tradizioni, di cogliere le loro 
reciproche reazioni, di scorgere il nascere dei problemi della cultura […] non si 
può fare storia della filosofia isolando […] un autore dal clima storico in cui si è 
affermato; bisogna per contro ricercare e mettere in luce la più vasta complessità 
di legami e di raccordi, purché si tratti sempre di legami e di raccordi 
documentabili in modo rigoroso e non semplicemente dichiarati nell’atmosfera 
rarefatta della storia ideale.1 
 
As an aspiring “filosofo storicista”, I will try to apply these recommendations in my 
inquiry about the reception of Aristotle’s Topics in the Middle Age. For anyone 
wishing to delve deeper into this subject, the inevitable starting point is the unique 
monography addressing this issue, namely The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle 
Ages. The Commentaries on Aristotle’s and Boethius’ ‘Topics’, published by Niels Jørgen 
Green-Pedersen in 1984. If a scholar attempts to approach the tradition of the Topics 
without the guide of Green-Pedersen, he may well feel like a reader who finds 
himself in a huge library whose innumerable volumes are neither rightly ordered 
nor precisely catalogued. Despite its undeniable merits, Green-Pedersen’s 
reconstruction of the developments of the tradition of the Topics fails to address 
                                       
1 M. Dal Pra, “Del «superamento» nella storiografia filosofica”, in M. Dal Pra, Storia della filosofia e 
della storiografia filosofica. Scritti scelti, ed. by M. A. Del Torre, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1996, pp. 81-82. 
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several important elements, which are indeed fundamental to a more complete and 
nuanced picture. This shortcoming seems to be consequent on Green-Pedersen’s 
choice to focus his inquiry on three general questions: “What do the medieval 
scholastic consider a locus to be? And in what context and by what means do they 
attempt to determine its nature? Second, how does a locus function in arguments 
and which species of arguments may occur in? Third, what classes are the loci 
divided into, and why?”2  
In selecting which questions to pose to the Aristotelian commentators of the 
Topics, I have adopted an alternative perspective and committed myself to 
Collingwood’s ‘logic of question and answer’: “anyone can understand any 
philosopher’s doctrines if he can grasp the questions which they are intended to 
answer”.3 Accordingly, I will endeavour to draw the medieval commentators’ 
discussions about the Topics into a wider horizon. Indeed, I shall attempt to 
contextualise the different authors’ views within the philosophical setting in which 
they were developed, in order to better identify the questions hotly debated during 
these Masters’ lectures on Aristotle’s text. Specifically, I will take into account the 
main views on logic and dialectic endorsed by commentators of different periods, in 
order to detect if and to what extent the adoption of different paradigms determined 
the authors’ differing approaches to the Topics. Furthermore, I shall endeavour to 
understand whether the Aristotelian tradition of the Topics replaced the Boethian 
tradition or if, in some cases, the latter was welded together with the former, and 
what indeed were the effects of this union. 
My analysis shall mainly focus on commentaries on Book One of the Topics, 
for this specific book was both lectured upon in many European Universities over 
the period considered in my analysis, and is preserved in almost all manuscripts of 
commentaries on Aristotle’s work. Furthermore, Book One has both an introductory 
aim and a more theoretical nature than the remaining seven books. Since it discusses 
some key-notions of Aristotle’s philosophy, it is the proper place to find the answers 
which Medieval commentators proposed to various philosophical and 
                                       
2 N. J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages. The Commentaries on Aristotle’s and 
Boethius’ ‘Topics, München: Philosophia Verlag, 1984, p. 137. 
3 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 55. 
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methodological issues, e.g. the questions about the status of dialectic, its 
methodology and the value of the argumentative strategies it employs, and about 
the relationship between dialectic and other disciplines. 
This research would not have been possible without the support of many 
people, to whom I wish to express my sincerest gratitude. My ‘Belgian’ supervisor, 
Professor Andrea A. Robiglio, accompanied me in this adventure and provided me 
with more support than I deserved. My ‘French’ supervisor, Professor Joël Biard, 
made ever available his expertise in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy. I would 
like to thank Professor Russell Friedman, for giving me the opportunity to conduct 
fruitful research on Peter de Rivo, and for his insightful comments on an early draft 
of the thesis. The support I received from my friend Serena Masolini, deserves more 
gratitude than I can here express. I also thank my friends Brian Garcia, who greatly 
helped me throughout this journey, and Charles Philip Tajtelbaum, who patiently 
edited my English. Gratitude is also due to the administrative staff and librarians at 
the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, who were always very kind and willing.  
Last but not least, my warmest thanks go to my beloved Gina, who is the causa remota 
of this thesis. 
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      “Né tu finor giammai quel che tu stessa 
      Inspirasti alcun tempo al mio pensiero, 
        Potesti immaginar” 
              (G. Leopardi, Aspasia) 
 
A Gina 
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Chapter One. Thinking visually. How did medieval men see 
dialectic? 
 
Walking through the west portal of the cathedral of Notre Dame of Chartres, many 
sightseers, who are unversed in medieval culture, would not imagine that the 
sculpture of the woman holding a dog’s head atop a serpent’s body in her left hand 
and a flower in her right hand, carries a deeper message than might appear at first 
glance (fig.1). Nor will the iconographical meaning of the Florentine “Triumph of 
Saint Thomas Aquinas” be completely intelligible for the visitor to Santa Maria 
Novella who is not acquainted with the medieval intellectual world (fig.2).4  
Leafing through the manuscript folios of Martianus Capella’s Nuptiae Philologiae et 
Mercurii or of Convenevole da Prato’s Regia Carmina, the great majority of modern 
readers will encounter difficulties in reading not only the ancient handwriting, but 
also the illuminations. They will probably not be able to identify the woman wearing 
old-fashioned cloths, and grasping snakes in her hands. Reasonably enough only 
someone familiar with the culture and literature of the Middle Age will recognize 
this Lady as the personification of dialectic. This is because the “secondary or 
conventional meaning”,5 which is implied by medieval visual artworks, has 
nowadays become obscure and almost unintelligible. In the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, however, this meaning was common knowledge among the cultured 
classes. Indeed, the learned observers were aware of the codified themes and 
concepts underlying iconographic subjects in the visual arts which were often 
conveyed through literary sources. Thus, educated medieval men would have been 
able to see beyond the mere visual meaning, and detect and to understand the 
symbolic elements of visual representations which intimate a deeper sense. In order 
                                       
4 On the Florentine “Triumph of Saint Thomas Aquinas” see I. P. Grossi, “ “Arti” e “Scienze” nel 
“Trionfo di s. Tommaso” di Andrea di Bonaiuto. Ipotesi di interpretazione”, in Memorie domenicane, 
n.s. 8-9 (1977-1978), pp. 341-353. 
5 I use Panofsky’s categories of “primary” and “secondary meaning”; see E. Panofsky, “Iconography 
and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art”, in Id., Meaning in the visual Arts. 
Papers in and on Art History, Garden City (N.Y).: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955, pp. 26-54, esp. pp. 
28-29 and 39-41, originally in Id., Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939. 
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to uncover the veiled connotations of the personification of dialectic, let us look 
medieval lenses at some of its ancient visual representations, and read these images 
by thinking in symbols. This will be possible: 
1) by carrying both a pre-iconographical and an iconographical description of such 
artworks: the iconographical description will illustrate how the iconographic subject 
of the artworks analysed in this chapter –  namely dialectic and her identifying 
attributes – changed through the centuries;  
2) by providing the iconographical interpretation of the iconographic subject: the 
identification of the literary sources on which the iconography of dialectic is based 
will disclose the “secondary or conventional meaning” conveyed by this allegorical 
figure and its associated symbols.6  
Within the late-ancient educational system which was codified and used in the High 
Middle Ages, dialectic was one of the seven Liberal Arts. The disciplines comprising 
the trivium and the quadrivium (namely music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy) 
played an instrumental role, and were primarily studied to better understand the 
Bible. Dialectic was part of the trivium along with the other disciplines concerned 
with language, namely grammar and rhetoric. Indeed dialectic was seen as the art 
dealing not only with dialogical encounters between opponents, but also with 
correct reasoning and the discernment of truth and falsehood. Thus it often 
overlapped with logic. In the Middle Age and modern period, indeed, dialectica was 
a polysemantic term. In its broader meaning it was used synonymously with logic.7 
In its narrower or proper meaning, the word dialectic signified the discipline that 
through probable reasoning (probabiliter arguere) produces opinion. As such, 
dialectic was the inventive part of logic, which aims at discovering (inventio) 
principles as well as suitable middle terms of syllogism. As is well known, authors 
                                       
6 Within the “special province of iconography” delineated here, we also encounter an element that 
could be understood as properly belonging to iconology. My iconographical interpretation will deal 
with the question of whether and to what extent philosophical and scholastic developments are 
reflected in and/or influenced the visual arts, particularly the representations of dialectic. I will leave 
aside the other elements usually taken into account in iconological analysis, such as “the influence of 
[…] political ideas; the purposes and inclinations of individual artists and patrons” (Panofsky, 
“Iconography and Iconology”, p. 32). One may also wonder if the influence between visual 
representation and philosophy was one-sided or rather mutual and reciprocal: Did visual arts sway 
philosophical writings? 
7 See infra chapter 2. 
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disagreed on the actual nature of logic, the “ars artium ac scientia scientiarum”, and 
on its epistemological status. One such disagreement focused on whether logic 
should be considered an ars or a science (habitus intellectualis). The intrinsic 
ambiguity of the term dialectic is plainly elucidated in the threefold definition 
associated with dialectica which we find in the first edition of the Lexicon Rationale 
sive Thesaurus Philosophicus compiled by Étienne Chauvin. Here, the previous 
tradition is clearly embraced: 
 
Dialectica: a Graeco dialeghestai derivatur. Variis autem modis verbum illud 
usurpatur. 1° Latissimè, pro omni usu rationis et orationis homini proprio: quo 
sensu Dialectica utramque logicam complectitur, ratiocinatricem scilicet, et 
sermocinatricem […] Secundo. Ita accipitur dialeghestai, latine disserere, ut sit 
idem ac probabiliter disputare: quo modo Dialectica ea est tantum logicae 
vulgaris pars, quae dicitur topica. 3. Per tò disserere intelligitur ignotum ex noto 
patefacere; atque sic Dialectica idem prorsus est quod logica propriè dicta, quam 
artem ratione recte utendi definiunt; quippe ignotum ex noto patefit tum 
definiendo, tum dividendo, tum argumentando; sunt autem definitio, divisio, et 
argumentatio potissima instrumenta quibus mens dirigitur in suis 
operationibus.8 
 
The Late ancient and Medieval organization of the disciplines constituting the 
teaching curriculum was reflected also in the visual arts. Artists often rendered 
through images descriptions found in literary sources.9 Thus let us briefly turn our 
                                       
8 Lexicon rationale sive thesaurus philosophicus ordine alphabetico digestus, in quo vocabula omnia 
philosophica, variasque illorum acceptiones, juxta cum veterum, tum recentiorum placita, explicare[…], 
Rotterodami, apud Petrum van der Slaart bibliopolam, 1692. On the Lexicon see G. Gasparri, Étienne 
Chauvin (1640-1725) and his Lexicon Philosophicum, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 
2016. 
9 The scholarship devoted to the iconography of the Liberal Arts is rather vast; see at least: P. 
d’Ancona, “Le rappresentazioni allegoriche delle arti liberali nel medio evo e nel Rinascimento”, in 
L’arte, 5 (1902), pp. 137-155, 211-228, 269-289, 370-385; L. H. Heydenreich, “Dialektik”, in Reallexikon 
zur deutschen Kunstgeschichte, vol. 3 (Stuttgart 1954), pp. 1389-90; A. Katzenellenbogen, “The 
Representation of the Seven Liberal Arts”, in M. Clagett - G. Post - R. Reynolds, Twelfth-Century 
Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society,  Wisconsin – Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1966, pp. 39-55; P. M. Verdier, “L’iconographie des arts libéraux dans l’art du moyen àge jusqu’à la 
fin du quinzième siècle”, in J. Koch, Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen-âge. Actes du quatrième congrès 
international de philosophie médiévale, Institut d'Études Médiévales-Vrin, Montréal-Paris, 1969 pp. 
305-354; A. Wirth, “Von mittelalterlichen Bildern und Lehrfiguren im Dienste der Schule und des 
Unterrichts”, in B. Moeller – H. Patze – K. Stackmann, Studien zum städtischen Bildungswesen des späten 
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attention to some texts which were particularly influent in this regard, in order to 
find some elucidation on the value and the concepts concealed by the symbolic 
attributes associated with Dialectic. As acknowledged by the great majority of 
scholars, Martianus Capella’s De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii was at the foundation 
of the iconography of the Liberal Arts, not only in illuminations, but in visual arts in 
general: “The bizarre figures born of the African imagination engraved themselves 
more deeply on the memory of the Middle Ages than did the purer creations of great 
masters, and until the Renaissance definite traces of their influence are seen in art 
[…] From that time onwards the poets were not fancy free when they set out to 
personify the Liberal Arts, for they could not forget the descriptions of the African 
rhetorician”.10  
The last seven books of Martianus’ allegorical treatise, which was widely read in the 
High Middle Ages, provided detailed imageries of the female personifications of the 
Liberal Arts,11 as well as precise descriptions of their individual symbols and the 
historical personalities accompanying each of them. The opening lines of the fourth 
book of the De Nuptiis portray a woman, clothed “with the dress and cloak of 
Athens”, who is entering at the assembly of the gods. Despite her pallor – probably 
due her sleepless nights spent studying,12 the lady appears “very keen-sighted”:  
 
                                       
Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen, 1989, pp. 256-370; J. Tezmen-Siegl, Die Darstellungen der 
septem artes liberales in der Bildenden Kunst als Rezeption der Lehrplangeschichte, Phil. Diss. Uni. 
München1983, München 1985; M. Stolz, Artes-liberales-Zyklen: Formationen des Wissens im Mittelalter, 
2 vols, Tübingen 2004. I was not able to consult M. Evans, “Allegorical Women and Practical Men. 
The iconography of the Artes reconsidered”, in Medieval Women. Studies in Church History. Subsidia 
1978, pp. 305-329 and W. E. Palmer, Images of Knowledge: The Seven Liberal Arts and Their Representations 
in Medieval and Renaissance Art (Ph.D. diss., California State University, Dominguez Hills, 2002). 
10 E. Mâle, L’art religieux du XIIIe siècle; étude sur l’iconographie du moyen âge et sur ses sources 
d’inspiration, Paris: Leroux, 1898; I used the English translation: Id., Religious Art in France of the 
Thirteenth Century, Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 77 and 79; G. Nuchelmans, 
“Philologia et son mariage avec Mercure jusq’à la fin du XIIe siècle”, in Latomus 16 (1957), pp. 84-107. 
11 “From De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii onward, personifications of the Liberal Arts were primarily 
women. That Capella assigned the female roles is probably due to the female gender of their Latin 
names […] This tradition carried through the Renaissance” (V. Schonfeld, “Sebald Beham and The 
Iconography of the Liberal Arts”, in P. Earenfight et al., Letters & Lines: Text and Image in Northern 
Renaissance & Baroque Prints, Carlisle, Pa.: The Trout Gallery, Dickinson College, 2014, pp. 49-59, here 
p.51). 
12 Cf. the description of Philology in book 1, §37, p. 19: “The constant pallor that comes from her [scil. 
of Philology] studies at night”; in the opening lines of the fourth book, Aristotle is said to have grown 
“pale as he tortures himself in thought” (Martianus Capella, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury, 
Eng. tr. By W. H. Stahl – R. Johnson– E. L. Burge, in Martianus Capella, Martianus Capella and the Seven 
Liberal Arts, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Columbia University Press, New York: 1977), bk. IV, §327, p. 106). 
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her eyes constantly darted about; her intricate coiffure seemed beautifully 
curled and bound together, and descending by successive stages, it is so 
encompassed the shape of her whole head that you could not have detected 
anything lacking, nor grasped anything excessive [...] In her left hand she held a 
snake twined in immense coils; in her right hand a set of patterns  carefully 
inscribed on wax tablets, which were adorned with the beauty of contrasting 
color, was held on the inside by a hidden hook; but since her left hand kept the 
crafty device of the snake hidden under her cloak, her right hand was offered to 
one and all. Then if anyone took one of those patterns, he was soon caught on 
the hook and dragged toward the poisonous coils of the hidden snake, which 
presently emerged and after first biting the man relentlessly with the venomous 
points of its sharp teeth then gripped him in its many coils and compelled him 
to the intended position. If no one wanted to take any of the patterns, Dialectic 
confronted them with some questions; or secretly stirred the snake to creep up 
on them until its tight embrace strangled those who were caught and compelled 
them to accept the will of their interrogator.13 
 
This vivid image of Dialectic conceals many hidden meanings, and employs several 
technical logical words and abstract concepts, whose obscure senses were differently 
elucidated by exegetes. In Remy of Auxerre’s Commentary on Martianus’ text, 
which “influenced the iconography of the art as well as educational theory during 
the later mediaeval times”,14 the paleness characterizing Lady Dialectic contrasts 
                                       
13 Ibid., §328, p. 107. “Pallidior paululum femina, sed acri admodum visu et vibrantibus continua 
mobilitate luminibus, cui crines tortuosi decentique inflexione crispati et nexiles videbantur, qui 
tamen deducti per quosdam consequentes gradus ita formam totius capitis circulabant. ut nihil deesse 
cerneres, nihil superfluum detineres. cui quidem pallium Athenarumque vestitus, sed gestamen in 
manibus fuerat inopinum ac prorsus gymnasiis omnibus inexpertum. in laeva quippe serpens gyris 
immanibus involutus, in dextra formulae quaedam florentibus discolora venustate ceris sollerter 
effigiatae latentis hami nexu interius tenebantur; sed quoniam eius laeva sub pallio occulebat insidias 
viperinas, cunctis dextera praebebatur; denique ex illis formulis si quis aliquam percepisset, mox 
apprehensus hamo ad latentis anguis virosos circulos trahebatur, qui tamen mox emergens primo 
spinosorum dentium acumine venenato assiduis hominem morsibus affligebat. dehinc ambitu 
multiplici circumactum ad condiciones propositas coartabat. si autem quamlibet formulam nullus 
vellet assumere, quibusdam obvios interrogatiunculis occupabat, aut latenter in eos anguem serpere 
stimulabat, donec nexilis complexio circumventos ad interrogantis arbitrium strangularet” (Martianus 
Capella, De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, ed. by J. Willis, Leipzig: Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, 
pp. 106,15-107,11; Italics are mine). 
14 Remigii Autissiodorensis Commentum in Martianum Capellam. Libri I-II, ed. by C. E. Lutz, Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1962 p. 48 fn. 35. Remy composed his commentary at the end of the ninth century, borrowing 
from older commentaries on that same text and thus offering a summary of the tradition preceding 
him. Also John Scotus Eriugena commented on Capella’s De Nuptiis. On Remy’s classification of the 
14 
 
with the more vivid skin tone of Grammar, and bespeaks the labor and difficulty of 
dialectic – “unde et dialectici macri et pallidi depinguntur”. The keen and dart 
eyesight of the Lady visually manifests the acumen of her mind. The hairstyle of the 
Lady reflects the manifold types of argumentation. In this logical perspective, the 
circularly wrapped coiffure represents the (chain of) syllogisms (implexio 
syllogismorum). The hair “bound together, and descending by successive stages” 
(deducti15 per quosdam consequentes gradus) symbolizes the conclusion of a syllogism, 
which follows from the perfect ordered disposition of the premises. And her tangled 
and woven hair of the lady allegorically represents fallacies and tantalizing 
propositions (seductrices propositiones) respectively. Remy’s interpretation implies 
the wider notion of dialectic understood as logic, namely as the discipline concerned 
with both correct reasoning and with captious arguments. Moreover, Remy stresses 
the sophistical component of dialectic, which was present in the Lady’s sensible 
imagery not only through the hair, but mainly through the serpent –  an emblem of 
sophistical argumentation.16 Playing with the ambivalent sense of the word 
involutus, Remy parallels the snake, which is involutus or twined on the left hand of 
dialectic, with the sophisticae calliditates which are so involutae, namely obscure, that 
at times they lead to deception by inclining someone to concede false conclusions as 
true. Indeed, as we shall see in the iconographical excursus, the formulae held by the 
Lady in her right hand, were variously interpreted. Remy understands them as signs 
of simple propositions, and the hidden hook holding the formulae as the fallacious 
conclusion (captiosa conclusio). He deepens the elucidation of the whole passage in 
the light of the material components of syllogisms, and explicates that the formulae 
could signify the propositio –that is the major premise, and the hook could signify the 
                                       
liberal arts see C. E. Lutz, “Remigius’ ideas on the classification of the seven liberal Arts”, in Traditio 
12 (1956), pp. 56-86. 
15 Remigius’ text of Martianus has ducti, instead of deducti; in the critical apparatus of the De Nuptis 
provided by Willis, deducti does not have any variant reading. 
16 This clearly appears in Martianus’ text; a few lines after the above description he adds, through the 
mouth of Bromius/Bacchus, “the wittiest of the gods” and ignorant in logic: “She [scil. Dialectic] is 
so well recognized by snakes, and they show their fondness for her in their slimy way. Apart from 
this, we may deduce from that concealed hook that she is proven a most alluring charlatan” (Capella, 
The Marriage, § 331, p. 109). In Christian symbolism, the snake has often negative connotations being 
connected with Adam’s and Eve’s sin and the consequent fall; moreover, the serpent is the Devil 
(Apoc. 20.2-3), who “mendax est et pater eius [scil. mendacii]” (John, 8.44); see W. Menzel, Christliche 
Symbolik, vol. 2, pp. 325-332. 
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minor premise (assumptio) that leads to the necessary conclusion, which is in turn 
symbolized by the snake. These lines, Remy states, are a caveat for the opponent, 
who should carefully select the premises that he will concede (to the answerer), 
otherwise, willingly or not, he will be lead to a conclusion that contradicts his own 
position. In the high Middle Ages and even later, the iconography of the Liberal Arts 
in general, and of dialectic in particular, heavily relied on the portraits painted by 
Martianus in the De Nuptiis.17 Usually, the Seven Liberal Arts were depicted all 
together as allegorical female figures. Thus, Dialectic was often included in a larger 
allegorical program, which at times was not merely visual, but also philosophical18 
and theological. The type of Lady Dialectic was characterized by some 
compositional and symbolic features that became the standard codification for her 
iconography. These compositional and symbolic elements are found in many of 
Medieval and Renaissance images of Dialectic produced all over Europe to decorate 
papal and royal graves, the rooms of private and public palaces, belfries, portals, 
pulpits, and rose windows of churches and cathedrals. And, obviously, the folii of 
manuscripts containing writings from various literary genres.  
Like the other six Liber Arts, Dialectic was almost always characterized through 
specific individual traits that both visually express her peculiarities – such as the 
variety and subtleness of arguments, or her ambivalent status of a discipline 
encompassing both logic and sophistry. Most of time, the Lady was represented 
holding a serpent and a hook either a hooked stick in her left hand, and grasping 
tablets with her right hand. Since it was not always possible to faithfully translate 
into imageries Martianus’ words, illuminators, painters or sculptors slightly 
departed from his description. This explains why frequently the hidden hook and, 
though more rarely, the formulae were replaced either by reptile-like dragons (fig.3-
                                       
17 On the influence of late ancient texts, like Capella’s or Boethius’ or Ysidore’s Ethymologiae, on the 
development of ancient iconography of the Liberal Arts see Mâle, L’art religieux, pp. 87 foll.; 
Nuchelmans, “Philologia”. 
18 With regard to the representational tradition(s) of the Liberal Arts in the 12th century 
Katzenellenbogen affirms that “The representations of the Liberal Arts in miniature become sharply 
articulated and even develop into a whole philosophical system of a comprehensiveness and clarity 
not found until that time” (Katzenellenbogen, “The Representation”, p. 39). 
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4)19 or lizards20 – which were loaded with analogous allegorical overtone, or by a 
second snake (fig.5). From the iconographical perspective, the two snakes were 
attributes related to Hermes – two serpents entwine his caduceus –  and medical art. 
However, from the philosophical perspective the two snakes tended to be related to 
dialectic in some way in late antiquity. In his letter On Dialectic, the Platonic 
philosopher Iamblichus advises his pupil Deuxippus that dialectic is a divine gift, in 
virtue of which men “discerned ambiguity and homonymy, and the ferreting out of 
every double meaning kindled in them the light of knowledge”. This discipline, 
claims Iamblichus, was revealed to humankind by some divinity, perhaps by 
“Hermes, the god of rational discourse, who bears in his hands its symbol, of two 
snakes looking toward each other”.21 Stobaeus repeated these same words in his 
widespread Florilegium: “Doctus Mercurius, qui manibus dialecticae symbolum 
gestat, nempe dracones se mutuo inspicientes”.22 
In general though, in medieval iconology tended to employ the serpent associated 
with Dialectic more to symbolized the peril implicit in the wrong use of logic and in 
sophistical reasoning, than in the whole discipline itself. 
                                       
19 “Les Latins le [scil. Dragon] confondaient avec le serpent et employaient concurremment les mots 
« serpens » « angius » et « draco » pour désigner soit un serpent, soit un dragon”. It was associated 
with logic or dialectic, prudence, fortitudo, the element of fire and Apollo (G. De Tervarent, Attributs 
et symboles dans l’art profane: Dictionnaire d’un langage perdu (1450-1600), Genève: Droz,19972, pp. 184-
185). 
20 “Le serpent est un attribut normal de la Dialectique. Or le lézard a souvent les mêmes attributions 
que le serpent, sans doute à cause de leur ressemblance physique” (De Tervarent, Attributs et symboles, 
pp. 280-281); the lizard is the symbol “du ‘sorite qui s’ insinue’” (Verdier, “L’ iconographie”, p. 335). 
21 Letter 5: To Dexippus, On Dialectic, in Iamblichus of Chalcis, The Letters, Ed. by J. M. Dillon–W. 
Polleichtner, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009, p. 15. In the second book of the Convivio 
Dante associated the seven planets to the seven liberal Arts, and correlated dialectic with Mars: “E lo 
cielo di Mercurio si può comparare a la Dialettica per due proprietadi: che Mercurio è la più picciola 
stella del cielo, ché la quantitade del suo diametro non è più che di dugento trentadue miglia, secondo 
che pone Alfagrano, che dice quello essere de le ventotto parti una del diametro de la terra, lo quale 
è sei milia cinquecento miglia: l’ altra proprietade si è che più va velata de li raggi del Sole che 
null’altra stella. E queste due proprietadi sono ne la Dialettica: ché la Dialettica è minore in suo corpo 
che null’altra scienza, ché perfettamente è compilata e terminata in quello tanto testo che ne l’Arte 
vecchia e ne la Nuova si truova; e va più velata che nulla scienza, in quanto procede con più sofistici 
e probabili argomenti più che altra” (Dante Alighieri, Convivio, ed. by G. Fioravanti, in Dante 
Alighieri, Opere, Milano: Mondadori, 2014, vol. 2, II. Xiii, 8-11-12, pp. 312-313). As Fioravanti has 
pointed out (Ibid., pp. 313-315), in this passage Dante equate dialectic with logic, precisely with the 
logica antiqua that comprises the logica vetus and the logica nova.  
22 Iōannou Tou Stobaiou Eklogai apophthegmatōn kai ypothēkōn in Ioannis Stobaei Sententiae ex thesauris 
Graecorum delectae[…], ed. by Conrad Gessner, Basileae: ex officina Ioannis Oporini, 1549, Sermo 79 
“de Literis”, p. 469. 
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Moreover, many Medieval artworks represented dialectic flanked by a man engaged 
in writing, who at times is identifiable as Aristotle, and others with Zoroaster. 
Indeed in some medieval traditions, the Stagirite was considered the father of 
dialectic, since he “brought the argumentative methods of this discipline under 
certain rules and named it ‘dialectic’ because in it one disputes about terms”.23 On 
other accounts, dialectic was “brought up on an Egyptian crag and then had 
migrated to Attica to the school of Parmenides, and there […] she had taken to 
herself the greatness of Socrates and Plato”.24 This oriental origin of dialectic could 
have been the link between the discipline and Zoroaster. 
A faithful visual transposition of Martianus’ narrative image of Dialectic decorates 
a manuscript, which contains Capella’s De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (fig.6), along 
with the commentary of Remy of Auxerre on it.25 This is the most ancient 
illumination representing Dialectic in a manuscript of Martianus’ text, even though 
it seems to rely on an already established iconographical tradition. Against the 
                                       
23 “Dialectica est disciplina ad disserendas rerum causas inventa. Ipsa est philosophiae species, quae 
Logica dicitur, id est rationalis definiendi, quaerendi et disserendi potens. Docet enim in pluribus 
generibus quaestionum quemadmodum disputando vera et falsa diiudicentur. Hanc quidam primi 
philosophi in suis dictionibus habuerunt; non tamen ad artis redegere peritiam. Post hos Aristoteles 
ad regulas quasdam huius doctrinae argumenta perduxit, et Dialecticam nuncupavit, pro eo quod in 
ea de dictis disputatur” (Isidorus Hispalensis, Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX, II.22; Engl. tr. in 
Id., The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, ed. by S. A. Barney–W. J. Lewis–J. A. Beach–O. Berghof, 
Cambridge – New York – Melbourne – Madrid – Cape Town – Singapore – São Paulo: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p. 79. 
24 Capella, The marriage, IV, §330, p. 108 (Id., De Nuptiis, p. 107: “haec [scil. Dialectica] se educatam 
dicebat Aegyptiorum urbe atque in Parmenidis exinde gymnasium atque Atticam demeasse. illicque 
versipellis studii calumniante proposito etiam Socratis sibi Platonisque amplitudinem mancipasse”). 
See also Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 3.2. 11-14, who however modified Capella’s account on the 
basis of Remy of Auxerre’s commentary, thus considering Parmenides as the inventor of dialectic: 
“Hic [Parmenides] philosophus fuit et primus apud Aegyptios artem dialecticam repperit. Erat 
autem solitus deserere divitates et conventus publicos et in hac rupe solus residere, ut liberius posset 
diaelcticam meditari. Unde et a Parmenide rupes Parmenidis vocata est. Claret autem et hanc et alias 
artes apud Aegyptum repertas et ab his ad Graecos deductas” (Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 3.14, 
Engl. tr. in The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor. A medieval guide to the Arts, ed. by J. Taylor, New York 
– London: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 98; cf. also 3. 4). See also John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, 
II.2. And see A.1, Robertus of Cilnacobi (A.1), Notulae Topicorum, book 1, lectio 1 (on Topics I.1): 
“Adhuc ponitur quod Parmenides invenit hec principia” (A.1, Robertus de Cilnacobi, Firenze, 
Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. B.4.1618, f. 95rb. On this topic see R. Klibansky, “The 
Rock of Parmenides: Medieval Views on the Origin of Dialectic”, in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 
I, 2 (1943), pp. 178-186. 
25 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. Lat. 7900 A, f. 132v; the manuscript is thought to have 
been made between the end of the 9th century and the 10th century, probably at Fleury. Studies on the 
part of the ms., which contains Capella’s text, have been done by K. A. Wirth, “Eine 
illustrierte Martianus Capella-Handschrift aus dem 13.Jahrhundert”, in Städel-jahrbuch ns. 2 (1969), 
pp. 43-74. 
18 
 
background of a wall, a woman, dressed in ancient Greek fashion, holds a tablet in 
her right hand and a hooked stick in her left hand, whilst two serpents come out of 
her left sleeve. Through the hook of the stick the lady –engaged in questioning with 
two young men – grasps the arm of the interlocutor who holds a tablet. He probably 
acts the part of the incautious respondent who, having conceded the premises 
proposed by the answerer, “was soon caught on the hook and dragged toward the 
poisonous coils of the hidden snake”. We can imagine the following scene – which 
has not been depicted – of the Lady forcing her opponent to say something 
inconsistent; the poor respondent, “compelled to the intendent position”, would be 
“gripped in many coils” of the snakes springing from the sleeve of dialectic.  
The serpent and Aristotle furthermore feature in an original illumination of 
Porphyry’s Isagoge (fig.7), produced perhaps in Paris at the same time when Peter 
Abelard and Hugh of Saint Victor were active.26 The Lady is crowned, presumably 
for symbolizing the highest relevance which dialectic/logic assumed in the 12th 
century in the educational curriculum, especially within the trivium.27 The lady 
holds a serpent in her left hand, and a scepter in a Porphyrian tree-shaped manner 
in her right hand. Interestingly, the illuminator has modernized the iconographical 
tradition of Dialectic by framing the Lady with four great philosophers. Aristotle, 
Plato and Socrates sit on three corners of the folio and the fourth person on the scene 
is, remarkably, a certain “magister Adam”, subsequently identified as the logician 
Adam of Balsham (Parvipontanus; 1105-c.1170),28 who was one of the first authors 
to be somewhat acquainted with Aristotle’s Topics.  
                                       
26 Darmstad, Hessische Landesbibliothek, Ms. 2282, Logica Vetus. In addition to J. Tezmen-Siegel, Die 
Darstellungen, see Katzenellenbogen, “The Representation”, p. 39, im. 5. 
27 As underlined by Tezmen-Siegel, Die Darstellungen, in this image the dialectica domina as represented 
in the same way and with the attributes – like the crown and the scepter three-shaped – which in the 
following century will accompany Philosophy. 
28 John of Salisbury informs us that his friend Adam of Balsham wrote a treatise on logic, the Ars 
disserendi (1132), which exhibits influences by some writings compounding the logica nova, namely 
the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. The Ars Disserendi has been published in L. Minio-Paluello, 
Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies, I, Adam Balsamiensis Parvipontani Ars disserendi (Dialectica 
Alexandri), Roma: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1956; here Adam says that he wants “disserere in 
disputando”, that is “interrogatione et responsione” (Ch. 9, pp. 6-7 and 27, p. 18). On Adam of 
Balsham see L. Minio-Paluello, “The “Ars disserendi” of Adam Balsham “Parvipontanus””, in 
Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies III (1954), pp. 116-169. 
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In addition to the attributes related to Martianus’ personification of Dialectic, 
at times, few other symbols, like the scepter or the key29 were used too. The key 
appears in the so called “Newberry Diagram” (fig.8) – a set of written 
recommendations useful for portraying Philosophy and the seven Liberal Arts 
which garnishes the last folio of a manuscript of Boethius’ De Musica.30 In this 
schema the artist could find descriptions for shaping the allegorical female figures, 
their identifying ornaments, as well as the practical men who should accompany 
each of them. According to the “Newberry Diagram”, Dialectic is “a virgin holding 
a key in her right hand, in her left this verse: through me is the true made firm and 
the false tested. From the sleeve of her left hand appears a serpent half way as if 
slipping through”. The magister who should join her is Aristotle, shaped as “a man 
turned toward her, in his right hand holding the same verse; in his left hand he holds 
a book”.31 This verbal representation of Dialectic implies the broader notion of 
dialectic as coextensive with logic, according to which dialectic/logic is the 
discipline discerning and concluding truth, but which also deals with fallacies and 
contentious argumentation. The written instruction of the “Newberry Diagram” are 
faithfully transposed in a series of illuminations produced at the Cistercian Abbey 
of Aldersbach around first quarter of the 13th century (fig.9).32 The personification of 
                                       
29 The key could symbolize the opening or closing, like the compelling argument that concludes or 
confirms the truth; it might simply allude to the conclusion alone. Interestingly, Alan of Lille 
mentions the key when depicting the usefulness of logic: “Qualiter ars logice, tamquam via, ianua, 
clavis, ostendit, reserat, aperit secreta sophie” (Anticlaudianus, III, vv. 70-71). In this context, the key 
should represent the logic as ars artium, which is useful for all the other disciplines and, more 
generally, is a prerequisite for attaining knowledge. In the Renaissance period, the key accompanied 
personifications of Grammar; De Tervarent traces back the source of this symbol to Martianus 
Capella: “La grammaire est la clef du langage et partant de tous les autres arts: « per grammaticam 
de aliis disputatur artibus »” (Id., Attributs et symboles, p. 129).  
30 It dates from the 1050-1150 and is nowadays preserved in Chicago, Newberry library, Ms. F9, fol. 
65; it was probably made in Admont. On the “Newberry diagram” see M. Masi, “A Newberry 
Diagram of the Liberal Arts”, in Gesta 11/2 (1972), pp. 52-56; Tezmen-Siegel, Die Darstellungen; 
Schonfeld, “Sebald Beham”, p. 53. 
31 “Dialectica: Virgo in dextra clavem, in sinistra hunc versum: per me firmatur verum falsumque 
probatur; a cuius sinistra manica serpens dimidius quasi persiliens apparet. Aristotiles: Cui vir 
oppositus, dextra eundem versum; in sinistro brachio librum tenet” (Image, text and English 
translation provided by Masi, “Newberry Diagram”, pp. 53 and 55 respectively). 
32 These drawings are at the end of a manuscript, which containing sermons of Peter Manducator 
and a treatise on music, preserved at München, Bayerischestaatsbibliothek, Clm. 2599; see Masi, “The 
Newberry Diagram”; E. Klemm, Die illuminierten Handschriften des 13. Jahrhunderts deutscher Herkunft 
in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1998; Ead., “Artes liberales und antike Autoren 
in der Aldersbacher Sammelhandschrift Clm 2599”, in Zeitschrift fuer Kunstgeschichte 41 (1978), pp. 1-
15. 
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Dialectic bears a key in her right hand, and a lizard comes out from the left sleeve. 
The woman holds one extremity of a captive, in which it is written “per me firmatur 
verum falsumque probatur”. The other extremity of the ribbon is held by Aristotle, 
which stands in front of Dialectic. On the folio of the open book, which he bears, is 
written “omnis homo rationale est animal/omnis homo rationale non est animal 
[homo]”.  
Martianus’ influence in visual arts was unrivalled along the High Middle Ages until 
the end of the twelfth century, when alternative sources of inspiration gradually 
came out, even though they impinged less on the creative imagination of artists than 
the De nuptiis. Accordingly, some variants of the type Dialectic made their 
appearance in the iconographical tradition.  
During the years 1181-1183, Alan of Lille epitomized some of his philosophical ideas 
in the Anticlaudianus. Among the theories, concepts and notions that the Doctor 
Universalis approached in his allegorical poem are the seven Liberal Arts. Their 
female personifications, which are appointed to build the chariot that will drive 
Wisdom and Reason in their ascent until the Empyrean Heaven, are characterized 
in detail in the second and, especially, in the third book.33 Alan did not preserve 
faithfully the legacy of Capella. He modified some aspects or added some details, as 
emerges in his word picture of Logic,34 who is portrayed as a “solers, studiosa, 
laborans Virgo” who “intrat penetralia mentis”. Her pinched body and her hollowed 
face are marked by the fatigue of study, but her sight (visus and intuitus) did not 
suffer for it. Her rebel, uncombed hair seems to restlessly contend against each other: 
 
Her right hand is adorned with a flower, and a scorpion, inflaming her left, 
threatens with the sharp sting of his tail. One hand smells of honey, the other 
                                       
33 It is acknowledged that Alan’s works relies heavily on other sources; Sheridan has shown that in 
the Anticlaudianus Alan borrowed many words and phrases from the De Consolatione Rationis of Peter 
of Compostella. As regard to the Dialectic, it should be noticed that Peter’s text omits the visual 
description of the personification of logic (J. J. Sheridan, “The Seven Liberal Arts in Alan of Lille and 
Peter of Compostella”, in Mediaeval Studies 35 (1973), pp. 27-37, for the text see esp. pp. 28-30). On the 
seven Liberal Arts in the Anticlaudianus see S. Arcoleo, “Filosofia ed arti nell’ Anticlaudianus di Alano 
di Lilla”, in Koch, Arts libéraux, pp. 569-574; C. Meier, “Die Rezeption des Anticlaudianus Alans von 
Lille in Textkommentierung und Illustration”, in C. Meier – U. Ruberg, Text und Bild: Aspekte des 
Zusammenwirkens zweier Kunste im Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1980, pp. 408-
549. 
34 Anticlaudianus III, vv. 1-89.  
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gives off the smell of gall; one promises laughter, the other ends in tears; one 
attracts, the other repels, one anoints, by the other one is stung; one strikes, the 
other soothes, one graces, the other corrupts.35  
 
These lines make allusion to the structural ambivalence of logic, which embraces in 
itself the method of correct reasoning as well as the art of merely apparent correct 
reasoning, namely sophistry which is a histrio veri. This ambiguity is reflected in the 
axiological indeterminateness of logical argumentative patterns. Arguments, 
indeed, can be good, if they are directed at discerning what is true.36 Or they can 
turn out to be falsa argumenta, namely sophistic or captious reasoning developed by 
a pseudologicus or sophista, who “temptat pro vero vendere falsum”, captiously 
argues to deceive the antagonist and vainly disputes. These ambiguities are 
expressed allegorically in the description of the lady. Her right side and the flower 
embellishing it symbolize the positive value of logic and the advantageousness of 
the correct logical reasoning. While her hair and especially the scorpion, which 
moves close to the left hand, can be interpreted as visual representations of eristic 
and sophistry. In Alan’s narration the flower has replaced the formule described by 
Martianus, while the scorpion has replaced the snake and the hidden hook, even 
though the snake will reappear few lines below.37 The serpent and the scorpion had 
already made their appearance together in a passage of the Gospel of Luke, in which 
they had received a very wicked connotation.38 This negative tradition associated to 
the scorpion was maintained and even buttressed by Church Fathers who, in their 
polemical writings, often drew parallels between the heretics and their offences 
                                       
35 Sheridan p. 91, ll. 25-31. 
36 Cf. Anticlaudianus, III, vv. 36-37: “Vis logice, veri facie truncata, recidit falsa, negans falsum veri 
latitare sub umbra”, and VII, vv. 261-269: “Logice virtus arguta […] adverse parti concludere, 
frangere vires oppositas partemquem suam racione tueri, vestigare viam veri falsumque fugare, 
scismaticos logice falsosque retundere fratres et pseudologicos et denudare sophistas”. 
37Anticlaudianus, III, vv. 84-86: “Sed florem dextra resignat ad presens aliisque vacat, serpensque 
sinistram exit”. Perhaps the inconsistency between the attributes associated to logic by Alan – namely 
the scorpion at v. 26 and the snake at v. 85 – can be removed if we read attentively the passages. Alan 
says that the scorpion incedens [instead of the Latin text incendens, as proposed by C. Chiurco], that is 
“drawing near <the lady>, threaten her left hand, which might bear a serpent, even though Alan does 
not mention it in this place. For Chiurco’s proposal see: Alano di Lilla, Viaggio della saggezza. 
Anticlaudianus. Discorso sulla sfera, ed. by C. Chiurco, Milano: Bompiani, 2004, p. 359, fn.5. 
38 Lc. 10.19: “dedi vobis potestatem calcandi super serpentes et scorpiones et supra omnem virtutem 
inimicis et nihil vobis nocebit”. 
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against the Christian doctrine on the one hand and the scorpions and theirs attack 
on the other.39 Thus, since antiquity the scorpion was employed as an emblem of 
insincerity and deceitfulness. And the way in which the scorpion attacks its prey 
from behind, with its tails, or laterally, by grasping it with one of its claws and then 
attacking with its stringer, was considered as a symbol of duplicity and treason, as 
emerges from the words of Gregory the Great:  
 
At si fortasse iustum quempiam tantae iam virtutis invenerint, ut ei loqui 
contraria non praesumant, quia subversores esse non possunt, statim scorpiones 
fiunt. Scorpio enim palpando incedit, sed cauda ferit; nec mordet a facie, sed a 
posterioribus nocet. Scorpiones ergo sunt omnes blandi et malitiosi […] 
Scorpiones ergo sunt qui blandi et innoxii in facie videntur, sed post dorsum 
portant unde venenum fundant.40 
 
However, Alan seems to have been the first author to have associated the scorpion 
with dialectic. Thus, his verbal description has been considered at the origin of the 
modification of the iconography of dialectic (see fig.2). His allegorical poem clears 
up why in some artworks, the codified type of Dialectic holding the serpent(s) leaves 
the stage to the new theme of Dialectic in which the woman is characterized by the 
scorpion. This motive still appears in works of Renaissance artists. In the fresco 
representing “A young man being introduced to the Seven Liberal Arts”, painted by 
Botticelli in 1482-3 for the Villa Lemmi (fig.10), the young Lorenzo Tornabuoni is 
introduced by a woman, presumably Venus, in the assembly of seven young ladies 
                                       
39 Medieval should not have been unaware that the word Scorpio is polysemantic; among other item, 
it can signify the animal, one of the Zodiac signs and also an instrument of torture (1 King. 12.14 “my 
father chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions”; 2 Chron. 10.11; Isidore, Etym. 
27.5.18: “Switches (virga) are the tips of branches and trees, so called because they are green or because 
they possess the power of persuading (vis arguendi) […] it is knotty and has points, it is correctly 
called by the term scorpio, because it is driven into the body leaving a curved wound”). An interesting 
analysis of the scorpion as animal and as sign of the Zodiac is developed by L. Aurigemma, Il segno 
dello scorpione nelle tradizioni occidentali dall’antichità greco-latina al Rinascimento, Giulio Einaudi editore: 
Torino, 1976, esp. pp. 89-136 for the Middle Ages. 
40 “Lo scorpione unisce la Potenza segreta e velenosa alla forma propriamente «diabolica», cioè 
indiretta, del suo attacco. […] Lo scorpione è diabolico perché colpisce di dietro e di traverso, cioè è 
in contrasto con le apparenze: è quindi falsità, ipocrisia, tradimento” (Aurigemma, Il segno, p. 92; in 
the following page is mentioned the above passage of Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Ezechielem, vol. 
1, Om. 9, 21). 
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symbolizing the seven daughters of wisdom, namely the seven Liberal Arts.41 
Among them, only the personification of Dialectic can be surely recognized. The 
veiled Lady, indeed, holds a stick in her right hand and a scorpion in the left. Even 
though the philosophical ideology that inspired Botticelli’s allegory of the Arts is to 
be traced back to the Florentine Platonism and to Ficino in particular,42 nevertheless 
it did not affect the established iconography of Dialectic.  
A year after Botticelli had finished the fresco, his fellow citizen Antonio del Pollaiolo 
left Florence for Rome, where he spent ten years, from 1484 to 1493, to sculpt the 
bronze funeral monument of Sixtus IV (fig.11). The Pope is carved on the top 
encircled by the seven Virtues, while the personifications of the Seven Liberal Arts 
and of Sciences decorate the sides of the base. Pollaiolo’s allegorical figure of 
Dialectic represents one of the highest visual transpositions of the literal tradition 
tracing back to Alan. The left hand of the lady seems to caress a scorpion, which is 
on a table. The woman, bearing an oak branch in the right hand, leans against a chair, 
on which is eased down an open book. On its pages, it is epitomized the medieval 
concept of dialectic: “Ars artium et scientiarum scientia ego sum. In omnibus 
doctrinis principia quia ratiocinandi doceo, modum ideo verum et falsum 
undecumque elicio”. These lines echo the opening words of Peter of Spain’s 
Tractatus or Summulae Logicales, which in many later redactions describe dialectic as 
“ars artium et scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principia viam 
habens”43. The deepness of Dialectic’s eyes perfectly translates into images Alan’s 
idea that she “intrat penetralia mentis”.   
The beginning of the third book of the Anticlaudianus further introduces another 
variation to the codified attributes of dialectic by replacing the formulae with the 
flowers. Usually, artists rendered through images the description found in literary 
                                       
41 Cf. M.T. D’Alverny, “La Sagesse et ses sept filles”, in Mélanges dédiés a la mémoire de Felix Grat, Paris 
1946-1949, I, pp. 245-278. 
42 According to Gombrich, the lady who introduces Lorenzo “must be Venus because she is dressed 
exactly like her counterpart on the other wall [scil. The three Graces] and is also accompanied by 
Cupid” (E. H. Gombrich, “Botticelli’s Mythologies: A Study in the Neoplatonic Symbolism of his 
Circle”, in Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 8 (1945), pp. 7-60, here p. 57). Gombrich 
clearly refutes Capella as the main source of inspiration for Botticelli,  which is instead accepted by 
Verdier (“L’iconographie”, pp. 343 e 346). 
43 Peter of Spain, Tractatus called afterwards Summulae Logicales, ed. by L. M. De Rijk, Van Gorcum & 
Co.: Assen, 1972, p. 1 and the critical apparatus. 
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sources. In Alanus’ case, it seems to be the other way around: Alan rendered through 
words the description found in artworks.44  
In his L’art religieux du XIII siècle en France, Émile Mâle notes that medieval 
artists often, if not always, decorate the façades and interiors of the cathedrals with 
allegorical figures of Liberal Arts and Philosophy. On the west façade of the Chartres 
cathedral, dating to the 1145-1155,45 is found one of the earliest sculptured allegory 
of the Liberal Arts and of Dialectic (fig.1);46 here “the personifications of secular 
learning were for the first time considered important enough to frame a theological 
cycle”.47 The iconographical program of the Liberal Arts on the Royal Portal, which 
entangles a deeper philosophical and theological program, was perhaps elaborated 
by Thierry of Chartres.48 Seven ladies surround the Virgin with her child, which 
occupies the center of the scene, the sedes sapientiae.49 Each of the seven women sits 
above a man who represents a historical personality outstanding for the practice of 
that discipline and who, like “a secularized version of Evangelists”, is engaged in 
thinking or writing. The artist has carved Lady Dialectic holding a flower in her right 
hand and a serpent or dragon with the head of a dog in the left. These outwards 
characteristics of dialectic hint at the good and evil (or bad argumentation). Beneath 
her sits “a man who dips his pen into the inkpot, and makes ready to write. One may 
safely assert that he is Aristotle”.50  
“An intricate philosophical system” is implied in one the most illustrious medieval 
images representing “the relation of the Liberal Arts to Philosophy and to one 
                                       
44 Perhaps, Alan found these attributes of Logic in some of his literary sources (see supra, fn. 
Sheridan). 
45 The three west portals, along with the bases of the bell towers did not burn in the 1194 fire, which 
destroyed almost the whole cathedral.  
46 “The earliest representations of the Liberal Arts are found on the façades of Chartres and Laon. 
This is not surprising, for in the Middle Ages few Schools were as famous as those of Chartres and 
Laon” (Mâle, Religious art, pp. 81-82). Later, the Liberal Arts were represented in many cathedrals, 
“twice at Auxerre”, at Sens, Rouen, Clermont-Ferrand, and Soissons: ibid., p. 83. 
47 A. Katzenellenbogen, The Sculptural Programs of Chartres Cathedral. Christ, Mary, Ecclesia, New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co., 1964, p. 16.  
48 Katzenellenbogen, The Sculptural Programs, p. 19. 
49 According to Verdier (Verdier, “L’iconographie”, p. 306), the circular arrangement of the scene 
translates in images the Neoplatonic idea of the gradual ascent to knowledge, which is found in 
Alcuin’s prologue to the De Grammatica and echoes some lines of the first book of Capella’s De Nuptiis. 
50 ibid. p. 88. 
25 
 
another”,51 which decorates Herrad of Landsberg’s Hortus Deliciarum (fig.12).52 
Philosophical concepts and biblical themes are shaped together into the illumination 
representing the allegory of Philosophy and the Liberal Arts, which betrays various 
sources of inspiration.53 The circular schematic organization of the scene, which 
recall to mind the rose windows of gothic cathedrals, has been paralleled to the 
“Newberry Diagram” by some scholars.54 In both diagrams, the focus of the 
composition is the female personification of Philosophy. The crowned lady55 is 
seated on throne at the center of two concentric circles. The philosophi Plato and 
Socrates, who are writing down their ideas,56 sit beneath her in the internal circle, 
while seven women, symbolizing the Liberal Arts, are placed in the in a heptagon 
arcade constituting the external circle. However, despite the similarities in shape 
that emerge at first glance, the structural setting of the Hortus Deliciarum results 
much more articulated than the scheme from Newberry. Furthermore, the 
                                       
51 Katzenellenbogen, “The Representation”, p. 49. 
52 The work, written between 1167 and 1185, is attributed to Herrad von Landsberg: R. Green – M. 
Evans – C. Bischoff – M. Curschmann, Herrad of Hohenbourg, Hortus deliciarum I. Commentary, Leiden 
1979, pp. 104-6, plate 33; II. Reconstruction, Leiden 1979, Abt. 117-124. 
53 For a more detailed analysis of the symbolic sense of the illumination see Tezmen-Siegel, Die 
Darstellungen; Katzenellenbogen, “The Representation”; F. J. Griffiths, The Garden of Delights: Reform 
and Renaissance for Women in the Twelfth Century, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 2007, 
ch. 6. 
54 Masi affirms that it is possible “to establish a real link between the two, perhaps through some 
unknown intermediary” (Masi, “A Newberry Diagram”, p. 54) and that the Newberry Diagram 
might be “the prototype of Herrad’s illustration” (ibid., p. 53). Masi’s hypothesis has been rejected by 
Griffiths, The Garden of Delights, pp. 151-152.  
55 “Herrad’s depiction of Philosophia, a secular figure, rather than Sapientia, a biblical one, is significant 
and reflects recent intellectual developments, as Katzenellenbogen comments: “It was, indeed, a bold 
step when about 1160 Philosophy took over the place of Wisdom”. Herrad’s Philosophia is shown as 
a queen enthroned; from her breast flow seven rivers, identified by an inscription to her right as the 
seven liberal arts, but also suggestive of the seven gifts of the spirit […] From her crown, three heads 
protrude, which are identified as ethica, logica and phisica” (Griffiths, The Garden of Delights, pp. 150-
151). 
56 As noticed by Verdier, Socrates and Plato accompany Philosophy at the center of the scene even in 
the bronze bowl found at Horst, and we find there the same word that are written in the circle 
surrounding Philosophy in the Hortus: “Septem per studia docet artes philosophia. Hec elementorum 
scrutatur et abdita rerum” (Verdier, “L’iconographie”, p. 311). Usually, Plato and Socrates flank only 
the personification of Philosophy; on Plato and the seven Liberal Arts, see D. Knipp, “Medieval 
Visual Images of Plato”, in S. Gersh – M.J.F.M. Hoenen, The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A 
Doxographic Approach, Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2002, pp. 373-413, esp. p. 377. In the 
illumination of Herrad’s writing, “at the bottom of the folio, outside the circles defined by Philosophia, 
four seated figures identified as poets and magicians are also shown at their desk. In contrast to Plato 
and Socrates, who, although not Christian, appear under the aegis of Philosophy, these men appear 
to derive inspiration from little black birds that are perched on their shoulders” (p. 149). The poeti and 
magi stand for those literary genres, such as poetry and fairy tales, which are not finalized at Christian 
knowledge. 
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personifications of the Seven Liberal Arts in Herrad’s illumination do not follow the 
“verbal instructions” contained in the “Newberry Diagram”: not the women with 
their individual attributes nor their mottoes coincide. As a case in point, consider 
Lady dialectic.  
The fashionable woman representing Dialectic, positioned in her own arch, departs 
from the (iconographic) type met so far. The tablets (or formulae) have passed into 
Rhetoric’s hands, from which Dialectic has borrowed the characteristic gesture of 
arguing.57 Her right hand, indeed, points, while the left hand bears the head of a 
barking dog. The arch inscription is meant to shed light on the obscure meaning of 
the caput canis by saying “argumenta sino concurrere more canino” (“I allow 
arguments to clash or to follow each other in the manner of a dog”). However, these 
words do not fully clarify the sense of the scene. As we have seen, the dog’s head 
appears also in the image of dialectic carved at Chartres. This similarity might 
signify that the dog had entered the iconographical tradition of the allegorical figure 
of Dialectic. But what connection does it have with this discipline? In visual arts, the 
dog carried various allegorical meanings, such as loyalty, sagacity and keenness.58 
In Bible commentaries from the early Christian period, this animal did not receive 
the positive connotations that Church Fathers and Medieval authors acknowledged 
to it in the following centuries. In his ninth homily on the Hexameron, Saint Basil had 
qualified the dog as “grateful and faithful in his friendship”, and had remarked that 
even though it does not posse reason, the dog is gifted with an instinct having “the 
power of reason”. That power enables the dog to learn “by nature the secret of 
elaborate inferences, which sages of the world, after long years of study, have hardly 
been able to disentangle”. When it hunts its quarry, the dog, “neglecting the false 
tracks, discovers the true one”,59 in virtue of this natural power, through which it 
                                       
57 The gesture of point was used also for personifications of rhetoric; it should express the act of 
debating; Dialectic is represented while pointing, perhaps engaged in a dialectical exchange, also on 
the west portal of Laon cathedral (dating 1210-1230), and on the cathedral of Freiburg i. B. On gestures 
signifying arguing see K. A. Wirth, “Die kolorierten Federzeichnungen im cod. 2975 der 
Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek. Ein Beitrag zur Ikonographie der Artes Liberales im 15. 
Jahrhundert”, in Anzeiger des Germanischen Nationalmuseums 1979, pp. 67-110. 
58 On this subject, see K. J. Höltgen, “Clever dogs and nimble spaniels: on the iconography of logic, 
invention and imagination”, in Explorations in Renaissance culture 24 (1998), pp. 1-36. 
59 Saint Basil, Exegetic Homilies, Engl. tr. by A. C. Way, Catholic University of America Press 1963, pp. 
138-139. This passage is analyzed by Höltgen, “Clever dogs”. 
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can produce a kind of reasoning. Even an author widely read in the Middle Ages as 
Isidore had reckoned the cleverness as peculiar to dog, which he considered by far 
the smarter animal.60 During the golden age of Scholastic “the dog became the 
attribute of the good prelate and preacher, and the members of the Ordo 
Praedicatorum, the Dominicans, gladly accepted the popular etymological 
interpretation of their name as Domini canes (Dogs of the Lord). No wonder that the 
pregnant mothers of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and St. Dominicus dreamt of giving 
birth to a dog […] Such appreciation of the dog was mainly due to the prestige of 
dialectic in the theologically-oriented culture of the Middle Ages”.61 In this 
perspective, and taking into account the widely accepted ambiguous notion of logic, 
the dog accompanying Dialectic can be considered the visual representation of logic, 
considered in its narrower sense, and of sophistry. And the motto more canino “like 
growling and barking (latratus), could be interpreted in malam partem as loud, 
aggressive, rude and sophistical but also in bonam partem as symbolizing the zealous 
and vigilant orator and preacher fighting valiantly for the truth in the duellum 
logicae”.62  
Visual representations constituted an essential component of the Der Welsche Gast. 
This didactical poem can be qualified as a Bilderkodex, therefore its illustrations are 
not mere decorations of the folios, but constitute a visual elucidation of the written 
text. Accordingly, they were part of the original program elaborated by Thomasin 
von Zirclaria, who should have singled out what kind of and in which places images 
had to be placed.63 Among the cycles that illuminate the great majority of the 
manuscripts preserving this writing, we find the cycles of the Seven Liberal Arts.64 
Despite the stylistic differences due to their diverse places and periods of origin, the 
manuscripts containing Thomas’ work share the same iconography of Dialectic 
                                       
60 Isidore of Sevilla, Etymologiae, XII.2.25, p. 253a. Höltgen mentions it (“Clever dogs”, p.2). 
61 Höltgen, “Clever dogs”, pp. 8-11. “The reappraisal continued through the age of Humanism when 
dogs in the portraits of humanist scholars and churchmen symbolize their faithful concern for the 
truth in secular and spiritual matters” (ibid., p. 11). 
62 K.A. Wirth, “Die kolorierten Federzeichnungen”, p. 73. 
63 Cf. M. Gibbs – W. McConnell, Der Welsche Gast (The Italian Guest), Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 
2009, “Introduction”, p. 6. 
64 It is the first conduct manual written in vernacular German, around in 1215-1216. It is preserved in 
24 manuscripts and the almost totality of the fifteen complete manuscripts, is largely illustrated. A 
detailed study of them is available on line http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/wgd/. 
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(fig.13-15). Her personification sits, more rarely stands, on the right side of the 
illumination, while Aristotle is right in front of her. They hold a square divided into 
four congruent triangles by two diagonals, whose elucidation is provided by the 
words written therein: “Omnis, nullus: contrarie. Contradictorie subalterne. 
Subcontrarie: quidam, quidam non. Contradictorie subalterne”. Any beginner 
student of logic of that time would have recognized it as the traditional Square of 
Opposition, which was often integrated in logical text such as Boethius’ writings. 
This diagram visually illustrates the doctrine of opposition, which was developed 
by Aristotle in the De interpretatione 6-7: it displays the principal types of logical 
relations (contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety, subalternation) holding among 
the four kinds of categorical proposition (universal affirmative, universal negative, 
particular affirmative, particular negative), which have the same subject and 
predicate but different quality and/or quantity.  
This representation of Dyalectica shares only the subjects with the images taken into 
account so far, namely Lady dialectic and Aristotle. Any attribute or symbol has 
disappeared and has left the room to a less allusive and rather technical element, the 
traditional Square of Opposition. This iconological modification hints at a notion of 
dialectic/logic, according to which it is no longer considered as the ambiguous 
discipline, which deals with both truth and its appearance, but as the science of logic 
properly said, which is concerned with rules for discovering truth. 
Some manuscripts, which were produced in Italy in the first half of the 14th century 
and containing various writings, testify to an established Italian iconographical 
tradition of the personification of dialectic, whose ancestor has been identified in an 
illumination prefacing the third book of Giovanni d’Andrea’s “Novella in libros 
Decretalium”, which was illuminated by Niccolò di Giacomo da Bologna or by some 
collaborator of him around the 1354 (fig.16). The iconographical program of the 
Virtues, Vice and the Liberal Arts implies a deeper philosophical and theological 
program. This allegory, indeed, visually represents the ways by which men can 
accomplish a gradual ascent to wisdom and spiritual perfection.  
The upper section of the “Novella”’s frontispiece reproduces the allegories of virtues 
and vices, while the liberal arts occupy the lower part. The second figure on the left, 
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under which sits a man engaged in writing (probably Zoroaster)65 represents Loicha. 
The young lady holds two snakes in her hands that symbolize the opponens and the 
respondens, as specified by the words written over their heads and between the 
necklace pendant, namely the head of a woman that might signify the ratio.66  
This iconography of dialectic bears resemblances with the allegorical figures that 
decorate some manuscripts containing Convenevole da Prato’s Regia Carmina 
(fig.17).67 Petrarch’s teacher conceived his poem as a Bilderkodex, accordingly it was 
probably Convenevole himself who selected the images that accompany and 
complete the text. Unlike Niccolò’s miniature, with which it partakes many 
elements, this personification of dialectic is supplemented by a title block. Its left 
part lists Aristotle’s logical writings compounding the vetus and nova logica, namely 
“Ysagoge, Cathegorie, Peri eremenias, Topica, Analetica”. It is linked to the left part 
through a stripe bearing the writing Silogismus. Its species are mentioned on the right 
side of the title block: the syllogism topicus, which pertains to dialectic properly said, 
then the demonstrativus, after which it is surprisingly placed the syllogism probabilis 
– which usually coincided with the topical or dialectical syllogism. The elencus and 
the paralogismus close this inventory. 
Ernst Saenger wrongly thought that the illuminations decorating the Regia Carmina 
preserved in the Viennese manuscript were related, perhaps inspired, not to 
                                       
65 On Zoroaster as magician see Verdier, “L’iconographie”, p. 311, fn. 15. 
66 The ratio should refer to Augustine’s de Ordine, in which it is said that dialectic “docet docere, haec 
docet discere, in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrate atque aperit quid sit, quid velit; scit scire; sola scientes 
facere non solum vult sed etiam potest” (De Ordine II.XIII.38, ed. by W.M. Green (Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina, vol. 29), Turnhout: Brepols, 1970, pp. 127.24-128.37). This passage is 
quoted verbatim by John of Salisbury, which in his Metalogicon connects it with Capella’s ending of 
the description of dialectic in which it is mentioned the twofold Cyllenian serpent. On the autoship 
of the miniature see D. Guernelli, “Ancora su Nicolò di Giacomo e Stefano degli Azzi”, in Strenna 
Storica Bolognese 65 (2015), pp. 273-283. On Niccolò di Giacomo see D. Guernelli, “Una Retorica per 
Nicolò di Giacomo. Tre nuove opere ed un punto su catalogo e cronologia”, in Strenna Storica 
Bolognese  63 (2013), pp. 229-250; F. Pasut, sub voce “Niccolò di Giacomo di Nascimbene”, in Dizionario 
biografico dei miniatori italiani. Secoli IX-XVI, ed. by M. Bollati, Milano, 2004, pp. 827-832. 
67 The Regia Carmina are transmitted by three manuscripts: the Florentine B.R. 38; the ms. 6.E.IX of 
the British Museum is the most ancient copy (1335-1340) and should be the exemplar donated to 
Robert d’Anjou; the later ms. Ser. Nov. 2638 is nowadays preserved at Vienna, Österreichische 
Nationalbibliothek. The three manuscripts were illuminated autonomously (the ms. 6.E.IX was 
decorated by Pacino di Bonaguida or Taddeo Gaddi’s school) on the basis of the iconographical 
program elaborated by Convenevole. The critical edition (Regia carmina, ed. by C. Grassi, Prato 1982) 
contains an analysis of the illuminations, which have been the subject of many studies, for instance 
G. Vaccaro, “Filologia del testo e filologia dell’immagine nei Regia carmina di Convenevole da 
Prato”, in Convenevole da Prato, Regia carmina: panegirico in onore di Roberto d’Angio. Commentario, 
Torino: UTET, 2004, pp. 20-38. 
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Convenevole’s poem, but rather to another writing, La canzone delle Virtù e delle 
Scienze, which was added at the end of the Viennese manuscript.68 The song of Virtues 
and Sciences was composed as an illuminated poem by the scribe Bartolomeo di 
Bartoli for Bruzio Visconti around the 1349.69 In the miniature of the allegorical 
figure of dialectic, which illuminates the most famous manuscript containing the The 
Song, namely the Condée manuscript (fig.18), neither the kinds of syllogisms nor 
Aristotle’s logical writings are present. The anonymous illuminator only mentions 
the three parts of logic, namely “probabilis, demonstrativa, sophistica”. 
Bartolomeo’s Canzone was thought of as a Bilderkodex, and the words accompanying 
the visual representation of dialectic clarify the sense of the image.70   
An interesting variation in the iconographical tradition of the allegorical figure 
of dialectic is found in a German manuscript containing the didactic poem on the 
Virgin Mary and the arts, the Der meide kranz, written by Heinrich von Mügeln 
around 1355 (fig.19). In the Seven Liberal Art cycle of illuminations, all the 
personifications of the Arts are portrayed as crowned ladies. The “pale and thin” 
women representing loyca can be easily identified since “her right hand carried a 
dove, a serpent twisted through her left one”:71 the serpent as attribute of the Lady 
was codified in the widespread medieval iconology of dialectic. Her other personal 
symbol, the dove resting on her right hand, deviates from the established tradition 
met thus far. In the written description of loica, Thomas puts in her mouth some 
words that portray her peculiarities:  
 
In all discourse I know what is true and false. I deceive, but no-one deceives me. 
I am responsible for many new discoveries as to how one should formulate 
                                       
68 E. Saenger, “Das Lobgedicht auf König Robert von Anjou. Ein Beitrag zur Kunst- und 
Geistesgeschichte des Trecento”, in Jahrbuch der kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien 84 (1988), pp. 
7-91, here p. 73. 
69 The most famous manuscript containing it is nowadays at Chantilly, Musée Condé, Codice Ital. 
1426: see L. Dorez, La canzone delle virtv e delle scienze di Bartolomeo di Bartoli da Bologna, testo inedito del 
secolo XV tratto dal ms. originale del Museo Condé, Bergamo: Istituto Italiano d’Arti Grafiche Editore, 
1904; G. Orlandelli, sub voce “Bartoli, Bartolomeo de’”, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Istituto 
dell'Enciclopedia italiana, Fondazione Treccani: Roma 1964, vol. 6, pp. 559-60; P. Stirnemann, 
“Bartolomeo di Bartoli: La canzone delle virtù e delle scienze”, in Enluminure Italienne: Chefs d'œuvre 
du Musée Condé, Chantilly: Somogy Éditions D’Art, 2000, pp. 12-17. 
70 Dorez, La canzone, p. 39, and Dorez’s commentary, p. 38 and pp. 63-64. 
71 A. M. Volfing, Heinrich von Mügeln: ‘Der meide kranz’. A Commentary, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997, 
pp. 73, 223-224. 
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judgments against the counterflow of feeble claims; and that one argument must 
follow from another, according to the straight aim of the wise heart […] My track 
leads to the paths of all the arts. I can dispute about the origins of every kind of 
art […] I am an art of reason /of speech [ich bin ein kunst der redlichkeit], which 
cuts out childish folly.72 
 
The substitution of the old themes, such as the formulae, the flower or the second 
serpent, with the dove, is due to the influence of a different literary source, namely 
the Compendium Anticlaudiani – a widely read shortened version of Alan’s writing 
produced in some Austrian or Low German Cistercians monastery in the mid-13th 
century. Despite the title, whilst depicting Dyalectica, the anonymous author did not 
slavishly follow in the footsteps of Alan. Even though the Lady whom he describes 
still has a pale, scrawny face, nevertheless the snake prevails over the scorpion and 
the flower in her right hand has been replaced by a white dove. This imagery of logic 
echoes the words of Jesus in the gospel of Matthew, where he cautions the twelve 
Apostles to be shrewd as snakes and innocent as doves.73 But whilst the biblical 
animals were allegorical images of the Holy Spirit and Satan, in the logical context 
of the Compendium they symbolize the “veritas et falsitas” that can be discerned 
through dialectic: “Dyalectica […] docet discernere inter veritatem et falsitatem {vel} 
quasi diceret: “estote prudentes sicut serpentes, ut a nulla falsitate possitis decipi, et 
simpli<ces> sicut col<umbe>, ut simplicitatem veritatis sectantes nullum decipere 
studeatis”.74 
                                       
72 Volfing, Heinrich, pp. 73-74, 224 and 250, 259. In the following sections she continues: “How noun-
words are meaningful according to the will [of men]: see how a circle signifies wine and is 
nevertheless completely different from wine in the barrel. My teaching is said to be about the 
universal: [about] a thing in the soul, the predictability of which extends to many things which differ 
in number and species. Take note of my example. When I ask you, what is a ram, a man, a bull, a fish, 
you reply: an animal. As a genus, the term animal must be predicable of them all, in common, in 
accordance with their properties and differences. The lesson guides you towards the doctrine of the 
universal. The ass is irrational/incapable of speech, [while] Lord Friedrich possesses the opposite 
quality. [Lord Friedrich is] entirely capable of laughing and his hair [is] curly. The bull has the 
property of bellowing white and black I call accidents. The fool pokes fun at this. This existence of 
these five and the knowledge of them are worked into the soul by reason. They are not outside the 
souls, as the folly of the old master claims” (pp. 73-74, 232, 243, 250). 
73 Mt. 10,16. 
74 P. Ochsenbein, “Das Compendium Anticlaudiani. Eine neu entdeckte Vorlage Heinrichs von 
Neustadt”, in Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur 98 (1969), pp. 80-109, esp. p. 101, 
166-172. 
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A rather unusual representation of dialectic decorates the first folio of a 
miscellaneous 15th century manuscript, which opens with miniatures, as well as 
Latin and Old German verses on De septem artibus liberalibus (fig.20).75 In this 
illumination, indeed, dialectic/logic is not represented as a lady, but as a fantastical 
creature with the body of a human and the head of a dog (less likely a wolf) – which 
evokes the decoration of the Hortus deliciarum. The “cynocephalic Loyca”, which 
gesticulates whilst disputing with a young man, affirms the conclusion as she herself 
says, “consecutiva [or conclusiva] tenet” – which is instead refused by the cleric 
(“nego consecutivam [or conclusivam]”). Behind a young man, who points at the 
opponens, stands a crowned ass, symbolizing the theologian who is not educated in 
logic, as it is specified in the banderole: “est sine loyca theologus quasi coronatus 
asinus”. Indeed as well known, logic in the Middle Ages was considered not only a 
science concerned with human reasoning, but also an art, an instrument useful for 
other disciplines, such as philosophy and theology. Yet this image puts on the 
foreground a further aspect of logic, more precisely of dialectic, namely the dialogue 
or dispute, which evolved into a codified methodological procedure in academic 
context.  
From the beginning of 12th century, the dispute in form of questions had become the 
most important teaching method in both the ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ faculties of 
European Universities. Professors elucidated the texts read in classrooms through 
the quaestio method, by confronting and resolving the conflicting opinions of the 
auctoritates on various issues that were more or less related to the textbook. 
Gradually, the quaestio gained its autonomous status in the curricula studiorum and 
played a prominent role in the (intellectual) training of students who, along with 
their masters, were required to participate in both classroom and public disputes, as 
prescribed by Universitiy statutes.76 A representation of an academic disputation 
illuminates the first letter of the opening word of Boethius’ translation of the Topics, 
                                       
75  Wirth, “Die kolorierten Federzeichnungen”; Stolz, Artes-liberales-Zyklen. 
76 On the scholastic method see M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 voll., 
Freiburg i. B.: Herder 1909; on the quaestio method see B. C. Bazàn – J. F. Wippel – G. Fransen – D. 
Jacquart, Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de  
medicine, Turnhout: Brepols, 1985; B. Lawn, The rise and decline of the scholastic Quaestio disputata: with 
special emphasis on its use in the teaching of medicine and science, Leiden – New York – Köln: Brill, 1993. 
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preserved in a manuscript produced in Paris in the 13th century (fig.21).77 The 
arguers engaged in the discussion point to each other. This gesture, as we have seen, 
characterizes also some of the personification of Dialectic. The emergence of the 
theme of the scholastic dispute in the iconographical tradition of dialectic could be 
related not to the appearance of new literal sources, but rather to the indirect 
influence of the academic life on the visual arts.  
The analysis of the tradition of the iconography of dialectic/logic unveils further 
indirect sources of inspiration. Indeed, at times some ideas and concepts, present in 
logical writings used as University manuals, converge in visual representations. 
And, perhaps, classroom teaching reproduced ideas present in visual 
representations.  A summa of all the key notions of Aristotelian and scholastic logic 
is the woodcut illustrating the “Typus Logice” prefacing the second book of Gregor 
Reisch’s Margarita Philosophica, which was probably conceived as a didactic tool for 
easily memorizing basic logical concepts (fig.22). 
In this allegory, Logic is portrayed while chasing the prey, Problema. Two 
bloodhounds help her in her hunting; Veritas closely follows the hare, whilst Falsitas 
is distracted by a trunk. Clearly, the retrievers symbolize the ambiguous status of 
logic as a discipline concerned with the discernment of truth and falsehood on the 
one hand, and with sophistical and eristic argumentations on the other hand. Yet, 
the two dogs might take on a further, less obvious allegorical overtone, and 
symbolize the natural logic, namely the innate and imperfect capability to reason 
that is perfected through artificial logic, which provides men with a set of rules and 
argumentative techniques.78 Indeed, some 15th century authors acknowledged this 
natural ability not only in human beings, but also in animals, and especially to the 
smartest animal, the dog. From the horn (sonus vox) that the lady plays, exit two 
flowers, representing the praemissae of the argument, whose conclusio is found on her 
chest next to an animal that looks like a scorpion. Even the woman’s hunting 
                                       
77 Oxford, Balliol College Library, ms. 253, f. 92r, Paris 13th century (see infra ch. 5). It is significant 
that among Aristotle’s logical writings contained in the ms., only the illuminated initial of the Topics 
represents a dispute. 
78 On the natural and artificial logic see M. J. F. M. Hoenen, “From Natural Thinking to Scientific 
Reasoning: Concepts of Logica Naturalis and Logica Artificialis in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern 
Thought”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 52 (2010), pp. 81-116. 
34 
 
clothing and gear symbolize logical notions. The upper part of her boots represents 
the praedicabilia and praedicamenta, whereas the soles signify the two main species of 
sophisms, namely the fallacies in dictione and extra dictionem. The long knife, 
syllogismus, hangs off her belt. From the bow, quaestio, the huntress can fire the 
arrows – argumenta, which are placed in the quiver-locus. This visual of the lady’s 
hunting equipment is highly reminiscent of the beginning of the fifth treatise of the 
Summulae Logicales, in which Peter of Spain explains that dubious propositions, 
otherwise called questions, should be proven through the argument, whose 
probative force is supplied by the topic: the locus, indeed, is the foundation of an 
argument.79 
In her hunt, Logic leaves behind her the ‘rock of Parmenides’. This allusion to the 
myth that traces back the origin of dialectic to Parmenides –  who invented this 
discipline while dwelling on “a rock in Egypt for fifteen years”80 – refers to the 
developments achieved by this discipline. The huntress carefully eludes the perils 
that pave her path to the pray, passing aside the bramble of insolubilia and the sylva 
opinionum, which visually express the forest of philosophical opinions held by the 
main schools of thought, such as Albertists, Scotists, Ockhamists and Thomists.  
The various changes that the representional tradition of Dialectic underwent 
during the 16th century, can be better seen by drawing a parallel between the images 
and the related descriptions of Dialectic and Logic found in Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia 
(fig.23), the “summa of iconography which, drawing from classical and mediaeval as 
well as contemporary sources, has rightly been called “the key of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century allegory””81. 
The woodcut of Dialectic provided by Ripa does not include any of the elements 
traditionally established as her identifying attributes. And this fact is confirmed by 
the short but precise description of the image: “Donna giovane che porti un elmo in 
                                       
79 “Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem […] Quaestio est dubitabilis propositio […] 
Argumentum autem per locum confirmatur […] est enim locus sedes argumenti vel illud unde ad 
propositam quaestionem conveniens trahitur argumentum” (Peter of Spain, Tractatus, tr. V. 2 and 4, 
pp. 55 and 58). 
80 Hugh of St. Victor, The Didascalicon, 3.14, pp. 97-98. 
81 E. Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts, p. 163. Ripa’s Iconologia was printed several times during 
the 16th and 17th century. The images presented here are taken from the French edition: Iconologie ou 
explication nouvelle de plusieurs images, emblemes, et autres figures hyerogliphiques des Vertus, des Vices, des 
Arts, des Sciences, des Causes naturelles, des Humeurs differents, et des Passions humaines, Paris 1643. 
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capo con due penne, l’una bianca e l’altra nera et per cimiero una Luna et con un 
stocco nella man dritta, che d’ambedue le parti punga e tagli, pigliandosi con la 
mano in mezzo fra l’una e l’altra ponta tenga le due prime dita della mano manca 
alte et stese stando in peidi con prontezza e ardire”.82 The symbols that usually 
appear in the iconography of Dialectic, reappear all together in relation to Logic in 
Ripa’s Iconologia. Amongst the three written portrayals of Logic found in the 
Iconologia, the third one pairs with imagery. Logic is depicted as a young lady, “nella 
mano destra tiene un mazzo di fiori, con un motto sopra, che dichi verum, e falsum, 
e nella sinistra un Serpente. Questa donna è pallida, perché il molto vegliare, e il 
grande studio, che intorno ad essa è necessario, è ordinariamente cagione di 
pallidezza, e indisposizione della vita […] I fiori sono segno, che per industria di 
questa professione si vede il vero apparire, e il falso rimanere oppresso, come per 
opra della natura dall’herba nascono i fori, che poi la ricoprono. Il Serpente c’insegna 
la Prudenza, necessarissima a questa professione, come a tutte l’altre, non si 
affaticando in altro l’humana industria, che in distiguere dal falso il vero et, secondo 
quella distintione, saper poi operare con proportionata conformità al vero 
conosciuto, e amato. Scopre ancora il Serpente, che la Logica è stimata velenosa 
materia, e inaccessibile a chi non ha grande ingegno, e è amata a chi la gusta, e 
morde, e uccide quelli, che con temerità le si oppongono”.83 
Since late antiquity, the ambivalent notion of logic, which accounted for the 
interchangeability between the terms logic and dialectic, was reflected in the 
iconography of Dialectic, one of the seven Liberal Arts. In the Iconologia, this 
ambiguity is resolved and the types of Dialectic and Logic acquire an iconographical 
autonomy.  
From this quick overview on some visuals, the iconography of dialectic seems 
to have originated from the interplay of various sources, whose differences lie in 
minor details. Religious and didactical writings, like the Bible, the De Nuptiis and 
the Anticlaudianus, directly and indirectly pervaded artists’ imaginations, providing 
them with manifold subjects. Unlike many classical iconographical subjects and 
                                       
82 Cesare Ripa, Iconologia overo descrittione dell’imagini universali cavate dall’antichità et da altri luoghi da 
Cesare Ripa Perugino, Romae: appresso Lepido Facii,1593, p. 103. 
83 Ibid., pp. 293-4. 
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motifs, the humanist recovery of the classical tradition did not provoke any 
significant shift or abrupt break in the iconography of Dialectic. Indeed the newly 
available literary and visual sources did not affect the type of Dialectic. The main 
characteristic of the representations of dialectic/logic remained, despite some 
changes due to new stylistic and ‘material’ trends. The scene, indeed, often migrated 
from the parchment of the manuscripts, and the stone blocks and windows of 
cathedrals, to the plaster of the frescos decorating private and public rooms, and to 
the bronze tombs of princes and popes. Consequently, the actors on scene, often 
clothed in marvelous Renaissance dresses, were portrayed as more expressive. 
Probably, a more momentous step in the evolution of the iconology of Dialectic was 
the preceding Medieval rediscovery of some of the Aristotelian logical writings, 
which appears to have influenced visual arts in oblique ways, and perhaps 
unconsciously. Aristotle’s Organon conveyed and ratified an association of ideas 
between dialectic and other parts of logic, which were translated into images and 
entered in the traditional type of Dialectic/Logic. More generally, then, the teaching 
activity of Medieval Universities integrated the traditional representations of 
Dialectic and supplied it with new themes.  
It is thus now the moment for us to enquire further into these unfamiliar indirect 
sources. 
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Chapter Two. Dialectic in the Middle Ages. Before and after the 
recovery of Aristotle’s Topics. 
 
2.1 “Della dialettica come dell’essere, πολλαχῶς λέγεται”.84 
 
2.1.1 “Being is said in many ways”, claims Aristotle.85 And we can add, 
paraphrasing his words, that ‘dialectic’ too is said in many ways. Within the history 
of Western philosophy, the term ‘dialectic’ has been used in numerous senses which 
seem to not be reducible to a unifying or primary sense,86 or more correctly, to a rich 
primary sense. If we scrutinize all the various meanings enjoyed by the term 
‘dialectic’ during various epochs – from Zeno of Elea, Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle 
to Pavel Florenskij, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean Paul Sartre and Theodor W. Adorno 
–, we might discover a unifying notion capable of capturing some common features 
of ‘dialectic’. But it will result too vague to be used as historiographical category. 
                                       
84 I. Mancini, “De Profundis per la dialettica”, in Id., Frammento su Dio, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2000, pp. 
63-121, here p. 70. 
85 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.1, 1028a10. 
86 Mancini (see fn. 84) offers a theoretical distinction between the various senses of dialectic. An 
historical overview on the various meanings of dialectic is found in an old article by Nicola 
Abbagnano, “Quattro concetti di dialettica”, in Rivista di Filosofia 49/2 (1958), pp. 123-133, reprinted 
in AAVV, Studi sulla dialettica, Torino: Taylor, 1969. In addition, on dialectic in general see AAVV, 
Aspects de la dialectique, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1956; R. Franchini, Le origini della 
dialettica, Napoli: Giannini, 1962; L. Sichirollo, Dialettica, Milano: Istituto Editoriale Internazionale, 
1973. On Late Antiquity, Medieval and pre-Humanistic dialectic see: E. Garin, “La dialettica dal 
secolo XII ai principi dell’età moderna”, in Rivista di Filosofia 99/2 (1958), pp. 228-253 (reprinted in 
L’età nuova. Ricerche di storia della cultura dal XII al XVI secolo, Napoli: Morano Editore, 1969, pp. 43-
79; I will refer to this edition); J. A. Weisheipl, “Classification of the sciences in medieval thought”, in 
Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965), pp. 54-90; G. D’Onofrio, «Fons scientiae». La dialettica nell'Occidente tardo-
antico, Napoli: Liguori, 1986; I. Hadot, Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique. Contribution à 
l’histoire de l’éducation et de la culture dans l’Antiquité, Paris: Vrin, 20052, esp. chs. 4-6; H.-U. Wöhler, 
Dialektik in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006; M. Spranzi, The Art of 
Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric: The Aristotelian Tradition, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011. 
On the debated question about the nature of medieval logic see P. V. Spade, “Why Don’t Mediaeval 
Logicians Ever Tell Us What They’re Doing? Or, What Is This, A Conspiracy?” (2000), available on 
line: http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Conspiracy.pdf; Id., “Thoughts, words, and things. An 
introduction to late medieval logic and semantic theory (2007)” available on line: 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf, esp. pp. 2-3; L. 
Cesalli, “What is medieval logic after all? Towards a scientific use of natural language”, in Bulletin de 
Philosophie Médiévale 52 (2010), pp. 49–53; Id., “Postscript. Medieval Logic as Sprachphilosophie”, in 
Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 52 (2010), pp. 117–132. 
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Within the boundaries assigned to the present inquiry about medieval, 
prehumanistic dialectic, it will suffice to restrict the examination to the different 
“significance of the employment of this designation of a science or art among the 
ancient”87 and to outline the intellectual frameworks underlying these significations 
in order to understand them fully. This chronological delimitation will allow us to 
investigate thinking on ‘dialectic’ rather than dialectical thinking. Moreover, it will 
justify us for disregarding one of the most important and influential notions of 
dialectic, namely the Hegelian one. Indeed, Hegel’s logical-methodological and 
metaphysical category of dialectic, along with 19th and 20th century ideas about 
dialectic, will be immaterial to the present context.  
 
If we want to understand the polysemanticity of the term ‘dialectic’ in the 
Middle Ages, we should preliminarily take a brief step back to ancient Greece, where 
we find the foundation of dialectic, and then to Late Antiquity. Thus, by considering 
the origin and early development of the notion of ‘dialectic’ from the perspective of 
the history of philosophy,88 we will disclose the way in which the problematic 
concept of dialectic showed up in Medieval times.  
During the Classic and Hellenistic periods, the term ‘dialectic’ assumed at least three 
different senses, which derived from three diverse philosophical traditions, namely 
1) the Platonic, 2) the Aristotelian and 3) the Stoic.  
                                       
87 “General logic, as putative organon, is called dialectic. As different as the significance of the 
employment of this designation of a science or art among the ancients may have been, one can still 
infer from their actual use of it that among them it was nothing other than a logic of illusion – a 
sophistical art for giving to its ignorance, indeed even to its intentional tricks, the air of truth, by 
imitating the method of thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the 
embellishment of every bempty pretentions” (I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by P. Guyer-A. W. 
Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 2nd part Transcendental Logic, Introduction, 
III,  A61, B85-85, p. 198; emphasis is added). 
88 The notion of ‘dialectic’ will be treated as objectively as possible, namely within the Medieval 
intellectual framework and as the authors presented it in their texts (I will consider only logical 
writings, leaving aside theological, rhetorical and grammatical works). This is in the hope of avoiding 
the imposition of philosophical categories that are far from an author’s thought, if not completely 
anachronistic. Following in the footsteps of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (esp. vol. 2), 
some 19th and 20th century authors have proposed a history of dialectic that covers the period from 
Zeno of Elea to Hegel. From their philosophical, rather than historic viewpoint, the history of the idea 
of dialectic consists in the recognition of the progressive stages in the development of the doctrine of 
the coincidentia oppositorum, whose apogee or full realization they considered to be Hegelian dialectic. 
Examples of this trend can be found in Benedetto Croce (Saggio sullo Hegel, Bari: Laterza, 1913, ch. 2 
“Chiarimenti circa la storia della dialettica”, pp. 25-36) and in Franchini (Le origini, esp. chs. 2-7). 
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1) Plato’s dialogical dialectic as philosophical method for searching truth.  
In many of his works, Plato displayed a dialogical notion of dialectic. According to 
him, dialectic was the philosophical method of inquiry par excellence and it was 
characterized by two complementary features. Firstly, dialectic intended to perceive 
and bring “together in one idea the scattered particulars” and to make “clear by 
definition the particular thing” that were to be explained. Secondly, dialectic aimed 
at “dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are”.89 Medieval 
authors were not acquainted with the Platonic dialogues and, accordingly, with the 
dialogical dialectic exhibited therein. At the most, they knew Plato’s dialectic 
indirectly and bereft of its ontological overtones through the writings of authors 
such as Cicero, Saint Augustine, Isidore of Sevilla90 and Boethius. Accordingly, the 
Platonic view of dialectic as the philosophical method actualized through the 
synagōgē and diairesis can be dismissed as non momentous to the present inquiry.  
 
2) Aristotle’s dialectical art as the ‘logica probabilium’ (logic of probable): dialectic 
is the art of debating starting from probable premises.91  
The opening lines of Aristotle’s Rhetoric describe dialectic, whose ‘counterpart’ is 
rhetoric, as the argumentative procedure which starts from the κοινά, namely what 
is “in a certain way common to everyone to know”, and which is employed in 
ordinary discussions or conversations by people: “All men”, claimed the Stagirite, 
“attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to 
attack others”. This dialectical exchange, Aristotle continued, could be led either 
                                       
89 Plato, Phaedrus 265d-e. 
90 Probably relying on St. Augustine [De Civitate Dei contra Paganos, VIII.4], Isidore ascribed the Stoic 
bipartition of logic into dialectic and rhetoric to Plato. Isidore proposed the tripartite division of 
philosophy into physics (naturalis), ethics (moralis) and logic. Logic, “quae rationalis vocatur, Plato 
subiunxit, per quam, discussis rerum morumque causis, vim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus est, 
dividens eam in Dialecticam et Rhetoricam” (Isidorus Hispalensis, Etymologiarum, II.24.3-8, here 7). 
Iwakuma has pointed out that “none of the medieval texts [he has] worked with calls this division 
Platonic” (see Y. Iwakuma, “The Division of Philosophy and the Place of the Trivium From the 9th 
to the mid-12th Centuries”, in S. Ebbesen – R. L. Friedman, Medieval Analyses in Language and 
Cognition, Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 1999, pp. 165-189, here p. 
166, fn. 3). After having exposed the tripartite schema, Isidore proposed the alternative bipartite 
Aristotelian subdivision of philosophy into a theoretical and a practical part, which he might have 
borrowed from Cassiodorus’ Institutiones, II.3.4 (Isidorus Hispalensis, Etymologiarum, II.24.10-16). 
91 I will not enter into the vexata quaestio of whether Aristotle’s dialectic can be considered as ‘strong’ 
or ‘weak’. 
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‘spontaneously’, as with the majority of people, or “through practice and from 
acquired habit”. Dialectical reasoning in general, he added, “can plainly be handled 
systematically” and “such an inquiry is the function of an art (τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι)”, 
namely of dialectic.92  
In the Sophistical Refutations, which in the past, and partly nowadays too, has been 
considered the ninth book of the Topics, Aristotle made similar claims while 
expanding upon dialectic, especially on ‘peirastic’ or the art of examination. In this 
context, the Stagirite affirmed that starting from the general principles or notions 
(the κοινά), even unlearned and common people were able to use dialectic and 
peirastic “for all undertake to some extent a test of those who profess to know things 
[…] and are engaged in refutation”. Unlike the ‘amateurs’, however, the 
‘dialectician’ reasoned and examined “by the help of a theory of deduction”,93 
namely according to dialectical rules. “After assuming that something does or does 
not belong to something”,94 the dialectician started arguing through deduction, 
                                       
92 “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things (κοινὰ ) as come, 
more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men 
make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to 
maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. The majority does this either 
spontaneously, while others through practice and from acquired habit 
(τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰσυνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως). Both ways being 
possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why 
some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously (ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου); and 
everyone will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.11, 
1354a1-11, in Aristotle, Complete Works, ed. by J. Barnes, 2 vols, vol. 2, p. 2152; I modified some lines 
of the English translation). 
10 “Dialectic, on the other hand, does proceed by questioning, whereas if it were concerned to prove 
things, it would have refrained from putting questions, even if not about everything, at least about 
the primitives and the appropriate principles […] Dialectic is at the same time a mode of examination 
as well. For the art of examination is not an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry, but one 
which a man may possess, even though he has not knowledge. For it is possible even for one without 
knowledge to hold an examination of one who is without knowledge, if the latter grants him points 
taken not from things that he knows or from the proper principles but from the consequences which 
a man may know without knowing the art in question (but which if he does not know, he is bound 
to be ignorant of the art) […] Hence everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of 
dialectic and the practice of examining; for all undertake to some extent a test of those who profess 
to know things. What serves them here is the general principles (κοινά); for they know these 
themselves just as well as the scientist, even if in what they say they seem to go wildly astray. All, 
then, are engaged in refutation; for they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic 
is concerned professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of 
deduction” (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 11, 172a17-35, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 292). 
94 “A demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectical one, because a demonstrative proposition 
is the assumption of one of the two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his 
premiss, but lays it down), whereas a dialectical proposition choice between two contradictories” 
(Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I.1, 24a21-27, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 39). 
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likewise the demonstrator did. But while the dialectician proceeded “by putting 
questions”,95 “the demonstrator d[id] not ask for his premiss, but la[id] it down”.96 
From the previous passages, dialectic emerged as the intersubjective art of debating 
starting from the κοινά, namely from what is “in a certain way common to everyone 
to know”. The vague notion of κοινά, which functioned as starting points of 
dialectical arguments, might be elucidated within the framework of Aristotle’s 
Topics, which is considered the Aristotelian writing devoted to dialectic.97 At the 
beginning of this treatise, the Stagirite stated that dialectical deductions reasoned 
from ἔνδοξα, which therefore seemed to amount to the κοινά. And he explained that 
the ἔνδοξα or ‘reputable opinions’ are those opinions “which are accepted by 
everyone or by the majority or by the wise – i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the 
most notable and reputable of them”.98 And, moreover, Aristotle strictly entangled 
dialectical reasoning with the topics, though in a somewhat obscure way.  
We will expand upon these points in the following chapters. What is relevant at this 
stage is: on the one hand, the Aristotelian demarcation of demonstration and 
dialectic, the latter of which he considered an art (τέχνη); on the other hand, the link 
established between dialectical art, topics and probability.  
 
                                       
95 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 11, 172a35. 
96 Ibid. 
97 On Aristotle’s dialectic, the secondary literature is vast. See at least: G. E. L. Owen, “Tithenai Ta 
Phainomena”, in S. Mansion, Aristote et les problèmes de méthode: communications présentées au 
Symposium Aristotelicum tenu à Louvain du 24 août au Ier septembre 1960, Louvain: Publications 
Universitaires de Louvain, 1961, pp. 83-103; Id., Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics. Proceedings of the Third 
Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; J. Brunschwig, “Dialectique et ontologie 
chez Aristote”, in Revue Philosophique 89 (1964), pp. 179-200; T. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; J. Barnes, “Philosophie et dialectique”, in  M.A. Sinaceur, “Penser 
avec Aristote”, Toulouse: Erès, 1991, pp. 107-116; J. Brunschwig, “Dialectique et philosophie chez 
Aristote, à nouveau”, in N. Cordero, Ontologie et dialogue. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Aubenque, 
Paris: Vrin, pp. 107-130; M. Sym, From Puzzles to Principles? Essays on Aristotle’s Dialectic, Lanham – 
Bouder – New York – Oxford: Lexington Books, 1999; on the Topics and its content see W. A. De Pater, 
Les Topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne. La méthodologie de la définition, Fribourg: St. Paul, 
1965; J. Brunschwig, “Introduction”, in Aristote, Les Topiques, livres I-IV, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967; 
Id., “Introduction”, in Aristote, Les Topiques, livres V-VIII, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007; Aristotle, 
Topics Books I & VIII. With excerpts from related texts, ed. by R. Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997;  P. Slomkowski, Aristotle’s Topics,  Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1997. 
98 Aristotle, Topics, I.1, 100a30-b24, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, pp. 167-8. 
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3) Stoics: dialectic is the science that enables “to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood”.99  
In his Lives of Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius sketched the Stoic tripartition of 
philosophy, in which logic occupied a place next to physics and ethics. Within the 
domain of logic fell elements of speech, mental impressions and laws of reasoning – 
subjects that nowadays pertain not only to logic, but also to other disciplines such 
as grammar, semantics, philosophy of language, epistemology, and rhetoric. The 
Stoics usually subdivided logic “into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic”. 
Rhetoric, “the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative”, 
contributed to “the invention of arguments, their expression in words, their 
arrangement, and delivery”. Whilst dialectic was deemed to enable the wise “to 
distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely 
plausible and what is ambiguously expressed” and to “methodically put questions 
and give answers”.100 From the Stoic perspective, therefore, insofar as it was part of 
philosophy, dialectic was a science, and not an art, and it was coextensive with logic 
in the modern sense. 
 
2.1.2 In Ancient times, the Stoic notion of dialectic, which equated dialectic with 
logic, appeared to predominate, whilst the Aristotelian idea of dialectic as the logic 
of probability, along with the related doctrine of the topics, did not receive full 
appreciation and attention.101 The first words of Cicero’s Topica offer us a testimony 
of the oblivion into which the homonymous Aristotelian treatise had fallen and of 
                                       
99 The secondary literature devoted to Stoic Logic is conspicuous, among the many contributors 
figure: B. Mates, Stoic Logic, Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961; M. Frede, Die 
stoische Logik, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprech, 1974; A. Speca, Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic 
Logic, Leiden – Boston – Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001; cf. also J.-B. Gourinat, “La postérité de la classification 
aristotélicienne des syllogismes”, in J. Brumberg-Chaumont, Ad notitiam ignoti, pp. 63-115. 
100 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, VII.1, 42-47, Eng. tr. By R. D. Hicks, Cambridge (Mass).: 
Harvard University Press, 1925, 2 vols, vol. 2, p. 157. 
101 On the development of the topics in Ancient times see E. Stump, Dialectic and its Place in the 
Development of Medieval Logic, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 58-66; Green-
Pedersen, The Tradition; S. Ebbesen, “The Theory of ‘loci’ in Antiquity and the Middle Ages”, in K. 
Jacobi, Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regelen 
korrekten Folgerns, Leiden: Brill, 1993, pp. 15-39; K. Hülser, “The topical syllogism and Stoic logic”, in 
J. Biard – F. Mariani Zini, Les lieux de l’argumentation. Histoire du syllogisme topique d’Aristote à Leibniz, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 2009, pp. 93-118; S. Rubinelli, Ars Topica. The Classical Technique of Constructing 
Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. 
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how topical argumentation had migrated from the philosophical to the rhetorical 
camp. Neither orators nor philosophers of his time, complained the Arpinate, were 
acquainted with “certain Topics of Aristotle” in which were “contained a system 
developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments (disciplinam inveniendorum 
argumentorum) so that we might come upon them by a rational system without 
wandering about”.102 Even more interesting are the subsequent lines, which reveal 
the high level of complexity that the notion of dialectic had reached in the mid-1st 
century BC. At that time, the ratio disserendi, as Cicero called logic, comprised two 
parts, “one concerned with invention of arguments (inveniendi) and the other with 
judgement of their validity (iudicandi)”. Aristotle cultivated both. The Stoics instead 
“followed diligently the ways of judgement (iudicandi vias) by means of the science 
(scientia) which they called διαλεκτική (dialectic), but they totally neglected the art 
(artem inveniendi) which is called τοπική (topics)”.103 These lines bear testimony to 
the semantic slipping of the term ‘dialectic’ and to the changes that the notion of 
dialectic had undergone from Aristotle to Cicero. According to the Stagirite, indeed, 
the adjective ‘διαλεκτική’ implied the noun ‘τέχνη’ for it referred to the art concerned 
with the production (or invention) of dialectical arguments through the topics. In 
contrast, at Cicero’s time dialectic was the science concerned with the judgement of 
                                       
102 “You [scil. Caius Trebatius] will remember that when we were together in my Tusculan villa and 
were sitting in the library, each of us according to his fancy unrolling the volumes which he wished, 
you hit upon certain Topics of Aristotle which were expounded by him in several books (incidisti in 
Aristotelis topica quaedam, quae sunt ab illo pluribus libris explicata). Excited by the title, you 
immediately asked me what the subject of the work was. And when I had made clear to you that 
these books contained a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might 
come upon them by a rational system without wandering about (disciplinam inveniendorum 
argumentorum, ut sine ullo errore ad ea ratione et via perveniremus), you begged me to teach you 
the subject […] I urged you to read the books yourself, or acquire the whole system (totam rationem) 
from a very learned teacher of oratory whom I named. You had tried both, as you told me. But you 
were repelled from reading the books by their obscurity (sed a libris te obscuritas reiecit); and that 
great teacher replied that he was not acquainted with these works, which are, as I think, by Aristotle. 
I am not indeed astonished in the slightest degree that the philosopher (eum philosophum) was 
unknown to the teacher of oratory, for he is ignored by all except a few of the professed philosophers. 
The philosophers deserve less excuse for their neglect, because they should have been attracted, not 
only by the matter which he has discovered and presented (rebus [...] quae ab illo dictae et inventae 
sunt), but also by an unbelievable charm and richness in his style (sed dicendi quoque incredibili 
quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitate) […] and when I left you, and set on my way to Greece […] 
since I had no books with me, I wrote up what I could remember on the voyage and sent it to you” 
(Cicero, Topica, i, 1, in Id., De inventione, De optimo genere oratorum, Topica, Engl. tr. by H.M. Hubbell 
(Cicero in twenty-eight volumes, vol. II), London – Cambridge (Mass).: William Heinemann – 
Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 382-384). 
103 Cicero, Topica, i-ii, 1-8, in Id., De inventione, pp. 382-389. 
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the validity of arguments.104  Dialectic, however, was not only a science having its 
own subject matter, principles and laws, but also an art. An art, Cicero stated, that 
functioned as an interdisciplinary method for scientifically ordering knowledge of 
any kind. In a passage of the Brutus, the Arpinate described dialectic as the “art 
which (1) teaches the analysis of a whole into its component parts, (2) sets forth and 
defines the latent and implicit, (3) interprets and makes clear the obscure; which (4) 
first recognizes the ambiguous and then distinguishes; which (5) applies in short a 
rule or measure for adjudging truth and falsehood, for (6) determining what 
conclusion follow from what premises, and what do not”. Insofar as it taught how 
to divide and define, discern truth and falsehood, and evaluate the validity of 
arguments, dialectic was “the mistress of all arts, he brought to bear on all that had 
been put together by others without system, whether in the form of legal opinions 
or in actual trials”.105 The Ciceronian qualification of dialectic as the ‘ars omnium 
artium’106 recalls to mind the later Augustinian appellation of dialectic as the 
‘disciplina disciplinarum’: both manifest the universal methodological function of 
dialectic in relation to all sciences. Indeed dialectic, which Augustine considered a 
science, “teaches how to teach and how to learn; in it Reason shows itself and 
manifests what it is, what it wants, what it can achieve. It knows how to know; it 
alone not only wants to make knowers but also can do it”.107  
  
                                       
104 A careful treatment of dialectic in Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages that offers an analysis of 
the most important texts, is provided by D’Onofrio, «Fons scientiae». 
105 Cicero, Brutus, Orator, Engl. tr. by G.L. Hendrickson – H.M. Hubbell (Cicero in twenty-eight 
volumes, vol. V), London – Cambridge (Mass).: William Heinemann – Harvard University Press, 
1971, pp. 128-131. Cf. also Ibid., 42, 189-90; De oratore 1.41-42,186-8; De finibus bonorum et malorum 2.6, 
18; Academica Priora 2.28,91; Orator 32, 113-33, 118. 
106 René-Antoine Gauthier has traced the origin of the definition ‘ars artium et scientia scientiarum’ 
back to the tradition of Greek commentators, such as Ammonius, John Philoponus, Elias and David 
the Invincible, who used this description with reference to philosophy in general and to the beginning 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Cf.  Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri Posteriorum. Editio altera retractata, ed. 
by R.-A. Gauthier, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII p.m. edita, Romae-Paris: 
Commissio Leonina-Vrin, 1989, vol. I*.2, p. 4, fn. on ll. 29-30. 
107 “Disciplina disciplinarum […] docet docere, haec docet discere: in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat 
atque aperit, quae sit, quid velit, quid valeat. Scit scire, sola scientes facere non solum vult sed etiam 
potest” (Augustine, De Ordine, II. XIII 38, pp. 127.24-128.37; emphasis is added). In this overview of 
dialectic I will not touch upon the issue of the reductio artium ad philosophiam and, indirectly, ad 
theologiam.  
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In the first centuries of the Christian epoch, dialectic was integrated within 
the didactic system of the seven liberal arts. The trivium and quadrivium were at the 
basis of the organization of the Early Medieval educational program, whose 
conceptual framework was also furnished by encyclopaedic works such as the 
writings of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus and Isidore of Sevilla. Martianus 
Capella did not expand upon the internal ordering of philosophical discipline. In the 
fourth book of the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, through the personification of 
Dialectic, Martianus emphasised the priority of this art over its six sisters in virtue 
of its unique prerogatives. Dialectic alone could provide the other disciplines with 
the proper method of inquiry, for it was only through dialectical reasoning that any 
of the subjects treated by other disciplines could be unfolded.108  
The Roman senator Cassiodorus devoted a chapter of the second Book of the 
Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum to the question on the epistemological 
status of dialectic – a term that he considered and used as a synonym of logic –, 
namely whether this discipline was an art or a science. In the opening lines of the 
second book of the Institutiones, the reader was introduced to the Aristotelian 
bipartition of philosophy into theoretical (inspectiva) and practical (actualis), which 
left logic out of the philosophical realm. Subsequently, Cassiodorus illustrated the 
intellectual habits, namely ars and disciplina, proper to speculative and practical 
philosophy. While ars was concerned with contingent things, which can be 
otherwise than they are, the disciplina speculated on immutable, necessary things. 
This demarcation between art and science (disciplina), commented the Roman 
senator, had its origin in Plato and Aristotle.109 Conceivably, here Cassiodorus 
referred to the renowned Platonic distinction between science (ἐπιστήμη) and 
opinion (δόξα), which is presented in the Republic (VI, 476A-480A), and mainly to 
the Aristotelian partition of the different habits of the rational part of the soul into 
science, art, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom and comprehension. Indeed in 
                                       
108 Capella, De Nuptiis, bk. IV, 336-7, p. 108 (Id., The Marriage, p. 110). 
109 “Inter artem et disciplinam Plato et Aristoteles opinabiles magistri saecularium litterarum, hanc 
differentiam esse voluerunt, dicentes artem esse habitudinem operatricem contingentium, quae se et 
aliter habere possunt; disciplina vero est quae de his agit quae aliter evenire non possunt” 
(Cassiodorus, Institutiones, bk. 2, ch. 3.20, p.130). This differentiation is also found in Isidore of Sevilla, 
Etymologiae I.1.1.  
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the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle had stated that science is the state 
or disposition whose objects of inquiry are “things that are of necessity in the 
unqualified sense”, and that “every science is thought to be capable of being taught”. 
In contrast, art was the “state of capacity to make, involving a true course of 
reasoning” and “concerned with what can be otherwise”.110 Cassiodorus employed 
the distinction between art and science in attempting to solve the puzzle of the 
undefined, intermediate status of ‘dialectic’. Thus, he claimed that dialectic is an art, 
the ars disputandi, insofar as it deals with contingent, probable items that are known 
through probable reasoning, which produces mere opinion about the inquired 
objects (quid verisimile atque opinabile). Dialectic, though, was also a science (disciplina) 
since it could elaborate apodictic arguments for knowing necessary, immutable 
things.111  
One of the main channels through which the idea of the equivalence of the 
disciplines of dialectic and logic was spread through the Early Middle Age was 
Isidore of Sevilla’s Etymologies. In the second book of his writings, Isidore firstly 
proposed the Stoic tripartition of philosophy into physics (naturalis), ethics (moralis) 
and logic (rationalis) and soon thereafter introduced the alternative Peripatetic 
subdivision of philosophy into theoretical and practical sciences. Accordingly, he 
presented both the contrasting Stoic and Aristotelian descriptions of logic/dialectic 
which, portrayed a confused, blurred image of logic. From the Stoic perspective logic 
was indeed the branch of philosophy concerned with speech – later named scientia 
sermocinalis – which Plato had subdivided into dialectic and rhetoric, as Isidore 
asserted. Logic, however, was not only a scientia sermocinalis, but also a scientia 
rationalis, as emerged from the etymological analysis of the term ‘logic’: the Greek 
                                       
110 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.3, 1139b19-24; VI.4, 1140a10-16, in J. Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 
2, pp. 1799-1800. See also Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II.19.  
111 “Nunc ad logicam, quae et dialectica dicitur, sequenti ordine veniamus. Quam quidam 
disciplinam, quidam artem appellare maluerunt, dicentes, quando apodicticis, id est veris 
disputationibus aliquid disserit, disciplina debeat nuncupari; quando autem quid verisimile atque 
opinabile tractat, nomen artis accipiat. Ita utrumque vocabulum argumentationis suae qualitate 
promeretur. Nam et pater Augustinus, hac credo ratione commonitus, grammaticam atque 
rethoricam disciplinae nomine vocitavit, Varronem secutus; Felix etiam Capella operi suo de Septem 
Disciplinis titulum dedit. Disciplina enim dicta est, quia discitur plena; quae merito tali nomine 
nuncupatur, quoniam incommutabilis illis semper regula veritatis obsequitur” (Cassiodori Senatoris 
Institutiones, ed. by R.A.B. Mynors, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937, bk. 2, ch. 3.1, p. 109; Engl. tr. in 
Id., Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning and On the Soul, Engl. tr. by J. W. Halporn, Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2004, p. 188). 
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word λόγος was equivocal and meant “both ‘utterance’ (sermo) and ‘reason’ (ratio)”. 
Insofar as it was the rational (rationalis) part of philosophy, logic/dialectic was 
concerned with “investigating the causes of things […] defining, questioning, and 
discussing” and with “how the true and the false may be distinguished by 
disputation”. A few lines later, without giving any further insight Isidore set forth 
the Peripatetic view of logic, which did not classify logic/dialectic amongst the 
sciences: “Some of the earliest philosophers had ‘logic’ among their terms, but they 
did not refine it to the level of skill of an art. After these, Aristotle brought the 
argumentative methods of this discipline under certain rules and named it ‘dialectic’ 
(dialectica) because in it one disputes about terms (dictum), for λεκτόν means 
‘utterance’ (dictio). Dialectic follows the discipline of rhetoric because they have 
many things in common”.112 
Although the use of the word ‘dialectic’ for denoting ‘logic’ in general appears 
preponderant in these encyclopaedical writings – and likewise in the Early Medieval 
texts – it is nevertheless remarkable to note the absence of any terminological 
precision in the description of ‘dialectic’ conveyed by Late Ancient scholars. 
Analogously to their Early Medieval successors, indeed Late Ancient writers often 
employed the notions of logica and dialectica interchangeably and without assigning 
to them specific and strict technical senses. This ambiguity at the linguistic level 
originated from the deeper ambiguity at the conceptual level. The boundaries 
between logic and dialectic were indeed blurred and their respective fields of 
                                       
112 “Dialectica est disciplina ad disserendas rerum causas inventa. Ipsa est philosophiae species, quae 
Logica dicitur, id est rationalis definiendi, quaerendi et disserendi potens. Docet enim in pluribus 
generibus quaestionum quemadmodum disputando vera et falsa diiudicentur. Hanc quidam primi 
philosophi in suis dictionibus habuerunt; non tamen ad artis redegere peritiam. Post hos Aristoteles 
ad regulas quasdam huius doctrinae argumenta perduxit, et Dialecticam nuncupavit, pro eo quod in 
ea de dictis disputatur. Nam λεκτόν dictio dicitur. Ideo autem post Rhetoricam disciplinam Dialectica 
sequitur, quia in multis utraque communia existunt […] Philosophiae species tripartita est: una 
naturalis […] altera moralis, quae Graece Ethica dicitur […] tertia rationalis, quae Graeco vocabulo 
Logica appellatur, in qua disputatur quemadmodum in rerum causis vel vitae moribus veritas ipsa 
quaeratur […] Logicam, quae rationalis vocatur, Plato subiunxit, per quam, discussis rerum 
morumque causis, vim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus est, dividens eam in Dialecticam et 
Rhetoricam. Dicta autem Logica, id est rationalis. λόγος enim apud Graecos et sermonem significat 
et rationem […] Item aliqui doctorum Philosophiam in nomine et partibus suis ita definierunt: 
Philosophia est divinarum humanarumque rerum, in quantum homini possibile est, probabilis 
scientia. Aliter: Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum” (Isidorus Hispalensis, 
Etymologiarum, II.22.1-24.9; Id., The Etymologies, pp. 79-80). For the Stoic and Aristotelian alternatives 
subdivision of philosophy proposed by Isidore see supra fn. 90.  
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inquiry often overlapped and were confused with each other. Moreover, the answers 
of the encyclopaedists to the issue of the place of dialectic in the system of liberal 
arts were equivocal, as with their treatment of its epistemological status, since 
dialectic was considered both an ars and a disciplina.113 Terminological consistency 
and conceptual precision were not peculiar to the Late ancient and Early Medieval 
epochs, since they had inherited a confusing concept of dialectic/logic that resulted 
from the conflation of two diverse traditions, namely the Peripatetic and the Stoic. 
This situation changed once Aristotle reappeared on the philosophical scene – firstly 
obliquely through Boethius, and then directly – as Aristotle brought along his 
subdivision of sciences and his classification of the habits of the soul. 
 
2.1.3 In some of his commentaries on Greek and Latin logical writings, Boethius 
provided a rather exhaustive, but still ambiguous picture of dialectic/logic. Let our 
eyes linger on this representation, as it might help us bring together the various 
elements addressed thus far. The elucidation of the opening lines of the Ciceronian 
Topica, offered to Boethius the opportunity to classify the distinct senses which his 
predecessors assigned to the words ‘logic’ and ‘dialectic’.114 This elucidation, 
however, presupposed a preceding clarification of the inner structure of logic and of 
the place it occupied in the division of science. Similarly to Cicero, Boethius 
explained that Aristotle had comprehended both discovery and judgment 
(inveniendi iudicandique peritia) under the general heading ‘logic’ and that he had 
limited the use of ‘dialectic’ to the logic of the probable. Whereas the Stoics had 
embraced the judicative branch of logic, on which they had focused, under the term 
‘dialectic’:  
 
The ratio disserendi has two parts, one of discovery and the other of judgment–
sometimes judgement of the discovery itself, sometimes judgement of the 
                                       
113 These were not the only problems concerning logic. As de Rijk has pointed out, and as emerges 
from Cassiodorus’ description of dialectic, there were other questions left open such as whether the 
subject of logic “is something accidental or unchangeable Reality”, or in other words whether the ars 
sermocinalis was concerned “with words or with Reality” (Garlandus Compotista, Dialectica, ed. by L. 
M. de Rijk, Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959, p. LII).   
114 On Cicero’s text see supra, pp. 45-46; on Boethius’ division see: F. Magnano, “Boethius: the 
Division of Logic”, in Brumberg-Chaumont, Ad notitiam ignoti, pp. 141-171. 
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deduction of the discovery, which is the form of an argumentation. The part that 
teaches about the discovery supplies in abundance certain tools for discoveries 
and is called ‘Topics’ […] The part that has to do with judgment proffers certain 
rules making determinations and is called ‘Analytics’. If it makes observations 
about the junctures of propositions, it is named ‘Prior Analytics’. But if it deals 
with the discoveries themselves, then the part that discusses the determining of 
necessary arguments is named ‘Posterior Analytics’, and the part that discusses 
false and tricky (that is, sophistical) arguments is named ‘Refutations’. The 
judgment of verisimilar argumentations is apparently not dealt with […] The 
Stoics call it [scil. the ratio disserendi] dialectic, and for them it consists in expertise 
in judging. Plato called it by the same name and understood it as skill at 
portioning by differentiae and reducing to a genus. Aristotle used the same 
name, only he applied it not to the whole art of discourse as the Stoics do but 
only to the part that deduces verisimilar arguments (verisimilibus argumentibus) 
for a question put forward. Aristotle, therefore, dealt with logic more completely 
since he discussed the two parts of logic (besides which there is no third), 
namely discovery and judgement, whereas the Stoics neglected discovery and 
transmitted only tools for judgment. 115 
 
Boethius seemed to stick to the Aristotelian intrinsic partition of logic, and 
accordingly he could disambiguate the terms ‘logic’ and ‘dialectic’ and use them 
consistently. He employed the general term ‘logic’ (disciplina logica or scientia 
disputandi) to signify the discipline dealing with the rules for discriminating between 
truth and falsehood and for producing both necessary and probable reasoning, 
whilst he restricted the meaning of ‘dialectic’ to the area of logic concerned with 
                                       
115 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, In Topica Ciceronis Commentaria, in M. Tullii Ciceronis opera 
quae supersunt omnia ac deperditorum fragmenta, ed. by J. K. von Orelli – J. G. Baiter, Zürich, 1833, vol. 
V, I, I.2.6-2.7, pp. 273-6 (Engl. tr. in E. Stump, Boethius’ In Ciceronis Topica, Ithaca-London: Cornell 
University Press, 1988, pp. 25-28, here pp. 27-28). In the De Topicis Differentiis, Boethius offered a 
résumé of the length passage mentioned (bk. 1, Patrologia Latina, vol. 64, 1173C). However, he then 
proposed a slightly different quadripartition of logic into four disciplines, namely dialectic, rhetoric, 
demonstrative philosophy and sophistry”. The discipline called Topica will “reveal a bountiful supply 
of arguments” to the ‘artisans’ of these four disciplines, thus paving “the paths of discovery”: “Not 
only the dialectician and the orator but also the demonstrator and producer of true argumentation 
have something they can take from the Topics since among the Topics of readily believable 
arguments this teaching contains also the starting points of necessary arguments […] occasionally 
certain sophistical Topics are brought up for the sake of exercising the reader” (bk. 1, Patrologia 
Latina vol. 64, 1181A-D; E. Stump, Boethius’ De topicis differentiis, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1978, pp. 41-42). 
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probable argumentation.116 In his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, 
Boethius directly faced the crucial problem concerning the nature of logic and its 
place in the system of philosophy. The question about the epistemological status of 
logic originated from the different places assigned to logic in the Peripatetic and 
Stoic partitions of philosophy: was logic a science, namely a part or branch of 
philosophy, as the Stoics thought? Or did logic serve as an instrument of philosophy 
(an omnino pars quaedam sit philosophiae an suppellex atque instrumentum), as assumed 
by Aristotle? Boethius offered a Solomonic solution to the problem, which later 
revealed itself to be troublesome and puzzling. He explained that logic was both a 
part of and an instrument of philosophy. Since it inquired about the rules for 
discovering the truth, logic could serve as instrument for theoretical and operative 
sciences in their search for truth and in the systematization of scientific 
knowledge.117 At the same time, logic was a science insofar as it had its own 
principles and laws and its own subject matter; its parts were the discovery or 
inventio and the judgement or iudicium. “Discovery is the matter” for the forms, 
which are definition, division and deduction,118 “but the whole division itself 
furnishes the matter for judgment”. Indeed, once the hylemorphic composite, that is 
the argumentation, is produced, judgement operates. One way of judging consists 
in determining and judging “the nature of the propositions themselves – whether 
they are true and necessary, whether they are verisimilar, or whether they are used 
in sophistries. This is a contemplation of “the matter” of argumentations. The other 
way, however, considers the junctures and composition of the propositions among 
                                       
116 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda, S. Brand, in 
Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii operum pars I: in Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, ed. by G. Schepps - S. 
Brandt, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 48, Vindobonae-Lipsiae: F. Tempsky – G. 
Freitag, 1906, bk. 1, ch. 2, pp. 138-140. While for Aristotle ‘probable’ qualified the ‘matter’ of the 
premises of dialectical deductions, for Boethius probability is a quality of the whole argument, and 
not only of some of its components. 
117 Ibid., ch. 3, pp. 140-143. 
118 “Discovery is the basis for or the others [scil. divisions of logic, namely definitio, partitio, collectio], 
holding the place, as it were, of their matter […] without discovery there cannot be deduction, and 
so there will no be the necessary, the verisimilar, or the sophistical, for these three are added to 
discovery so that an argument becomes necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. Necessity, ready 
believability, and sophistry are forms (formae) of a sort; when they come to discoveries, they make 
arguments necessary, readily believable or sophistical” (Boethius, In Topica, 2.07, p. 274; Stump, In 
Topica, p. 26).  
51 
 
themselves, and it is a part of judgement. This way judges “the form” of 
arguments”.119  
 
Boethius played a prominent role as cultural mediator between the Ancient 
and Medieval epochs by conveying the classical intellectual heritage to the Middle 
Ages. He pervaded almost all branches of knowledge, especially logic, through his 
translations and writings.120 Boethius was “le maître de logique” of intellectuals 
during the High Middle Ages, but nonetheless his views on logic – about its status 
                                       
119 Boethius, In Topica, 2.07, 1047A; Stump, In Topica, p. 27; on this topic see Magnano, “Boethius”. 
For a precise sketch of the hylemorphical composition of deductions in Boethius, and the differences 
in the usage of the conceptual pair matter-form between Boethius and Greek Commentators see 
Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions de la logique selon Albert le Grand”, in Brumberg-Chaumont, 
Ad notitiam ignoti, pp. 336-416, esp. pp. 343-352. 
120 Lorenzo Minio Paluello identifies three phases in the spread of ancient logical writing during the 
Western Middle Ages: 1) end 8th-beginning10th century; 2) years 970-1040; 3) beginning-middle 12th 
century. During the first stage (end 8th-beginning10th century), the following texts were known: 
Porphyry’s Isagoge translated by Boethius, along with the two Boethian commentaries on that text; 
Aristotle’s Categoriae, and Boethius’ commentary on it; Aristotle’s De interpretatione according to 
Boethius’ translation, accompanied by the second Boethian commentary on it; the Categoriae Decem 
attributed to Augustine; (Ps-) Apuleius’ Periermeneias; Boethius’ first commentary on Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione; Cicero’s Topica and Boethius’ incomplete commentary on it. In the second stage (970-
1040) were rediscovered Boethius’ logical treatises: the Prolegomena/Antipredicamenta, then edited as 
Introductio in Syllogismos Categoricos; the De syllogismo categorico and the De syllogismo hypothetico; the 
De divisione and the De topicis differentiis; Boethius’ complete and revised translation of Aristotle’s 
Categoriae; a fragment of an anonymous translation of Aristotle’s Topics (IV.2, 122a10-b24). Porphyry’s 
Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categoriae and De interpretatione, Cicero’s Topica together with the Boethian 
commentary on it, Boethius’ monographies and, later, the Liber sex Principiorum constituted the so 
called logica vetus. During the last phase, the recovery of Latin translations of Aristotelian works prior 
to 525 BC occured. Around 1115 began the circulation of Boethius’ translations of the Sophistici 
Elenchi, Topica, Analytica Priora (both the recensio Carnutensis and the recensio Florentina). At the latest 
around 1150, James of Venice translated from Greek the Analytica Posteriora and translated, anew or 
merely modifying a previous translation, the Sophistici Elenchi; it is uncertain whether he also 
translated the Analytica Priora and the Topica. Shortly thereafter, an unknown John translated again 
from Greek into Latin the Analytica Posteriora and an anonymous translated the Analytica Priora and 
the Topica. In the 60s of 12th century, Gerard of Cremona translated from Arabic into Latin the 
Analytica Posteriora, along with Themistius’ paraphrasing of it. Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, 
Topics and Sophistical Refutations constituted the logica nova. Both logica vetus and nova were part of the 
so called logica antiqua, in opposition to the modern logic, whose bulk were the parva logicalia (L. Minio 
Paluello, “Nuovi impulsi allo studio della logica: la seconda fase della riscoperta di Aristotele e di 
Boezio”, in La scuola nell’Occidente Latino dell’ Alto Medioevo. 15-21 Aprile 1971, vol. II, Spoleto: Centro 
Italiano di Studi per l’Alto Medioevo, 1972, pp. 743-766, here pp. 747-749); see also O. Lewry 
“Boethian Logic in the Medieval West”, in M. T. Gibson, Boethius: His life, Thought and Influence, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, pp. 90-134; J. Marenbon, “Logic at the Turn of the Twelfth Century: a 
synthesis”, in I. Rosier-Catach, Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe-XIIe siècle: conditions et 
enjeux d’une mutation, Turnhout: Brepols, 2011, pp. 181-217. For a more exhaustive picture also 
addresses the translations of Ancient Greek and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s corpus see B. 
Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus”, in N. Kretzmann – A. Kenny – J. Pinborg – E. Stump, The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 45-79. On 
Boethius’ translation see infra ch. 5.1.2. 
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and place within the classification of science – as well as the lexical exactness and 
conceptual precision peculiar to his works, did not influence the Early Medieval 
period considerably. Major figures of the Carolingian Renaissance, such as Alcuin121 
and Hrabanus Maurus,122 and later authors, such as Remy of Auxerre, repeated the 
descriptions of dialectic supplied by late Ancient encyclopaedists – like Capella, 
Cassiodorus and Isidore – which carried with them not only a terminological and 
conceptual oscillation between logic and dialectic, but also uncertainty concerning 
the nature and the status of ‘dialectic’/‘logic’.123 
 
2.1.4 The turn of the first millennium displayed a heightening interest in Boethius’ 
views, which was perhaps an outgrowth of the recovery of his logical treatises.124 
Dialectic/logic assumed an ever more pivotal role in the didactic system and in the 
systematization of knowledge in general, since it was considered the most efficient 
tool for searching and organizing all branches of wisdom (grammatical, legal, 
theological). The attention towards Boethius became accentuated as we move into 
the 12th century.125 Consequently, the discussions about logic increasingly run 
                                       
121 De rhetorica et virtutibus Dialogus (PL 101, 948). 
122 De institutione Clericorum, III, 20 De Dialectica (PL 397-8). 
123 On dialectic in the High Middle Ages see: J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of 
Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981; D’Onofrio, «Fons scientiae»; J. Fried, Dialektik und Rhetorik im früheren und hohen Mittelalter. 
Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit, vornehmlich im 9. Und 12. Jh., 
München: Oldenburg, 1997; on the trivium see Y. Iwakuma, “The Division”. 
124 Gerbert of Aurillac and Adalbero of Laon, to whom is attributed the authorhip of the De divisione 
philosophiae eiusdem, elaborated “a unique subdivision of logica, that into dialektike, epideiktike (!), and 
sophistike […] In some other texts from the aetas Boethiana too, logica is used in its Boethian sense [scil. 
‘logic’ in the modern sense] […] Another treatise uses the term logica almost as an equivalent to 
dialectica (eam nunc dici dialecticam quae olim logica dicta est)” (Iwakuma, “The Division”, pp. 171-
172). In some 11th century grammatical texts, the whole logica is characterized as sermocinalis, namely 
as dealing – in different ways – with the sermo or vox, and tripartite into grammatica, dialectica and 
rhetorica. This tripartite division “came to be widely adopted in one way or another in later texts […] 
By the late eleventh century, several divisions of logica and/or dialectica had been proposed” (Ibid., p. 
173). Iwakuma has remarked on a common feature of theories about the subdivision of logica/dialectica 
shared by some commentaries on the logica vetus, namley their concord in identifying the scientia 
inveniendi with Boethius’ De topicis differentiis and the scientia iudicandi with the Boehtian De syllogismis 
categoricis and De syllogismis hypotheticis. And the discrepancies between these writings concerned the 
place to assign to the Isagoge, Categories, On the Interpretation and On the Division (Ibid., p. 175). 
125 Regarding the use of the term logica and dialectica during this period, Michaud-Quantin states that 
“au Xie s. et au début du XIIe, l’emploi de dialectica est universel pour désigner la discipline qui dirige 
l’exercise de la raison, discerne le vrai du faux: le terme logica n’est pas oublié, mais il reste abstrait” 
(Michaud-Quantin, “Les termes logica et dialectica”, p. 856). In his Didascalicon (end of 1120s), Hugh 
of St Victor distinguished between ‘linguistic logic’ (logica sermocinalis) and ‘dialectic’ or 
‘argumentative logic’ (dialectica and logica rationalis or dissertiva). ‘Linguistic logic’ was one of the four 
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within the contours of the Aristotelian-Boethian conceptual framework conveyed to 
Medieval authors by the texts compounding the logica vetus. Logic became even 
more important, and attracted “such tremendous crowds from every quarter that 
more men [we]re occupied in the study of logic alone than in all other branches of 
that science which regulates human acts, words, and even thoughts”.126 The 
outstanding status of logic in the educational program, and its influence upon other 
disciplines was firmly established. Newly rediscovered ancient texts started 
circulating, including some of the books of the Aristotelian Organon that were later 
called the logica nova, such as the Topics. The prologue that the 12th century 
anonymous translator of the Topics placed ahead of his translation of the text, which 
was accomplished before 1125, bears testimony to this intellectual renewal. Therein, 
indeed, the translator supplied some information not only about the content of the 
eight books of the Topics, but also on its troubled textual history:  
  
Formerly, Aristotle’s Topics were rendered into Latin by the guide of the Latins, 
Boethius the philosopher. But for an unclear and extremely execrable 
coincidence, the Boethian translation fell into oblivion. Now, though, a 
translation of the Aristotelian Topics is available again, however it might be. 
Those who are interested in logical studies could consider it, if they wish.127 
                                       
general branches of philosophy, together with the theoretical, practical and mechanical arts (the term 
‘art’, which he considered equivalent to science). Since it taught the rules for speaking and arguing 
correctly, “linguistic logic stands as genus to grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, thus containing 
argumentative logic as subdivision”.  ‘Dialectic’ or ‘argumentative logic’, which was a species of the 
linguistic logic, prescribed the rules for distinguishing the true from the false by reasoning” (Hugh 
of St. Victor, The Didascalicon, 31.11, p. 59; more than a century later, Robert Kilwardby quoted this 
passage in the De ortu scientiarum). Moreover, Hugh specified the inner articulations of such a 
dialectic. The genus ‘argumentative logic’ was composed of two integral parts, namely invention and 
judgement, which in turn were features proper to the three intermediate species of argumentative 
logic – namely demonstration, probable argument, sophistic –  falling under the species 
‘argumentative logic’. ‘Probable arguments’ were the subject matter of dialectic and rhetoric, both of 
which contained invention and judgement, which however were not “the same thing in dialectic that 
they are in rhetoric” (Hugh of St. Victor, The Didascalicon, 2.30, pp. 81-82).  
126 Ioannis Saresberiensis, Metalogicon, ed. by J. B. Hall-K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, Turnhout: Brepols, 1991, 
bk. 2, ch. 6, p. 63; Engl. tr. in D. D. McGarry, The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: a twelfth-century defense 
of the verbal and logical arts of the trivium, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955, p. 69. 
127 “Hec itaque Aristotelica a latinorum duce et philosopho S. Boetio in latinam eloquentiam 
aliquando deducta, sed incertum quo nefandissimo casu obliterata, nunc vero recidua translatione 
utcumque reddita, quos talia studia delectant, si volunt, inspiciant (nisi forte nullam qualicumque 
translationi preferendam iudicent; et nisi eos sani capitis autument, si qui sunt qui inedia ac nuditate 
malint perire quam escis aut indumentis grossioribus uti)” (L. Minio-Paluello, “Note sull’Aristotele 
latino medievale”, in Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 52 (1969), pp. 29-45, here p. 41). As Minio-Paluello 
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Almost thirty years later, similar words were written by John of Salisbury. In his 
praise of the Aristotelian Topics in the third book of the Metalogicon, John voiced 
surprise that such a useful text “had completely, or almost entirely, fallen into 
disuse” for centuries: 
 
At length, however, in our day, through the insistent researches of diligent 
geniuses, it has, as it were, been raised from the dead, or aroused from sleep, so 
that it may summon back to their sense those who have been wandering, and 
make plain the way of truth to those who have been seeking it.128 
 
Furthermore, John offered a picture of the logical studies prevalent at the time he 
was writing his work. Around the 50s of the 12th century, ‘the body of the [logical] 
art’ was mainly compounded by the Aristotelian Topics, whose knowledge John 
considered “the most necessary, especially for those whose aim is [to prove with] 
probability”, the Analytics, and the Sophistical Refutations. In these texts, affirmed 
John, a scholar could find teachings applicable in demonstration, dialectic, and 
sophistry and which would allow him to master “invention and judgement in every 
branch of knowledge”.129  
 
The old books educated the new men. The recovery of unknown Boethian, 
Aristotelian as well as Arabic volumes was flanked by a proliferation of logical 
writings in which school masters expressed fresh ideas. These textbooks disclose the 
                                       
has pointed out, the translator’s short summary of the Topics “si può paragonare a quello molto più 
ampio, ma certamente più tardo, e basato sulla versione boeziana, contenuto nel libro IV[sic]. 5-10 del 
Metalogicon di Giovanni di Salisbury (1159)” (Minio-Paluello, “Note sull’Aristotele”, p. 42). 
128 McGarry, The Metalogicon, p. 172. 
129 Subsequently, John expressed his preference for the Topics, whose science “chiefly builds up our 
power of invention, it also assists our judgment in no small measure […] it is of greatest service to 
the dialectician and the orator, I believe that it is almost equally helpful to those who are engaged in 
the weighty labors of demonstration, or involved in sophistic fallacy and strife […] The Analytics and 
the Sophistics are also useful in invention; while the Topics, on their part, likewise aid in judgment” 
(John of Salisbury, The Metalogicon, bk. 3, ch. 5, pp. 171-172; from ch. 5 until the end of the 3rd book, 
John offers an overview of the content of the eight book of the Topics). John’s words are also telling 
indicators of the tendency to apply to logic the Aristotelian quadipartition of arguments into 
demonstrative, probable, tentative and sophistic, which was accordingly subdivided into four parts 
or disciplines, namely the demonstrative, dialectic, tentative or eristic and sophistry. 
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ongoing process of terminological definition and conceptual refinement of the 
notions of ‘logic’ and ‘dialectic’. Indeed the usage of these terms became less 
oscillating and gradually standardized. This progressive crystallization at the 
lexicological level, however, was an epiphaenomenon whose hypophaenomenon 
was to be found in the gradual definition of the logical and dialectical realms. The 
fields of research of and the relation between logic and dialectic were more clearly 
established, and their respective subject matters, principles, rules and methods of 
inquiry were more defined. On the basis of the etymological interpretation of the 
equivocal Greek term λόγος – which according to Latin authors could signify 
‘speech, discourse’ (sermo) as well as ‘reason’ (ratio) – ‘logica’ was considered as both 
the scientia or ars sermocinalis, and the scientia or ars rationalis or dissertiva. Insofar as 
it was the discipline concerned with speech, logic was typically understood as the 
general discipline that comprehended the trivial arts. While inasmuch as it dealt 
with concepts and reasoning, ‘logica’ was generally considered the genus under 
which fell the species ‘dialectica’.130 Furthermore, logic was considered an integral 
whole whose integral parts were the judicative and the inventive. This intrinsic 
process of definition of logic/dialectic was mirrored by the external process of 
differentiation between logic and other arts and science, such as grammar, rhetoric 
and theology.131 Despite this, however, the epistemological status of logic and its 
place within the sciences could not be unequivocally defined, and neither the 
Aristotelian nor the Stoic divisions of philosophy imposed itself upon the other. 
 
One of the outstanding intellectual figures of the 12th century, Peter Abelard, 
openly refuted the widely-accepted tripartition of logic into grammar, dialectic and 
                                       
130 In the following century, Robert Kilwardby mentioned this distinction in the opening of the 
chapter of the De ortu scientiarum, which introduced the nature of logic: “Regarding logic, it is 
important to know that its very nature is equivocal. For, as Hugh of St. Victor says in his Didascalion, 
the name [‘logic’] is taken from the Greek name ‘logos’, which among the Greeks signifies both speech 
and reason and so is equivocal among them. And so among us logic is in one sense a science of 
discourse, and in that sense it includes grammar, rhetoric, and logic properly 
called; in the other sense it is a science of reason, and in that sense it is a science belonging to the 
trivium, distinguished from grammar and rhetoric” (R. Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, ed. by A. G. 
Judy, Toronto: PIMS, 1976, pp. 167-168, Engl. tr. in N. Kretzmnn – E. Stump, The Cambridge 
Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Cambridge (Mass).: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
3vols., vol. 1, pp. 264–282, here pp. 264-265). 
131 According to Garin, “lo sforzo dei logici dal XII secolo in poi era stato quello di determinare 
l’ambito della dialettica come ars disserend”( E. Garin, “Dialettica e retorica”, pp. 46-50). 
56 
 
rhetoric which had been adopted by many nominalist, vocalist and realist authors 
since the end of the 11th century. This tripartition presupposed that the subject 
matter of logic was human speech (sermo) and implied that the scientia sermocinalis, 
namely logic, was distinct from dialectic.132 Abelard preferred instead the Stoic 
tripartition of philosophy according to which logic was the scientia rationalis.133 At 
the beginning of both the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ and the Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni 
sociroum’,134 the Palatin Master followed verbatim Boethius in stating that logic was 
one of the three parts of philosophy. Specifically, it was the rational science that 
taught how to find arguments, distinguish valid from invalid arguments, and what 
were the techniques of disputation. Abelard further aligned himself with Boethius 
in acknowledging the instrumental role of logic. This discipline served as a universal 
tool for any philosophical inquiry since it equipped other sciences, and also logic 
itself, with the rules for arguing correctly.135 The idea that logic was the science 
                                       
132 Iwakuma, “The Division”, pp. 176-178. On the basis of his attribution of the paternity of glosses 
on Boethius De topicis differentiis – found in the ms. Paris BNF, lat. 7094A fol. 82-95 – to the young 
Abelard, Iwakuma claimed that “Abelard had earlier made concessions to the new tripartite division 
of logica. According to the glosses, logos has a two-fold etymology, ratio and sermo, and if logos is 
interpreted as sermo, then logica would contain grammar and rhetoric as well as dialectic […] In the 
end, however, Abelard sticks to the traditional characterization of dialectica as scientia rationalis and 
rejects the idea of dialectica as scientia sermocinalis” (ibid., pp. 178-179). 
133 In the introduction to the edition of the Dialectica, De Rijk claimed that “for Abelard logic is ars 
sermocinalis, i.e. the art of the use of language, in the large sense of the word”. However, as he pointed 
out in the related footnote, the term ars sermocinalis “is missing from Abailard’s writings; it occurs 
with his contemporary Theodoric of Chartres (†before 1155) who calls the arts of the trivium artes 
sermocinales (MS. Carnot, 497 f1r). I found the term ‘scientia sermocinabilis’ in the Dialectica of Garland” 
(L. M. De Rijk in Petrus Abaelardus: Dialectica, Assen: Van Gorcum 19702, I, p. xci, fn. 4). Perhaps, the 
absence of this term, ars sermocinalis, is due to the doctrinal choice of Abelard. In the Dialectica, logic’s 
primary task is to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments and to give reason for their 
validity or invalidity, and, secondarily, to discovery truth (De Rijk, Dialectica, I, pp. 73,3-5; 99,10-21; 
114,16-31; III, 388,11-20). 
134 The Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ (ante 1118) contains Abelard’s commentaries on the Isagoge, Categories 
(both edited by B. Geyer, 1) the Isagoge in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des 
Mittelalters 21 (1), Munster: Aschendorff, 1919; 2) the Categories in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
und Theologie des Mittelalters 21 (2), Munster: Aschendorff, 1921), De interpretatione (edited by K. Jacobi 
– C. Strub in the series Corpus christianorum continuatio mediaevalis, vol. 206, Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 
and the De topicis differentiis (edited by M. Dal Pra in Pietro Abelardo: Scritti di logica, Firenze: La nuova 
Italia, 19692); the Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’ is a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (1124ca; 
it was published by B. Geyer in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 21 
(4), Munster: Aschendorff, 1933); the Dialectica is a logical textbook dealing with the topics treated by 
Boethius in his logical writings and by the treates De Definitionibus (De Rijk, Dialectica). 
135 Cf. Logica ingredientibus, in Beiträge 1919, pp. 1-3, where the three parts are the speculativa, moralis 
and rationalis; Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’, in Beiträge 1933, pp. 505-506, esp. p. 506. It should 
be noted that in the Logica Nostrorum, Abelard preliminarily divided the scientia in agendi, consisting 
“in rerum compositione” and discernendi, which consists “in rerum compositarum discretione”. The 
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committed to reasoning and disputing did not allow place for any trivial arts within 
logic.136 Grammar, rhetoric and dialectic were not parts of logic. Its principal parts 
were the inventive and judicative alone, as stated by Cicero and Boethius. The 
Palatin Master refined this principal division of logic by subdividing the inventive 
part into division and definition, and by attaching the collectio to the judicative 
part.137 
For Abelard, therefore, the term ‘dialectica’ did not denote any specific species or 
part of logic, but it rather amounted to ‘logica’ in general. Consequently, he 
employed ‘logica’ and ‘dialectica’ as synonyms: the title of one of his logical 
textbook, the Dialectica, is telling enough about this Abelardian general attitude.138 
Notwithstanding his terminological inconsistency, in the Glossae super Topica the 
Palatin Master meticulously followed the technical Aristotelian lexicon, which he 
found in the Boethian text that he was elucidating. Thus, he utilized ‘logic’ to signify 
logic in general, and ‘dialectic’ to limitedly signify the part of logic concerned with 
probable reasoning.139  
A particular passage of the Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’ deserves to be 
highlighted, since it proposes the differentiation between the theoretical and the 
practical aspects of logic, which was to remain a common feature of this discipline 
in subsequent centuries. In the preface to this work, Abelard explicated that the 
genus scientia comprehended two species, the scientia agendi and the scientia 
                                       
scientia discernendi alone is called philosophy, therefore the physica, ethica and logica are three parts of 
the scientia discernendi. 
136 “Cum videlicet grammaticam et rhetoricam omni<no> a philosophia dividamus […] grammatica 
est quaestio et illa civilis, id est rhetorica, nec ad supradictas scientias [scil. logicam, physicam, 
ethicam] attinet, nisi forte secundum eos qui grammaticamque rhetoricam logicae supponunt. 
Boetius tamen hoc nomen logica non ponit, sed disserendi ratio scientiam, quod multo minus applicare 
potest grammaticae, quae nullo modo disserere, id est argumentari vel disputare docet” (Super Topica 
Glossae, in Pietro Abelardo, p. 290.5-16; cf. also Logica Ingredientibus in Beiträge 1919, pp. 1-3). 
137 “Per quam partem vero ad logicam praesentis operis scientia tendat statim dinoscitur, si prius 
logicae partes diligenter distinxerimus. Sunt autem duae auctore Tullio et Boethio quae logicam 
componunt, scientia scilicet inveniendi argumenta et diiudicandi, hoc est confirmandi et 
comprobandi, ipsa inventa” (Logica ingredientibus, in Beiträge 1919, pp. 10-13, here p. 10; Logica 
‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’, in Geyer in Beiträge 1933, pp. 506-507 and 510; Glossae super Topica, in 
Pietro Abelardo, pp. 211.38-212.3). 
138 “Logicam uero idem dicimus quod dialecticam et indifferenter utroque nomine in designatione 
utimur eiusdem scientiae” (Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’, in Beiträge 1933, p. 506).  
139 “<Disputatio decurrit> tantum probabilibus <argumentationibus> et dialectica dicitur” (Glossae 
super Topica, in Pietro Abelardo, p. 214, 20-21 and also p. 205.16). It is worth noting that Abelard aligned 
himself with Boethius in associating ‘probability’ to the whole argument, while for Aristotle it was a 
property of the premises of dialectical deductions alone. 
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discernendi. The scientia agendi was concerned with the “rerum compositione” and 
could also be acquired through practice and experience (“solo usu”) – it would not 
be incorrect, perhaps, to equate this practical science to an art. While the scientia 
discernendi was committed with the “rerum compositarum discretione”, namely 
with knowing the causes of things; thus it amounted to philosophy. Accordingly, 
Abelard restricted the Stoic tripartition of philosophy into physica, ethica and logica 
to the scientia discernendi alone. In this context, he introduced the idea of a twofold 
science of argumentation, the practical, called ratiocinativa, which dealt exclusively 
with the elaboration and use of arguments, and the theoretical, named logica, whose 
business it was to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments and to explain 
the reason of an argument’s validity.140 Perhaps Abelard was not the first Western 
logician to propose this demarcation between the practical and theoretical aspects of 
logic, which might well have been elaborated upon by authors of his own or 
preceding age. Plainly, however, in his words in nuce appeared the distinction 
between docens and utens, which was applied extensively to logic/dialectic by later 
generations of scholars from the 13th century onwards.141  
 
                                       
140 “Est autem logica Tulli auctoritate diligens ratio disserendi, id est discretio argumentorum per 
quae disseritur (id est disputatur). Non enim est logica scientia utendi argumentis siue componendi ea 
sed discernendi et diiudicandi ueraciter de eis, quare scilicet haec ualeant, illa infirma sint. Nemo 
enim aliter logicam habet nisi uniuscuiusque argumenti uim diiudicare ualeat, cum scilicet is qui 
illud facit, uim ei exposuerat, quam uim componendo ipse intendit. Duae itaque sunt argumentorum 
scientiae, una componendi quam dicimus ratiocinatiuam, alia discernendi composita quam logicam 
appellamus. Illa quippe in usu argumentorum tantum consistit, quam quiuis puer facile sibi per 
exercitium comparat, ista uero in discretione ac diuisione diiudicatur causarum per quam scilicet 
assignare sufficimus, quare hoc argumentum sit idoneum ad conclusionem inferendam, id est ita 
adiunctum, ut per id conclusio sit recipienda, illud uero minime. Hanc autem magis ingenium quam 
exercitium ministrat” (Logica ‘Nostrorum petitioni sociorum’, in Beiträge 1933, pp. 506-507; emphasis 
added). 
141 Green-Pedersen faced this question with regards to commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, and 
proposed to trace its roots back to Abelard, who “in his Super Topica (Boethii) glossae explains the 
same distinction, only he does not say docens, but tractans” (N. J. Green-Pedersen, “On 
the interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics in the thirteenth century”, in Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age 
Grec et Latin 9 (1973), pp. 1–46, esp. pp. 14-15, here p. 15). Pedersen refers to Glossae super Topica, in 
Pietro Abelardo, pp. 315.8-316.14, here p. 315). Relying on this passage of Pedersen and on Markowski (M. 
Markowski, Logika, in Dzieje filozofii sredniowiecznej w Polsce 1, Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. 
Ossolińskic, 1975, p. 58), Ebbesen makes the general claim that “im 12. Jh. findet man statt ‘docens/utens’ die 
Synonime ‘tractans/utens’ und ‘qui agit de arte/qui agit ex arte’” (S. Ebbesen, “Logica docens/utens”, in 
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 5 (1980), pp. 353-355. On the logica (and dialectica, understood in 
its narrower sense) docens and utens, see infra, § 2.2.2. 
59 
 
When leafing through the folia of logical textbooks and compendia written 
shortly after Abelard’s activity, the doctrinal and terminological similarity is 
straightforward, and suggests the standardization of a corpus of doctrines about 
dialectic. The Introductiones Parisienses, the Logica ‘Ut dicit’, the Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’ 
and the Dialectica Monacensis, whose compositions spanned the late 12th and early 
13th centuries, show many common features and only minor changes in the 
elucidation of the nature and various meanings of logic and dialectic, with the usage 
of the last word predominating. All the anonymous authors of these tracts were 
conscious of the general and the proper senses of the term ‘dialectic’. They agreed 
that ‘dialectic’ was commonly employed as synonymous with logic for denoting the 
science or art aiming at discriminating truth from falsehood. In contradistinction, 
‘dialectic’ was an integral part of logic and was concerned with probable reasoning. 
Despite these semantic remarks – which show the awareness of these authors about 
the polisemanticity of ‘dialectic’ – they still employed ‘dialectic’ interchangeably 
with ‘logic’. Similarly, they indifferently used art and science when referring to 
logic/dialectic. discipline. From the prologues of these writings there also emerged 
the methodological function usually attributed to dialectic in virtue of its usefulness 
for arguing correctly in almost all disciplinary fields (ad omnium methodorum principia 
viam habens). And, furthermore, from the aforementioned prologues appeared an 
inchoate delimitation of a proper field of dialectic – understood as intersubjective 
dialectic, or ars disserendi between an opponent and a respondent – and the 
disputational character of this art:142  
 
Dialectic is the art that discerns truth from falsehood, for logic aims at that. And, 
as Augustine says, dialectic is art of arts and science of sciences, it alone knows 
how to know, and it alone can make someone knower. Thanks to it every science 
is perfectly known, without it no science can be perfectly known. Dialectic is so 
                                       
142 “They [scil. Compendia and textbooks, composed at the end of 11th century, first half of 12th 
century] are focussed all of them on disputation technique (ars disputandi) […] This view of the task 
of logic certainly was not new. It is found already in the well-known definition of Cicero, Top. II, 6, 
which circulated in the Middle Ages thanks to Boethius […] This view was the current one, indeed, 
in the first half of the twelfth century […] This view on the task of dialectic was bound to change the 
arrangement of the subjects to be discussed in those treatises. Already in the Early school of St. Victor 
we find the discussion of sonus and vox as starting-point, since they are supposed to be the simplest 
units in dialectic” (De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 1, pp. 163-165).  
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named from ‘dia’, which means two, and ‘logos’, which means discourse (sermo) 
or ‘lexis’, which means reason, as if <dialectic> was a dual discourse, since it is 
led by two people, namely the opponent and the respondent. Properly speaking, 
then, dialectic differs from logic in the same way that a part differs from its 
whole; while commonly speaking, dialectic and logic are the same. And we use 
the term ‘dialectic’ in this latter sense.143 
 
 
From mid-13th century onwards, these words, slightly modified, resounded in the 
ears of many students who read that dialectic is the art of arts and science of sciences 
in the prefaces of either Peter of Spain’s Tractatus – then called Summulae logicales – 
or one of his commentators.144  
 
2.1.5 The process of terminological differentiation and conceptual clarification of 
logic and dialectic received a decisive impulse when the newly available books of 
the Organon, together with the writings of Arabic authors, spread widely and were 
integrated in the academic syllabus. On the one hand, the wave of newly translated 
texts supplied Western scholars with novel views about logic, its divisions and place 
among the other sciences.145 Logic gradually became specified as a scientia rationalis 
                                       
143 “Est autem dialectica ars discernendi verum a falso; ad illud idem est logica. Et, ut Augustino 
placet, dialectica est ars artium, scientia sceintiarum, que sola novit scire, sola scit scientes reddere, 
ex qua omnis, sine qua nulla scientia perfecte scitur. Dicitur dialectica a ‘dia’, quod est duo, et ‘logos’ 
sermo vel ‘lexis’ ratio, quasi dualis sermo, quia vertitur inter duo, scilicet opponentem et respondentem. 
Differt autem dialectica a logica sicut pars a suo toto proprie loquendo; communiter tamen loquendo 
idem sunt, et sic utimur ea” (Logica ‘Ut dicit’, in de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 2, p. 379,15-
23). A similar claim is found also in the Introductiones Parisienses (de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II, 
part 2, p. 357,6-20), while the Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’ (de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 2, p. 
417,23-32) and the Dialectica Monacensis (de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 2, p. 462,6-16; here it 
is said that the definition of ‘ars artium scientia scientiarum’ expresses the formal cause of dialectic) 
does not mention Augustine. De Rijk suggests that the famous definition of dialectic as ars artium, 
scientia scientiarum arrived to these anonymous authors through “an intermediary source, 
presumably some glossary” (Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 1, p. 439). 
144 For logic as ‘ars artium’ see K. Jacobi, “Dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum”, in I. Craemer-
Ruegenberg – A. Speer, Scientia und Ars im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter, Berlin-New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1994, vol. 1, pp. 307-328; M. J. F. M. Hoenen, “Ars artium und scientia scientiarum. Logik an 
den mittelalterlichen Universitäten von Paris und im Alten Reich”, in R. C. Schwinges, Artisten und 
Philosophen. Wissenschafts- und Wirkungsgeschichte einer Fakultät vom 13. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, Basel: 
Schwabe & Co., 1999, pp. 63-82. On the Introductiones Parisienses (written in the years 1170-1200), the 
Logica ‘Ut dicit’ (1200 ca), the Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’ (1200ca), the Dialectica Monacensis (1st quarter of 
the 13th century) see L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II; Stump, Dialectic and its Place, pp. 111-
134. 
145 For an overview, see D. Gundissalinus, De divisione Philosophiae, (ed. Bauer, pp. 349-97). 
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rather than sermocinalis, operating with concepts, mainly with concepts of concepts 
or second intentions, and dealing with terms as well as with arguments. The 
restricted or ‘standard Organon’, compounded of six tracts, was flanked by the 
Arabic Long version of the Organon, which integrated the Poetics and the Rhetoric to 
the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistical 
Refutations.146 The hitherto unknown sources equipped scholars with additional 
hermeneutic tools, such as the pair ‘matter-form’,147 which were advantageous for 
analysing problematic issues in a deeper, more refined and conceptually rigorous 
way. The old questions underwent more or less substantial changes and were 
reshaped in accordance with the new conceptual setting, which favoured the 
elaboration of innovative solutions to longstanding problems. On the other hand, 
however, the reading of the Greek and Arabic works introduced new philosophical 
paradigms and perspectives, which were fertile soil for the proliferation of 
unsuspected problems.   
Moreover, the ancient didactic program based on the seven liberal arts was 
profoundly modified, since, as Aquinas claimed, the “seven liberal arts do not 
adequately divide theoretical philosophy”.148 The academic educational 
programme was reshaped on the Aristotelian corpus of writings and on the newly 
                                       
146 “According to al-Farabi there are eight parts of logic: “categories, interpretation, prior analytics, 
posterior analytics, topics, sophistries, rhetoric, poetics” (Gundissalinus, De divisione, in Bauer IV, p. 
69; Engl. tr. in E. Grant, A source Book in Medieval Science, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press, 1974, vol. 1, p. 67). Al-Fārābī introduced also the idea of the quadrivium composed by grammar, 
rhetoric, dialectic and poetics, which was later adopted also by Albert the Great, for example in his 
paraphrase of the Topics (see infra ch. 3.4.4). The long Organon was adopted by Albert the Great and 
also Thomas Aquinas. On this topic see D. L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval 
Arabic Philosophy, Leiden: Brill, 1990; C. Marmo, “Suspicio: A Key Word to the Significance of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism”, in Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et 
Latin 60 (1990), pp. 145-190; J. Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions”. 
147 See J. Barnes, “Logical matter and logical form”, in A. Alberti, Logica, mente e persona, Firenze: 
Olschki, 1990, pp. 7-119; J. Spruyt, “The Forma-Materia device in Thirteenth-Century Logic and 
Semantics”, in Vivarium 41 (2003), pp. 1-46; J. Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions”. 
148 T. Aquinas, Exp. Super De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ed. B. Decker, Leiden: Brill, 1959, p. 167. Cf. H. Roos, 
“Le Trivium à l’université au XIIIe siècle”, in Koch, Arts libéraux, pp. 193-197; C. Lafleur, Quatre 
introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: textes critiques et études historique, Montreal: Institut d’Etudes 
médiévales, 1988; C. Lafleur, “Logic in the Barcelona Compendium (With special reference to 
Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistici Elenchi”, in K. Jacobi, Argumentationstheorie, pp. 81-98; O. Weijers, 
“The Evolution of the Trivium in the University Teaching: The Example of the Topics”, in J. Van 
Engen, Learning Institutionalized. Teaching in the Medieval University, Notre Dame (Ind).: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2000, pp. 43-67 (reprinted in O. Weijers, Études sur la Faculté des Arts dans les 
universités médiévales.  Recueil d’articles, Turnhout: Brepols, 2011, pp. 351-378). 
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introduced didactic technique and tool of the disputatio/quaestio.149 Similarly, the 
organization of knowledge was accommodated to the Aristotelian system; yet logic, 
along with grammatic, still maintained its role of prominence among the disciplines 
taught. The texts compounding the logica nova entered the didactic curriculum of all 
Universities, and became the object of thorough reading and hermeneutic. Dialectic 
and logic were not immune from change. Dialectica began to be associated with the 
part of logic expounded in the Aristotelian Topics and Sophistical Refutations150 and, 
accordingly, it was subordinated to logica, which covered a wider area.  
Having walked hand in hand for centuries, dialectic and logic finally went separate 
ways which, however, ran side by side and at times intersected. We here will walk 
the path of dialectic, and the commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics will guide us along 
this way: we will leaf through their folios in order to analyse the answers that the 
authors offered to some of the vexed questions concerning dialectic itself – about its 
nature, status and realm – as well as about its relations to other disciplines, especially 
those which were more akin to it, such as rhetoric and metaphysics.151  
 
 
 
                                       
149 Bazàn et al., Les questions; Lawn, Rise; O. Weijers, “L’enseignement du trivium à la Faculté des arts 
de Paris: la ‘quaestio’”, in J. Hamesse, Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans 
les Universités médiévales, Louvain la Neuve: Publications de l’Institut d’études médiévales, 1994, pp. 
57-74; O. Weijers – L. Holtz, L’Enseignement des Disciplines à la Faculté de Arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–
XIVe siècles), Turnhout: Brepols, 1997; O. Weijers, La disputatio dans les facultés des arts au moyen âge, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 2002;  Ead., In Search of the Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity 
to Early Modern Times, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013. 
150 “Au XIIIe siècle l’évolution est achevée, le mot logica triomphe” (Michaud-Quantin, “Les termes 
logica et dialectica”, p. 859). It is not a mere coincidence, therefore, that in his Logica, or Summa, Lambert 
of Auxerre (or of Lagny, as argued by de Libera) claimed that logica is the “art of arts, the science of 
sciences. When accessible, all [of the sciences] are accessible, when inaccessible, all of the others are 
inaccessible. Without Logic there is no [science], and any [science] requires it (ars artium, scientia 
scientiarum qua aperta omnes aperiuntur et qua clausa omnes alie clauduntur, sine qua nulla, cum 
qua quelibet)” (Lambertus de Auxerre, Logica (Summa Lamberti), ed. by F. Alessio, Firenze: La Nuova 
Italia Editrice, 1971 (written in 1250-1260), p. 4; Engl. tr. in Lambert of Auxerre, Logica, or Summa 
Lamberti, ed. by T. S. Maloney, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015, pp. 5-6); on 
Lambert of Lagny’s authorship of the Summae see A. de Libera, “Le traité De Appellatione de Lambert 
de Lagny (Lambert d’Auxerre)”, in Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 48 (1981), 
pp. 227-285. 
151 Dialectic dealt with general principles, namely the loci, and was ‘common’, namely it was not 
restricted to a specifica area. Therefore, it could be paralleled to metaphysics, which was the most 
general discipline, which did not study a specific aspect of being, but the ens in quantum ens. 
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2.2 Reading Aristotle’s Topics. Some general issues concerning dialectic. 
 
2.2.1 The gradual assimilation of the Aristotelian Organon and the Arabic logical 
writings, such as Algazel’s and Avicenna’s Logic, heavily influenced the 13th century 
academic discussions about logic, and consequently about dialectic.  
Before beginning our inquiry, however, perhaps we would do well to briefly sketch 
the content of Aristotle’s Topics. According to modern scholars, the Topics is an 
earlier Aristotelian work conceived by the Stagirite as a practical textbook. Therein, 
the aspiring young dialectician could find a systematic treatment of the rules to be 
used in dialectical exchanges such as those described at the end of the Topics. Indeed 
throughout the eight books which comprise the Topics, Aristotle provided his reader 
with a dialectical method, namely with practical advice for succeeding in debates, in 
which two opponents argued on questions about logic, ethics, natural philosophy 
and other subjects. The first book had an introductory nature.152 Firstly, because it 
announced the scope and the utility of the work, namely “to find a line of inquiry 
whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject 
presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid 
saying anything contrary to it” (chapters 1-3). Secondly, because in chapters 4-18 of 
that same Book One, Aristotle touched upon some key-notions of both his logic and 
philosophy in general, such as syllogisms and inductions (ch.12) and the ten 
categories (ch.9).153 Furthermore, he set forth some basic concepts concerning 
dialectical method, such as the nature of dialectical problems and of dialectical 
propositions (ch. 4, 10-11), and the four predicables – genus, property, accident or 
definition (ch. 4-8) of which he stated: “every proposition and every <dialectical> 
problem indicates either a genus or a property or an accident”.154 In other words, 
for Aristotle, any dialectical inquiry was concerned with questions regarding the 
                                       
152 Even though the first book has a theoretical flavour, the Topics should not be seen as developing 
a systematic theory of dialectic: “Les Topiques […] Leur portée se veut exclusivement pratique; ils 
fournissent une méthode de dialectique, non une théorie de la dialectique” (Brunschwig, Les Topiques, 
livres I-IV, p. xiii). 
153 The notion of syllogism in general and its “varieties” or “species”, namely demonstration, 
dialectical syllogism, contentious deductions and fallacies, are addressed in Topics I.1; see infra, 
chapter 3.1. 
154 Top. I.4, 101b17-18. 
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correct way of predicating or attributing a term, viz. the predicate, to another term, 
viz. the subject, as its genus, property, accident or definition.155 These four 
predicables, then, “give a highest-level classification of problems or conclusions, and 
thus a highest-level organization of topoi. This is explicitly reflected in the 
arrangement of Books II-VII”, which contained the ars topica and listed almost 300 
topoi.156 The second book dealt with the topics concerning accident in general, while 
book 3 enumerated the topics 1) on what “is the more desirable, or the better, of two 
or more things” (Top. III.1-5) and 2) on accidents appearing in problems put in a 
universal form (Top. III.6). Book four examined “questions relating to genus”, while 
book five analysed “the question whether the attribute stated is or not a property 
(proprium)”. Specifically, book five inquired “whether the property has or has not 
been rendered correctly […] whether the terms in which the property is stated are 
not or are more familiar” (Top. V.2-3) and “whether what is stated is or is not a 
property at all” (Top. V.4-9).  Books six and seven featured topoi about the definition, 
more precisely the topoi concerning issues such as if the thing “has been defined 
incorrectly” or correctly (Top. VI.2-3) and if its essence has been defined or not (Top. 
VI.4-14). And these topoi also addressed “whether two things are the same or 
different” (Top. VII.1-2,) and arguments for establishing the desired definition (Top. 
VII.3-4). The middle section of the Topics ended with a comparison of the various 
kinds of dialectical problems which aimed at identifying the problems which can be 
constructed and destroyed more easily (Top. VII.5).157 The last book of the Topics 
focused on the practice of dialectical exchange and offered rules and advice for the 
questioner and the answerer to perform a good dialectical dispute. The dialectical 
                                       
155 “In the Topics, Aristotle presents a classification, which purports to be comprehensive of all 
predications. In any predication, he says, the predicate must be in one of four relationships to the 
subject: definition, genus, unique property, or accident […] The four predicables serve as the largest 
classifications both of problems and of topoi. The first step in dealing with a problem, then, is to 
identify which predicable it falls under” (Smith, Topics, pp. xxix-xxx). 
156 Here, I will not enter the vexata quaestio about what a topos is and how does it function; on that 
issue, see the secondary literature mentioned in fn. 100; and Ebbesen, “The Theory of Loci”, pp. 15-
39. 
157 Are there some transversal, organizing principles, or “categories of classification of conclusions” 
which underlie books 2-7 and according to which the topoi concerning the four predicables could be 
grouped? Smith has proposed “three large classifications” running under the four predicable 
divisions: “topoi involving ‘opposites’ (antikeimena), topoi involving ‘coordinates’ and ‘cases’ 
(sustoicha, ptōseis), and topoi involving ‘more and less and equal’. Aristotle generally presents these 
three groups together and in the same fixed order” (Smith, Topics, p. xxxi). 
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practice involved a questioner and an answerer who argued about the proposed 
question through deductions called dialectical syllogisms. The starting point of the 
dialectical syllogisms were the endoxa (ἔνδοξα), namely opinions “universally or 
widely accepted and shared” which at first sight were more believable than the 
conclusion: 
 
It is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions (ἔνδοξα) […] 
Those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority 
or by the wise– i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and 
reputable of them (ένδόξοις).158  
 
The aforesaid definition of the endoxic premises, given at the beginning of the Topics, 
was supplemented a few pages later by other details, according to which endoxa 
were also those “things which are similar to what is acceptable; the contraries of 
things which appear to be acceptable, put forward by negation; and such opinions 
as are derived from established arts.”159 As strange as it might sound for a modern 
mind used to understanding probability in quantitative and stochastic terms, from 
the Aristotelian perspective probability or endoxality was a qualitative notion.160 As 
                                       
158 Aristotle, Topics, I.1, 100a30-b24, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, pp. 167-8; “Propositum quidem 
negotii est methodum invenire a qua poterimus syllogizare de omni problemate ex probabilibus […] 
Primum igitur dicendum quid est syllogismus et quae eius differentiae, quatinus sumatur dialecticus 
syllogismus; hunc enim quaerimus secundum propositum negotium […] Probabilia autem <sunt> 
quae videntur omnibus aut pluribus aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime notis 
et probabilibus [et praecipuis]” (Aristoteles, Topica, I.1, 100a19-24, in L. Minio-Paluello–B. G. 
Dod, Aristoteles Latinus: Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis Alterius et Translatio 
Anonyma (Aristoteles Latinus V, 1-3), Brussels – Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1969 (hereafter AL), pp. 
5,1-6,1). As proposed by some scholars, such as Bolton and Brunschwig, Aristotle’s definition of 
endoxa can be interpreted as a decreasing authoritative hierarchy that reflects the level of acceptance 
of endoxa and their consequent greatest or lesser weight and authority. 
159 Aristotle, Topics, I.10, 104a13-15, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 173.  
160 A vast secondary literature about Aristotle’s notion of ἔνδοξα has been generated since the second 
half of the last century, especially after the publication of Owen’s seminal article “Tithenai Ta 
Phainomena”;  Aristote, Les Topiques, livres I-IV, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967, esp. pp. 113-114; R. 
Bolton, “Definition and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics”, in A. Gotthelf– J. Lennox, 
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 120-166; 
R. Bolton, “The epistemological basis of Aristotelian dialectic”, in D. Devereux–P. Pellegrin, Biologie, 
logique et métaphysique chez Aristote: actes du séminaire C.N.R.S.-N.S.F., Oléron 28 juin-3 juillet 1987, 
Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1990, pp. 186-236; J. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Authority of ‘Appearances’”, 
in Id., Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999, pp. 281-291; Brunschwig, “Dialectique”; J. Barnes, “Philosophy and Dialectic”, in 
J. Barnes–M. Bonelli, Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, pp. 164-173; D. Frede, “The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa are and What They 
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emerged from the information scattered in these and further passages of the Topics, 
in this writing the Stagirite employed the term ἔνδοξον161 in relation to people and, 
mainly, propositions. The endoxality of propositions did not stem from any intrinsic 
property or from the nature of actual things that the proposition talked about. Nor 
did endoxality depend on the truth-value of the sentence, for Aristotle claimed that 
endoxic premises had an undefined truth-value and could indifferently be true or 
false, although they could not be openly false. Probability was extrinsically 
bestowed on propositions on the basis of their being believed or approved by any 
group, either by the totality or the majority of people or by a minority of experts. It 
depended on the superior number of the multitude, either all or the majority, or on 
the acknowledged standing of some persons deemed experts, again, either the 
totality or majority or an élite. Relying on someone judging, and on his beliefs about 
the fact, the Aristotelian notion of probability could not have any mathematical 
overtone.  
 
Since their ‘rediscovery’ in the Latin West, the Topics, read in the Boethian 
translation, along with the sections devoted to the topics that were included in the 
                                       
are Not”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43 (2012), pp. 185-215; J. Karbowski, “Complexity and 
Progression in Aristotle’s Treatment of Endoxa in the Topics’”, in Ancient Philosophy 35 (2015), pp. 75-
96. On the pre- and modern notions of Probability see: A. Gardeil, “La ‘certitude probable’”, in Revue 
des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 5 (1911), pp. 237-485; T. Deman, “Probabilis”, in Revue des 
sciences philosophiques et théologiques 22 (1933), pp. 260-90; E. Byrne, Probability and Opinion. A Study in 
the Medieval Presuppositions of Post-Medieval Theories of Probability, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968; K. 
Michalski, La philosophie au XIVe siècle, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969; I. Hacking, The Emergence of 
Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction, and Statistical Inference, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; P. Von Moos, “ ‘Was allen oder den meisten oder den 
Sach- kundigen richtig scheint.’ Über das Fortleben des endoxon im Mittelalter”, in B. Mojsich– O. 
Pluta, Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi II, Amsterdam: Grüner, 1991, pp. 711-743; I. Kantola, Probability 
and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times, Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1994; 
D. Gillies, Philosophical Theories of Probability, London: Ashgate, 2000; S. Knebel, Wille, Würfel und 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, Hamburg: Meiner, 2000; J. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001; A. Hald, A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications 
before 1750, New York: Wiley, 2003; S. Knebel, “Wahrscheinlichkeit, III. Scholastik”, in J. Ritter et 
al., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie XII, Basel: Schwabe, 2004, pp. 252-65; P. Von Moos, “Die 
‘bloße’ und die wahrheitsfähige Meinung im Mittelalter”, in K. Hempfer–A. Traninger, Macht Wissen 
Wahrheit, Freiburg: Rombach, 2006, pp. 55-75; R. Schuessler, “Probability in Medieval and 
Renaissance Philosophy”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed)., URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/probability-medieval-
renaissance/>. 
161 In his Latin translation of the Topics, Boethius translated ἔνδοξα as probabilis and probabilia. On 
Boethius’ translation see infra, ch. 5.2. 
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general textbook usually baptized Summae or Summulae, such as that of Peter of 
Spain, constituted the main and proper realm of dialectic. Dialectic was indeed even 
more identified with the logic of probable - expounded mainly in the Aristotelian 
Topics. The autonomization of dialectic allowed for the establishment of certain 
relationships between this discipline and general logic on the one hand, and between 
dialectic and the other subpart of logic - each of which matched with a book of the 
logica nova, that is Posterior Analytics and Sophistical Refutations - on the other hand. 
Thus, the ancient problem concerning the place of dialectic within the system of 
sciences seemed to have eventually found a solution, even though it carried with it 
some lateral issues which related to the nature of logic, as we shall see.  
 
2.2.2 The proper places for debates about dialectic were the schoolrooms of the 
Faculty of Arts and, then, also the Studia of religious orders. Indeed during the 
Medieval epoch reflections on dialectic were the outcome both of the master’s daily 
reading and commenting upon ‘dialectical’ writings - mainly on Aristotle’s Topics, 
and also as a result of classroom and public disputations. Scholastic commentaries 
upon these texts - the great majority of which remain unedited, provide us with a 
testimony of this teaching activity.162 Typically, these works opened with an 
epistemological and methodological introduction to dialectic, whose length largely 
varied, and which was meant to provide students with a preliminary overview on 
the nature of the discipline taught. For the sake of completeness, in this context 
masters also expanded upon the relation between dialectic and the Topics with 
general logic and the other writings of the Organon. Usually, at the beginning of their 
clarification of the epistemological status of dialectic, the masters approached the 
issue of whether dialectic was an art or a science. This question, which every logician 
was faced with since Boethius’ time, had become more problematic after the spread 
of Peripatetic philosophy - which had proposed a new understanding of the notions 
of art and science as cognitive dispositions. The Aristotelian connotation of ars and 
scientia gradually gained predominance over the oldest meanings, although they 
never replaced the pre-Aristotelian notions fully:  
                                       
162 For the presence of the Topics in the curricula of European Universities during the Middle Ages 
and for the manuscript tradition of commentaries on this work, see infra ch. 5.1.1. 
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the names ‘art’ and ‘science’ are sometimes taken broadly, and sometimes 
strictly or properly. If they are taken broadly, then we use them interchangeably, 
as synonyms; hence, taken in this way, in this description it would be sufficient 
to insert only one of these two names. Indeed, logic should not even be called 
the science of sciences, for this would indicate a certain excellence of logic with 
respect to [all] other sciences, which it cannot have with respect to metaphysics; 
in fact, metaphysics, rather than logic, should more truly be called the science of 
sciences, having access to the principles of all inquiries. But when the names ‘art’ 
and ‘science’ are taken strictly, then, in [accordance with] bk.  VI of the Ethics 
[scil. EN, VI.3, 1139a15-17] there are five intellectual habits, or virtues, 
distinguished from one another, namely, understanding, wisdom, prudence, 
science [or knowledge: scientia], and art. Therefore, taken in this way no such 
habit is at the same time art and science; in fact, logic thus understood is an art, 
rather than a science.163 
 
The term ars had enjoyed many meanings during the Medieval period. Limitedly to 
logic and philosophy, it was employed to denote the totality of “strict art and rules”; 
or “a set of rules which provide a definite method and a system of doing anything”. 
A rather neutral definition of art described it as “the set of manifold principles or 
rules which are directed towards a unique scope”; moreover, art was also 
understood in opposition to nature as the method or “system that reason has devised 
in order to expedite, by its own short cut, our ability to do things within our natural 
capabilities”. Art, then, was defined oxymoronically as the “scientia finita 
infinitorum”, namely the “science capable of handling the infinite possibilities of 
                                       
163 J. Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 1.1.1 (Eng. tr. in J. Buridanus, Summulae de dialectica, trans. by 
G. Klima, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001 (hereafter abbreviated as SD; when not specified, 
I will make use of this translation), p. 6). In the following century, the Realist John Versoris claimed 
that “ars dupliciter accipitur, uno modo specialiter, ut ab Aristoteles definitur quod est recta ratio 
rerum a nobis factibilium [scil. Auct. Aris. p. 240.56] […] Alio modo sumitur ars generaliter ut 
definitur a Tullio, quae est collection plurium praeceptorum in unum finem tendentium [M. 
Victorinus, Ars grammatica, 1.2, ed.by  I. Mariotti, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1967, p. 65,5-7]. Et hoc modo 
est quoddam superius ad scientiam et ad artem proprie dictam” (J. Versoris, Petri Hispani Summulae 
logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione (quoted by N. Germann, “Logik zwischen ‘Kunst’ 
und ‘Wissenschaft’. Avicenna zum Status der Logik in seiner Isagoge”, in Recherches de Théologie et 
Philosophie Médiévales 75/1 (2008), pp. 1-32, here p. 30). 
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nature”.164 In some commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon, and thus also on the 
Topics, the term ‘art’ designated the discipline taught in the book under discussion – 
viz. the ars prioristica, demonstrativa, topica, sophistica –  as well as the books 
themselves.  
The Aristotelian technê (τέχνη, ars in Latin), had instead a narrower semantic 
extension. In its stricter sense, which the Stagirite had stated and articulated in the 
sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, technê denoted one of the five cognitive 
dispositions of the intellectual part of the soul, along with knowledge/science, 
practical wisdom, philosophical wisdom and comprehension. Art was the 
productive intellectual virtue accompanied by true reasoning, which was 
“concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how 
something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being”.165 
Similarly to art, the Medieval pre-Aristotelian notion of science had not received a 
strict, well defined connotation. Some 13th century authors, such as William of 
Auxerre and Roger Bacon, as well as many Parisian master of Arts of the 1250s, 
defined sciences as “nobilis animi possessio, quae distribute recipit incrementum et 
avarum dedignata possessorem, quae, nisi publicetur, cito elabitur”.166 Whilst in the 
                                       
164 This classification is provided by De Rijk (Logica Modernorum, vol. II, part 1, pp. 171-176), who 
identified the respective sources: 1) Isidore, Etymologiae I.1.2: “ars dicta, quod artis praeceptis 
regulisque constat”; then Papias in his lexicon, sub voce “Ars”, and Hugh of St. Victor (Didascalicon 
II.1); 2) Ps. Cicero, Auctor ad Herennium, I.1.3: “ars est preceptio quae dat certam viam rationemque 
faciendi aliquid”, this definition appears variously reshaped in some twelfth century treatises on 
logic, e.g. in the De arte disserendi: “ars est preceptio qua aliquid docemur facere”; 3) the definition of 
ars as “collectio multorum principiorum sive preceptorum (=regula, maxima, locus) ad unum finem 
tendentium”, which is found in Victorinus (Victorinus, Ars grammatica, 1.2, p. 65,5-7) but was 
(erroneously) ascribed to Cicero, is found in many 12th century logic textbook, such as the Logica ‘Cum 
sit nostra’, Logica ‘Ut dicit’, in Roger Bacon’s Summulae and Lambert of Auxerre’s Logica; 4)  Abelard 
defined ars as “id est scriptum, quod subjectis praeceptis scientiam coartat, ipsam amplificat quam 
natura suscitat”, also the Introductiones parvulorum (Glossae super Topica, in Pietro Abelardo, p. 206.7-13) 
and similarly did John of Salisbury (Metalogicon I.11): “est autem ars ratio que compendio sui 
naturaliter possibilium expedit facultatem. Neque enim impossibilium ratio prestat aut pollicetur 
effectum, sed eorum que fieri possunt quasi quodam dispendioso nature circuitu compendiosum iter 
prebet, et parti (ut ita dixerim) difficilium facultatem. Unde et Greci eam ‘methodon’ dicunt quasi 
compendiariam rationemque nature vitet dispendium et amfractuosum eius circuitum dirigat, ut 
quod fieri expedit, rectius et facilius fiat”; 5) John’s definition was rewritten by authors related to the 
school of Petit Pont: “(ratio) tandem artem statuit quasi quandam infinitorum finitam esse scientiam”, 
a definition which “is only found in what we may call an ‘English’ tradition”, according to De Rijk. 
165 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.4, 1140a9-14, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 1800. 
166 A. de Libera, “Les Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon I-II. De Termino. De Enuntiatione”, 
in  Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 53 (1986), pp. 139-289, esp. pp. 151-154; R. A. 
Gauthier traced back the roots of this definition of science to Alain of Lilla’s Anticlaudianus and De 
Planctu Naturae. 
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sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle had assigned a technical sense to 
epistêmê (ἐπιστήμη, in Latin scientia). The term ‘science’ denoted the habit of the 
intellectual part of the soul underlying knowledge of eternal, immutable, necessary 
things. Scientific knowledge involved demonstration, namely the deduction of the 
conclusion starting from a set of first principles, on which Aristotle had fully and 
detailingly expounded in the Posterior Analytics.167 While the pre-Aristotelian 
notions of art and science were perfectly compatible, from the Peripatetic viewpoint 
they were hardly harmonizable.  
Some passages of the Topics seemed to incline toward an assimilation of dialectic to 
art rather than to science. When explaining that a good dialectician is not the one 
who always achieves the goal, but he who considers and uses all the proper means 
at his disposal for reaching the aimed end, Aristotle compared dialectic to arts such 
as rhetoric and medicine.168 Additionally, in his methodological remark about the 
kind of accuracy apt to his treatment of the matter explained in the Topics, the 
Stagirite had admitted that the subject did not require “a precise definition (subtiles 
rationes)”: a mere description in outline, figuraliter, was more suitable to it.169 It is 
rather unlikely that these words did not bring to the minds of medieval 
commentators the homologous methodological claims that opened the Nicomachean 
Ethics. In the first book of this treatise, Aristotle had affirmed that the discussion he 
was going to undertake would have been adequate if it had had the clearness apt to 
the subject matter, “for precision (το ἀκριβής) is not to be sought for alike in all 
discussions”. As a corollary, he affirmed that he would have been content “in 
speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and 
in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and 
with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better”.170 Therefore, 
                                       
167 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.3; Id., Posterior Analytics, I.1-2. A questionable point concerning 
the Aristotelian notion of science was whether scientia had a subjective or/and an objective value. Or, 
in other terms, if scientia was a disposition of the soul or/and a body of scientific knowledge. 
168 Topics I.3. 
169 Topics I.2, 101a20-24. 
170 Nicomachean Ethics, I.1, 1094b1-27; “Certum enim non similiter in omnibus sermonibus 
querendum est, quemadmodum neque in conditis […] Amabile igitur de talibus et ex talibus dicentes, 
grosse et figuraliter veritatem ostendere; et de his que ut frequencies et ex talibus dicentes, talia et 
concludere. Eodem utique modo et recipere debitum est unumquodque dictorum. Disciplinati enim 
est in tantum certitudinem inquirere secundum unumquodque genus, in quantum rei natura recipit. 
Proximum enim videtur et mathematicum peresuadentem acceptare, et rethoricum demonstraciones 
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in inquiries about practical matters, such as carpentry, the ‘practical accuracy’ was 
more suited than the highest level of precision, which was instead required in 
disciplines such as geometry.  Probably, the ‘dialectical’ accuracy described in the 
Topics seemed closer to the ‘practical accuracy’ of the carpenter than to the 
‘mathematical accuracy’ of the geometer.171  
 
Now further related questions arose, since the discussions about the nature of 
dialectic began taking place within the Aristotelian theory of science. Firstly, if 
dialectic was deemed to be a science, it was then necessary to specify whether it was 
a speculative or a practical science. The Topics could not provide any decisive insight 
for answering this. Aristotle had indeed stated that dialectical problems could 
concern “choice and avoidance” – “e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not” – as 
well as “truth and knowledge, e.g. whether the universe is eternal or not”.172 
Furthermore, commentators had to harmonize the epistemic status of logic, which 
required it to “mark off some particular being, some genus” and to “demonstrate 
the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal”,173 with Aristotle’s claims 
about the universal applicability of the dialectical method. If, indeed, dialectic was 
suited for reasoning “about any subject presented” and could pave “the path to the 
principles of all inquiries”,174 how could it be a ‘scientia specialis’? Moreover, if 
dialectic was a science, how could it produce mere opinion, and not scientific 
knowledge, about the doubtful debated question?  
The earliest existent commentaries on the Topics, which date from the 40s of the 13th 
century, already exhibit the basic features of the solutions to the epistemological 
issue about the nature of dialectic, which were shared by future generations of 
commentators, even though variously nuanced.  
Similarly to Boethius, medieval authors endeavoured to put together the two horns 
of the dilemma about the epistemological status of dialectic, rather than to 
                                       
expetere” (Tr. lincolniensis: recensio pura, AL 26, 1-3, ch. 2, pp. 142-143). Cf. also Nicomachean Ethics, 
I.7, 1098a25-30. Cf. Maierù, “Influenze Arabe”, pp. 263-67. 
171 Cf. Robert Kilwadby, De ortu, ch. 41, p. 135-6, § 383-388.  
172 Aristotle, Topics, I. 3 and 11. 
173 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI.1, 1025b8-18, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 1619). 
174 Aristotle, Topics, I.1, 100a1 and I.2, 101b3-4, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 168. 
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straightforwardly take up one of them. They solved the apparent inconsistency 
about the middle position of dialectic by applying the general hermeneutic category 
“docens/utens”, which connotated two distinct but related facets of this discipline, 
respectively the pure theoretical and the practical or applied aspects.175 The usage 
of this conceptual pair - which was still present in the 19th century in authors such 
as Charles S. Peirce - was cross-disciplinary since it was suited not only to dialectic, 
but to the sciences which did not have a purely speculative purpose, such as general 
logic, sophistry, rhetoric, poetics and ethics.176  
As docens, dialectic was a science. Medievals indeed understood the dialectica docens 
(theoretical or teaching dialectic) as the metalogical reflections on the subject-matter 
of dialectic, and of its properties and principles, which were achieved through 
demonstration. Considered from this perspective, therefore, dialectic met all the 
requirement of scientificity. In contradistinction, as utens, dialectic was an art. The 
                                       
175 See S. Ebbesen, “Logica docens/utens”; Id., Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici 
Elenchi: A study of post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval writings on Fallacies, Vol. 1, pp. 88-90; Id., 
“Is Logic Theoretical or Practical Knowledge?”, in J. Biard, Itinéraires d’Albert de Saxe: Paris – Vienne 
au XIVe Siècle. Actes du Colloque organisé le 18–22 juin 1990 dans le cadre des activités de l’URA 1085 du 
CRNS à l’occasion du 600e anniversaire de la mort d’Albert de Saxe, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 
1991, pp. 267–276; N. Germann, “Logik”. With regard to dialectic in particular, see N. J. Green-
Pedersen, “On the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics in the 13th century”, in Chaiers de l’Institut du 
Moyen Âge grec et latin, 9 (1973), pp. 1-45, here pp. 14-15. Even though the exact source of this 
distinction has not been identified, some hypotheses have been proposed. Ebbesen has identified a 
possible source of inspiration in the similar distinction that is found in the tradition of Greek 
Commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations and which would possibly be transmitted to the Western 
Latin world through the mediation of James of Venice (Ebbesen, Commentators, p. 89). Germann 
(“Logik”) has proposed an Arabic origin for this pair of participles. Latin authors, indeed, might have 
been inspired by the beginning of the Avicennian Al-Madkhal. Here, they could read not only 
Avicenna’s view on logic, according to which this discipline deals with second intentions and aims 
at knowing what is unknown from the known. But also his opinion concerning the status of logic and 
its place in the system of sciences. According to the Arabic thinker, the question of whether logic was 
a branch of philosophy, and therefore a science, or rather an instrument of philosophy and thus an 
art, was a false dilemma, since logic was both a science and an art. Albert the Great quoted verbatim 
Avicenna in the second chapter of his Commentary on Porphyrys’ De V universalibus, which was 
devoted to the issue an logica sit aliqua pars philosophiae. Moreover, Abelard discriminated between the 
practical and speculative/theoretical aspects of logic/dialectic (see supra ch. 2.1) 
176 Some commentators of the Topics, like Robert A.7 (see infra, ch. 3.1), applied this distinction even 
to speculative disciplines: according to Robert, indeed, the demonstrativa sive philosophia prima is docens 
and utens. The distinction between ‘speculative grammar’, which “speculates about the principles, 
rules and conclusions of the grammatical science”, and “positive grammar, which teaches the 
significates of the terms […] is not a science” brings to mind the distinction between docens and utens 
(the quotation is mentioned in I. Rosier-Catach, “Grammar”, in R. Pasnau, The Cambridge History of 
Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, vol. 1, ch. 15, pp. 187-216, here p. 
206). 
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dialectica utens177 indeed put into practice the theory of dialectical reasoning 
elaborated upon by the teaching logic (docens) to logical, dialectical, theological, 
physical and ethical problems. Accordingly, two levels or species of dialectica utens 
could be identified, namely the dialectical or logical level and the extradialectical or 
extralogical level. On the dialectical/logical level, the dialectician applied dialectical 
syllogisms and topics to dialectical problems, namely to issues pertaining to the 
correct way of attributing or denying the attribution of one of the four predicables – 
namely accident, proper, genus and definition – to a subject. Whereas, at the 
extralogical level, the dialecticus utens used the dialectical theory of reasoning in 
theological, physical, ethical debates through an object language. Applied logic was 
thus strictly dependent on theoretical logic since it was the docens that established 
and studied the kind of dialectical reasoning, viz. syllogism or other species of 
argumentation, and their properties as well as the rules for arguing correctly, which 
then served as the instrument for practical logic.  
Through the distinction between the theoretical and practical levels of dialectic the 
gap between the Aristotelian and the Stoic views about logic/dialectic was 
eventually bridged, since dialectic was both a part of and an instrument of 
philosophy. Teaching dialectic (dialectica docens) was a special science which 
produced certain knowledge about its limited, defined subject matter. Whereas the 
dialectica utens was the universal method suited for arguing in a probable way on 
necessary as well as contingent matters about which it could only produce opinions, 
namely beliefs less certain than knowledge.  
 
                                       
177 The logica utens does not amount to the logica usualis. On the basis of some Aristotelian claims, 
such as that found in Sophistical Refutations, 11, 172a17-35 (cf. supra fn. 93), some scholastic authors 
(like Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1), f. 97ra; Walter Burley, Notulae, bk 1, C121rb, V114va-vb) admitted 
an inborn capacity to produce syllogistic reasoning, labelled logica usualis, which they opposed to  
artificial logic. The logica artificialis was the science dealing with the study of the rules for reasoning 
correctly: “syllogizans nesciens se syllogizare habet logicam usualiter sed non habet eam artificialiter, 
quia nescit se syllogizare nec habere logicam; isto modo syllogizant idiote secundum Philosophum” 
(W. Burley, Expositio super librum Porphyrii, transcribed by M. Vittorini, available on line 
http://www-static.cc.univaq.it/diri/lettere/docenti/conti/Allegati/WB_praedicabilia.pdf). Some 
later authors, mainly nominalistically oriented, added a further kind of logic, the logica naturalis, 
which related to the natural capability to readily argue. The distinction ‘docens/utens’ concerns 
artificial logic. Cf. Hoenen, “From Natural Thinking”; L. Cesalli, “Logique et Topique chez Gauthier 
Burley”, L. Cesalli, “Logique et Topique chez Gauthier Burley”, in Biard–Mariani-Zini, pp. 293-333, pp. 
298-299, esp. p. 298, fn. 3. 
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2.2.3 Another principal issue for Medieval commentators was the partition of logic 
into an inventive and a judicative part, which had its origin in the topical writing of 
Cicero and Boethius, and which was accepted by the great majority of Medieval 
logicians. After the recovery of Aristotle’s Organon and especially of the Topics, this 
problem needed to be reshaped.178 Moreover, from this main issue some by-product 
questions stemmed, one of which concerned the place of the Topics in the internal 
ordering of the books of the Organon. The authors’ answers to these problems were 
strictly related not only to their views about inventio and iudicium, but also to the 
various criteria which each of them adopted for discriminating amongst the diverse 
logical disciplines and for arranging the Aristotelian logical writings. It is perhaps 
more advantageous to consider each of these issues in detail. It will help us recognise 
the views advocated by commentators, and to consider whether their ideas were 
compatible with some of the intellectual trends which prevailed in logic during the 
time in which they were reading and commenting upon the Topics. 
Medieval authors did not come across the bipartition of logic between iudicium and 
inventio in their classroom readings of Aristotle’s logical writings, for this distinction 
was conveyed by Boethius’ works on the topics. In his De Topicis Differentiis as well 
as in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica - which was the source for his distinction, 
Boethius had claimed both that the Aristotelian logic constituted the discovery of 
arguments, which was called “Topics”, as well as the judgement of arguments, 
which was named “Analytics”, and was expounded upon in the two homonymous 
Aristotelian treatises and in the Sophistical Refutations.179 Boethius had connected 
Topics and Analytics through the pair ‘matter-form’, by assigning the role of ‘matter’ 
to discovery and the role of ‘form’ to judgement. Discovery had indeed to supply 
“the matter for judgment”, and judgement had in turn to evaluate whether 
arguments, considered as hylemorphic composites, were compounded of the apt 
matter, namely the propositions or premises, and of the correct form, that is “the 
composition of the propositions among themselves”.180  
                                       
178 Green-Pedersen, “On the interpretation”, pp. 7-8. 
179 See supra, ch. 2.1. 
180 Boethius, In Topica, 2.07, 1047A; Stump, In Topica, p. 27; see supra, ch. 2.1. 
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How did the inventio or topica accomplish its heuristic task and discover arguments? 
When a question was posited, namely when “a proposition [was] brought into doubt 
and uncertainty, as when someone ask[ed] whether the heaven is revolvable”, an 
argument was needed to confirm the conclusion, e.g. “when someone shows by 
means of other facts that the heaven is revolvable”. Thus, the argument, which could 
be either necessary or probable, was strictly connected to the question from which it 
started. Boethius defined the argument in epistemological terms as “a reason 
producing belief regarding a matter [that is] in doubt (argumentum est ratio rei dubiae 
faciens fidem)”,181 and also in logical terms as “the discovery of an intermediate”182 
or the middle term of a syllogism. A syllogism was “a discourse (oratio) in which, 
when certain things have been laid down and agreed to, something other than the 
things agreed to must result by means of the things agreed to”.183 Syllogism was the 
principal species of argumentation, and the argumentation was the unfolding of the 
argument “by means of discourse (oratio)”. Boethius claimed also that there were 
appropriate loci for the various syllogisms: 
 
Arguments drawn from definition, genus, differentia, or causes most of all 
provide force and order to demonstrative syllogisms; the remaining arguments, 
                                       
181 Sketching the different kinds of arguments in the first book of his De Topicis Differentiis, Boethius 
had attributed a basic role to the subject’s assent in epistemic processes, e.g. when he describes the 
argument as the reason that produces <firm> belief in the hearer about a doubtful issue, thus 
implying a psychological activity of the subject involved. This aspect has been highlighted also by E. 
Stump: “Boethius defines argument not as something of particular form […] but as a reason having 
certain effect on its perceiver. Because he defines argument in psychological rather than logical or 
formal terms […] the same things are argument and not arguments, depending on who is perceiving 
them” (Stump, Boethius’, p. 109, fn. 82). 
182 “Quoniam igitur extremi termini medii interpositione copulantur, eoque modo quaestionis inter 
se membra conveniunt, adhibitaque probatione solvitur dubitatio, nihil est aliud argumentum quam 
medietatis inventio, haec enim vel coniungere, si affirmatio defendatur, vel disiungere, si negatio 
vindicetur, poterit extremos” (Boethius, In Topica, bk. 1, 1051A, p. 279,30-31; Stump, In Topica, p. 32). 
183 “Syllogismus est oratio, in qua positis quibusdam et concessis aliud quiddam per ea ipsa quae 
concessa sunt evenire necesse est quam sunt ipsa quae concessa sunt” (Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1183A; 
Stump, Boethius’, p. 43; the italics are mine). Syllogism, Boethius stated, has priority over the other 
species of argumentation- induction, enthymeme and example, since these “obtain their force from 
the syllogism” (Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1185A, Stump, Boethius’, p. 46). Stump has pointed out 
that, despite the similarity in their formulation (cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I.1, 24 b18-22 and Topics, 
I.1, 100a25-27), Boethius did not employ the notion of syllogism in the technical, narrow sense of the 
Aristotelian valid syllogism analysed in the Prior Analytics: “That he is using ‘syllogism’ in a broader 
sense than ‘(valid)’ Aristotelian syllogism’ is clear from some of the examples which he considers 
syllogism and which do not fall under any of the moods of the syllogism” (Stump, Boethius’, pp. 110-
111, fn. 5). 
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to syllogisms which have the appearance of truth and are dialectical. The Topics 
which have most of all to do with the substance of the things asked about in the 
question have to do with predicative and simple syllogisms; the remaining 
Topics, with hypothetical and conditional syllogisms.184  
 
Insofar as it had to “provide force and order” to an argument or a syllogism, the 
locus/topic was the grounding or ‘foundation’(sedes) of the argument itself. It could 
“be understood partly as a maximal proposition, partly as the Differentia of a 
maximal proposition”.185 Unfortunately, Boethius’ treatment of the topica did not 
include a theoretical explanation of the topical heuristics. It only offered practical 
examples of how loci and syllogisms related to each other in the elaboration of 
arguments. According to Eleonore Stump, the topics, especially the topics 
differentiae, were the means through which the intermediates were found. The locus 
differentiae indeed should provide “the genus of intermediate appropriate to th[e] 
argument”. Moreover, it was suitable for finding the appropriate maximal 
proposition by which the dialectical argument was secured. Since the topics were 
apt for producing not only probable or dialectical arguments, but also necessary 
arguments fitting for philosophical demonstration, the topica was advantageous not 
only and mainly for orators and dialecticians, but secondarily for philosophers too: 
“insofar as knowledge of the Topics serves dialecticians and orators, it provides an 
abundance [of materials] for speech by means of the discovery [of arguments]; on 
the other hand, insofar as it teaches philosophers about the topics of necessary 
[arguments], it points out in a certain way the path of truth”.186  
It is worth bearing in mind that the Boethian topica depened mainly on the 
Ciceronian and Themistian tradition of the topics, and that the Aristotelian Topics 
did not directly influence any of Boethius’ monographic writings devoted to the 
topics. This explains why some important notions that played a prominent role in 
                                       
184 Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1195A-B, Stump, Boethius’, pp. 61-62. 
185 “Argumenti enim sedes partim maxima propositio intelligi potest, partim propositionis maximae 
differentia” (Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1185A, Stump, Boethius’, p. 46). On Boethius’ locus see 
Boethius, De Topicis, esp. bk 2; E. Stump, “Dialectic and Boethius’ De topicis differentiis”, in Stump, 
Boethius’, pp. 179-204; Green Pedersen, The tradition, pp. 39-82; Ebbesen, “The Theory of Loci”; F. 
Magnano, “Il De topicis differentiis di Severino Boezio”, Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 2014. 
186 Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 1, 1182C, Stump, Boethius’, p. 42. 
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Aristotle’s Topics and dialectic, such as the four predicables, could hardly find a 
practical function in Boethius’ topica. 
 
In the Arabic tradition, which (mostly) remained unknown to Medieval 
commentators, the universal heuristic function of the topical art (Topic) was even 
more emphasized and played a fundamental role in logic in general. Within this 
tradition, indeed, the topics were reckoned to be the proper tool for finding premises 
and producing any kind of syllogism - dialectical as well as apodictic syllogisms. 
Consequently, the Topic was not limited to nor coincided with dialectic. Having 
accentuated the role of the doubtful proposition (quaesitum) in the logical inquiry, 
Al-Fārābī and Averroes considered the Topics “a heuristic method which […] allows 
one to construct syllogisms intended to establish a given quaesitum”.187 More 
specifically, according to these authors the topos provided the material element of 
deductions, namely the suitable premises to produce the syllogism for the given 
particular quaesitum. And, according to Averroes, they were advantageous even 
from the ‘formal’ view point since the topoi served for establishing the proper figure 
of the syllogism related to the quaesitum.188 The universal role attributed to the Topic 
                                       
187 A. Hasnawi, “Topic and Analysis: The Arabic Tradition”, in R. W. Sharples, Whose Aristotle? Whose 
Aristotelianism?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 28-62, here p. 32; see also Id., “Topique et syllogistique: 
la tradition arabe (al-Farabi et Averroès)”, in Biard–Mariani-Zini, Les lieux, pp. 191-226. This 
paragraph relies on Hasnawi’s account. Hasnawi specifies that according to Al-Fārābī (in the Treatise 
on Analysis) and Averroes (in his Summary of Logic and Treatise on Topics), “heuristic topics is restricted 
to the part of the Topics of Aristotle that relates to the topics of accident, and so to book 2 of this work 
[…] the two authors make a division between, on the one hand, the topics of accident which, as the 
texts of Averroes specifies, establishes the simple existence of a thing, and on the other hand the topoi 
of genus (to which are attached those of the differentia), of the proprium and of definition, which are 
directed, in the last analysis, towards definition, or more precisely towards the procedures which 
tend to verify the adequate or inadequate character of a definition” (ibid., pp. 45-46). This 
discrimination between the topoi concerning accident on the one hand, and the other three predicables 
on the other hand, bears resemblance to Slomkowski’s interpretation of the topics of accident in book 
II: “Topoi of sumbebekos are more important than those of the other predicables since they deal with 
the level of belonging only, which is common to all the other predicables as well. Thus they can also 
be used for destruction of the genus, proprium and definition” (Slomkowski, Aristotle’s Topics, p. 94; 
see the whole ch. 3, in which Slomkowski examines Sirati’s and Brunschwig’s similar views). 
188 These two Arabic authors traced the “productive character of topics” back to Aristotle, who in the 
Prior Analytics [Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I.27, 43a22-24 (in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 68); see 
also I.32, 47a3-5] had declared that in order to “have a supply of deductions in reference to the 
problem proposed and […] reach the principles relative to the problem (per quam viam accipiemus 
circa unumquodque principia)”, it was necessary “not only to investigate the construction of 
deductions, but also […] the power of making them”. Moreover, therein Aristotle had also affirmed 
to “have explained fairly well in general terms how we must select propositions: we have discussed 
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led these authors to reshape the relation between topics or inventio and analytics. 
And the effects of this transformation were reflected in the ordering of the 
Aristotelian Organon proposed by both Al-Fārābī and Averroes, who positioned 
their treatises on the topics after the treatment of syllogistic and before the discourse 
on demonstration. 
The importance attributed to Topic as a “general heuristic” by Arabic authors clearly 
emerged from the beginning of Al-Fārābī’s Treatise on Analysis:  
 
We must now say how one finds the [appropriate] syllogism for each given 
quaesitum, in whatever discipline it may be; [we must say] from where one 
acquires the premises of every syllogism that is sought with a view to a quaesitum 
and where one starts from to get them. The way to this is located first of all in 
the knowledge of topoi189 […] When the topoi are available to us, we analyse the 
given quaesitum into each of the two contradictory [propositions] which are 
contained in it, and we make of each of them a separate thesis, which we seek 
either to establish by producing it as a conclusion itself, or to refute by producing 
its opposite as a conclusion. We next analyse the thesis into its predicate and 
subject and we place them all – each separately – under our consideration. Then 
we review, inductively, each of the topoi, comparing it with the given thesis, until 
we have exhausted all the topoi in our possession. If in the given thesis, or in its 
parts, we find something that can be described by some topos in our possession, 
we have then found the syllogism by means of which we establish or refute [this 
thesis].190 
 
Boethius and the aforementioned Arabic authors associated the Topic or inventive 
part of logic with syllogisms. The Arabs, however, deemed it to be a “general 
heuristic” valuable for syllogistic in general. From this perspective, the Topic was 
not limited to dialectical syllogism alone and, accordingly, it was in strict continuity 
                                       
the matter precisely in the treatise concerning dialectic [scil. the Topics]” (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 
I.30, 46a28-30 (Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, pp. 73-74). 
189 According to Al-Fārābī, the topoi “are the universal premises of which the particular [instances] 
are used as major premises in each of the syllogism which occur in each discipline. For each topos includes 
several particularised premises, some of which are used in dialectic, others in rhetoric, yet others in the 
sciences, and others finally in the other intellectual disciplines” (Al-Fārābī, Treatise on Analysis, cited by 
Hasnawi, “Topic”, p. 30; italics are mine). 
190 Al-Fārābī, Treatise on Analysis, cited in Hasnawi, “Topic”, pp. 29-30.  
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with Analytic - the judicative part of logic. Although as a matter of principle he had 
acknowledged the universal utility of the topica for finding any kind of argument, as 
a matter of fact Boethius had highly emphasized the strict relation between 
inventio/topica and the scientiae sermocinales, dialectic and rhetoric. Insofar as it was 
concerned with the discovery of the proper intermediate rather than of the suitable 
premises, the art of the topics was primarily convenient for producing dialectical 
syllogisms. From this Boethian viewpoint, therefore, the topica was related to 
dialectic, which was understood as the part of logic dealing with probable or 
dialectical arguments. This implied a clear demarcation between inventio and 
iudicium, and the topica was limited to dialectica reasoning, while the judicative part 
of logic inclined towards apodictic syllogistic.  
The medieval commentators of the Topics followed in the footsteps of Boethius in 
linking the ars topica or inventio with dialectic, dialectical syllogism and the Topics. It 
was thus obvious for them to match the iudicium with the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics, and the inventio with the Topics and Sophistical Refutations – which were 
often considered as an appendix to the Topics. Furthermore, the Aristotelian text 
upon which they commented seemed to justify this association. Indeed, in his 
description of the questioner’s task, which opens the first book of the Topics, the 
Stagirite had affirmed that the treatise aimed at explaining the way to find the proper 
method for producing dialectical deduction: “Propositum quidem negotii est 
methodum invenire a qua poterimus syllogizare de omni problemate ex 
probabilibus”.191 The subject-matter of the Topics was syllogizare (συλλογίζεσθαι) 
and syllogismus (συλλογισμὸς, namely “dialectical deduction”), as Aristotle himself 
had stated. What did the terms syllogizare (συλλογίζεσθαι) and syllogismus 
(συλλογισμὸς) mean according to the Scholastic commentators of the Topics? How 
did they understand invenire and, more generally, inventio or ars topica? And how 
did they relate it to the iudicium, to general logic and to the books compounding the 
Organon?  
 
 
                                       
191 Aristotle, Topics, I.1, 100a19-24 (AL, p. 5, 3-4). 
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Chapter Three. What kind of pluralism of forms in syllogism? 
 
3.1 Logical form and logical matters, dialectical form and dialectical matter: On 
some characteristic features of the earlier Parisian commentaries on the Topics.  
 
3.1.1 The most ancient identified Latin Medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics 
were produced in Paris between the 30s and the 50s of the 13th century,192 a period 
in which terminism was the major intellectual trend in logic. Typically, terminist 
authors considered logic a sermocinal or rational science (scientia sermocinalis or 
rationalis) concerned with terms and their properties as well as with arguments, and 
dealing with concepts or intentions, rather than with res. The syllogism was usually 
understood in hylomorphic terms as compounds of matter and form and was 
considered the subject-matter of logic, whose various branches had the different 
components of the syllogism as their objects of study. Thus, according to this 
division of logic penes partes syllogismi each logical sub-discipline matched a book of 
the ‘standard’ Aristotelian Organon. The books of the logica vetus, namely the 
Categoriae and the De Interpretatione, took up the remote and proximal integral parts 
of syllogism, namely terms and propositions. Meanwhile, the books of the logica nova 
expounded on the subjective parts of syllogisms. The Prior Analytics treated the 
simple syllogism, the Posterior Analytics demonstrative syllogism, the Topics the 
dialectical syllogism, and the Sophistical Refutations the contentious syllogism. In this 
picture, rhetoric could not find any room as well as the other sermocinal art, 
grammar, whilst dialectic was subordinated to the general logic.193 
Several features characterizing terministic views about logic and its subdivision into 
parts were present in many commentaries on the Topics, which were produced from 
the 1230s to the 1280s in Paris – namely in the writings attributed to: 1) an 
                                       
192 See Green-Pedersen, The tradition, pp. 225-226 and pp. 382-387, A.1, A.5, A.7, A.8-A.11. 
193 Cf. Marmo, “Suspicio”, esp. pp. 156-158. 
82 
 
unidentified Robert (A.7);194 2) a Robertus Anglicus (A. 10);195 3) Robertus de 
Cilnac(h)obi (perhaps Kilwardby; A.1);196 4) Adenulphus de Anagni (A.11);197 5) an 
anonymous commentator which we shall label A.9;198 6) Elias (A.14).199 The same 
general characteristics are exhibited by Albert the Great’s Expositio (A.2),200 which 
was probably written in Cologne.  
                                       
194 Robert’s commentary does not include book 8 and is known only from a manuscript preserved in 
Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Fundo Alcobaça 175 (378), ff. 1ra-113ra, to which I will refer 
in my analysis of Robert’s commentary. According to Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 225 and p. 
385, this commentary is “probably the earliest extant” one, he dates it to the 1230s, Paris. Perhaps, a 
terminus post quem is the 1227-1229, the date of composition of Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on 
the Aristotelian Posterior Analytics. Robert (A.7) the commentator of the Topics indeed spoke of 
contingentia nata when referring to things that happen in most cases (f. 25va-vb: “omne praedicatum 
dialecticum est contingens natum vel in pluribus hoc est ad utrumlibet”), an expression which was 
used by Robert Grosseteste and Robert Kilwardby (R. Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum 
Analyticorum libros, I, 2, ed. by P. B. Rossi, Firenze: L. Olschki, 1981, p. 99; cf. also R. Kilwardby, Notulae 
Libri Posteriorum, in D. Cannone, Le ‘Notule libri Posteriorum’ di Robert Kilwardby nella tradizione esegetica 
latina medievale del XIII secolo, 2 vols., PhD diss. University of Cassino–University “La Sapienza” of 
Rome, 2003–2004, vol. 1, pp. 31-32; see P. B. Rossi, “Robert Grosseteste and the Object of Scientific 
Knowledge”, in J. McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 1995, pp. 53-75). 
195 For Robertus Anglicus (A.10) see Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 386; I will quote from the only 
known manuscript containing his commentary, preserved in Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Canon. 
403, ff. 182ra-221rb. 
196 The only known copy of Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1)’s commentary is in Florence: Biblioteca 
Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. B.4.1618, ff. 95ra-151rb; Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 382. A 
transcription of some parts of book 1 and a of a passage of book two are provided by O. Weijers, 
“Le commentaire sur les ‘Topiques’ d’Aristote attribué à Robert Kilwardby (ms. Florence, B.N.C. 
Conv. Soppr. B.4.1618)”, in Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 6 (1995), pp. 107-143, 
308-310; some words of Weijers’ transcription should be corrected: p. 124, erratum 
‘predica<men>torum’ – corrige ‘predicatorum’; erratum ‘inventum’ (ms). –  corrige ‘inventio’; pp. 126-
127, erratum ‘quo ad’ – corrige ‘quoad’; p. 130, erratum ‘demonstrativo’ – corrige ‘demonstratio’; pp. 
134-136 all the occurrences of ‘predicamenta/ predicamentis/predicamentorum’ should be corrected 
in ‘predicata/predicatis/predicatorum’. 
197 The commentary written by Adenulphus de Anagni (A.11) is contained in six manuscripts, listed 
by Green-Pedersen, The tradition, p. 387. According to Ott, the commentary is preserved in two 
redactions: 1) mss.: Brugge, Perugia, Cesena, Cambridge, Münich; 2) Firenze, which is an abridged 
version. I used the Cesena manuscript, Biblioteca Malatestiana, Plut. D. XXVI.3, ff. 43ra-106vb, which 
was produced in the 14th century; the marginal glosses contained excerpts from the commentary of 
Angelus de Camerinio (“totum quod est in marginibus istius libri est additum de scripto fratri Angeli 
de Camerino in 4 primis libris et in 8” f. 106vb; for Angelus see infra, ch. 4) and then owned by 
Giovanni Marco da Rimini (d. 1474), Novello Malatesta’s physician. For the two different redactions 
see L. Ott, “Die Wissenschaftslehre des Adenulf von Anagni”, in Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson de 
l’Académie Française, Toronto-Paris: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies – Libraire Philosophique 
J. Vrin, 1959, p. 466; Weijers, “Le commentaire”, pp. 114-119; Ead., “The Evolution”. 
198 This anonymous fragmentary commentary, which Green-Pedersen dates to the 1250s, is preserved 
in a unique manuscript, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. lat., 1276, ff. 155va-160vb, to which I will 
refer. See Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 386, A.9. 
199 The commentary attributed to Elias, who does not coincide with Elia Bruneti, contains a 
paraphrase on the eight books of the Topics. I used the manuscript preserved at the Vatican Library, 
Vat. Lat. 4883, ff. 56ra-88rb; see Green-Pedersen, The tradition, p. 389, A.14. 
200 Green-Pedersen, The tradition, pp. 382-383. 
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Many of these authors agreed in considering logic a rational or sermocinal science201 
and having as its subject matter syllogism in general. Usually, they divided this 
discipline as well as the books of the ‘standard’ Organon penes differentias 
syllogismorum, and assigned to dialectic the study of dialectical syllogism, which was 
dealt with in the Topics.202 Despite this consensus on general points, differences of 
opinions arose on certain specific arguments.  
3.1.2 A hotly debated topic focused on the principled basis for differentiating the 
various types of syllogisms among them. Since syllogism was deemed to be a 
hylomorphic compounded resulting from the union of a matter and a form, authors 
discussed whether matter or form was the appropriate criterion for discriminating 
between the various kinds of syllogisms. Robert (A.7), Robertus Anglicus (A. 10), 
Adenulphus de Anagni (A.11) and Albert the Great (A.2) subscribed to the doctrine 
of the diversity of forms between the various kinds of syllogisms. They maintained 
that syllogisms differentiated essentialiter that is in virtue of different specific forms 
and assigned a specific form to dialectical syllogism. On the basis of the doctrine of 
the diversity between substantial forms, these masters admitted an unbridgeable 
hiatus between the inventive (topica) and the judicative (analytica/resolutoria) parts of 
logic. 
Other authors, such as Robertus de Cilnac(h)obi (A.1), the anonymous A.9 and Elias 
(A.14) endorsed the opposite opinion of the ‘unity’ of forms and acknowledged a 
mere material differentiation between syllogisms. According to this view, all (valid) 
syllogisms shared the unique form - that of the syllogismus simpliciter described in 
the Prior Analytics. This form descended into different matters – necessary, probable, 
impossible – thus producing various species of deductions, which were degrading 
instantiations of the simple syllogism, from the perfect demonstrative syllogism to 
                                       
201 Robertus Anglicus (A.10), f. 182ra: “Totum negotium logicum est de sermone […] de illo sermone 
per quem significatur opus rationis quod est ordinare causam ad effectum […] cum huiusmodi sit 
syllogismus quia omnis syllogismus significat ordinationem causae quae est vel consequendi vel 
essendi ad effectum”. This passage is present almost verbatim in Adenulphus (A.6), f. 43ra. Also 
Robert de Cilnacobi (A.1) qualified logic as a sermoncinal or rational science: A.1, f. 95rb, Weijers, 
“Le commentaire”, p. 124. On Adenulphus’ prologue see Ott, “Die Wissenschaftslehre”, esp. pp. 480-
490; C. Lafleur-J. Carrier, L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du “Guide de l’étudiant” 
du ms. Ripoll 109, Turnhout: Brepols, 1997, 2 vols., esp. vol. 2, pp. 421-446. 
202 Frequently, they included the ars temptativa in the domain of dialectic. 
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the imperfect fallacious syllogism.203 Unlike the alternative pluralist view, the 
theory of the unity of forms entailed a less rigid separation between the parts of 
logic, so that discovery and judgement were considered continuous sciences.  
The first chapter of the Topics invited the masters to debate the issue about the 
principle in virtue of which syllogisms were distinguished from each other. Here 
indeed Aristotle had written that “primum igitur dicendum quid est syllogismus et 
quae eius differentiae”. He had then defined deduction (syllogismus) in general as a 
‘discourse’ (oratio) in which the conclusion was necessarily drawn from the 
propositions or premises (“oratio in qua positis quibusdam aliquid aliud a positis ex 
necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt”).204 Subsequently, the Stagirite had 
explained the four types of deduction, namely demonstration (demonstratio), fallacy 
(paralogismus), dialectical and contentious syllogisms (dialecticus and litigiosus), in 
relation to the diversity of their respective matters, namely their premises: 
 
 
Demonstratio ergo est quando ex veris et primis syllogismus erit, aut ex talibus 
quae per aliqua prima et vera eius quae circa ipsa est cognitionis principium 
sumpserint. Dialecticus autem syllogismus qui ex probabilibus est syllogizatus 
[…] Litigiosus autem est syllogismus qui ex his quae videntur probabilia non 
sunt autem, et qui ex probabilibus aut his quae videntur probabilia est apparens 
[…] primus quidem eorum qui dicti sunt [scil. qui ex his quae videntur 
probabilia non sunt] litigiosus syllogismus et syllogismus dicatur. Reliquus vero 
litigiosus quidem syllogismus, syllogismus autem non, eo quod videtur quidem 
                                       
203 More precisely, these authors acknowledged a plurality of matters, proximate or 
arranged/complete and remote/unarranged. The idea of the unity of the syllogistic form also 
characterized some Commentaries on the Prior Analytics produced in that same period, such as 
Robert Kilwardby and the so called Anonymous Aurelianensis III. On the relevance of the couple 
matter-form see J. Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions”. For Robert Kilwardby, see the analysis 
provided by P. Thom, Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2007, 
esp. pp. 41-74; for the text of the Anonymous Aurelianensis see S. Ebbesen, “Analyzing Syllogisms or 
Anonymus Aurelianensis III - the (presumably) Earliest Extant Latin commentary on the Prior 
Analytics, and its Greek model”, in Cahiers de l’institut du moyen-âge grec et latin 37 (1981), pp. 1-20. 
204 “First, then, we must say what deduction is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical 
deduction […] Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something 
other than these necessarily comes about through them” (Aristotle, Top. I.1, 100a21-26; AL, p. 5, 5-10; 
Engl. tr. in Barnes, Complete woks, vol. 1, p. 166; italics are mine). This definition of syllogism is 
almost identical to that found in the Prior Analytics, I.1, 24b18-20 and is very close to the Boethian 
definition of syllogism given in the De topicis differentiis. 
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syllogizare, non tamen syllogizatur. Amplius autem praeter omnes qui dicti sunt 
syllogismos ex his quae sunt circa aliquas disciplinas convenientia fiunt 
paralogismi […] Species igitur syllogismorum, ut figuraliter sit complecti, sint 
quae dictae sunt.205 
 
3.1.3 Thus, Aristotle’s words seemed to hint at the formal unity between syllogisms 
insofar as he had qualified the four varieties of syllogisms as species falling under the 
genus oratio and had pointed that they differed in virtue of their diverse matters. 
This solution, however, was problematic in many respects.  
More generally, it was largely acknowledged that a genus was divided into species 
by the (inseparable) differences, as stated by Porphyry,206 and not in virtue of the 
matter. Moreover, the genus was “predicated synonymously of the species under 
them”. A genus and the (inseparable) differences dividing it did not admit of any 
gradation, and it could not be predicated more or less of the species, as any beginner 
student of logic could read in the Isagoge.207 With regard to the genus syllogism, this 
implied that the four types of syllogisms were all at the same level in the division of 
the set ‘syllogism’. Or, in other words, the theory of the unity of form of syllogisms 
had as unwanted consequence that a fallacy or a formal contentious deduction was 
put on an equal footing with demonstration - which was normally deemed to be the 
highest form of deduction. Furthermore, this view was also questionable from an 
epistemological perspective. In fact, the material differentiation between syllogisms 
was grounded on the diverse epistemic status of their premises, which implied an 
epistemological distinction between the species of deductions. From this 
                                       
205 “It is a demonstration, when the premises from which the deduction starts are true and primitive, 
or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primitive 
and true; and it is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions […] Again, a deduction 
is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be reputable, but are not really such, or again if 
it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be reputable […] So then, of the 
contentious deductions mentioned, the former really deserves to be called deduction, but the other 
should be called contentious deductions, but not deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does not really do so. 
Further, besides all the deductions we have mentioned there are the fallacies that start from the 
premises peculiar to the special sciences […] The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the 
species of deduction” (Aristotle, Top. I.1, esp. 100a26-101a19; AL, pp. 5,6 - 6,25; Engl. tr. in Barnes, 
Complete woks, vol. 1, pp. 166-167; italics are mine). 
206 Porphyry, Isagoge, 9,4-5. 
207 Porphyry, Isagoge, 15,20-21 (Engl. tr. in Porphyry, Introduction, ed. by J. Barnes, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2006, p. 14). 
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perspective, the diverse types of deductions were not on the same level since since 
they generated various types of beliefs in the cognitive agent. A demonstrative 
syllogism engendred certain knowledge, while a dialectical syllogism produced a 
belief that fell short of certitude. 
More specifically, then, the uniqueness of the syllogistic form appeared to be 
controversial in the case of contentious or sophistical deductions, some of which, 
claimed Aristotle, should not be called deductions, since they deduced only 
apparently. Insofar as they were formally invalid, therefore, some sophistical 
syllogisms were not members of the set ‘syllogism’. However, the Stagirite had also 
added that these syllogisms “should be called contentious deductions”, thus 
allowing for these contentious deductions to be members of the subset 
‘contentious/sophistical deduction’. How could the ‘contentious deductions-not-
deductions’ simultaneously be excluded from the set ‘syllogism’, whilst belonging 
to its subset ‘contentious/sophistical deduction’? How could the Aristotelian 
affirmation that a ‘contentious deduction-not-deduction’ “should be called 
contentious deductions, but not deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does not 
really do so” be coherently read? 
An escamotage for overcoming these difficulties was provided by Aristotle himself, 
who had affirmed that his exposition had been developed figuraliter (τύπῳ), a term 
which could be interpreted in various ways, one of which is as a not strictly technical 
explanation. 
If the supporters of the unity of the form had to face many puzzling problems, a no 
less difficult task awaited the advocates of the plurality of forms, since they had to 
harmonize their own views with the text of the Topics mentioned above. 
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3.2. The Notitiae supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis of Robert (A.7). 
 
3.2.1.1 Probably, the most ancient known Latin commentary on Aristotle’s Topics is 
the Notitiae supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis written in the second quarter of the 13th 
century by a master of the Parisian Faculty of Art, whom in the manuscript 
preserving his work is named Robert (A.7).208 This lectio-commentary offers an 
articulated and detailed exposition of the text, that opens a window on debates about 
logic and dialectic which lie behind some issue raised in the Notitae. Hence it 
furnishes a valuable testimony of the difficulties faced by the earlier commentators 
while reading the Topics, as well as of their attempts to produce convincing answers 
to the questions related to the text. Moreover, Robert’s work witnesses on the one 
hand the exegetical efforts of these earlier masters to reconcile the century-old 
Boethian tradition of the topics with the emerging Aristotelian tradition, and on the 
other hand the endeavours of commentators to place their reflections within broader 
philosophical debates. 
According to Robert, logic concerned syllogism in general (sillogismus simpliciter) as 
its subject-matter and operated through intentions, namely high-level concepts.209 
He divided this discipline, as well as the books which formed the logica nova, 
according to the constitutive elements of syllogism (secundum sillogismi differentias). 
Thus, he assigned to each part of logic, except for fallacy (paralogismus), the study of 
one of the types of syllogism that Aristotle had enumerated at the beginning of the 
Topics. In his vew, therefore, general logic embraced three doctrines or arts, namely 
                                       
208 In his exposition of the text, Robert often presented alternative exegeses of the passages analyzed, 
and at times referred to an expositor. On this basis, it would be not implausible that Robert’s 
commentary is the earliest commentary known to us, but that it was not the earliest commentary 
absolutely speaking. 
209 Robert did not expand upon the issue concerning the relation between logic and the arts of the 
trivium, and he treated the question only incidentally: “rethoricae propositiones et grammatice uno 
modo continentur sub logicis propositionibus, alio modo opponuntur logicis propositionibus. Logica 
enim dicitur a logos quod est ‘sermo’ vel ‘ratio’. ‘Ratio’ autem potest esse virtus discernendi veri et 
falsi, et sic logica opponitur grammaticae et rethoricae cum sint distincta congenerari vel in 
congenerari suasionis vel dissuasionis. Vel potest esse ‘ratio’ virtus apprehensiva animae rationalis” 
(A.7, f. 28rb). 
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the demonstrativa, the dialectica, and the sophistica, each of which mapped a book of 
the logica nova.210  
But how did Robert read the Aristotelian definition of syllogism, given in the 
opening lines of the Topics? And how did he understand the differentiae mentioned 
therein? Firstly, it should be noted that according to Robert, the syllogism dealt with 
in this passage, and more generally in the Topics, was the categorical syllogism. 
Strictly speaking, claimed Robert, the hypothetical syllogism could not be 
considered a syllogism since it inferred its conclusion probably, not necessarily.211 
Similarly to Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus de Anagni (A.11), Robert 
explained the definition of syllogism in the light of the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
causes by reducing all its constitutive elements to each of the four causes.212 From 
this standpoint, the propositions or premises of a syllogism amounted to its material 
cause; whilst the efficient cause of the deduction consisted in the proper 
arrangement of terms and propositions, which yielded the conclusion by 
determining the valid moods in each figure syllogism. The conclusion itself was in 
turn the final cause, insofar as any syllogism pointed to the conclusion. The formal 
cause, then, coincided with the necessary relation of logical consequence of the 
syllogism.213 This preliminary explanation was followed by an extensive literal 
                                       
210 A.7, f. 6vb: “Cum enim doctrinae dividantur secundum sillogismi differentias, sunt autem solum 
tres doctrinae sub doctrina quae est de sillogismo simpliciter, quare videbitur quod solum sint tres 
differentiae sillogismorum. Et sic apparebit quod falsigraphus non sit aliqua differentia sillogismi”. 
211 A.7, f. 34vb (commenting on Topics, II.2, 108b10): “Sillogismus ex ypotesi est sillogismus cuius 
illatio non est necessaria, sed probabilis, et non tenet nisi per conditionem et suppositionem”. 
Adenulphus (A.11) agreed with Robert that the hypothetical syllogism inferred per suppositionem 
starting from premises in which the similitude between the terms was not evident. He deemed this 
kind of syllogism to be useless since its probative function could be performed by the topic from a 
similar thing: “per unum simile probatur aliud simile dyalectice, ergo non exigitur quod fiat ex 
ypotesi” (A. 11, f. 55ra). 
212 A.7, f. 3vb: “Diffinitio sillogismi hic posita [scil. oratio in qua positis quibusdam aliquid aliud a 
positis ex necessitate accidit per ea quae posita sunt] quantum pertinet ad propositum sic est 
exponenda, quia melius habet exponi in libro Priorum ubi principaliter est intentio de sillogismo 
simpliciter. Sicut enim res naturales componuntur ex quatuor causis, similiter et sillogismus. Et illae 
quatuor causae tanguntur in diffinitione sillogismi”; see also f. 1rb-va; 4rb. For Robertus Anglicus 
(A.10), see f. 182ra-rb; for Adenulphus (A.11), see f. 44rb. This exegesis was not unusual, it was 
adopted by Robert Kilwardby in commenting the opening lines of the Prior Analytics. Albert did not 
used it in his commentary on the Topics (1.1.1). 
213 A.7, f. 3vb: “Per hoc enim quod dicit quibusdam tangitur causa materialis, quia propositiones, in 
quantum sunt unae, sunt causa materialis sillogismi; positis tangitur ordinatio terminorum et 
propositionum in modo et figura: propositiones autem et termini, in quantum modificati et figurati 
sunt, sunt causa efficiens conclusionis; de necessitate tangitur causa formalis quia necessitas est 
dispositio illationis propositionum ad conclusionem, quae illatio est causa formalis sillogismi; per 
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exegesis of the elements making up the definition of syllogism, namely the genus 
‘discourse’ (oratio) and the various differences. According to Robert, at the opening 
of the Prior Analytics and of the Topics, Aristotle intended to define the inferring 
syllogism through the dismissal of the other species of discourses that fall short of 
syllogism (aliae orationes que non sunt sillogismi). The differentiae therefore served for 
excluding those discourses: 1) which were not syllogisms neither in potency nor in 
act, such as invalid arguments, conversion and petitio principii; and 2) which were 
not syllogisms actually, such as example, enthymeme and induction, which needed 
to be reduced to syllogism in order to be formally valid.214  
3.2.1.2 Robert’s exposition of the dividing differences is indicative of his inclination 
toward the theory of the plurality of forms. Indeed along with his own, Robert 
mentioned two alternative explanations of the sense of the differentiae. According to 
one view, the differences aimed at removing the fallacies in dictione and extra 
dictione from the set ‘syllogism’.215 And the second interpretation took the 
differences as excluding the three species of reasoning, namely induction, 
enthymeme and example.216 Robert dismissed these anonymous exegeses as 
erroneous, since they applied the differentiae to the genus ratiocinatio or reasoning, 
rather than to the genus oratio. In doing so, they confused the inferring syllogism 
(sillogismus inferens), which Aristotle meant to define in the opening of the Topics, 
                                       
hoc quod dicitur aliud tangitur causa finalis, quae quidem est conclusio”. Albert the Great offered a 
similar explanation, even though he expressed it through its long-winded prose (1.1.3). 
214 A.7, f. 3vb. Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 183vb) and Adenulphus (A.11, f. 45ra-rb) offered an 
abridged version of Robert’s explanation and mentioned only the first of the two interpretations, 
which aimed at removing the fallacies. A similar reading of the text is found in the marginal glosses 
which accompany the translation of the Topics in the manuscript Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, ms, 
658, f. 100r (available on line: 
http://www.internetculturale.it/jmms/iccuviewer/iccu.jsp?id=oai%3Awww.internetculturale.sbn
.it%2FTeca%3A20%3ANT0000%3APG0213_ms.658&mode=all&teca=MagTeca+-+ICCU). On this 
13th manuscript, which is one of the most important in the tradition of the translation of the Topics, 
see infra, ch. 5.2.  
215 This elucidation of the Aristotelian definition of syllogism was widespread. It is found in many 
logical Summae from the 12th and 13th centuries, e.g. William of Sherwood (see Introductiones in 
logicam, in C. H. Lohr – P. Kunze – B. Mussler, “William of Sherwood, ‘Introductiones in Logicam’ 
critical text”, in Traditio 39 (1983), pp. 219-299, here p. 241) as well as at the beginning of Kilwardby’s 
commentary on the Prior Analytics. 
216 This exegesis traces back to Boethius and is found also in the 12th and 13th century Summae as well 
as in commentaries on the Prior Analytics. Cf. Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, in Id., Opera Omnia II, 
ed. by J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina 64, Paris, 1860, 821B-C; Anonymus Aurelianensis III, in Ebbesen, 
“Analyzing Syllogisms, pp. 17-19. 
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with the probative syllogism (notum faciens or probans sive ad propositum).217 Oratio 
was indeed the genus of the inferring syllogism (sillogismus inferens), whose 
instantiation was the sillogismus simpliciter. Whilst ratiocinatio was the genus of 
probative syllogism, whose instantiation were the demonstrative and dialectical 
syllogisms:  
 
Et quia argumentum et ratiocinatio sunt idem, argumentum autem est ‘ratio rei 
dubie faciens fidem’ [cf. Boethius, DTD, I], manifestum est quod ratiocinatio 
semper est fidem faciens et notitiam, et ita semper est in terminis specialibus. 
Unde sillogismus notum faciens potest esse species ratiocinationis, sed 
sillogismus inferens non est species eius. Et propter hoc, cum hic diffiniatur 
sillogismus in quantum est inferens, et hoc modo non est species ratiocinationis, 
propter hoc non diffinitur per ratiocinationem. Diffinitur autem per orationem 
quia sillogismus in quantum est inferens est ratio exterior sive ‘ad rationem 
exterius’ [An. Post. I.10, 76b24-25]. Oratio autem est ‘oris ratio’ et ita est ratio 
exterior. Et ideo diffinitur per orationem sillogismus hic et non per 
ratiocinationem.218 
 
What does exactly mean that “duplex est syllogismus, inferens scilicet et notum 
faciens”, as claimed by Robert? These two species of syllogism seem to embody two 
autonomous facets of it. We would do well to interpret the differentiation between 
inferring and probative syllogisms as an attempt made by the advocates of the 
                                       
217 “Ad propositum” might derive from the Prior Analytics, I.27, 43a22, where Aristotle begins the 
section Pr. An. I.27-31 devoted to how to find the premises by saying: “We must now say how we 
may ourselves always have a supply of deductions in reference to the problem and by what road we 
may reach the principles relative to the problems” (“Quomodo autem ipsi idonei erimus semper 
syllogismorum ad propositum”) (Aristotle, Complete Works, vol. 1, p.68; AL, p. 58,22-23). The distinction 
between the inferens and probans syllogisms is found in other logical texts of the same period, such as 
Peter of Spain’s Tractatus: “Fallacia ista [scil. de petitione eius quod est in principio] non impedit 
sillogismum inferentem, sed probantem. Nam sillogismorum alius est inferens tantum, alius inferens 
et probans” (Peter of Spain, Tractatus, VII.148, p. 168). It is worth noting that Robert did not pair 
probans and inferens: for him a syllogism is either ‘inferens’ or ‘probans sive notum faciens’. For other 
authors who employed this division see J. Pinborg, Logica e semantica nel Medioevo, Torino: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 1984, pp. 87-88. 
218 A.7, f. 4va. Also Adenulphus (A.11, f. 45ra) and Robertus Anglicus (A.10) acknowledged that the 
definition of the syllogism given in the Topics concerned the “syllogismus inferens […] et quia 
inferens solum est oris ratio, ideo genus propinquum est oratio et non ratiocinatio” (A.10, f. 183vb). 
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plurality of forms to conceptually differentiate between the logical and the 
epistemological functions of syllogisms.  
Robert described the inferring syllogism as an abstract type whose concrete token 
was the sillogismus simpliciter: the sillogismus inferens was an exemplar form or 
paradigm, which existed when instantiated by the simple syllogism. The simple 
syllogism was a hylomorphic compounded of a general matter, which some authors 
named materia essentialis, and of a form. The material elements were the qualified 
and quantified propositions, whose truth-value was not considered in this context. 
Constitutive material principles of the simple syllogism were also the simple 
components of propositions, namely the subject and predicate – Robert did not 
mention the copula –, which were treated as abstract terms deprived of any 
signification, replaceable by dummy letters. The proper disposition of the terms in 
the propositions, known as the syllogism’s figure, and the correct arrangement of 
the premises on the basis of their quantity and quality, or mood of the syllogism, 
determined the valid syllogistic schemes. These argument-schemata were thus 
considered the formal cause or form of both the inferring and simple syllogisms.219 
In his explanation from the causes, the commentator seemed to privilege the form 
over the other three causes; accordingly, the formal principle took prominence over 
the material principles in his hylomorphic analysis of syllogisms. 
While Robert’s account of the inferring and simple syllogisms relied on 
Aristotle, in his description of the probative syllogism he departed from the Stagirite, 
and turned toward Boethius and his definitions of reasoning, argument and 
argumentation, which had an epistemological flavour. Robert indeed considered the 
probative syllogism to be a species of the genus ratiocinatio. The ratiocinatio or 
reasoning was nothing other than the Boethian’s argumentum, namely the “reason 
producing belief regarding a matter [that is] in doubt”. Ratiocinatio divided into two 
                                       
219 A.7, f. 4vb: “Sillogismus inferens est sillogismus exemplaris et hoc est in materia generali et dicitur 
esse sillogismus secundum formam. Sed est forma quae est exemplar vel paradigma et talis 
sillogismus habet esse in materia generali ut: “omne b. est a.: omne c. est b.; ergo omne c. est a”. Isti 
vero termini “a.b.c”. aliqua significatione speciale non habent, sed b. significat omne illud quod 
potest subici vel probari et c. similiter. Unde b. non est signum alicuis rei specialis, sed solum nota 
sui ordinis et sui situs, unde significat solum suam positionem et ordinem”.  
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perfect species, syllogism and induction,220 whose imperfect subspecies were 
enthymeme and example. Consistently, Robert admitted that the two species of 
dialectical reasoning, syllogism and induction, were on the same level and that their 
subspecies had to be reduced to the respective species, namely the example to 
induction and the enthymeme to syllogism. Whereas from the standpoint of the 
oratio, induction, enthymeme and example were imperfect and needed therefore to 
be reduced to the syllogistic form.221 
Unlike the inferring syllogism, which was in materia generali and aimed at the 
necessary deduction of the conclusion, the probative syllogism applied to specific 
matters and aimed at making the conclusion known or opined. Starting from what 
was prior and more known, the probative syllogism was meant to produce certitude 
                                       
220 Robert applied the distinction between inferens and probans/notum faciens also to induction. 
Considered as illatio or sillogismus inductionis, it was described in the Posterior Analytics II.19 and was 
an imperfect deduction. As notum faciens, namely as it was described in the Topics, induction was a 
perfect ratiocinatio since its formal principle was a locus, the topic from the whole: “Dupliciter est 
inductio: est inductio in terminis generalibus et specialibus. Sed in terminis generalibus sic est 
inferens solum, sed in specialibus sic est notum faciens. Dico ergo, ut visum est superius, quod hic 
[Top. I.12] determinat de inductione prout est notum faciens. Item determinat de inductione 
dialectica. Sed omnis inductio dialectica fit respectu alicuius praedicati, sed omne praedicatum 
dialecticum est contingens natum vel in pluribus, hoc est ad utrumlibet. Dico ergo quod quando fit 
inductio respectu alicuius contingentis natis, tunc non oportet omnia singularia sumere. Et hac de 
causa quia illud praedicatum inhaerat partibus ratione sui totius, habito ergo in talibus praedicatis 
quae insunt particularibus per suum totum quod quibusdam inest illud et habetur quod omnibus, 
dico ergo quod respectu talis praedicati non oportuit sumere omnia particularia. Sed potuit esse tale 
praedicatum quod fuit contingens ad utrumlibet et istud non infuit partibus ratione sui totius, sed 
ratione partium. Tale autem <praedicatum> alicui potuit abesse vel multis, et propter hoc respectu 
talis praedicati omnia singularia sumere oportet. Et similiter est quando est inductio in terminis 
generalibus. Tunc enim praedicatum non convenit partibus ratione sui totius quia non est 
argumentatio per habitudines. Et propter hoc dicit ibi [Post. An. II.19] Aristoteles loquens in terminis 
generalibus quod inductio est per omnia” (A.7, f. 25va-vb). 
221 A.7, f. 25va: “Dico ergo quod ipsa inductio quantum ad illationem suam imperfecta est respectu 
sillogismi et quantum ad ipsam reducitur ad sillogismum. Et non quantum ad notum facere […] 
Postea dubitatur. Cum omnes species ratiocinationis reducantur ad sillogismum, quem est perfecta 
ratiocinatio inter illas species, similiter videtur quod cum demonstrativus sillogismus sit species 
completissima omnium specierum sillogismi quod ad illam omnes species sillogismi debent reduci. 
Solutio huius est quia omnes species ratiocinationis ad sillogismum reducuntur ratione suae illationis et non 
ratione suae notificationis. Sed ipsae species sillogismorum ad sillogismum demonstrativum non 
potuerunt reduci ratione illationis quia essentialis est ratio illationis in omnibus speciebus 
sillogismorum”. Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus (A.11) subscribed to the same opinion 
(A.10, f. 189rb-va; A. 11, f. 51vb). Albert specified that whilst syllogism and induction were complete 
dialectical reasoning, nevertheless the genus ratiocinatio dialectica was predicated by analogy of them 
(Albertus, Topica, 1.3.4, p. 273a). These authors agreed that taken as ratiocinationes, example and 
enthymeme needed to be reduced to their perfect species, respectively the induction and the 
syllogism. Robert did not treat the subject, but we might suppose that in the reduction of enthymeme 
to the syllogistic form, the locus maxima had the role of the internal warrant, thus functioning as the 
major premise. 
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or opinion about the doubted proposition. Similarly to the inferring syllogism, 
Robert considered the syllogism notum faciens or probans as a type whose concrete 
instantiations were the demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms. Of the various 
species of ratiocinationes, we will concentrate on the dialectical syllogism since it was 
the subject matter of dialectic and of the Topics.  
3.2.1.3 The commentator also applied the doctrine of the causes to dialectical 
syllogism, although he probed the material and formal causes alone, since he 
analysed the dialectical syllogism in hylomorphic terms. The material principles of 
dialectical syllogism were the dialectical terms, propositions and problems, upon 
which Aristotle had expanded in the first book of the Topics.222 From the Aristotelian 
perspective, the most important feature of dialectical propositions, or premises, was 
their being ‘probable’, in virtue of which they were differentiated from the 
demonstrative ones. Indeed within the dialectical context, quantification, 
qualification, truth-value and necessity of propositions were not momentous. In 
order to be assumed as a premise in a dialectical reasoning, a dialectical proposition 
was required to be more evident (notius), that is to have a higher degree of 
probability than the conclusion to prove it true:  
 
Et differentia est inter sillogismum inferentem et notum facientem quoniam 
propositio, quantum ad has differentias, universale <et> particulare, est 
principium <materiale> sillogismi inferentis; quantum ad has differentias, prius 
et notius, est principium <materiale> sillogismi notum facientis. Unde 
sillogismus inferens indifferenter est in terminibus generalibus et specialibus, 
sillogismus notum faciens <est> solum in terminis specialibus.223 
                                       
222 According to Robert (A.7), the first book of the Topics dealt with the material principles of 
dialectical syllogism, while the books from 2 to 7 treated the formal principles or rationes inferendi of 
dialectical syllogism, namely the loci. These books were in turn arranged around the four types of 
dialectical problems each of which related to one of the four predicables. Robert linked the books 1-
7 to the main utility of dialectic mentioned by Aristotle, that is “for the study of the philosophical 
sciences” and “in relation to the principles used in the several sciences” (Top. I.2, 101a34-38). The 
eighth book explained the use of dialectical syllogism in relation to the other two utilities of dialectic, 
that is for intellectual training and casual encounters. Robert’s arrangement of the Topics, which was 
shared also by Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 189ra and 192ra) and Albert the Great seemed to be limited 
to the dialectica docens and its subject-matter alone. Albert specified that the first seven books dealt 
with the dialectica docens, while the last book dealt with the usus dialecticae, namely the dialectica utens, 
as ars obviativa and exercitativa (8.1.1, p. 492a).  
223 A.7, f. 4va. 
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In the Topics, Aristotle had defined probability in terms of endoxality: the probable 
premises of dialectical syllogism had to be selected from among the probable 
opinions, and propositions believed or accepted by specific groups of people.224 At 
the end of the Prior Analytics, the Stagirite had offered a further, different elucidation 
of probability and probable propositions. There, indeed, they were considered in the 
light of contingency and understood as “what men know to happen or not to 
happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus”.225 This definition 
allowed for the connection between probability and contingency, precisely with 
contingency as two-sides possibility, a notion elucidated by Aristotle in his 
treatment of modal propositions and modal syllogistic in the Prior Analytics.226 
Robert often conflated the modal and the epistemological-endoxal account of 
probability into one account, and consequently employed the terms probable and 
contingent interchangeably when dealing with probable propositions.227 In the first 
book, he did not clearly demarcate between the proposition as matter of syllogisms 
on the one hand and the subject-matter of the proposition on the other hand, 
between a probable-contingent proposition – namely a proposition in which there 
                                       
224 See supra, ch. 2.2. 
225 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.27, 70a3-5, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 112; the Latin translation 
rendered ‘probability (τό είκός)’ as ‘verisimilis’: “Verisimile quidem est propositio probabilis; quod 
enim ut in pluribus sciunt sic factum vel non factum aut esse aut non esse” (Aristoteles, Analytica 
Priora, in Aristoteles Latinus, III 1-4:  Analytica Translatio Boethii, Recensio Florentina, Bruges-Paris: 
Desclée de Brouwer, 1962, p. 137, 10-12). Cf. also Posterior Analytics, I.30, 87b22. 
226 In the thirteenth chapter of the first book of the Prior Analytics (I.13, 32b5-11), which expanded 
upon possibility propositions, the Stagirite had clarified the two meanings of ‘being possible’ 
(contingere). In one sense, possibility-contingency meant those things which were neither impossible 
nor necessary and which were said to “happen for the most part and fall short of necessity, e.g. a man’s 
turning grey […] or generally what naturally belongs to a thing”. In the second sense, possibility 
amounted to the indeterminate contingency and meant things are not impossible and “which can be 
both thus and not thus”.  
227 A.7, f. 7vb: “Propositio habet esse ab ordine praedicati ad subiectum. Huiusmodi ordinatio est 
secundum idemptitatem et haec idemptitas aliquando est substantialis, aliquando accidentalis. 
Quando est substantialis, tunc est propositio necessaria, quando est accidentalis, tunc est propositio 
contingens. Et sic possibile est propositiones ex quibus fit illatio esse contingentes vel necessarias. 
Sillogismus vero perficitur a conclusione illata quae conclusio causalis est, et ita dicit comparationem 
causae ad causatum. Ordinatio ergo quae est in sillogismo est causae ad causatum. Huiusmodi 
ordinatio est essentialis unde cum est, semper est, et est necessaria; cum vero non est, tunc est 
impossibilis”. However, while discussining the topic of accident concerning things which occur of 
necessity, for the most part or ad utrumlibet (Top., II.2, 109b14-29) Robert (A.7) was more precise. Here, 
indeed, the commentator distinguished clearly between natural and logical modalities (A.7, f. 44rb-
va). 
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occurs a modal operator such as “all human are possibly healthy” – and an assertoric 
proposition whose content was a contingent fact, such as “All mothers love their 
children”, which is not a modal possibility proposition, yet is possibly true. Despite 
the absence of any overt claim about that, Robert seemed to consistently treat 
demonstrative syllogisms, whose matter was necessary, and dialectical syllogisms, 
whose matter was contingent, not as modal syllogisms but as assertoric syllogisms 
whose premises described necessary or contingent states of affairs. 
  An illuminating case of Robert’s oscillating attitude is his treatment of the variety 
of syllogisms’ matters listed by Aristotle in his description of syllogisms (Topics, I.1). 
Robert explained it in the light of the basic differentiation between necessary and 
contingent beings. Necessary things were the necessary matter of the most perfect 
argumentation (demonstratio) and were therefore dealt with by the most perfect 
science, namely the demonstrativa or metaphysics, which through demonstrative 
reasoning produced certitudo about necessary things in the epistemic agent. 
Contingent things which happened in most cases (frequenter et ut in pluribus) were 
intrinsically uncertain and were the probable matter of dialectical syllogism.228 The 
indeterminacy of contingent beings at the ontological level was reflected at the 
gnoseological level in terms of uncertain beliefs. The cognitive agent knew 
contingent items through the ‘virtute opinativa’ therefore he could only have 
opinion, namely a reasoned but still not completely certain belief, about them.229 
Contingent beings which happened rarely were the matter of contentious 
syllogisms: 
                                       
228 A.7, f. 1rb: “Cum omnis res supra quas fit demonstratio habeat esse necessarium et perpetuum, et 
hoc modo erit omnis demonstrativa analitica, quia in omni est convertentia terminorum; sed ista 
convertibilitas est secundum naturam rei et non secundum habitudinem terminorum […] omnes 
enim res supra quas dicimus dialecticam esse sunt res probabiles et contingentes et ideo non habent 
esse necessarium”. 
229 Robert did not face the problem of whether a necessary item could be known imperfectly thus not 
insofar as it is necessary but as a contingent item. In order to have an opinion about a doubted 
conclusion, at times multiple dialectical syllogisms are required. Indeed, the dialectical deduction 
might assume a weak middle term or locus: “quando est medium debole ut quando sumitur a loco 
qui est a communiter accidentibus vel ab aliquo alio loco debili, quia igitur facere opinionem non 
convenit cuilibet sillogismo dialectico. Propter hoc non diffinitur per finem suum dialecticus 
sillogismus quia illa diffinitio non esset universalis, sicut diffinitur demonstratio per finem suum […] 
dialectici vero sillogismi per media possunt augeri, plura enim media dialectica possunt adduci ad 
idem ostendendum, potest enim aliquid ostendi per locum a diffinitione, a genere, a simili, ab 
oppositis et sic de aliis” (A.7, f. 5va). Cf. Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 184ra). 
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sillogismi differunt per materiam secundum quod materiam illorum est 
completior et perfectior […] sicut enim quaedam res, quae sunt et quae non 
possunt non esse et haec sunt semper et de necessitate. Huiusmodi autem res 
sunt materia sillogismi demonstrativi. Aliae vero res non sunt neque possunt 
esse et huiusmodi sunt impossibiles et sunt materia sillogismi falsigrafi. Aliae 
vero res sunt quae possunt esse et non esse et huiusmodi sunt contingentes. Sed 
contingens duplex est, quaedam enim contingens est frequenter et in pluribus, 
et de tali contingenti est dialecticus sillogismus, quaedam contingens et raro et 
de tali est litigiosus. Res autem necessariae magis sunt completae quam 
contingentes et res contingentes quam impossibiles.230 
 
Thus, the explanation of the definition of simple syllogism given at the beginning of 
the Topics offered Robert the opportunity to develop a modal interpretation of the 
notion of probability, which eventually described objective features of the world. He 
also spelled out a subjectivist and epistemological interpretation of probability in his 
elucidation of the Aristotelian definition of probabilia (ἔνδοξα) as what “videntur 
omnibus aut pluribus aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime 
notis et probabilibus [et praecipuis]”.231 The commentator explained these lines as 
delineating a gnoseological and endoxal hierarchy. All men were naturally 
equipped with cognitive skills, which needed to be actualized to become fully 
operative. The majority of people, however, did not attain this goal and remained 
within the boundaries of sensible knowledge, which was uncertain and weak. And 
only few people - the wise - achieved intellectual knowledge, which had a higher 
degree of certitude. Only a small minority of savants, then, were able to properly 
actualize all the potentiality of human intellect, which allowed them to grasp the 
most difficult things and to disclose the secreta naturae: 
 
Sciendum autem quod differentiae probabilis accipiuntur a parte videntis et non 
a parte rei visae […] Quoniam acceptio plurium est acceptio debilis et incerta, 
sed acceptio sive visio sapientium est visio certa et firma. Et propter eius 
                                       
230 A.7, f. 4vb; cf. also f. 7va. Cf. Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 182ra). 
231 Aristotle, Topics, I.1, 100a19-24, AL, pp. 5,18-6,1. 
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certitudinem est quod visio paucorum sapientium vel etiam unius sapientis facit 
aliquid esse probabile, sed visio plurium, cum sit incerta et debilis, si sunt pauci 
de numero plurium, non facit aliquid esse probabile. Similiter neque visio 
multorum de numero plurium potest facere aliquid esse probabile, sed oportet 
quod sit visio omnium plurium ad hoc quod illa visio faciat aliquid probabile. 
Et propter hoc non dividitur haec differentia ‘pluribus’ in plures differentiae, 
sicut haec differentia ‘sapientes’ contingit dividere tripliciter. 232  
 
 Robert’s exegesis was characterized by an overt gnoseological tone. The degree of 
development of the cognitive capacities constituted the relevant criterion for 
evaluating the degree of probability of propositions and it replaced the extrinsical 
justification which was proper to the genuine Aristotelian account of endoxality.  
 
3.2.1.4 Unlike the demonstrative syllogism, which shared the form with the simple 
syllogism and added to it the necessary matter, the dialectical syllogism not only 
had its own material principles, but it also had its peculiar formal principles, the 
rationes inferendi or dialectical topics.233  
Robert claimed that the dialectical topics were absolutely necessary and thus they 
could warrant the necessity of the dialectical syllogism. These claims found support 
in the Boethian account of loci and argumenta. Boethius had stated that a locus was 
the sedes argumenti namely the warrant of the inference underlying an argumentum – 
or probative syllogism in Robert’s terminology – whose concrete instance was the 
dialectical syllogism. Boethius had also specified that a locus had two aspects, 
                                       
232 A.7, f. 6ra. In Robertus’ (A.10) and Adenulphus’ (A.11) exegeses, the description of probabilia 
(ἔνδοξα) in terms of cognitive states was combined with the levels of understandability of the object 
known. Moreover, Robertus Anglicus emphasized the epistemological connotation of probability and 
stressed the subjectivity and relativity of that notion by comparing the pair probability-improbability 
with the couple truth-falsehood: “Non similiter se habet probabile ad improbabile sicut verum ad 
falsum quia probabile et improbabile dicunt aliquid a parte nostra, verum et falsum a parte rei. Et 
ideo illud quod videtur oppositum uni potest videri alteri, ideo non sequitur quod si una pars sit 
probabilis, quod altera improbabilis, licet sequatur si una pars vera, quod altera falsa” (A.10, f. 184ra). 
233 A.7, f. 1ra (a transcription is provided by Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 360): “Dialecticus 
syllogismus ultra principium syllogismi simpliciter non addit solum materialia principia, ex quibus 
fiat illatio, sed addit […] principia quae sunt rationes inferendi, scilicet formalia principia, quae loci 
appellantur […] dialecticus syllogismus novam formam addit ultra syllogismum simpliciter”. We 
would do well to understand formal and material principles not as particular instances, but rather as 
two general classes to which belong specific classes. Within the general class of principia materialia are 
the specific classes of type-terms, type-propositions and type-problems. Within the general class of 
principia formalia are the specific classes of the locus ‘maxima propositio’ and of the locus differentiae. 
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namely the locus differentiae and the locus ‘maxima propositio’.234 The maximal 
propositions were known per se, undemonstrated and indemonstrable, and were 
therefore suitable for imparting force to arguments.235 The differences of the 
maximal propositions (locus differentiae) were conceived of by Boethius as general 
terms, such as genus, species, definition, cause.236 And it was the locus differentiae 
that Robert had in mind when he affirmed that the principles of inferences were 
concepts (intentiones) such as genus, definition, species etc. Consistent with his idea 
of the priority of metaphysics over dialectic, Robert claimed that these general 
concepts were derived from being qua being, and therefore they fell into the field of 
metaphysics rather than of dialectic.237 So the dialectician could not provide himself 
with these general concepts, but he could borrow them from the metaphysician or 
demonstrator. The dialectician derived also the necessary maximal propositions – 
such as “whatever is predicated of a species, is predicated of the genus” (“de 
quocumque <praedicatur> species, et genus”) and “whatever is predicated of the 
definition, is predicated also of the thing defined” (“de quocumque <praedicatur> 
diffinitio, et diffinitum”) – from the metaphysician.238 Thus, the dialectical syllogism 
                                       
234 “Argumenti enim sedes partim maxima propositio intelligi potest, partim propositionis maximae 
differentia” (Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1185A, Stump, Boethius’, p. 46). On Boethius’ locus see 
Boethius, De Topicis, esp. bk. 2; E. Stump, “Dialectic and Boethius’ De topicis differentiis”, in Boethius, 
De Topicis, pp. 179-204; Green Pedersen, The tradition, pp. 39-82; Ebbesen, “The Theory of Loci”; 
Magnano, “Il De topicis differentiis”. 
235 Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1185A-D, Stump, Boethius’, pp. 46-47. 
236 “The Differentiae of maximal propositions are called Topics, and they are drawn from the terms 
that make up the question […] There are many propositions which are called maximal, and these 
differ among themselves; and all the Differentiae by which they differ among themselves we call 
Topics” Boethius, De Topicis, bk. 2, 1186A, Stump, Boethius’, pp. 47-8. 
237 A.7, f. 1rb and 3ra: “Intentiones dupliciter possunt considerari aut secundum veritatem aut 
figuraliter. Et primo modo considerantur a philosopho primo sive a demonstratore docente qui 
dicitur analeticus posterior. A dialectico vero considerantur figuraliter, et hoc est quod dicitur in 
Philosophia Prima quod de eodem sunt philosophia prima et dialectica, sed differunt [Met. IV.2, 
1004b23-24]. Differunt enim dialecticus et philosophus primus fortitudine et debilitate quia 
philosophus primus considerat res secundum veritatem, dialecticus secundum debilitatem. Dicimus 
ergo quod causa et aliae intentiones prout secundum veritatem considerantur loci non dicuntur, sed 
prout est de hiis consideratio figuraliter et verisimilis. […] Quaedam principia accipit dialecticus a 
se, sicut principia materialia ut propositiones, probleumata, et haec omnia probabilia sunt et 
contingentes. Sed illationem a se non accipit, sed a libro Priorum; similiter hoc principium <inferendi> 
‘de quocumque species et genus’, ‘de quocumque diffinitio et diffinitum’, ab alio accipit scilicet a 
philosopho primo et haec principia quae ab alio accipit necessaria sunt et non contingentia”. Similar 
claims are found in Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 182vb). 
238 These maximal propositions are more akin to the phrasing found in 13th century Summae, such as 
those of Peter of Spain and Roger Bacon, than to Boethius’ maxims given in the De topicis differentiis. 
It is not due to a mere coincidence that Robert mentioned the maximal propositions of the locus from 
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seemed to be an inference based on metaphysical necessity rather than on logical 
necessity. And this was consistent with Robert’s assumption of the ontological 
ground of dialectic.  
The topics granted the necessity of the dialectical syllogistic inference, just as 
the mood and figure granted the necessity of the simple syllogistic inference. But 
whilst the inference of simple syllogisms was based on conversion and on the proper 
arrangement of the quantified and qualified premises whose terms were abstract, 
the necessity of the dialectical inference had a semantic connotation, since it 
depended on the correct topical relation between the significative terms of the 
proposition (habitudo terminorum or loci): “Principia quae sunt loci et considerationes 
dicunt huiusmodi dispositionem terminorum et sunt dispositiones consequentes 
ens in quantum ens”.239  
Robert circumscribed the probability of dialectical syllogisms to their material 
principles - thus admitting the probabilitas consequentis. While he openly denied that 
a dialectical syllogism could have a probable warrant or formal principles, and, 
accordingly denying that there could be a probable syllogistic inference (probabilitas 
consequentiae).240 The topics necessitated the dialectical syllogism from outside 
dialectical syllogism itself, and they did not enter into it neither as the major premise, 
in the case of the locus ‘maxima propositio’, nor as its middle term, in the case of the 
locus differentiae: 
 
                                       
the definition and of the locus from the genus/species. He indeed considered them the most certain 
topics, insofar as they were directly derived from the substance of things (A.7, f. 31va). 
239 A.7, f. 52vb. One of the most hotly debated issues among 13th century logicians was whether the 
Barbara syllogism was validated by the topic “from a quantitative whole” and consequently whether 
the dici de omni et nullo amounted to the locus ‘maxima propositio’ of this topic (“quicquid predicatur 
de toto in quantitate, et de qualibet eius parte”). Robert did not face the question, and if he had done, 
it would have answered negatively, since the first-figure syllogism and the dici de omni et nullo 
concern the simple syllogism, while the topic “from a quantitative whole” falls into the camp of 
dialectic, therefore it can be the formal principle of a dialectical syllogism but not of a simple 
syllogism. 
240 A. 7, f. 3ra: “Sed quia dictum est quoniam forma sillogismi dialectici est necessaria, materia vero 
contingens, quare propter quid e contrario non posset esse scilicet quod materia sit necessaria, forma 
vero contingens, ita quod esset aliquis sillogismus cuius illatio erit contingens, materialia principia 
vero essent necessaria? Ad hoc dicendum quod […] forma sillogismi <dialectici> semper est 
necessaria vel impossibilis et numquam est contingens. Materia vero sillogismi contingens esse 
potest”. The probabilitas consequentiae was instead proper to induction, as acknowledged also by 
Robertus Anglicus (A.10, f. 189va). 
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duo sunt principia sillogismi dialectici, materialia et formalia. Materialia 
principia sunt termini, propositiones, probleumata et haec omnia probabilia 
sunt et non necessaria. Sed principium formale est ratio inferendi sicut illatio. Et 
quamvis materia sillogismi sit contingens et probabilis, tamen illatio est 
necessaria quare et principia illationis necessaria debent esse. Sed hoc 
principium ‘de quocumque <praedicatur> species et genus241’ non est 
principium materiale sillogismi neque ex quo fiat illatio vel sillogismus. Non 
enim ponitur intra sillogismum, sed est principium inferendi extra sillogismum. 
Unde quia est principium illationis et illatio <est> necessaria, multo fortius illud 
principium necessitatem debet habere. Unde principia sillogismi dialectici 
materialia, quae intra sillogismum sunt <et> ex quibus est sillogismus, 
huiusmodi sunt probabilia et contingentia; sed principium extra, quod est ratio 
inferendi, est principium illationis, illud principium necessarium debet esse. 
Unde quaedam principia accipit dialecticus a se sicut principia materialia, ut 
propositiones <et> probleumata, et haec omnia probabilia sunt et contingentes. 
Sed illationem a se non accipit, sed a libro Priorum. Similiter hoc principium ‘de 
quocumque <praedicatur> species et genus’, ‘de quocumque diffinitio et 
diffinito’, ab alio accipit scilicet a philosopho primo; et haec principia quae ab 
alio accipit necessaria sunt et non contingentia.242 
 
3.2.1.5 Robert’s claim that the dialectician derived the inference (illatio) from the Prior 
Analytics might seem to contradict the essential difference of the two species of 
syllogism claimed so far. As Robert had acknowledged, the Prior Analytics provided 
the formal and material principles of the syllogismus inferens. Moreover, Robert had 
claimed in many passages that the dialectical syllogism added the dialectical form 
to the form of the simple syllogism. From the previous excerpt, however, the 
dialectical inference (illatio) emerged as plainly grounded on the topical relation or 
                                       
241 Species et genus ] genus et species ms. 
242 A.7, f. 3ra. This passage seems to contradict Green-Pedersen’s interpretation of Robert’s text, 
according to which “the actual applications of the loci to arguments take place through maximae 
propositiones which can be specified according to the subject matter actually under debate. The 
principle of inference itself, i.e. the locus differentia, the name of the locus or the class of the maximae 
possible for one locus, cannot be so specified, and is not stated in the arguments, but stands outside 
as a basis granting them necessarity” (Green-Pedersen, On the interpretation, p. 44). Green-Pedersen 
seems to confuse the material and formal principles of syllogism by deeming the maxima the intrinsic 
principle ex quo fit illatio, which according to Robert however is the material principle, namely the 
pair of premises. 
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locus, and the validity of the dialectical syllogism appeared to be tied to the 
dialectical, namely topical, form alone.  
The supposition that the pluralism of syllogistic forms presupposed two different 
criteria for evaluating the validity of dialectical and simple syllogisms (the latter of 
which should be coupled with demonstration - which shares its same form), might 
not be as counterintuitive as seems at first sight. As has been stated previously, the 
form or formal principles of simple syllogisms were the valid syllogistic schemes, 
which depended on the quality and quantity of syllogisms’ premises, a topic dealt 
with by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. The quantification of propositions was 
completely neglected in the chapter on dialectical propositions in the Topics, as 
acknowledged by Robert. Indeed he specified that although quantified premises 
appeared in dialectical syllogisms, nevertheless the type of quantification of 
dialectical propositions was substantially different from that of the premises of a 
simple syllogism.243  This clue however is not conclusive, and we would do well to 
look for stronger evidence supporting the hypothesis that the logical and dialectical 
validities were evaluated on the basis of two independent criteria. The analysis of 
the contentious syllogism will assist us in our search.  
In his treatment at the beginning of the Topics of the various types of deduction, 
Aristotle had claimed that a fallacious syllogism (litigiosus syllogismus) is  
 
ex his quae videntur probabilia non sunt autem, et qui ex probabilibus aut his 
quae videntur probabilia est apparens […] primus quidem eorum qui dicti sunt 
[scil. qui ex his quae videntur probabilia non sunt] litigiosus syllogismus et 
                                       
243 The issue was addressed in his commentary on the opening line of the second book of the Topics, 
“Of problems some are universal, other particular” (II.1, 108b34) by Robert (A.7, f. 37va-vb), whose 
answer bore resemblance to the solution proposed by Robertus Anglicus (A.10): “Ad primum 
dicendum quod quaedam est quantitas et qualitas causata a parte sermonis et non a parte rei et talis 
quantitas et qualitas est cum dicitur: ‘omne b. est a.’ quia a parte rei indifferenter possum inferre vel 
dicere ‘nullum b. est a.’ et ‘aliquod b. non est a.’ et sic universale et particulare secundum quod dicunt 
talem quantitatem et affirmativam et negativam talem qualitatem sunt differentiae propositionis 
inferentis. Est alia quantitas et qualitas causata a parte rei et talis qualitas et quantitas est in sillogismo 
dialectico. Unde universale <et> particularem secundum quod dicunt talem quantitatem sunt 
differentiae sillogismi dialectici et sic affirmativum et negativum secundum aliud dicunt et talem 
qualitatem, quia non possum affirmare vel negare pro velle meo” (A.10, f. 189ra and 192ra); even 
though he was not so precise, Adenulphus agreed in considering differently the quantity of premises 
of dialectical and simple syllogisms (A.11, f. 50vb). 
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syllogismus dicatur. Reliquus vero litigiosus quidem syllogismus, syllogismus autem 
non, eo quod videtur quidem syllogizare, non tamen syllogizatur.244  
 
This puzzling passage prompted medieval commentators to spell out subtle 
explanations in order to avoid unwelcome outcomes. The principal point to clarify 
was whether the fallacious syllogism was defective in relation to the inferring or 
probative syllogism and their respective instantiations. Or, in other words, whether 
it was the simple or dialectical form which was invalid. And whether it was the 
general (essentialis) or specific matter which was invalid; and, moreover, in what 
sense a meterially fallacious syllogism was a syllogism or not: did it conclude 
logically or dialectically? The description of the contentious or fallacious syllogism 
seemed to insinuate three ways in which a deduction could be vicious, namely a) 
materially: if its premises were apparently but not really probable; b) formally: if the 
conclusion appeared to be necessarily yielded by the premises, but it was not really 
so; c) both in matter and in form. On the basis of Aristotle’s words, then, only the 
materially fallacious syllogism was a syllogism. And syllogisms formally defective, 
namely b) and c), were not syllogisms properly speaking, although they were 
contentious or fallacious syllogisms. This reading of the text was adopted by 
Robertus Anglicus (A.10), Adenulphus de Anagni and Albert the Great. According 
to Robert (A.7), however, this threefold division inadequately represented the 
fallacious syllogism because it contrasted the fallacious syllogism to the simple 
syllogism, while the proper term of comparison for fallacious syllogisms was instead 
the dialectical syllogism.245 Thus Robert tried to make up for this mistake by 
                                       
244 “Again, a deduction is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be reputable, but are not 
really such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be reputable […] 
So then, of the contentious deductions mentioned, the former really deserves to be called deduction, 
but the other should be called contentious deductions, but not deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does 
not really do so” (Aristotle, Top., I.1, esp. 100b24-101a19; AL, pp. 6,1 - 9; Engl. tr. in Barnes, Complete 
woks, vol. 1, p. 167; italics are mine). 
245 A.7, f. 4va: “Sophistici enim sillogismi qui determinantur in libro Elenchorum non deficiunt a 
sillogismo simpliciter sicut inutiles coniugationes, quae determinantur in libro Priorum. Inutiles enim 
coniugatio deficit a necessitate illationis quae causatur ex qualitate et quantitate propositionum et 
ordine earumdem. Sophisticus autem sillogismus deficit a necessitate illationis quae causatur ex 
habitudine terminorum, quae quidem habitudines sunt loci dialectici, qui in libro isto [scil. Topicis] 
determinantur”. Although he agrees with Robert that the fallacious syllogism is deficient in relation 
to the dialectical syllogism, Adenulphus accepts the threefold distinction of the fallacious syllogism. 
His explanation of the passage seems to incline more toward the solution provided by the advocates 
of the unity of forms (see infra, ch. 3.5) rather than to the view endorsed by pluralists such as Robert 
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discarding the threefold division of the fallacious syllogism and by adopting a 
bipartition in place of it. If set against a dialectical deduction, a fallacious syllogism 
could be vicious 1) in matter or 2) in form.  
1) A materially fallacious syllogism had premises that “seem[ed] to be reputable, but 
[we]re not really such,” nevertheless the conclusion followed necessarily from the 
premises.  
2) A formally fallacious syllogism was defective insofar as “it merely seem[ed] to 
reason”: its inference was dialectically invalid since it was grounded on sophistical 
topics. As we have seen, Robert had stated that the essential differentiation between 
syllogisms relied rather on differences between their form or formal principles, the 
rationes inferendi or loci, than on the material diversity. For this reason, he deemed 
the distinction between b) and c) to be erroneous, since it was held on the basis of 
material differences, namely the truly or merely apparently probable premises. 
Insofar as b) and c) grounded on the same formal principle, the loci sophistici, they 
did not differ from each other.246 Robert’s interpretation offered a solution to the 
puzzle concerning the ‘contentious deductions-not-deduction’. A formally 
fallacious syllogism was a litigiosus syllogismus if it was considered as simple 
syllogism, whilst it was not a syllogism (syllogismus autem non) if it was understood 
as a dialectical syllogism.  
Let us consider the syllogism I) “Every dog is something that can bark; every marine 
animal is a dog; therefore, every marine animal is something that can bark”. With 
regard to the sillogismus simpliciter, which disregarded the signification of terms, I) 
was a valid first-figure syllogism. Considered as a sillogismus probans vel ad 
propositum, whose necessary illatio rested on semantics consideration, the syllogism 
I) could not be considered a syllogism at all. It was a fallacy ‘of words’ (in dictione), 
                                       
(A.7) and Robertus Anglicus (A.10). Adenulphus indeed explained that even though syllogism a) 
lacks the materia dialectica, yet it is a syllogism in virtue of the remote matter, namely the three terms 
and the two premises. While b) and c) were not syllogisms insofar as they were deficient in the 
dialectical form and, consequently, in the inferens form too (A.11, f. 45v). 
246 A.7, f. 7va: “Erunt duae differentiae sillogismi litigiosi scilicet sillogismus litigiosus peccans in 
forma [materia ms.], et hic continebit sub se sillogismum qui peccat in forma tantum vel in utroque, 
eo quod uterque eandem formam habet [scil. locum sophisticum]. Unde non faciunt duas differentias 
sillogismi litigiosi sed unam. Alius vero est qui est sillogizatus ex apparentibus, faciens aliam 
sillogismi differentiam, et hoc est quia iste habet formam differentem [scil. locum dialecticum] ab aliis 
sillogismis et ideo sunt duae differentiae sillogismi litigiosi”. 
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specifically the first species of equivocation. The term ‘dog’ was indeed 
polysemantic and it was used equivocally in the major and minor premises, 
respectively as the terrestrial and marine animals: 
 
Dicimus ergo quod sillogismus litigiosus impedit sillogismum ad 
propositum sive sillogismum notum facientem et non sillogismum 
inferentem. Cum enim dicitur ‘omnis canis est latrabile, omne marinum 
est canis, <ergo omne marinum est latrabile>’, si sumerentur isti termini 
ut designarent medium, primum et postremum, esset ibi necessitas quae 
causatur a qualitate et quantitate propositionum et ordine earumdem. Et 
sic patet quod esset ibi sillogismus litigiosus, unde sillogismus litigiosus 
non impedit formam sillogismi inferentis, sed est sillogismus inferens. 
Impedit autem aliam necessitatem quae causatur ab habitudinem terminorum 
et haec est necessitas sillogismi ad propositum sive sillogismi notum facientis. 
Unde isti termini in quantum significationem habent specialem 
impediunt sillogismum <notum facientem> […] Unde cum dicit quod 
‘litigiosus sillogismus est et non est sillogismus’ hoc intelligendum est de 
sillogismo notum faciente et non de sillogismo inferente.247 
 
Robert’s view about the fallacious syllogisms seems to support the hypothesis that 
the notion of dialectical validity is distinguishd by and independent of the notion of 
formal validity of the simple syllogism. The formal validity of a simple syllogism 
was indeed tied to the ‘logical’ form, namely the moods and figures, and the simple 
syllogistic inference was based on logical necessity. While the dialectical validity 
                                       
247 A.7, f. 7va. While elucidating this passage and an example as the one given by Robert, Albert the 
Great stated even more explicitly the autonomy of the criterion for the validity of dialectical 
syllogism: “Iste syllogismus est litigiosus, et non peccat contra formam syllogismi simpliciter, sed 
contra formam syllogismi ad propositum. Si enim termini positi in tali syllogismo recte se haberent 
in habitudine medi ad maius extremum et in habitudine medii ad minus extremum, esset syllogismus 
probans et ad propositum; sed quia non habet terminorum debitam habitudinem, quae est causa 
concludendi in syllogismo ad propositum et forma ipsius, ideo peccat contra formam syllogismi 
probantis, et secundum hanc formam non est syllogizatus, quamvis habeat formam syllogismi 
simpliciter” (Albertus, Topica, 1.3.3, p 242b-243a). On Albert’s exposition see J. Brumberg-Chaumont, 
“Les divisions”, pp. 386-394. 
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was tied to the dialectical form and the dialectical inference was grounded on the 
topical necessity (on the habitudo terminorum).  
 
3.2.1.5 The theory of the plurality of syllogistic forms affected Robert’s 
understanding of the bipartition of logic into discovery and judgement. The 
commentator denied any continuity between the judicative (resolutiva sive analytica) 
and the inventive (topica) parts of logic. The resolutiva concerned apodictic syllogistic 
and demonstration, which were the subject matters of the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics. Only the prima philosophia, which Robert used synonymously with 
demonstrativa, dealt with deduction whose middle term was the cause of the 
conclusion.248  
Dialectic was the inventive part of logic (topica) and was covered by the Topics. We 
may wonder whether Robert conceived of the topica as a “general heuristic” for 
finding the premises and/or the middle terms of any type of deduction. The 
commentator spent many efforts trying to explain that the topica was aimed at 
discovering the middles and not the premises of syllogisms. More specifically, it 
intended to find the dialectical middle alone.249 Accordingly, he limited the topica to 
dialectical reasoning and dialectic. Robert scrutinized the hypothesis that the topics 
of accident could be regarded as a universal heuristic method concerned with the 
existence of thing (de inesse simpliciter). This assumption found some support in the 
second of the two definitions of the predicable ‘accident’ found in the Topics. Here, 
Aristotle had affirmed that an accident is “something which may either belong or 
not belong to any one and the self-same thing” (“accidens est quod inest autem rei 
et contingit inesse cuilibet uni et eidem et non inesse”),250 and that this qualification 
of accident was the most suitable. Robert however reckoned as most appropriate the 
                                       
248 A.7, f. 1ra-rb, 4rb. Robertus Anglicus (A.10) endorsed the same view: see f. 182ra.  
249 While the demonstrative middle term was the cause of the connection between the extreme terms 
of syllogism, the dialectical middle term was only a probable sign: “In dialectici medium non est 
causa propter quam est, sed propter quam accidit conclusio […] Cum medium dialecticum accipiatur 
sub istis intentionibus localibus, quae intentiones dividuntur per istas differentias genus, species, 
diffinitio, diffinitum, causa, causatum et sic de aliis, medium demonstrativum accipitur solum sub 
hac intentione ‘causa’ […] dialecticum medium non est causa esse, sed inferendi et consequendi 
solum. Sed intentio entis sub qua medium demonstrativum accipitur causa est esse” (A.7, f. 1ra). 
250 Aristotle, Topics, I.5, 102b5-7 (AL, p. 11, 1-3). This view has been endorsed by some modern 
scholars, such as Brunschwig, Sairati and Slomkowski (see supra ch. 2.2). 
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first definition of accident as “something which, though it is none of the foregoing, 
i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus – yet belongs to the thing”. 
Therefore, he excluded the reading that Aristotle had conceived the topics of 
accident as pertaining to the predication de inesse simpliciter. Indeed for Robert, the 
topics about accident, which were found in the second book of the Topics, dealt with 
accidental predication properly speaking (“de inesse in quantum contrahitur et 
determinatur ad accidens”).251 
 
3.3 A further step forward: Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus de Anagni 
(A.11). 
 
3.3.1 The theory of the plurality of forms characterizes also two Topics commentaries 
written in Paris by an unidentified Robertus Anglicus (A.10)252 and by Adenulphus 
de Anagni (A.11), “horum librorum non imperitus interpres”.253 The works of these 
                                       
251 A.7, f. 36rb; see also f. 15va-vb. Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus (A.11, f.55va) devoted 
some dubia to this issue; they answered that the topics concerning accident could not replace the other 
topics nor could they function as general topics of inherence since they did not concern substantial 
predication, but were limited to accidental predication. 
252 Plausibly, Robertus’ lectio-form commentary was written in Paris. Green-Pedersen dated it to the 
1250ca., I would incline to postpone its composition to after 1266, a terminus post quem with which 
Robertus himself provided us in his discussion of fallacious syllogism. In order to explain that a 
materially fallacious syllogism was a syllogism, Robertus recast the metaphor of the coin, which 
Algazel employed in his Logica in connection to fallacious syllogisms and which Albert the Great 
borrowed for his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Robertus used it while referring to the view 
according to which a syllogism vicious in dialectical matter did not have the dialectical form, yet it 
was a syllogism since it had the simple syllogism’s form, “sicut denarius parisiensis cum peccet in 
materia sintluigis non est sintluigius, tamen est parisiensis denarius” (A.10, f. 184rb). Plausibly, the 
sintluigius mentioned by Robertus was the French écu or denier d’or, a golden coin issued by the King 
Louis IX in the context of the1266 monetary reform that caused the depreciation of the ancient denier 
de Paris. Unfortunately, I could not verify whether the coin was called sint(luigius) prior to Louis’ 
canonization proclaimed in Orvieto in 1297 – and which could therefore constitute a new terminus 
post quem. For the diverse commentary genres see Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, pp. 88-89; for the 
dating see p. 386. 
253 A. Niphus, Stagiritae Topicorum Libri Octo, cum Augustini Niphi medices suessani philosophi clarissimis 
commentariis, Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1569, f. 6a. Adenulphus’ lectio-commentary was 
produced in Paris around the 1250s, according to Green-Pederesn and Weijers it was influential in 
the second half of 13th century, as testified to by the high number of manuscripts containing it, and it 
was still known in the 16th century, when Nifo mentioned Hedenolphus in his commentary on the 
Topics (1520-25). Nephew of the Pope Gregory IX and canon of Notre-Dame in Paris, Adenulphus de 
Anagni studied in Paris. Here, he was named magister artium around the 1250s, master of theology 
(1272ca) and became acquainted with Thomas Aquinas. In 1264, he was named Provost of the church 
of St. Omer, to which he had donated some philosophical and theological manuscripts. In 1286 the 
episcopacy of Narbonne was offered to him, but he refused, and in 1288 he was named bishop of 
Paris, but declined, preferring instead to retire at the abbey of St. Victor where he died in the 
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two Parisian commentators disclose several points of contact with Robert’s (A.7) 
commentary, some of which have been signalled in various footnotes of the previous 
section. The undeniable abundant correlations between these texts however do not 
constitute evidence that the two masters had direct knowledge of Robert’s (A.7) 
work nor that they consciously advocated Robert’s (A.7) ideas, along with the basic 
tenets underlying them. Indeed, the similarities might have well originated from a 
common body of opinions shared at the Parisian Faculty of Arts. At times, the 
harmonious agreement of words discloses divergences of thoughts. Surely, the three 
authors had in common the exegesis of the definition of syllogism in the light of the 
doctrine of the causes.254 But Robertus Anglicus’ (A.10) and Adenulphus’ (A.11) 
explanations were more focused on the physiological, psychological and 
gnoseological facets than on the formal – logical – aspect of syllogism. Unlike Robert 
(A.7), the two masters highly emphasized both the physiological grounds and the 
cognitive effects of the various types of syllogism, arriving at an association of the 
four species of reasoning to the bodily characteristics of the four stages of life. From 
this standpoint, the dialectical syllogism was proper of adolescence since dialectical 
deduction operated through reason and phantasms in producing opinion in the 
cognitive agent, and ratio was the predominant power of the soul in adolescence.255  
                                       
following year (March, the 26th). As a legacy, he left his manuscripts of the Tractatus and of the 
Syncategoreumata of Peter of Spain to the College of the Sorbonne. Adenulph was a polyhedric author. 
He wrote a Summa causarum de facto et usu curiae (immediately before 1250), 18 quodlibetic Questions 
(dating after 1272) and commented on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and on some books of the Bible. A 
testimony of his preaching activity is the 12 sermons found by J.B. Schneyer in the 1960s. On 
Adenulphus see M. Grabmann, “Ungedruckte lateinische Kommentare zur aristotelischen Topik aus 
dem 13. Jahrhundert”, in Mittelarlterlichen Geistesleben, München: M. Hüber, 1956, vol. 3, pp. 142-157, 
esp. pp. 149-151; Id., “Adenulf von Anagni, Propst von Saint-Omer (†1290). Ein Freund und Schüler 
des hl. Thomas von Aquin”, Ibid., pp. 306-322; C. B. Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries”, in 
Traditio 23 (1967), pp. 313-413, esp. pp. 324-325; Ott, “Die Wissenschaftslehre”; O. Weijers, Le travail 
intellectuel à la faculté des arts de Paris. Textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500), Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, vol. 1, 
pp. 32-33. 
254 A.7, f. 3vb; A.10, f. 182ra-rb; A.11, f. 44rb. 
255 “Si <sillogismus> dividatur penes causam efficientem, ut causa ipsius sillogismi sit ipsa ratio, aut 
erit sillogismus prout ipsa ratio elevatur ad intellectum aut prout deprimitur ad fantasiam aut prout 
stat in medio. Si dividatur per statum hominis, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter causa: pueritia, 
adolescentia, iuventus et senium. Dum homo in puericia est, generatur in eo fantasma per sillogismos 
sophisticos, dum est in adolescentia generatur in eo opinio per sillogismum dialecticum, dum est in 
iuventute generantur in eo scienta per sillogismum demonstrationis, dum est in senectute generatur 
ignorantia per sillogismum falsigraphum. Nam senes accipiunt propositiones necessarias male tamen 
intellectas” (A.11, f. 44rb); cf. A.10, f. 182ra-rb, which parallels Adenulphus almost verbatim, and f. 
182va. 
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3.3.2 The import of these differences can be better comprehended if contextualized 
within the framework of the theory of the plurality of forms, upheld by these 
authors. Similarly to many Parisian masters of that epoch, such as Nicolaus 
Parisiensis256 and Arnulphus Provincialis,257 Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and 
Adenulphus (A.11) admitted a two-sided syllogism, the inferens and inferens et 
probans. Unlike these authors, Robert (A.7) did not couple probans with inferens, since 
for him a syllogism could be considered either insofar as it was inferens or in as much 
as it was probans sive notum faciens. This terminological difference is revealing of the 
diverse attitudes of these masters. Robert’s (A.7) analysis of the various types of 
syllogisms assumed the pair ‘matter-form’ as exegetical guide. This earlier 
commentator (A.7) focused on the hylomorphic structure of syllogisms and 
investigated deeply the interplay between the formal and material elements, 
conclusively acknowledging prominence to the form over matter. As a consequence 
of that, Robert (A.7) assigned a founding role to the topics in the production of 
dialectical arguments and within his system. Surely, both Robertus (A.10) and 
Adenulphus (A.11) agreed with Robert (A.7) about the pluralism of forms and 
subscribed to the view that the dialectical syllogism differed from the inferring 
syllogism and from the demonstration “a parte formae quia addit supra formam 
complexionis formam habitudinis”.258 Moreover, they accepted Robert’s (A.7) main 
tenet that the loci were the formal principles of dialectical syllogism.259 And that in 
                                       
256 Nicolaus Parisiensis was student and master at the Parisian Faculty of Arts (around 1250-65), then 
chancellor of the same University of Paris. He commented on the Aristotelian Organon – and he 
claimed to have commented also on the Topics, but unfortunately his commentary is lost or not 
identified yet –, on Boethius’ De topicis differentiis and perhaps on Priscianum minorem. Moreover, he 
wrote tracts on obligations and syncategorematic terms, as well as the Summa Metenses and a treatise 
on the division of philosophy, the Philosophia. On Nicolaus see C. Marmo, “Suspicio”; Lafleur- 
Carrier, L’enseignement, esp. vol. 2, pp. 447-465. 
257 Little is known about Arnulfus. He was magister artium in Paris in the middle of the 13th century 
and wrote the Divisio Scientiarum, in which referred Al-Fārābī’s ‘long Organon’ that he knew through 
the mediation of Gundissalinus (see ch. 2.2; see Lafleur, Quatre introductions, pp. 297-347; Marmo, 
“Suspicio”; Weijers, Le Travail, p. 70. 
258 A.10, f. 182ra; A. 11, f. 44ra-rb. 
259 While the Topics’ commentators agreed on the necessity of the habitudines locales, in his Notulae on 
the Boethian De topicis differentiis (1255-65ca)., Nicolaus of Paris denied it and specified instead that 
the habitudo localis was necessary for the intrinsic topics, which were derived from the substance of 
things. And it was merely probable in the case of the extrinsic and middle topics: aliquando 
necessaria, aliquando non. Necessaria est sicut in habitudine definitionis ad definitum; non 
necessaria est sed probabilis sicut in loco a maiori et in aliis locis extrinsecis, ibi enim non est aliqua 
necessitas, sed probabili<ta>s solum” (the transcription is provided by Green-Pedersen, 
“Discussions”, pp. 65-66). 
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as much as they were necessary, the habitudines locales secured the necessity of the 
dialectical inference.260 Notwithstanding these claims, the loci were less relevant in 
Robertus’ (A.10) view. And they were relegated to the margins of Adenulphus’ 
general account of dialectical reasoning.261 Unlilke Robert (A.7), they did not 
develop deep reflections neither on the specific form of dialectical syllogisms nor on 
the loci. In their accounts, the centre of the scene was occupied by the cognitive agent, 
in relation to which both masters described the differences between the types of 
probative syllogism. In addition to the standard division between inferens and notum 
faciens syllogisms, which they shared with Robert (A.7), Adenulphus and Robertus 
(A.10) added a further subdivision of the syllogism notum faciens into: 1) ad 
propositum syllogism: it was probative only a parte rei notae; and 2) demonstrative 
and dialectical syllogisms: they were probative a parte rei notae et cognoscentis. The 
syllogismus notum faciens was said analogically of these two instances, since these two 
types of probative syllogism caused different cognitive effects or habits in the agent. 
                                       
260 A.10, f. 182va “Quaedam sunt principia formalia dyalectici sillogismi et huiusmodi sunt maximae 
maxime propositiones sive loci, et huiusmodi sunt necessaria. Quaedam vero <sunt> principia 
materialia, ut maior propositio et minor, et huiusmodi sunt contingentia et sumit dyalecticus”; cf. A. 
11, f. 44va: “sillogismi duo sunt principia, materialia et formalia. Materialia sunt propositiones, 
formalia dicuntur intentiones. Quantum ad principia materialia quae sunt propositiones sillogismi, 
dyalecticus est ex contingentibus, quantum ad formalia quae sunt habitudines, quia habitudines sunt 
necessaria, sic est sillogismus ex necessariis”. 
261 The nonessential role acknowledged to the loci by Adenulphus seems to be confirmed by his 
subdivision of the books of the Topics according to their respective subject-matter. Robert (A.7) and 
Robertus (A.10) had considered the first book of the Topics to be dealing with the material principles 
of dialectical syllogism, and books 2-7 to be concerned with its formal principles, namely the loci. 
Then, they linked books 1-7 to dialectics’ directness towards “the study of philosophical sciences”. 
Adenulphus seemed instead to endorse a different view, according to which the first book covered 
the dialectica docens, while the remaining books treated the dialectica utens: “determinavit Aristoteles 
de principiis sillogismi dyalectici secundum sui substantiam. In hac parte [scil.in secundo libro] 
determinat quoad suum usum et hoc <est> quod solet dici per alia verba quod in primo libro 
determinat de sillogismo dyalectico quoad eius substantiam, in aliis libri in quantum est 
instrumentum. Secundum hoc haec pars dividitur in duo quia contingit uti instrumento dupliciter, 
scilicet ad determinandum problemata et ad exercitationem et obviationem. Primo determinat de 
sillogismo dyalectico prout ordinatur ad terminandum problemata, in secunda <parte> prout 
ordinatur ad exercitationem et ad obviationem, et hoc facit in octavo. Et hoc est quod solet dici per 
alia verba quod ipsis libris determinat de dyalectica inquisitiva, in octavo de dyalectica obviativa et 
exercitativa” (A.11, f. 55rb). Green-Pedersen (“On the interpretation”, p. 15) supposed that 
Adenulphus’ opinion was the same as Robert’s and Robertus’ and that it was the common way of 
arranging the Topics. In my opinion, there was general agreement among authors only regarding the 
last book: “constat secundum omnes expositores [scil. Adenulphus, Robertus A.10, Albert the Great] 
quod in illos VIII determinatur de syllogismo dialectico obviativo” (Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones 
Veteres, in Id., Quaestiones super Libro Elenchorum, ed. by S. Ebbesen et alii, Toronto: Pontifical Institute 
of Medieval Studies, 1984, Quaestiones Veteres q. 4, p. 38). While the general arrangement of books 1-
7 proposed by Adenulphus was not universally accepted; it was adopted by the authors who 
endorsed the view of the unique form. 
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The demonstrative syllogism indeed generated knowledge, a complete habit, while 
the dialectical syllogism generated opinion, which was an imperfect habit: 
 
loycae divisio propter hoc recipit divisionem penes divisionem veri. Sed verum 
quoddam est complexum, quoddam incomplexum. Si sit complexum, sic de 
ipso est libro Praedicamentorum et Porphyrii [scil. Ysagoge] et Sex Principiorum […] 
si sit complexum […] complexum ex complexis, sic est scientia de sillogismo, 
sed hoc potest esse dupliciter cum duplex est sillogismus, quidam inferens 
tantum, quidam inferens et notum faciens. Si sit inferens tantum, sic de 
sillogismo determinatur in libro Priorum, quod habet fieri in terminis 
generalibus usque ad illud capitulum quo autem ydonei erimus [scil. An. Pr. I.27, 
43a20]. Si sit sillogismus inferens et notum faciens, hoc est dupliciter: aut faciens 
notum a parte rei cognitae aut a parte rei <et> cognoscentis. Si faciat notum a 
parte rei cognitae, sic est sillogismus ad propositum de quo determinatur in illo 
capitolo quomodo autem ydonei erimus. Si faciat notum a parte rei et cognoscentis, 
aut generat scientiam et sic est sillogismus demonstrativus, aut generat bonam 
opinionem et sic est sillogismus topicorum262 aut generat fantasiam et sic est 
sophisticus, aut generat ignorantiam et sic falsigraphus.263    
 
 
3.3.3 This passage revealed another important divergence between Robertus (A.10) 
and Adenulphus on the one hand, and Robert (A.7) on the other hand. Their 
different opinions about the probative syllogism implied a different arrangement of 
the books of the logica nova. By admitting a unique syllogismus instantiated by 
different types of syllogisms, Robert (A.7) adopted a unifying reading strategy for 
the Prior Analytics. On the contrary, having divided the syllogism notum faciens and 
having based the organizational principles for the Organon on the divisio syllogismi, 
Robertus and Adenulphus had to accommodate their arrangement of the logica nova 
to their subdivision of syllogisms. Thus, they split the Prior Analytics, thereby 
following some authors of that epoch such as Nicolaus Parisiensis. According to this 
                                       
262 Topicorum ] topicum in Brugge, Bibliothèque publique de la ville, ms. Cod. 493, dialecticus in 
Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. Conv. Soppr. A. 2. 2840. 
263 A. 11, f. 43vb; cf. A. 10, f. 182ra. 
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division, the first twenty-six chapters of the first book were concerned with the 
inferring syllogism, the 27th chapter of the 1st book of the Prior Analytics dealt with 
the probative syllogism ad propositum, the demonstrative syllogism was the subject-
matter of the Posterior Analytics, and the dialectical of the Topics.264  
The different views about the probative syllogisms and the internal ordering of the 
logica nova, which were upheld by Robertus (A.10) and Adenulphus (A.11) on the 
one hand, and Robert on the other hand, did not prevent them from agreeing on the 
way to subdivide logic into a judicative and inventive part. Similarly to Robert (A.7), 
indeed, the two masters (A.10 and A.11) sharply separated the scientia Priorum et 
Posteriorum from the scientia Topicorum in virtue of the double form proper to 
dialectical syllogism, which was the subject-matter of the Topics. But in Robertus’ 
(A.10) and Adenulphus’ (A.11) views, this was not the major motivation behind the 
clear demarcation between these sciences. In accordance with the general trend 
towards gnoseology, which characterized their exegeses of the first book of the 
Topics, Robertus and Adenulphs traced the division between analytic and invention 
back to the human apprehensive powers. Discovery argued dialectically and the 
middle terms employed in dialectical argumentations were signs of the relation 
between items.265 These were known by the ratio, which was the faculty involved in 
discovery. Whilst the demonstration, which fell into the camp of analytics, could 
produce a causal explanation, or knowledge, of things since the middle terms used 
in demonstrative deductions were the causes of thing, which were grasped by the 
intellect: 
 
Possunt diversificari a parte formae, quia addit supra formam complexionis 
formam habitudinis, et sic dyalecticus et temptativus; autem non addit supra 
                                       
264 This partition was found in the Philosophia of Nicolaus Parisiensis, which was probably the source 
for this ordering of the books. Scholars have shown that Adenulphus borrowed from Nicolaus’ work 
much material for his prologue to the Topics, which constituted a concise Wissenschaftslehre. Cf. Ott, 
“Die Wissenschaftslehre“, pp. 480-490. 
265 On sign-inference in arguments see Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.27. Few manuscripts of Peter of 
Spain’s Tractatus defined the sign-inference in relation to Aristotle’s account of enthymeme as 
inference that argues “ex yocotibus et signis”, by saying that within that context a sign “idem est 
quod propositio demonstrativa vel necessaria vel probabilis et hoc est inferendo. Signum autem 
secundum quod hic sumitur dicit necessitatem illationis, ycos autem dicit probabilitatem ipsius 
propositionis in se secundum quam probabilitatem propositio videtur esse vera” (Peter of Spain, 
Tractatus, V.3, p. 57, fn. 2). 
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forma complexionis formam habitudinis sed materiam solum et sic 
demonstrativus et falsigraphus. Et ideo patet et materia non diversificet speciem 
neque scientiam quod debet esse una scientia continualis Priorum et Posteriorum 
eo quod syllogismus Posteriorum non addit nisi materiam supra sillogismum 
Priorum. Sed non debet esse una scientia continua libri Topicorum et Priorum eo 
quod non addit materiam solum, sed formam sillogismi topici supra 
sillogismum Priorum. Item quia iste procedit per signum et ille per causam et 
virtus apprehensibilis intendens illum est ratio, virtus apprehendens illum est 
intellectus, virtus apprehendens tam demonstrationem quam Priorum est una et 
eadem, scilicet intellectus, et utraque procedit per causam licet hic per causam 
essendi, hic per causam consequendi. Et ideo sunt unius continuationis et sunt 
una scientia ordinata per prius et posterius.266 
 
3.4 A look back and ahead: Albert the Great.267 
 
3.4.1 Albert’s Paraphrases of the Topics was one of the most widespread 
commentaries on Aristotle’s text and was still popular in the 16th century. The exact 
place and date of its composition is still uncertain, nevertheless it could be dated to 
the years from 1264, when Albert was in the Würzburg Dominican Convent, to the 
                                       
266 A.10, f. 182ra. Cf. A.11, f. 44va-45ra. “In loco duo sunt, substantia loci et intentio loci. Demonstrator 
locum considerat secundum sui substantiam, unde considerat causam et effectum secundum sui 
substantiam. Quod patet: si quaeritur a demonstratore unde locus? ‘fumus est, ergo ignis fuit [affuit 
ms.] etc’, <iste> respondet ab effecto. Dialecticus autem considerat locum secundum sui intentionem 
et dicit: a causa” (A.11, f. 94va). 
267 M. Grignaschi, “Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe et l’abrégé d'Alfarabi”, in 
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 39 (1972), pp. 41-107; S. Ebbesen, “Albert (the 
Great?)’s Companion to the Organon”, in A. Zimmermann, Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, sein 
Wirkung, Berlin-New York: W. De Gruyter, 1981, pp. 89-103; J. Weishepl, “Albert the Great’s Inventive 
Logic: His Exposition on the Topics of Aristotle”, in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1996), 
pp. 11-49; a different view from Ebbesen’s opinion on Albert’s companion to the Ogranon is provided 
by R. Meyer, “Eine neue Perspektive im Geistleben des 13. Jahrhunderts: Plädoyer für eine 
Würdigung der Organon-Kommentierung Alberts des Großen”, in Aertsen –Speer, Geistesleben, pp. 
189-201; J. Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions”; J. Janssen, “Albert le Grand et sa connaissance des 
écrits logiques arabes: une réévaluation du dossier Grignaschi”, in J. Brumberg-Chaumont, Ad 
notitiam ignoti, pp. 225-257; C. Steel, “Prolegomena to an edition of Albert’s Topics”, in “Przegląd 
Tomistyczny” 21 (2015), pp. 69-85. I will quote from: Albertus Magnus, Topica, in Albertus 
Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. by A. Borgnet, Paris: Vivès, 1890-1899 (38 vols), vol. 2, 1890 (hereafter 
Albertus, Topica). 
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1269, before he went to Cologne.268 It is conceded that in some of his commentaries 
on the Organon, Albert borrowed much material from other authors, especially from 
Robert Kilwardby and John Pagus. This claim, however, seems not to hold for the 
Topics.269 Undoubtedly, Albert was acquainted with the ideas commonly shared by 
the previous commentators, nevertheless he did not rely on a single author nor 
slavishly repeated what he had read elsewhere. In his paraphrase, indeed, the 
Dominican merged his manifold sources, Latin as well as Arabic and Jewish, into 
one picture - at times incoherent, and proposed original readings of the text. 
Similarly to Robert (A.7), Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus (A.11), Albert 
subscribed to the doctrine of the plurality of forms in dialectical syllogism.270 In his 
preliminary explanation of the subject-matter of the Topics, which was the 
syllogismus dialecticus sive topicus, Albert related the twofold adjectival qualification 
of this type of deduction to its formal and material principles. This syllogism, he 
stated, was characterized as topicus, since its inference was secured by the topics, 
while it was said dialecticus in virtue of its probable premises.271 Similar to Robert 
(A.7), the Doctor Universalis adopted both the distinction between the simple and the 
probans sive ad propositum syllogism as well as the separation between the inventive 
and judicative parts of logic, although the Dominican justified this distinction by 
referring to its probable matter. Coherenthly, Albert identified autonomous criteria 
for testing the validity of the various species of syllogism. The validity of the simple 
                                       
268 According to Brumberg-Chaumont (“Les divisions”, p. 373), the commentary on the Topics was 
written before the commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, during the years 1267-1269, when Albert 
was travelling in Burtscheid, Esslingen and Strasbourg. Perhaps it is more likely that Albert 
accomplished his task of commentator in 1264ca, at the beginning of the three years he spent at the 
Dominican convent in Würzburg, from 1264 to 1267, as it has been supposed in the chronology of 
Albert’s life and works, in the volume Albertus Magnus und sein System der Wissenschaften. 
Schlüsseltexte in Übersetzung Lateinisch-Deutsch, Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2011, p. 30. 
269 “It has not been possible to identify the commentary Albert used for his Topics. It was hardly the 
one that is now commonly thought to be Kilwardby’s (MS Firence [sic] BNC C.4.1618)” (Ebbesen, 
“Albert (the Great?)”, p. 93). 
270 “Dialecticus formam habitudinis localis addit supra formam syllogismi simpliciter” (Albertus, 
Topica, 1.1.4, p. 245a). As remarked by Brumberg-Chaumont (Les divisions, p. 393), it is rather striking 
Green-Pedersen’s claim that the doctrine of the pluralility of forms “does not last long, and it is not 
even shared by all contemporary authors, for already Robert Kilwadby and Albertus Magnus state 
that there is only one form common to all syllogisms, viz. the figures and moods of the syllogism as 
such, described in the Prior Analytics” (The Tradition, p. 252). 
271  Albertus, Topica, 1.1.1, p. 234a; see also 1.1.5, p. 248a-b: “Syllogismus per habitudinem localem 
inductus [scil. the locus differentiae], per maximas locos confirmantes, ut ‘de quocumque praedicatur 
[prima ed.] species et genus’ et huiusmodi”. 
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syllogism was evaluated on the basis of the syllogism’s figure and mood. Even 
though the demonstration was a probative deduction, its formal validity was judged 
through the valid syllogistic schemes akin to the simple syllogism with which it 
shared the form, while the demonstration’s material validity derived from the 
necessity of its premises. On the contrary, the validity of the other type of probative 
syllogism, namely the dialectical syllogism, depended on the probability of its 
premises, which were the material principles, and on the application of the suited 
topic, which was the ratio inferendi or formal principle of the deduction. Albert stated 
this explicitly in his analysis of fallacious syllogisms. Upon dealing with the formally 
contentious syllogism ‘Every justice is good; every honesty is good; therefore, every 
honesty is justice’, Albert affirmed that the viciousness of this reasoning did not lay 
in its being inconcludens – it was indeed an invalid second figure insofar as its 
premises were two universal affirmative propositions. Its invalidity was due to the 
use of an incorrect topical maxim, that is “if the same consequent follows from two 
antecedents, then one of the antecedent follows from the other”.272  
 
3.4.2 Dialectical syllogisms, said Albert, were produced starting ex probabilibus et 
verisimilibus. Albert used ‘probable/probability’ and ‘truthlike(ness)’ 
interchangeably, and this may be accounted for by supposing that he adopted the 
modal interpretation of probability found in the Prior Analytics, where Aristotle had 
defined probable propositions as verisimilia and in terms of contingency.273 In 
elucidating the notion of ‘probability’, Albert revealed an acute awareness of its 
complexity. Indeed he endeavored to clearly differentiate between probability’s 
                                       
272 “ ‘Omnis iustitia est bona, omnis honestas est bona, ergo omnis honestas est iustitia’. Habitudinem 
terminorum probantium non valet, quia non sequitur: ‘si idem consequens sequitur ad duo antecedentia, 
quod unum istorum sequatur ad aliud’; et ideo peccat contra formam syllogismi ad propositum, quamvis 
in materia non peccet in aliquo” (Albertus, Topica, 1.1.3, p. 243a); cf. also supra fn. 247 and Albert’s 
commentary on the Sophistical Refutations, I.3.5 in Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia, ed.by A. Borgnet, 
Paris: Vivès, 1890-1899 (38 vols), vol. 2, 1890, pp. 564-566. This issue has been extensively dealt with 
in J. Brumberg-Chaumont, “Les divisions”, esp. pp. 384-409. 
273 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.27, 70a3-5, in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 112; “Verisimile quidem 
est propositio probabilis; quod enim ut in pluribus sciunt sic factum vel non factum aut esse aut non 
esse” (AL, p. 137, 10-12). Albert exhibited a modal understanding of probability in many sections of 
the Topics where he said for example that the dialectical method “est ex contingentibus et 
probabilibus facere sive persuadere, quae appetimus persuadere” or that the proposition “solem esse 
maiorem terra acceptum per quantitatem diametri” is necessary and not probable “secundum quod 
necessarium et probabile opponuntur”. 
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modal and objective sense on the one hand, and its epistemological-endoxical and 
subjective understanding on the other hand.  
Objective probability described features of the world: “est autem probabile in 
contingentibus, quod secundum sui substantiam probabile est”. Albert offered a 
semantic and semiotic account of it, in which he explained that probability was the 
contingent mode of inherence of the predicate term in the subject. In probable 
propositions, claimed Albert, the predicate was not included (inest) per se in the 
subject nor the subject was per se in the predicate. But he was not explicit about the 
kind of per se predication he was referring to.  
In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle had defined three kinds of per se inherence, which 
were proper to the necessary propositions assumed as premises in demonstrative 
syllogisms. A thing belonged to another in itself (per se): 1) “both a) if it belongs to it 
in what it is […] and also b) if the things it belongs to themselves belong in the 
account which makes clear what it is […] and similarly in other cases too it is such 
things that I say belong to something in itself; and what belongs in neither ways I 
call accidental;” 2) “what is not said of some other underlying subject” that is “things 
which are not said of an underlying subject call things in themselves, and those 
which are said of an underlying subject I call accidentals”; 3) “what belongs to 
something because of itself belongs to it in itself, and what does not belong because 
of itself is accidental.”274  
The second sense of per se concerned the mode of being rather than the mode of 
predication, thus it could be dismissed. The third sense of per se expressed the causal 
predication and the first sense denoted that the predicate expressed something 
included in the definition of the subject or that the subject was included in the 
predicate’s definition. We could suppose that Albert had in mind the first and third 
connotation of per se predication, which expressed some dispositions of the predicate 
to the subject and vice versa.275 Accordingly, ‘probability’ expressed the non-causal 
                                       
274 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.4, 73a35-b24 (Engl. tr. in Barnes, Complete works, vol. 1, pp. 118-119); 
cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.18, 1022a25-37. 
275 In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Albert qualified the first sense of per se as the 
“dispositio entis unius ordinati ad alterum […] odine praedicandi et subjiciendi: et hoc dupliciter: si 
enim ordo est ingrediendi praedicatum in ratione subjecti, est modus primus [scil. 1a in corpore]: aut 
e converso, ita quod subjectum sit de quidditate praedicati, et sic est modus secundum [scil. 1b in 
corpore] […] primi duo sic pertinent ad demonstrationem, quod cadunt in simpliciter scibilibus” 
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and non-essential relation between the subject and the predicate of a proposition. 
This implied that since the essential predication per se was omni-temporal, by 
contrast the accidental predication verisimile was contingent, namely it held for most 
of the times, but not always. This interpretation of the probable proposition – as that 
in which the predicate was not a cause of the subject nor was the subject the effect 
of the predicate – squared with the Albert’s subsequent claim that in probable 
propositions the coherence between predicate and subject was neither necessary nor 
essential since it was not causal, but only probable. And being as such, this inherence 
or coherence was known through signs.276 Signs manifested the properties of a 
thing, without however showing its nature completely. And they were what was 
more intelligible quoad nos; thus, signs allowed men to have some insight into the 
essence and properties of a thing, when it was not possible to have direct access to 
its principles. 
The objective probability, however, was not the probabile out of which came the 
premises of dialectical reasoning. They concerned the subjective or epistemological-
endoxical probability (secundum modum acceptionis). According to this interpretation 
of the concept, probability did not express the essential contingency of beings but 
the imperfect knowledge of men. In semantic terms, this meant that the causal or 
essential relation of inherence of the predicate in the subject was not known as 
necessary, as it was, but only as probable by the cognitive subject, since he knew it 
through truthlike signs and not according to its causes, namely through probable 
premises and not true defintion.277 For example, that the sun was larger than the 
earth was true and necessary in itself and it was acknowledged by ordinary people 
as well as by wise people, although in different ways. Only the astronomers indeed 
                                       
(Albertus Magnus, Liber I Poster. Analyticorum, in Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia, ed.by A. Borgnet, 
Paris: Vivès, 1890-1899 (38 vols), vol. 2, 1890, I.2.9, p. 46b.; hereafter, Albertus, Post. An). 
276 “Probabilia autem, ex quibus fit syllogismus dialecticus, sunt verisimilia. Dupliciter autem sunt 
verisimilia; aut enim in se sunt verisimilia, eo quod ipsa habitudo praedicati ad subiectum verisimilis 
est, eo quod nec praedicatum est in subiecto per se nec subiectum in praedicato per se nec utrumque 
in utroque; nec praedicatum necessariam et essentialem cohaerentiam habet cum subiecto, sed 
verisimilem <cohaerentiam> in signis, non in causis necessariis acceptam” (1.3.2, p. 241b). 
277 In commenting on Aristotle’s statements about sign-inference in the Prior Analytics, Albert offered 
a twofold description of sign as “quod, praeter speciem quam cognoscenti offert, ad aliquid ducit 
cuius est signum” and “communiter dictum, est omne illud quod ex sui specie, quam cognoscenti 
exhibet, aliud praetendit quod inferri potest ex ipso” (Albertus Magnus, Libri Priorum Analyticorum, 
II.78, in Id., Opera omnia, vol. I, ed. by A. Borgnet: Paris, 1890, p. 803).  
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deemed the proposition to be a necessary truth, since they knew that the diameter 
of the sun was larger than the  diameter of the earth. While for common people, who 
did not know the causes and judged it only through signs, the sun’s major size was 
probable or verisimilar since the sun appeared to have the same size everywhere. 
Albert explained the Aristotelian definition of probabilia (ἔνδοξα), namely the 
probability or endoxality of propositions, as resulting from the interplay between 
the degrees of perfection of men’s cognitive capacities,278 their acquired knowledge 
and the type of truthlikeness of the signs he used in reasoning. The different types 
of truth-like signs were indeed known through different human cognitive faculties. 
1) Some truth-like signs were merely superficial and were not ground in the essence 
of things, thus they could be known sensibly by all people having normal sensory 
organs, particularly the five senses and memory, which enabled them to receive 
universals mixed with particulars. Since probable propositions of this type were 
grounded on signs that did not require any particular skill or competence in judging, 
but only non-disordered sensory perceptions, and since these were proper to 
(almost) all human beings, these types of endoxical propositions were widely 
accepted: by young and old, educated and vulgares men.279 2) Some truth-like signs 
were linked with the substantial, but not with the innermost nature of the subject; 
they were apprehended through the interaction of sense perception and intellect. 
Hence, propositions relying on such signs appeared to be truth-like not to all men, 
but to a majority of them (pluribus,) included the unlearned people.280 3) A minor 
number of truth-like signs were close to the essence and causes of things and farther 
from sense perception, thus they could be understood through the participation of 
rational apprehension. Consequently, propositions relying on these quasi-
substantial signs were accepted only by intellectually gifted and educated men – the 
                                       
278 In the 8th book of the Topics, Aristotle introduced the concept of “bene natus”, namely the man who 
has a “bonum ingenium”. There, he claimed that those men possessing “a certain natural ability to 
choose the true and shun the false” can easily pick out what is best “by a right liking or disliking for 
whatever is proposed to them” (Top., VIII.14, 163b12-16). In commenting on these lines, Albert 
identified two influential components in determining the success or failure in grasping the first 
principles and reaching the highest knowledge, whose interplay accounted for a good or bad result. 
On the one hand, a set of physiological and environmental predisposing factors, on the other hand 
social and cultural factors.  
279 Albertus, Topica, 1.1.2, p. 241b. 
280 Ibid. 
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wise.281 Subsequently, Albert explained the Aristotelian tripartition of experts’ 
opinions in light of the degree of purity of truth-like signs. 3.1.) The propositions 
grounded on signs that were still partly grasped through sensorial perceptions were 
accepted by all the wise; while 3.2) those based on signs which were connected to 
the substantial nature of the subject, and which were therefore understood almost 
exclusively by the intellect, were known only by the most reputable wise men, and 
the experts in some arts. Finally, 3.3) propositions relying on truth-like signs, which 
pertained to the nature of the thing and were remote from sense perception, could 
be known only by men equipped with a “keen and exceptional understanding 
(subtili et habundanti intellectu)”, which enabled them to have access to the first 
propositions and principles. And these most theoretical minded and learned 
(probatis et probabilioribus) were a small minority. 
Albert’s elucidation of epistemological-endoxical probability may be read as 
insinuating a subjective and objective epistemic hierarchy. On the one hand, his 
explanation of what is probable depicted the ascending ordering of human cognitive 
abilities and acquired skills, from sense perception universally shared by human 
kind, to the keenest intelligence perculiar to philosophers, properly actualized 
through (academic) intellectual training. On the other hand, Albert’s account 
represented the ascending ordering of the objective intelligibility of reality as it was 
in itself. In climbing this pyramid, Albert proceeded from what is posterior in itself 
but is prior to us, namely that which is more readily intelligible for human beings 
since it falls under perception, to what is most intelligible in itself and less accessible 
to ordinary men, namely the first principles that regulate scientific understanding.  
 
3.4.3 In his discussion of probability, Albert mentioned a commentus Arabicus as the 
source for an interpretation he had proposed therein. Having excluded the 
hypothesis that it could be one of Averroes’ commentaries on the Topics, which 
remained unknown until the 16th century, scholars have not yet identified a suitable 
candidate.282 It is commonly acknowledged that Albert was in debt, often heavily, 
                                       
281 Ibid. 
282 Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics were translated into Latin in the 20s of the 16th 
century by Abraham de Balmes and Jacob Mantinus. For Albert’s Arabic sources see Grignaschi, “Les 
traductions;” J. Janssen, “Albert le Grand”. 
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to his Arabic sources for many of his logical views. This holds true particularly in 
the case of the Isagoge, the Categories and the Posterior Analytics, less for the Sophistical 
Refutations and even less for the Topics, despite some references to Avicenna.283 In 
considering Albert’s acquaintance with Arabic writings, we could inquire whether 
the Dominican had any direct or indirect knowledge of Al-Fārābī’s and Averroes’ 
ideas about the topics of accident as a “general heuristic”. Albert tackled the problem 
while commenting on Aristotle’s assertion that it was not possible to obtain a unique 
universal dialectical method applicable to problems concerning any of the four 
dialectical predicables, “for this is not an easy thing to find, and, even were one 
found, it would be very obscure indeed, and of little service”, The Dominican 
pointed out that according to one of the three senses of the polysemantic term 
‘method’, the topics of accident constituted a common method (universalis methodus), 
the most general, sure and useful among the four particular methods pertaining to 
the four predicables. If, indeed, method was considered as the means for 
establishing whether a certain predicated was predicable of a certain subject 
(quantum ad illud quod astruitur in ipsa), then the topics of accident could be deemed 
to be a general method. Since it established the correct and faulty modes of essential 
predication (astruitur in ipsa inesse), it was presupposed by all the other particular 
types of predication: before analyzing whether a predicated inhered in the subject 
as its property or genus, it was necessary to ascertain preliminarily whether the 
predicate inhered in the subject or not. Similarly to Robert (A.7) and unlike the 
Arabs, Albert did not consider this method as universal in the sense that it could be 
applied to syllogistic in general. For him, indeed, the topics of accident was confined 
to the discovery of the middle term of dialectical syllogism, and could not play any 
role in the discovery of premises for the posited question, nor could it be employed 
                                       
283 Cf. Ebbesen, “Albert (the Great?)”, esp. p. 92; Grignaschi, “Les traductions;” J. Janssen, “Albert le 
Grand”. Janssen raised the question about the unnamed commentators to whom Albert referred in 
his elucidation of Topics I.10 104a11 (Janssen, “Albert le Grand”) pp. 255-256 and concluded that 
Albert’s sources remained enigmatic. A parallel done with A.7, A.10, A.11, A.1 has revealed that the 
Dominican is the only author who mentioned Avicenna and, moreover, that none of these 
commentators expresses a view which is compatible with the auctores and the quidam, to whom the 
Dominican referred. A complete comparison with the ‘existing’ commentaries which date earlier or 
from the same period as Albert might unveil the names of these unnamed expositors. Or, in case of a 
negative result, it could stimulate further research dedicated to finding commentaries on the Topics, 
which Albert had at his elbow and that we do not yet know. 
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in producing demonstrative syllogisms. The topical method, indeed, permitted the 
invention of the appropriate sign, and not of the cause, which functioned as 
syllogisms’ intermediate. The discovery of the proper middle term was made 
possible by the locus differentia, while the locus maxima - which was the principle of 
the syllogistic inference properly speaking - provided the correct way of disposing 
(dispositio) the middle and the extreme terms of the dialectical syllogism.284  
 
3.4.4 Albert’s descriptions of the topics, which were scattered throughout his 
paraphrases, recalled to mind the similar definitions found in the commentaries of 
Robert (A.7), Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and Adenulphus (A.11). However, in his 
claims that a locus is a habitudo rerum, the Doctor Universalis did not mention the 
metaphysical foundations of such principles, which was instead a common feature 
of his predecessors. This substantial difference among the Dominican and the three 
Parisian masters can be fully perceived when paralleling Albert’s exegesis of the 
beginning of the eighth book of the Topics with the elucidations elaborated upon by 
his peers (A.10, A.11). The Stagirite opened the last book of the Topics affirming that 
the philosopher and the dialectician proceeded alike in regards to finding the topics; 
and their common method of finding the topics was made even more explicit in the 
Latin translation, in which commentators read that “donec inveniat locum similiter 
philosophi et dialectici consideratio”.285 Normally, commentators elucidated this 
passage by saying that the philosopher, or metaphysician, dealt with the substance 
of the topics, namely in relation to the things (res) and considered the causes of the 
relations among things. And the dialectician considered the topics only secundum 
intentionem, namely he was concerned with the topical relation between general 
concepts such as genus and species, cause and definition. Accordingly, the 
discoverer of the topical relation was the metaphysician, from whom the dialectician 
derived the topics. And it was in virtue of this metaphysical ground that the 
dialectical topics were necessary, and could therefore accomplish their function as 
warrants of the syllogistic inference. In Albert we hardly find any claim concerning 
                                       
284 Albertus, Topica, 2.1.3, p. 297b. 
285 Aristotle, Topics, VIII.1, 155b9-10 (AL, p. 156, 7-9). 
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the derivation of the dialectical topics from the demonstrative topics.286 In his short 
paraphrase of the opening lines of book 8, the Dominican explained the affinity 
between the dialectician and the demonstrator in light of their identical mental 
procedure for discoverying syllogisms’ middle terms. Both indeed found the proper 
intermediate through an internal inquiry which was led by them alone and which 
did not involve other people: “uterque negotiatur circa medium inveniendum et 
ordinem proponendorum apud se ipsum […] quaerit apud se ipsum dialecticus et 
non requirit alterius consensum”.287 The reference to this mental discourse provides 
us with a clue for unveiling the deep reason underlying the diverse exegeses of the 
Aristotelian text elaborated upon by these commentator: the author’s different 
opinions about logic in general. Robert (A.7), Robertus Anglicus (A.10) and 
Adenulphus (A.11) considered logic a scientia sermocinalis dealing with a specific 
type of sermo, namely the syllogism. Albert explicitly refused the view of those who 
“dicunt logicae generalis subiectum esse sermonem, prout est designativum rerum, 
quae significantur per ipsum”, since from this standpoint logic focused primarily on 
language, specifically on the “sermo exterius prolatus”. And this type of language 
(sermo) was not significant in itself, as Avicenna had pointed out, but only insofar as 
it signified the mental concepts, namely the mental language (sermo interius in mente 
dispositum). Therefore, stated Albert, logic dealt with the external language only 
secondarily insofar as it signified mental concepts.288 According to the Doctor 
Universalis, the principal subject of logic was instead the argumentatio insofar as it 
was the instrument through which men acquired knowledge starting from what is 
known. And logic, which guided the intellect in its move from what is known to 
what is unknown, was a rational science concerned mainly with mental concepts 
and acts considered in themselves  
 
                                       
286 Albert did not admit such conflation of logic and metaphysics; in the prologue of his commentary 
on the Posterior Analytics, he stated the distance between them: “Demonstratio et scientia 
demonstratitiva consideranda est hic per differentias sermonum et non per rerum differentias; logica 
enim non res, sed intentiones rerum considerat, ut universale, particulare, orationem, 
argumentationem” (1.1.1, Albertus, Post. An., p. 2b). 
287 Albertus, Topica, 8.1.1, p. 492a-b. 
288 Albertus Magnus, Super Porphyrium de V Universalibus, in Opera Omnia. Editio Coloniensis, vol. I.1a, 
ed. by M. Santos Moya, Münster: Aschendorff, 2004, I.4, p. 5. 
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Cum logici intentio sit docere ea, per quae per se venitur in notitiam ignoti per 
id quod notum est, logici subiectum est argumentatio […] notum, per quod 
scientia ignoti accipitur, dupliciter consideratur, scilicet prout est res extra 
animam noscentis accepta et prout notio quaedam est in anima noscentis. Non 
autem facit notitiam ignoti, prout est res extra animam noscentis accepta, sed 
potius prout notio rei est in anima noscentis existens. Sic enim significativa et 
illuminativa eius, quod ignotum est, quod in notitia ipsius aliquo modo percipit 
intellectus perfecta comprehensione. Hoc igitur modo voces significativas 
rerum considerat logicus et non aliter.289   
 
This turn from a sermocinalis to a rationalis logic and the enlargement of its subject-
matter from syllogism to argumentation, which comprehended also induction, 
enthymeme and example, enabled Albert to flank the ‘standard’ version of the 
Organon with the Arabic ‘long Organon’ in some of his writings.290 A mark of this 
was left also in Albert’s discussion of the first dialectical instrument, namely the 
collection of premises for producing dialectical syllogisms. Habitually, 
commentators used Aristotle’s description of logical premises as a starting point for 
discussing the relation between logic and the arts of the trivium.291 In paraphrasing 
this passage, Albert departed from his predecessors and replaced the traditional 
trivium with Gundissalinus’ quadrivium: logic, taken in its general sense, embraced 
the trivial arts and, moreover, poetics which, said Albert, Aristotle had deemed to 
be a special science. In its proper or narrower meaning, then, logic coincided with 
the science concerned with the various types of syllogisms, namely the 
demonstrative, dialectical and sophistical.292    
 
3.5 Logical form and logical matters: the descensus of the form into the matters. 
The theory of the plurality of forms was rivalled by the theory of the unique form 
shared by the various species of syllogism, which was upheld by Robertus de 
                                       
289 Ibid. 
290 On this topic see the detailed article of Brumber-Chaumont (“Les divisions”), which rectifies some 
conclusions of Marmo (in “Suspicio”). 
291 Aristotle, Topics, I.14, 105b20-25. 
292 Albertus, Topica, p. 278b. 
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Cilnacobi (A.1), Elias (A.14) and the anonymous commentator A.9, whose 
commentaries on the Topics seem to have been produced in Paris.293  
When comparing the commentaries analysed so far (A.2, A.7, A.10, A.11) with 
Robertus’ (A.1), Elias’ (A.14) and A.9’s works, the difference in length, accuracy and 
depth between these exegeses becomes immediately evident. The commentaries 
written by the advocates of the unity of syllogistic form are much less elaborate and 
they never examine in depth any of the issues raised. The authors seem to be content 
with short, at times trivial, answers to standardized sets of questions. None of the 
three authors expanded upon logic in general, Elias and A.9 merely repeated the 
Boethian definition of logic as the ratio disserendi divided into an inventive and a 
judicative part. And Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1) incidentally qualified logic as 
scientia rationalis.294 All three agreed that logic was arranged according to the 
varieties of syllogisms (penes diversitatem sillogismi) and that dialectic dealt with 
dialectical syllogism and the Topics. In their hylomorphic accounts of syllogism, 
these authors admitted neither the plurality of forms nor the differentiation between 
the inferring and the probative syllogism. It is worth pointing out that none of them 
mentioned as an alternative to their own views either the doctrine of the plurality of 
forms nor the division of syllogism into inferring and probative. Unlike the 
‘pluralists’, Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1), the anonymous A.9 and Elias (A.14) did not 
apply the doctrine of the four causes in their exegeses of the definition of syllogism 
that opened the Topics. They explained it through the principle of the descent 
                                       
293 According to Green-Pedersen the author of A.1 commented on all the books of the Topics in Paris 
around the 1240s. The attribution of A.1 to Robert Kilwardby is not sure. As pointed out by Green-
Pedersen and Weijers, the conciseness of this commentary in form of lectiones makes difficult a 
doctrinal comparison with Kilwardby’s works, such as the commentary on the Prior Analytics and the 
De ortu scientiarum. I paralleled A.1’s and Kilwardby’s explanation of the definition of syllogism 
found in Kilwardby’s commentary on the Prior Analytics, but I found few points of doctrinal and 
terminological contact. A.9 is a fragmentary lectio-form commentary, which stops at I.3, 101b.10, 
Green-Pedersen dates it to the 1250. Elias’ Sententia libri Topicorum (A.14) is a short sententia-
commentary covering all the eight books of the Topics, whose prologue was taken from the 
commentary on the Prior Analytics of Robert Kilwardby. Probably it was produced in Paris, around 
the 1275-80 according to Green-Pedersen. For the different dates see Green-Pedersen, The tradition, 
respectively p. 382, p. 386, p. 389. 
294 A.1, f. 95b (see Weijers, “Le commentaire”, p.127); A.9, f. 155va; A.14, f. 56ra. Robertus (A.1) 
acknowledged that in its general sense, logic subsumed the trivium, while in its proper meaning, logic 
was the science concerned with the Organon: “logicus communiter sumendo ipsum continet sub se 
totum trivium proprie autem sumendo non” (A.1, f. 102a). 
 
 
124 
 
(descensus) of the unique form into the matter, which had a more Neoplatonic than 
Aristotelian flavour, and implied the interpretation of the Aristotelian 
differentiation of syllogism as an analogical division. According to this elucidation, 
the undifferentiated simple syllogistic form, which was described in the Prior 
Analytics, descended directly and completely into the demonstrative syllogism, 
which was the perfect syllogism insofar as it preserved both the necessity of 
consequence and of the consequent. Subsequently, the simple syllogism’s form 
degraded into imperfect types, firstly into the dialectical syllogism, which 
maintained the necessitas consequentiae but had mere probable premises and 
conclusion, and finally into the sophistical syllogism which did not preserve any 
necessity.295 From this unitary perspective, the variety of matters accounted for the 
differentiation between syllogisms: “sillogismi distinguuntur penes materialia ex 
quibus sunt”, claimed the anonymous commentator A.9. The three authors could 
avoid the possible objection that a form should inform only the matter suited to it, 
by acknowledging a plurality of matters. The syllogism’s appropriate matter was the 
essential matter, which consisted of the terms and premises of syllogism and was 
identical in all syllogisms: if it was vicious, there would not have been any syllogism. 
By admitting such essential matter, these commentators could also solve the puzzle 
about fallacious deductions. Materially sophistical syllogisms were syllogisms in 
virtue of their materia essentialis, even though they were faulty in probable matter, 
which was a merely accidental matter. The various species of deduction shared the 
essential matter and differed for their accidental matters, which were probable 
propositions for fallacious and dialectical syllogism, necessary propositions for 
demonstrative deductions.296 From the few words these three authors spent on the 
accidental matter, it seemed that the Elias and the anonymous commentator A.9 
                                       
295 A.1, f. 95a-b (Weijers, “Le commentaire”, p.126); A.14, f. 56ra and A.9, f. 158ra-rb (“sillogismus 
potest tripliciter considerari aut in comparatione ad conclusionem quam infert, aut in comparatione 
ad animam cui facit fidem aut in comparatione ad materialia ex quibus est. Si comparetur ad 
conclusionem quam infert, sic dicitur ratiocinatio, unde Algazel formacio est descessus causae in 
causatum”). In the prologues to his commentaries on the Topics (and also on the Posterior Analytics), 
Albert the Great had interpreted the division of syllogisms as a descending degradation from the 
perfect, the demonstration, to the imperfect form, fallacy, without however assigning any active role 
to this distinguishing principle in the rest of the work. 
296 A.1, f. 97a (Weijers, “Le commentaire”, pp.132-133); A.9, f. 159va; A.14, f. 57ra. 
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considered necessity and probability both objectively, in terms of modality,297 and 
subjectively (ex parte nostra) or cognitively. Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1) agreed with 
them in proposing a gnoseological reading of the definition of probabilia (ἔνδοξα), 
according to which probability reflected three cognitive human powers:  
 
Tres conditiones principales positae in ratione probabilis respiciunt tres gradus 
virtutis cognoscitivae in nobis: primus est sensus coniunctus cum fantasia, et hac 
coniunctione utuntur omnes. Secundus gradus est virtus cogitativa vel 
estimativa, qua plues utuntur. Tercius est virtus intellectiva, qua habundant 
sapientes […] quidam [scil. sapientes] enim utuntur intellectu debili modo 
parum profundantes intellectum, alii autem modo mediocri, alii autem modo 
optimo et perfecto.298 
 
One of the main consequences of the dismissal of the dialectical form was the 
decreased importance of the loci. Although they were still considered the principle 
of dialectical syllogism, they did not have any theoretical or active function in 
relation to dialectical syllogism. Neither as warrants, since the dialectic inference 
was secured by moods and figures exclusively. Nor as criteria for the validity of 
dialectical deductions, since the validity of all syllogisms was evaluated on the basis 
of valid syllogistic schemes. The mere symbolic role assigned to the loci by Robertus 
de Cilnacobi (A.1), the anonymous A.9 and Elias emerged from their opinions on 
the subjects treated in the various books of the Topics. Similarly to Adenulphus, these 
masters deemed the first book to be treating general principles of syllogism, and the 
central books (2-7) to be concerned not with the formal principles of syllogism, but 
with dialectical syllogism itself insofar as it applied to problems related to the four 
predicables. The eighth book dealt with the use of syllogisms in training and testing 
discussions.299 
                                       
297 A.9, f. 158va: “Omnis sillogismus est aut ex hiis quae sunt et non possunt non esse, et sic est 
sillogismus demonstrativus, aut est ex hiis quae nec sunt nec possunt esse et sic est paralogismus 
disciplinae, aut est ex hiis quae possunt esse et non esse. Et tunc dupliciter, aut enim magis se habet 
ad esse quam ad non esse, et sic est sillogismus dyalecticus, aut magis se habet ad non esse quam ad 
esse et sic est sillogismus litigiosus”. Cf. A.14, f. 56rb. 
298 A.1, f. 96b (Weijers, “Le commentaire”, p.132); A.9, f. 158va; A.14, f. 56rb. 
299 A.1, f. 97b (Weijers, “Le commentaire”, p. 135) and 105a; A.14, f. 81ra. 
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The elimination of the dialectical form obviously had repercussions for the way 
these authors considered the division of logic into discovery and judgement. 
Similarly to the ‘pluralists’, the advocates of the unique form affirmed that the ars 
iudicandi was taught in the Prior and Posterior Analytics and the ars inveniendi in the 
Topics and Sophistical Refutations. Unlike them, however, Robertus de Cilnacobi 
(A.1), Elias and the anonymous A.9 did not conceive these two parts of logic as 
completely separated, but in continuity. Or, in other words, in all the parts of logic 
there was both a specific discovery and a peculiar invention but at different degrees 
– e.g. in the Topics the discovery of the dialectical middle term was preeminent over 
judgment; and on the contrary in the Posterior Analytics the discovery of the 
demonstrative middle term, namely the definition, was less preponderant than 
judgment. The three commentators arrived at an acknowledgement of an inventive 
and a judicative part to each of the disciplines falling under the general logic by 
equating the pair discovery-invention to the couple ars/utens-docens/scientia. 
Robertus (A.1), Elias and A.9 considered indeed inventio as equivalent to ars, which 
concerned the production (fieri) and operated through rules, and iudicium as equal 
to scientia, which studied the properties of its subject-matter. Thus, they raised the 
question whether a logical discipline, such as dialectic or demonstrative, was 
inventive (an ars), or judicative (a scientia). As regard to dialectic, they answered that 
it was docens or iudicativa, insofar as it treated dialectical syllogism per modum 
scientiae, and it was also utens or inventiva since it operated per modum artis on the 
dialectical problem, that is the quaestio.300 
 
Conclusion 
 
This overview of the earliest existing commentaries on the Topics, with a special 
emphasis on the first book and sections of the second and eighth books, has revealed 
some of the points of contact and divergence between the earlier commentators. All 
of them interpreted syllogism from the hylomorphic perspective. Generally 
                                       
300 A.1, f. 95a (Weijers, “Le commentaire”, pp. 124-125); A.9, f. 156rb-va; A.14; f. 57ra. 
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speaking, usually these authors had a twofold understanding of the concept of 
‘probability’. They offered a modal and objective account of ‘probability’ in their 
elucidation of the material differentiation of syllogisms introduced in the opening 
lines of the Topics. And they opted for a subjective and epistemological 
understanding of the notion of ‘probability’ in their exegeses of the Aristotelian 
probabilia (ἔνδοξα). 
Even though it was not possible to precisely determine the direct dependence of a 
commentator on another, since “between any two medieval logicians there is 
another logician”,301 it has however been possible to identify some 
Familienähnlichkeit between those authors who advocated the plurality of syllogistic 
forms on the one hand, and the upholders of the unique syllogistic form on the other 
hand.  
The commentators who admitted the formal identity of syllogisms, such as Robertus 
de Cilnacobi (A.1), Elias (A.14) and the anonymous A.9, did not explain the 
Aristotelian definition of syllogism, found in the first chapter of the Topics, in the 
light of the doctrine of causes, which was instead adopted by all the pluralists, except 
Albert the Great. They assumed instead the differentiating principle of the descensus 
of the unique form into the various matters, which in the case of dialectical and 
sophistical syllogism implied a degradation of the form itself. These masters did not 
admit of any substantial differentiation between syllogisms. They refused not only 
to acknowledge a special form proper to dialectical syllogisms, but also to 
distinguish between the inferring and the probative syllogism. The theory of the 
unity of forms had consequences on the role acknowledged to the loci - which did 
not find any room in this unitarist account, and also on the interpretation of the 
division between the inventive and the judicative parts of logic - which were 
considered to be common features of all the subparts of logic.  
While the adherents to the doctrine of the unique form seemed to closely 
follow Aristotle, the advocates of the plurality of forms were considerably 
influenced by Boethius’ epistemological reading of syllogisms and arguments. As a 
                                       
301 N. Kretzmann, “Incipit/Desinit”, in P. Machamer - R. Turnbull, Motion and Time, Space and Matter: 
Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976, pp. 
101-36, here p. 108. 
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consequence, all the pluralists assumed the division of syllogism into an inferring 
and a probative one, and an instantiation of the latter was dialectical syllogism. 
Accordingly, they admitted a specific form for dialectical deductions, whose 
principle of inference were the dialectical topics.302 At the same time, dialectical 
syllogisms were based on the loci, the simple syllogism and the demonstration, 
which shared the same ‘logical’ form, grounded on the valid syllogistic schemes. In 
authors such as Robert (A.7) and Albert the Great the distinction between logical 
and dialectical forms and matters was carried to the extreme. Through the 
differentiation between logical and dialectical forms, these commentators tied the 
notion of logical validity to the simple (logical, we may say) form, and the notion of 
dialectical validity to the dialectical form. This discrimination, in turn, formed the 
basis for separating not only discovery and judgement, but also between the logical 
and dialectical (or non-logical) features of syllogisms and reasoning in general. By 
grounding the material validity of dialectical reasoning on the evidentness of the 
premises, the distance between logic and dialectic was broadened further. 
Consequently, within the boundaries of dialectic some types of reasoning which 
were on the margin of logical theories, such as induction and, secondarily, 
enthymeme and example could find a place in their own right. While ‘logical’ 
induction needed to be resolved into the categorical syllogism, the dialectical 
induction was put on an equal footing with dialectical syllogism.  
The distinction between logical and dialectical form and, more generally, between 
the logical and dialectical facets of reasoning did not amount to the material-formal 
distinction between inferences, but rather to a demarcation between a formal and an 
epistemological understanding of logic. In those authors who were markedly 
influenced by Boethius, logic, or better dialectic, inclined towards psychologism: 
indeed dialectical ratiocinationes did not aim at inferring necessarily the conclusion, 
by at producing beliefs about it.  
  
                                       
302 By assigning a funding role to the loci, the doctrine of the double form was the heir of the Boethian 
tradition of the topics. But while Abelard as well as 12th and early 13th century authors had assigned 
a function to the topics in validating enthymematic inferences, the Aristotelian commentators had to 
struggle in assigning a validating role to the topics in syllogistic deductions. 
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Chapter Four. Semantic topics: the Modistic mode of commenting on 
the Topics. 
 
4.1 The influence of new conceptions and paradigms of logic on commentators 
of the Topics.  
4.1.1 In his commentaries on the Organon, Albert the Great embraced the Avicennian 
notion of logic, according to which science dealt with mental concepts namely with 
second intentions applied to primary intentions, and he introduced diverse divisions 
of logic and of the books of the Organon, both in its ‘standard’ and Arabic ‘long’ 
version. The models proposed by Albert influenced the arrangement of logic 
proposed by Thomas Aquinas in the prologue of his commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics (1270-72ca).303 Thomas qualified logic as a rational science (scientia 
rationalis) concerned with the study of beings of reason (entia rationis) that were 
produced by the threefold intellect’s activity, namely apprehension, judgement and 
ratiocination.304 Accordingly, Thomas subdivided logic on the basis of these three 
acts of the mind (secundum diversitatem actuum rationis), hence associating each being 
of reason to a part of logic and to the books of the ‘long’ Organon. First, Aquinas 
connected simple apprehension, through which the intellect knew the essence of 
things, to the doctrine of the Categories. Secondly, he matched predication and 
judgment to the On interpretation. Thirdly, he deemed the books of the logica nova to 
parallel the proper act of the ratio, which consisted in “discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut 
per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti”. Aquinas articulated this 
third part of logic in three subparts whose features stemmed from the interplay of 
two principles. On the one hand, Aquinas considered the parallel between nature’s 
                                       
303 On Albert’s divisions of logic see Marmo, “Suspicio”, esp. pp. 159-163 and 165-169; Brumberg-
Chaumont, “Les divisions”; on Aquinas’ division of logic see R. W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic 
According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Martinus Nijohff: The Hague, 1966. 
304 Logic is the art “quae [es]t directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu 
rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae 
non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); 
sed etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam” (T. Aquinas, 
Expositio libri Posteriorum, in S. Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia, ed. Commissio Leonina, Romae 1989, 
vol. I*, p. 6); Schmidt, The Domain, pp. 52-57. 
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and ration’s acts: nature as well as art achieved their scopes by necessity, ut in 
pluribus or they could produce a faulty effect. On the other hand, Thomas took into 
account the types of cognitive effects produced by the mind’s activity in the agent: 
I) some reasoning led to necessary conclusions and engendered certitudo in the 
reasoner; II) others led to true conclusions only most of time and produced various 
beliefs that were comprehended within the graded classification: opinio, suspicio and 
estimatio; III) some reasoning was defective and corresponded to the sophistical 
reasoning treated in the Sophistical Refutations. Aquinas accommodated this 
threefold division of the partition of logic into discovery and judgment. The 
judicative (or analytica sive resolutoria) part dealt with type I) reasoning, namely those 
argumentations engendering knowledge and certitudo such as the simple syllogism 
described the Prior Analytics and the demonstrative syllogism treated in the Posterior 
Analytics. The inventive part of logic concerned type II) reasoning, and Aquinas 
divided it according to the types of the cognitive habits they begot: 
 
Secundo autem rationis processui deservit alia pars logicae, quae dicitur 
inventiva. Nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. Unde de his, quae 
inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem 
in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur 
(quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu), ita et in 
processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis 
invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur. 
Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit 
tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur: quia 
ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et 
ad hoc ordinatur topica sive dialectica. Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus 
est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro Topicorum. Quandoque vero, non fit complete 
fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam 
partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc 
ordinatur Rhetorica. Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam 
partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit 
homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius 
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abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod 
virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem.305  
 
Eventually, Aquinas’ model revealed itself to be largely adopted by next generation 
of authors and did not have negligible consequences in the subsequent speculations 
about logic and its inner articulation. Thomas’ scheme introduced a shift in the 
partition of logic from its ‘objective’ to its ‘subjective’ elements, from syllogism and 
its components to the mental acts that produced the beings of reason (entia rationis) 
and to the habits which accompanied them. This change of perspective allowed for 
the making of room for rhetoric and poetic within the inventive part of logic aside 
from dialectic, thus introducing a significant reshaping of the ancient arrangement 
of the sermocinal disciplines of the trivium.  
The spread of Avicenna’s opinions on the “intentionalistic logic”306 along with 
Aquinas’ new paradigm for distinguishing the parts of logic secundum diversitatem 
actuum rationis played a key role in the transformation that logic and its subject 
matter underwent in the sense of intentional science (scientia rationalis) from the 
1270s.  
 
4.1.2 A testimony of this modification is provided by Angelus de Camerino, who in 
his commentary on the Topics dating from the end of the 13th century, proposed a 
rather elaborate doctrine of second intentions.307 He committed himself to the view 
                                       
305 Aquinas, Expositio, bk. 1, l.1, pp. 6-7. 
306 As remarked by Green-Pedersen, in Boethius of Dacia’s commentary on the Topics the term 
“second intentions” did not appear, whilst it was present in Simon of Faversham’s commentary 
(Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 233). On the different ways of understanding and subdividing the 
intentiones in the 13th-14th centuries see J. Pinborg, “Radulphus Brito’s sophism on second intentions”, 
in Vivarium 12 (1975), pp. 119-152; G. Klima, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Mediaeval 
Semantics and Ontology”, in Synthese 96/1 (1993), pp. 25-59; L.M. de Rijk, Giraldus Odonis OFM, Opera 
philosophica, vol. II: De intentionibus. Critical edition with a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to 
ca. 1350, Leiden: Brill, 2005.  
307 Angelus de Camerino (d. 1314 ca). belonged to the Heremits of St. Augustine, in 1295 became the 
regent master of Theology for the Augustinians at Paris and taught in Rome, was named bishop of 
Cagli on December 1296, in 1298 was named bishop of Fiesole and in 1301 bishop of Larino, then of 
Modon (1303) and in 1311 became Patriarch of Grado. The outcome of his teaching activity were 
commentaries on the logica vetus (Isagoge, Categories, Perihermeneias) and on the Topics. In the 
dedicatory letter, which is appended to some manuscripts of Angelus’ commentary on the Topics and 
is addressed to Andriolus, a brother of his, Angelus claimed that he wrote his commentary on the 
Topics while he was lecturing on the Metaphysics, at the request of their young student, probably the 
novices (nostrorum studentium iuniorum). In his commentary, Angelus showed a peculiar taste for 
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that logic was a rational science centred around second intentions namely high-level 
concepts or rules drawn from the first intentions: 
 
Secunda intentio non est aliud nisi secundus conceptus quem intellectus sibi 
format de re cui immediate non res, sed conceptus primus respondit. Sic enim 
debemus imaginari quod intellectus intelligit hominis vel alterius ordinate et 
distincte quidditatem, quam quidditatem sic apprehensam appellat hominem 
vel ut melius dicatur humanitatem. Et tale nomen vocatur nomen primae 
intentionis. Sed intellectus ex tali ordine partium quidditatis ipsam quidditatem 
representante format sibi quemdam secundum conceptum cum non quidditas 
rei immediate.308  
 
Angelus subdivided logic on the basis of Aquinas’ threefold acts of mind, which he 
accommodated to Al-Farabi’s criterion of the intellect’s ways of erring, which was 
used around the mid-13th century. Angelus then divided the logica nova on the basis 
of simple syllogisms’ material differences. Dialectic and the Topics were concerned 
                                       
etymology and borrowed etymological explanations of Greek words such as topos or method from 
Hugh of Pisa’s (Ugucio) Liber derivationum and Papias’ Elementarium doctrinae. Angelus commentary 
in sentence-form is preserved in seven manuscripts and it may have enjoyed a rather wide circulation: 
only two manuscripts are nowadays in Italian libraries, at Rome and Florence, while four are 
preserved in libraries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely Erfurt, Prague, and two copies in 
Cracow. As is known, the universities of these cities were influenced by nominalist ideas. That 
Angelus commentary may have been considered interesting by nominalist authors is confirmed by 
the ownership note of the Vatican copy, which came from Marsilius of Inghen’s library: “Exposicio 
thopicorum pro libraria universitatis per me Marsilium de Inghen propria manu” (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. Lat. 1057, ff. 1ra-198vb, here f. 1; I will refer to this manuscript). 
Moreover, Angelus is mentioned in an anonymous 15th century commentary (A.46) and excerpts of 
his commentary were added to the margins of the Cesena manuscript, which contains Adenulphus 
de Anagni’s commentary (cf. supra ch. 3.3). On Angelus see D. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana, 
Scriptores Itali, Firenze 1929, vol. I, p. 173; O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: 
textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500), I, Répertoire des noms commençant par A-B, Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, p. 
63; D. Walz, Die historische und philosophischen Handschriften der Codices Palatini Latini in der 
Vatikanischen Bibliothek (Cod. Pal. Lat. 921-1078), Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1999, p. 229. 
On the commentary on the Topics see Green-Pedersen, p. 390, A.17. 
308 A.17, f. 3va; see also: “Logica ergo sola considerat huiusmodi conceptus ut sunt ex primis 
conceptis formatis, et istud est quod Avicenna dicere voluit quod <logica> est de secundis 
conceptibus adiunctis primis idest formatis ex primis. Et quia sunt formati ex primis sicut 
carpentarius format regulam aliquando ex aliquo ligno recto et sine obliquitate per quam postea alia 
ligna dirigere valet, ideo secundi conceptus, licet sint formati ex primis, sunt tamen regulae quaedam 
ad cognoscendum res quae in primis conceptibus immediate cognoscuntur” (A.17, f. 1ra-rb). 
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with the dialectical or topical syllogism, which was a second intention whose 
principles were dialectical topics and which applied to probable matter.309 
These newly introduced paradigms gained prominence in the following decades, 
nevertheless the old alternatives were not completely replaced, as attested to by one 
of the outstanding modistic logicians, Radulphus Brito who, at the edge of 13th 
century, wrote that “aliqui dicunt quod ens rationis est subiectum in logica, alii quod 
syllogismus, alii quod modus sciendi”.310  
 
4.1.3 In the prologue to his Quaestiones supra Thopica, Radulphus Brito offered a 
picture of the most widely adopted dividing principles underlying the alternative 
paradigms of logic, which were adopted in his time. “Secundum antiquam viam et 
considerationem”, which was followed by many mid-13th century Parisian masters 
of Arts, logic was divided “secundum divisionem sillogismi”: the remote and 
proximal integral parts of syllogisms were dealt with in the logica vetus, namely the 
Categoriae and the De Interpretatione, whilst the subjective parts in the logica nova. 
                                       
309A.17, f. 3rb-vb: “Subiectum huius libri non est sillogismus dialecticus in quantum huiusmodi, sed 
in quantum est quaedam intentio secunda; est quaedam intentio formata ex quodam discursu primi 
intellectus circa rerum probabilitatem vel qualitercumque velis hanc secundam intentionem 
describere vel exprimere”. 
310 R. Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, q. 3, in S. Ebbesen – J. Pinborg, “Bartholomew of Bruges 
and his Sophisma on the Nature of Logic”, in Chaiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 39 (1981), 
pp. iii-80, here p. xv. Bartholomew’s sophism offers a valuable testimony about the discussion on the 
manifold views endorsed by 13th century authors – such as Albert the Great, Boethius of Dacia and 
Radulphus Brito – about logic, its epistemic statute and its subject-matter, along with the criticism 
raised against these opinions. Radulphus Brito (1270-1320ca). studied in Paris, where he became 
master of Arts before 1296; he continued teaching while studying theology (from 1299ca.), and 
obtained his degree in theology around 1308. He then became administrative head (provisor) of the 
Parisian University between 1315 and 1320. Brito was a prolific and all-round author. His writings 
span from mathematics to theology and grammar, he commented on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, 
metaphysics and ethics, and on the ‘standard’ Organon, along with Boethius’ De topicis differentiis. His 
logical commentaries were read by generation of scholars; particularly, his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Topics, which was written before 1295, was still used by Prague and Cracow Arts masters at the turn 
of the 14th century (see infra, ch. 7.5). On Brito’s Quaestiones supra Thopica Aristotelis, which is 
preserved in nine manuscripts, see Pinborg, “Die Logik”, pp. 82-86, which provides a list of the 
questions (reprinted in Deuffic, “Un logicien”, pp. 69-73); Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 392, A.20. 
I will use the manuscript preserved at Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. Lat. 11132, ff. 1ra-
52ra, written in 1307 and available on line on Gallica: 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90767186?rk=42918;4%C3%B9. On Brito see S. Ebbesen, 
“Radulphus Brito. The Last of the Great Arts Masters. Or: Philosophy and Freedom”, in Aertsen – 
Speer, Geistesleben, pp. 231-251; J.-L. Deuffic, “Un logicien renommé, proviseur de Sorbonne au XIVè 
s. Raoul le Breton de Ploudiry. Notes bio-biographiques”, in Pecia: ressources en médiévistique 1 (2002), 
pp. 45-154; W.J. Courtenay, “Radulphus Brito, master of arts and theology”, in Chaiers de l’Institut du 
Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 76 (2005), pp. 131-158. 
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Brito seemed more inclined towards the new view, according to which the logica 
utens centred around the various modi sciendi – definitive, demonstrative, divisive et 
topice – and aimed at providing itself and the other sciences with the proper tools for 
producing knowledge. These instrumenta, such as syllogism, induction, and 
definition, were intellectual entities and as such were the objects of the study of the 
logica docens. Teaching logic, indeed, dealt with beings of reason (entia rationis) or 
second intentions, namely with logical concepts that resulted from three mental acts, 
apprehension, judgment and reasoning. According to the new way, logic was 
organized on the basis of these threefold operations of reason and the ‘standard 
Organon’ was divided secundum diversitatem actuum rationis, similarly to Aquinas. 
The adherents of the new view, however, did not side with him in separating the 
parts of the logica nova according to the graded classification of beliefs. Indeed 
Thomas’ modern followers opted for the old division based on the material 
differences between syllogisms (penes divisionem syllogismi).311 Even though Brito 
did not mention any of the advocates of the modern way, they could be identified 
with his fellow Modistae. The turn toward intentionalism was indeed a basic tenet of 
the views about logic and its subject matter which were endorsed by the group of 
authors active in Paris from the 1270s to the turn of the century and known as 
Modistae,312 such as Boethius of Dacia313 and Martin of Dacia, Simon of 
                                       
311 A.20, I, q. I, f. 11vb-12ra. In answering the question about the subject matter of logic, Brito claimed 
that the “subiectum in logica est ens rationis sive secundae intentionis, subiectum dico commune per 
praedicationem. Sed subiectum commune per attributionem est syllogismus” (Brito, Super 
Porphyrium, q. 3, p. xvi). 
312 On the Modistae see J. Pinborg, “Die Logik der Modistae” in Studia Mediewistyczne 16 (1975), pp. 
39-97, reprinted in Id., Medieval Semantics. Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grammar, ed. by S. 
Ebbesen, London: Variorum, 1984; J. Pinborg, Logica e semantica; C. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio nella 
Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330. La semiotica dei Modisti, Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per 
il Medio Evo, 1994; Id., “The Semantics of the Modistae”, in S. Ebbesen – R. L. Friedman, Medieval 
Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium ‘the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, 
January 10-13, 1996, København: C.A. Reitzels Forlag, 1996, pp. 83-104. 
313 We have little information about Boethius’ life. The Danish philosopher was perhaps born around 
1245, in the 60s and 70s he taught at the Paris Faculty of Arts, probably until the 1277 when some 
views which he endorsed in his writings were condemned by the Parisian Bishop Stephen Tempier. 
After that period, he may have joined the Dominican order. Possibly, the condemnation caused the 
loss of some of his works such as the Ars Demonstrativa and the questions on the Aristotelian 
Metaphysics, Perihermeneias, Sophistical Refutation and Rhetoric. Fortunately, part of his writings 
survived; they cover various subjects, such as grammar, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics and 
logic. His questions on Aristotle’s Topics (A.13) which date from the 1270s have been published: 
Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum, in Boethii Daci Opera. Topica-Opuscula, ed. by 
N.G. Green-Pedersen – J. Pinborg, København: G. E. C. Gad, 1976, vol. VI/I. On Boethius see J. 
Pinborg, “Zur Philosophie des Boethius de Dacia. Ein Überblick”, in Studia Mediewistyczne 15 (1974), 
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Faversham,314 Thomas of Erfurt and Radulphus Brito himself. In their grammatical 
and logical writings, these authors introduced a novel approach to language and 
new ideas in semantics. They understood logic as a science, rather than as an art and 
in order to fulfil the requirements of scientificity, the Modists needed to assign an 
immutable and stable object of study to logic, which they identified in the second 
intentions that presupposed the first intentions (“secundae intentiones fundatae in 
primis intentionibus”). Their interest in the mental aspect rather than in the external 
expression of concepts and reasoning led modistic logicians to refuse the view of 
logic as a sermocinalis science and to opt for the alternative interpretation of logic as 
a scientia rationalis. Second intentions indeed were psychological entities, they were 
metalinguistic concepts as well as the foundation for the meaning of the second 
intentions themselves. In other words, they were the extramental beings 
conceptualized or known by the intellect, which considered the accidental 
properties of the modus essendi of the extramental items.315 Specifically, the second 
intentions which were dealt with in logic were metalinguistic and high-level 
concepts such as genus, species, difference, proposition, affirmation, syllogism, 
topics. Modistic logicians also understood the topics in light of their theories of 
second intentions. They deemed the loci to be habitudines or relations between logical 
high-level concepts, such as genus and species, which could be applied to various 
                                       
pp. 165-185; S. Ebbesen, “Boethius of Dacia: science is a serious game”, in Theoria 66 (2000), pp. 145-158; 
S. Ebbesen, “The Man who Loved Every: Boethius of Dacia on Logic and Metaphysics”, in The Modern 
Schoolman, 82 (2005), pp. 235-250. 
314 Simon of Faversham (1260ca-1306) was an English philosopher; after having studied at Oxford, 
probably he was master of Arts in Paris in the 1280s. From the last decade of the 13th century he was 
back in Oxford, where he received his degree in theology and was named chancellor in 1304. Simon’s 
extant writings were the outcome of his Parisian teaching activity and covered all the books of the 
‘standard’ Organon, and some of the Aristotelian physical and biological writings; he commented also 
on Peter of Spain’s Tractatus and Priscian’s Institutiones Grammaticae. His writing disclosed influences 
of various authors, such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Gilles of Rome and Peter of Auvergne. 
Simon’s Dicta or literal commentary on the Topics (1280s) is preserved in a single manuscript from 
the 15th century, Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 1368, ff. 24ra-43ra. This copy, to which I will 
refer, does not cover Topics IV.5 127a20-VII.3 153a10. On Simon see M. Grabmann, Die 
Aristoteleskommentare des Simon von Faversham: Handschriftliche Mitteilungen, Munich: Verlag der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1933; C.H. Lohr, “Problems of Authorship concerning 
some Medieval Aristotle Commentaries”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 13 (1971), pp. 131–36. On 
the Dicta see Green-Pedersen, The tradition, p. 391, A. 18. 
315 “Quaedam cognitiones vel rationes intelligendi rem sive saltem res cognitae sub istis intentionibus 
secundis ut sub quodam respectum vel sunt res intellectae ut sunt in respectu tali” (A.20, I, q. 1, f. 
11va). 
136 
 
arguments in virtue of their generality.316 Angelus provided us with a clarifying 
enumeration of the four senses assigned to the polysemantic term locus. First, a topic 
was the maximal proposition; secondly, it was the difference of the maximal 
proposition; thirdly, locus amounted to the Aristotelian consideratio;317 finally, a topic 
was the middle term of syllogisms.318 This quadripartition was not introduced by 
the Augustinian friar himself, it is found also in Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1) who 
enumerated the four meanings of locus as “maxima et differentia maximae <et> 
consideratio et medium.”319  
 
4.1.4 Another interesting remark came from Brito, who offered a conceptual 
distinction between a dialectical locus and a dialectical consequentia. Dialectical topics 
were the principles of dialectical consequences since the validity of the connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent of the dialectical consequence was 
granted by the intentional relation holding between the second intentions 
corresponding to the terms appearing in the antecedent and in the consequent of the 
dialectical consequence:  
 
Licet quidam dicant quod locus et consequentia non differunt, differunt tamen 
quia locus est habitudo confirmans consequentiam sicut dicendo sic ‘est sanum, 
                                       
316 Green-Pedersen provided an in-depth exposition of Boethius’, Simon’s and Brito’s views about 
dialectical topics in The Tradition, pp. 228-240; see also Marmo, “La topique”, pp. 346-350. 
317 That this issue was interesting is confirmed by a marginal note in A.11, at the end of the first book, 
which was drawn from Angelus’ commentary: “Nota quod locus vel maxima propositio potest 
dupliciter considerari vel secundum substantiam vel secundum usum. Philosophus in sequentibus 
<libris> [scil. II-VII] determinat de loco secundum suum usum, Boethius secundum substantiam. Et 
quia ‘locus’ dicitur secundum substantiam, secundum operationem vero dicitur ‘consideratio’ ideo 
hic appellantur ‘considerationes,’ sed in Thopiciis Boetii ‘loci’. Et quia ista instrumenta ordinantur ad 
ipsam maximam propriam et ad ipsum sillogismum secundum substantiam, ideo ipsae maximae 
propositiones, quae in sequentibus libris dicuntur considerationes, hic per comparationem ad dicta 
instrumenta appellat eas locos philosophus. Et in hoc terminatur summa primi libri secundum 
Angelum” (A.11, f. 55r). 
318 “Notandum quod locus potest accipi multipliciter. Uno modo idem est quod maxima, alio modo 
idem est quod differentia maximae […], alio modo sumitur pro consideratione et isto modo sumpsit 
philosophus prius [scil. books II-VII] locum […], alio modo idem est quod medium” (A.17, f. 169va). 
319 A.1, f. 140a-b. When introducing the various topics, Robertus often qualified the maxima as the 
ground of the consideratio: “Alius locus. <Philosophus> dat aliam considerationem, quae fit ex modo 
ex parte subiecti. Prima consideratio fundatur supra hanc maximam: ‘nihil quod inest secundum 
alium modum quam ut accidens inest ut accidens’. Et in ista parte sic procedit: primo dat 
considerationem et est: si aliquid assignatur inesse ut accidens videndum est si insit ut genus vel ut 
diffinitio vel ut proprium et si hoc non inest ut accidens et istam considerationem doceat extra” (A.1, 
f. 105a). 
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ergo non est aegrum’. Habitudo istorum ad invicem, scilicet sani et aegri, quae 
est quod si unum insit subiecto alterum simul non inest, ista habitudo est locus 
et consequentia confirmatur per talem habitudinem sive locum. Ita quod locus 
et consequentia differunt sicut principium et principiatum. Locus est sicut 
principium et confirmans, consequentia autem sicut principiatum. Unde et 
propter hoc, quia different, <locus> denominatur ab inferente sive ab 
antecedente, sed consequentia denominatur a consequente, quia in antecedente 
est principium illationis et quia locus dicit principium illationis, ideo locus 
denominatur ab antecedente; sed consequentia dicit processus rationis ab uno 
in aliud et ideo consequentia denominatur ab eo quod habet rationem 
termini.320  
 
Although beings of reason (entia rationis) had a psychological nature, the Modists 
stated that second intentions were not arbitrarily produced by the intellect, they 
were not a mere figmentum intellectum. They indeed possessed an objective value in 
virtue of their ontological foundation - of their being fundata in re. As we have seen, 
the real foundation for dialectical concepts and dialectic in general was commonly 
acknowledged by earlier commentators of the Topics and mainly by the ‘pluralists’. 
Despite the evident exterior similarities, however, these authors’ and Modists’ 
claims were profoundly distant from each other. The analysis of a specific case will 
show the difference.  
 
4.1.5 In his exegesis of the chapter on the ten categories (Topics I.9), Robert (A.7) had 
limited himself to the observation that the Aristotelian categories concerned the 
modus praedicandi of things. In the profound explanation of the same text, Simon of 
Faversham went much further in developing an almost fully-fledged theory of the 
derivation of the categories from the modes of being: according to him, the ten 
categories were modi praedicandi drawn from the modi essendi. Consequently, 
Aristotle’s praedicamenta could be considered under a twofold perspective. On the 
one hand, insofar as they expressed the various ways in which being existed outside 
the soul (modi essendi), the categories were the proper object of metaphysical 
                                       
320 A.20, II, q. 13, f. 34ra. 
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analysis. On the other hand, they were also second intentions, that is mental 
concepts (conceptum praedicamenti), and as such they were studied by natural 
philosophers (quantum ad modum abstractionis), logicians and dialecticians, who 
examined the various ways in which being was predicated (modi praedicandi).321 In 
the case of modistic logicians, the ontological foundation of high-level concepts had 
a far wider scope of application than the analogous thoughts found in earlier 
commentaries on the Topics. First, because the metaphysical grounding covered 
explicitly not only dialectic, but also logic and grammatic. Furthermore, in the case 
of modistic logicians it was incorporated into a general theory.322 According to the 
Modists, indeed, the real properties (modi essendi) of extramental items were 
mirrored in the ways of understanding (modi intelligendi) and of expressing (modi 
significandi) them:  
 
De quo est logica, illud est modus rei […] ergo illud, de quo logica est, ad rem 
ipsam reducitur et ex ipsa acceptum est […] In tantum logica a re ipsa et 
proprietatibus eius regulatur, quod etiam partes logicae a re ipsa ordinem 
habent et etiam intellectus in apprehendendo, componendo et ratiocinando. Et 
quia res et proprietates sive modi essendi illarum consimiles sunt apud omnes et 
mutari non possunt eo modo, quo sub arte et scientia cadunt, ideo eadem est 
logica apud omnes et mutari non potest. Per eandem enim causam extremum 
de eodem concludit latinus et graecus syllogismo eodem in specie. Aliter enim 
logica translata nobis ex lingua graecorum non esset eadem in specie.323  
                                       
321 A.18, f. 27va and 40va-vb, where Simon repeated that the metaphysician and the dialectician 
differed ex parte obiecti, since the former was concerned with extramental things and their natures, 
while the latter with “intentiones et conceptus rerum”. He added two further differences: 1) “ex parte 
finium ad quos suas considerationes ordinant: dyalecticus ad aggenerandum fidem [finem ms.] et 
opinionem, demonstrator scientiam et opinionem et veritatem”; 2) “in modo considerandi: 
dyalecticus ea quae considerat, considerat per communia et generalia, philosophus per specialia et 
propria”. Cf. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones, I. qq. 27-28, pp. 71-74. Commenting on Topics I.9, 
similarly to Simon, Angelus stated the deduction of the Aristotelian categories from the real property 
of beings: “cum ista praedicamenta sint res extra animam res ipsae sunt in eis per se et per eo quod 
significant, sed cum ista praedicata sint intentiones in anima sunt in praedicamentis non per se, sed 
per reductionem ad res a quibus mediate sumuntur non cum sint in eis per eo quod significant sed 
per eo a quo nomen impositum unum” (A. 17, f. 15va). 
322 Marmo, “La topique chez les modistes”, pp. 337-338. 
323 A.13, p. 4. Boethius discussed the ontological grounding of logical concepts in many places of 
book one (i.e. q. 7: “Tota logica de necessitate est accepta a rebus […] Et si esset alia natura alia esset 
logica”, p. 26) as well as of other books, e.g. IV, qq. 6-7, pp. 208-212; q. 9, pp. 215-215; VIII, q.1, pp. 
309-310. 
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Along with the doctrine of the modi intelligendi and of the second intentions as the 
proper object of the logica docens (and the modi sciendi for the logica utens), the 
isomorphism between the ontological and the conceptual levels (modi essendi and 
modi intelligendi) was a further common feature of modistic logicians.324  
 
4.1.6 A parallel between the Modists’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and those 
of their predecessors discloses manifold differences, which stemmed from the 
Modists’ acquaintance with the newly introduced paradigms, such as Thomas’ 
partition of logic and the intentionalistic logic, as well as from their semantics and 
logical theory.325 The first difference which stood out was the change of literary 
genre. While Simon of Faversham still stuck to the ancient sentence-form 
commentary, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito opted for the question-form 
alternated by few paraphrases.326 A novel feature common to modistic 
commentaries was the higher attention they devoted to semantic and metalogical 
issues, in spite of the literal elucidations of Aristotle’s words. This attitude toward 
topics dealing with general subjects, along with their interests for semantics and 
with their syntactical approach, prompted these commentators to introduce novel 
questions in relation to the Topics and, in the case of Simon, to develop fresh exegeses 
of the text. We will have an overview of both these aspects through the examination 
of some passages of Simon’s Dicta, which will reveal a development in the reception 
of the Aristotelian Topics.  
 
                                       
324 A detailed and meticulous account of the peculiarities of and divergences between the views 
endorsed by Boethius, Simon and Radulphus falls outside the scope of this chapter. For the 
characteristic of the Modists’ attitude toward logic see Pinborg, “Die Logik der Modistae”.  
325 For Simon’s and Boethius’ acceptance of Albert’s and Thomas’ paradigms see Marmo, “Suspicio”, 
pp. 170-172; for Brito’s refusal of the Thomistic model see ibid, pp. 185-187. 
326 As was usual in prefaces to logical writing of the last quarter of 13th century, Boethius and Brito 
opened their commentaries on the Topics with an ethical introduction, in which the metaphysician or 
philosopher was placed at the peak of men’s hierarchy in virtue of their natural and acquired 
superiority; a similar example is found in the anonymous prologue to Porphyry’s Isagoge analysed 
by C. Marmo, “Anonymi Philosophia “Sicut dicitur ab Aristotile”. A Parisian Prologue to Porphyry”, 
in Chaiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 61 (1991), pp. 140-146; for Boethius see A. A. Robiglio, 
“The Thinker as a Noble Man (bene natus) and Preliminary Remarks on the Medieval Concepts of 
Nobility”, in Vivarium 44 (2006), pp. 205-247. 
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4.2 Boethius of Dacia, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito. 
4.2.1 Modistic logicians agreed in deeming logic a rational science, and since 
dialectic was a part of logic, they considered dialectic a rational science centred 
around dialectical syllogism.327 In treating these issues, the Modists employed the 
same hermeneutic categories of their predecessors, at times however reshaping 
them, as in the case of the pair docens-utens, upon which Simon and Brito conferred 
an epistemological nuance. Conventionally, the term docens referred to the theory of 
dialectical syllogism and to its scientific treatment of this subject (traditur et docetur 
demonstrative), while the term utens denoted applied dialectic, namely the probable 
dialectical reasoning put to use in other sciences for reaching a merely probable, not 
scientific knowledge. Simon refused this interpretation of the twofold aspects of 
dialectic, and assigned a marked epistemological tone to the conceptual pair docens-
utens, which he understood in the light of the Nicomachean Ethics as habits of the 
souls, respectively as science and opinion: 
 
Dyalectica igitur docens nihil aliud est quam habitus animae aggeneratus in 
intellectu speculativo de sillogismo dyalectico et eius partibus et proprietatibus 
per causas et principia. Sed dyalectica utens est habitus aggenerativus in 
animam per sillogismum dyalecticum quia dyalectica docens docet 
constitutionem sillogismi sed utens iam utitur sillogismo constituto.328 
 
                                       
327 A.18, f. 24ra. Brito specified that the dialectical syllogism starting from probable premises did not 
amount to the modal syllogism described in the Prior Analytics since the former started from premises 
having contingent matter while the latter had contingent premises. Thus, Brito discriminated 
between natural and logical contingency: “aliud est dicere propositiones de modo contingentis et 
propositiones contingentes” (A.20, f. 12vb). 
328 “Nota quod dyalectica dupliciter consideratur. Uno modo ut est docens, secundo modo ut est 
utens. Et licet ista verba sint communia ill. tamen non bene intelliguntur, ideo notandum est ad 
intellectum huius quod dyalectica est habitus animae existens in intellectu speculativo sicut in 
subiecto. Modo talis habitus potest comparari ad duo, primo ad causas et principia per quae inesse 
conservatur et in intellectu speculativo per doctrinam aggeneratur; sic accipiendo dyalecticam solum 
est docens. Soli enim docent qui per causas et principia docent ut dicitur in prohemio Metaphysicae. 
Alio modo accipitur per comparationem ad scibilia aliarum scientiarum quibus per sui usum 
applicatur et sic vocatur utens, ut malleus qui per sui usum applicatur ferro. Et nota quod ista 
distinctio non est applicabilis omnibus scientiis quia solum illae scientiae quae disputant ad alias 
scientias sunt sic distinguibiles ut est grammatica, logica, rethorica” (A.18, f. 24ra); cf. A.20, I, q. 1, f. 
12ra.  
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Subsequently, he linked the pair utens-docens to the inventive-judicative parts of 
logic, thus making explicit what earlier commentators had left implicit, namely that 
the applied dialectic (utens) coincided with the inventive part of logic, and the docens 
with the judicative and analytic part, since it “docet resolvere sillogismum in suas 
partes”.329 Brito introduced an additional noteworthy subdivision of dialectic into 
the innata, namely the natural but imperfect capability of reasoning shared by 
human beings, and the acquired (artificialis) dialectic, which had been formalized by 
Aristotle and was proper to learned men alone.330  
Similarly to his predecessors, Simon analysed the definition of syllogism found at 
the beginning of the Topics, but with a special emphasis for its grammatical 
implications. The modistic logician sided with Albert the Great in affirming that 
absolute syllogism was analogical in respect to its species,331 while he added that it 
could also be considered an unqualified whole (totum in modo) whose qualified parts 
were the various types of syllogisms.332 Possibly, the Dominican was also Simon’s 
source of inspiration for the twofold understanding of syllogism as inferring and 
concludens (or inferring and probative), which the British logician introduced on 
accounting for the differences between the Aristotelian and the Boethian definitions 
of syllogism: while Boethius dealt with the probative syllogism, in his Topics 
Aristotle was concerned with the inferring syllogism. Although Brito did not use the 
terminology employed by his predecessors and Simon, he also admitted a twofold 
operation performed by syllogisms, namely to infer and to prove the conclusion.  
 
                                       
329 Brito dismissed this interpretation and claimed instead that a science is said resolutoria properly 
speaking since it dealt with the “modum resolvendi et iudicandi, secundum quem aliquis scit 
resolvere aliquid in suas causas et principia, et isto modo proprie liber Priorum et Posteriorium 
dicuntur resolutorii vel iudicativi”. Similarly, a science was inventiva properly speaking, since it 
taught the “modum inveniendi media”, as the Topics; see A.20, I, q. 7, f. 13va and Green-Pedersen, 
“On the interpretation”, pp. 8 and 41. 
330 A.20, I, q. 16, f. 17ra. 
331 A.18, f. 24vb; in his Dicta, Simon mentioned Albert many times, once along with an unknown 
Alanus. Similarly to Simon, even Brito mentioned Albert’s commentary on the Topics in many of his 
Quaestiones. Unlike Simon, Boethius did not openly endorse the analogical predication of syllogism, 
questions, see A.13, I, q. 10, pp. 35-39 and q. 16, pp. 50-53. On the influence of Albert the Great on 
Simon see S. de Faverisham, Quaestiones veteres et novae super libro Elenchorum, ed. by S. Ebbesen – T. 
Izbicki – J. Longeway – F. Del Punta – E. Serene – E. Stump, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1984, p. 11. 
332 Even Brito claimed that the simple syllogism is “totum in modo respectu sillogismi dialectici et 
demonstrativi” (A.20, I, q. 8, f. 14ra). 
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4.2.2 Interestingly, he specified that “probare conclusionem” had a wider and a 
narrower meaning, which connected with the Boethian definition of argument as the 
reason producing belief about a doubtful proposition. According to the general but 
improper sense of probare as signifying the correct disposition of the extreme and 
middle terms, simple syllogisms proved the conclusion. In the appropriate meaning, 
to prove concerned the inherence of the predicate in the subject, and from this 
syntactical perspective ‘to prove’ fell outside the scope of syllogisms.333 This 
distinction then, between inferring and probative syllogism, was strictly intertwined 
with Simon’s claim that a dialectical syllogism was valid if it was made up of the 
proper matter, namely probable propositions, and of the apt specific or ad propositum 
form. Brito specified that dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms shared the 
substantial syllogistic form, namely the form of the absolute syllogism, while they 
differentiated in virtue of the accidental form. Along with the probability and 
necessity of premises (the dispositiones materiales), the accidental form accounted for 
the diverse aims and operations performed by dialectical and demonstrative 
syllogisms, namely the production of opinion and knowledge. Although he did not 
mention any type of form, Boethius of Dacia conceded that dialectical syllogism was 
based on the topical relation. These claims seemed to incline toward the acceptance 
of the pluralist view, nevertheless modistic logicians did not admit it. They intended 
instead to stress the psychological and epistemological facet of reasoning.334 
                                       
333 A.20, I, q. 8, f. 14va. 
334 A.18, f. 25ra. Boethius of Dacia explicitly refused the pluralists’ view: “Qui enim dicit quod 
dialecticus et demonstrativus in specie differunt, debet dicere quod alia est forma specialis in 
dialectico quam in demonstrativo, scilicet alius modus et alia figura et quid aliud, et hoc est grave 
fingere” (A.13, I, q. 10, here p. 38). Nevertheless, Boethius acknowledged that while in simple 
syllogism it was required the proper relation between the three terms, “habitudo autem fundata 
super communes intentiones requiritur in syllogismo dialectico” (A.13, I, q. 18, pp. 57-58). For Brito’s 
accidental form see A.20, I, q. 8, f. 14ra-rb. Furthermore, Radulphus Brito made a clear distinction 
between the illatio and the probatio when discussing the dialectical induction. Within this framework, 
he stated that a valid inference was a consequence in which it was impossible that the “antecedens 
esset verum consequente existente falso”, otherwise “ex vero sequeretur falsum”, and that this was 
untenable (inconveniens) since “ex vero non sequitur nisi verum”. An induction which was a bona 
illatio could however be an invalid dialectical induction when it failed to prove the conclusion. And 
this happened when the predicate was known to inhere more in the subject of the consequent than 
in the subject of the antecedent: “potest dici quod praedicatum est notius de termino universali quam 
de singularibus in quibus inducitur, sicut homo per hoc praedicatum quod est animal est notius de 
homine quam de Sorte et ideo si quis sic inducat: Sor est animal, Plato est animal etc, ergo omnis 
homo est animal, ibi non esset inductio dyalectica immo petitio principii, cum non procedat ex 
notioribus quia notius est animal inesse homini quam Sorti. Unde licet ibi sequatur conclusio de 
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4.2.3 The Modists’ view of an intentionalistic dialectic coupled with the dismissing 
of both the pluralists view and the interpretation of the Aristotelian definition of 
syllogism in terms of univocal predication of the simple syllogism, allowed 
Boethius, Simon and Radulphus to push to the limit the ‘formal’ identity between 
diverse syllogisms. Unlike the commentators who had read the Topics before them, 
the three Modists were directly faced with the question of whether the numerically 
same syllogism could be dialectical and demonstrative. This issue was originally 
debated within the context of the Posterior Analytics,335 and after the Modistae it 
became a conventional topic found in almost all commentaries on the first book of 
the Topics from the beginning of 14th century onwards. They acknowledged that the 
same syllogism could be demonstrative, dialectical or sophistical, thus implicitly 
admitting that there was not a token-syllogism or an uninstantiated essence of 
syllogism, and that particular syllogisms were intrinsically undetermined or 
undifferentiated. However, some objections could be raised against this view upheld 
by Modists. A first criticism claimed that this assumption seemed to violate the 
predication principle according to which one and the same individual could not 
belong to more than one species except if the species were subordinate one to the 
other. Having dismissed the hypothesis of the univocal predication of the simple 
syllogism over the various types of deductions, Modists could easily avoided this 
difficulty. A further criticism was raised against the cognitive effects of syllogisms. 
A demonstrative syllogism started from necessary propositions and engendered 
certitude and knowledge in the subject, while dialectical syllogism assumed 
probable premises and produced mere opinion in the agent. If, however, there was 
just a type of syllogism, how could the numerically same syllogism account for the 
production of different habits in the same person? Modistic logicians could fend off 
this attack by appealing to both the doctrine of intentions and to the subjective aspect 
of the understanding of syllogisms. A syllogism was a complex second intention 
                                       
necessitate non oportet quod sit bona inductio nisi procedat ex notioribus unde non solum de ratione 
inductionis dyalectice est inferre sed probare” (A.20, I, q.39 f. 25vb). 
335 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.33, 89a39-b9. 
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made up of complex second intentions, the propositions, which in turn were 
composed of incomplex second intentions, such as genus and species.  
 
4.2.4 Simon explicated that the diverse incomplex mental concepts could be drawn 
from a single extramental being, whose common nature and various properties were 
conceptualized under different respects by the intellect, which therefore elaborated 
upon diverse mental concepts. In like fashion, the various types of complex second 
intentions, such as propositions, could be drawn from one unique extramental 
being. If the intellect took under consideration the essential properties of the thing, 
then the complex second intention, namely the proposition, related to such 
properties expressed them through the causal and necessary subject-predicate 
relation. And the syllogism made up of these necessary propositions was a 
demonstration. Whilst if the intellect took into account only the general properties 
of a thing, it expressed them through the accidental relation between the subject and 
predicate. Accordingly, a syllogism whose premises were probable propositions was 
a dialectical syllogism. And since one and the same person could not contemplate 
the same thing under different respects at the same time, namely he or she could not 
start from necessary and probable propositions drawn from the same thing at the 
same time, it was impossible that he or she could opine and know the conclusion of 
the deduction at the same time: 
 
Idem sillogismus numero potest esse dyalecticus, demonstrativus, sophisticus 
unde sicut diximus quod sunt intentiones istae secundae incomplexae genus et 
species fundantur supra idem obiectum et etiam complexae ut enunciatio et 
propositio […] sed videndum est ulterius quod ista habitudo diffinitionis et 
diffiniti dupliciter conisderatur. Uno modo quantum ad idem realitatis quod 
importatur per eam, alio modo quantum ad intellectum sub quibus imponuntur 
[…] Si secundo modo consideretur hoc est dupliciter. Vel considerantur 
quantum ad intellectus proprios et essentiales sub quibus istae res importantur, 
verbi gratia: dicamus ‘homo est animal rationale mortale’ hic possumus 
considerare duo, rationem diffinitionis, […]et rationem diffiniti […] Si 
consideretur primo modo quia tunc inter diffinitio et diffinitum est necessaria 
habitudo <et> supra hanc habitudinem fundatur sillogismus demonstrativus. Si 
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autem respiciamus ad communia intellecti sic supra talem fundatur locus 
dyalecticus. Ut quando dicitur ‘homo animal’ potes hominem considerare 
dupliciter. Primo modo quantum ad connaturalem propositum et sic dicendo 
‘homo est animal’ hic est processus necessarius. Sed quantum ad propriam 
considerationem* ut quantum ad rationem speciei, sic est ibi processus 
accidentalis et probabilis et est ibi ratio signi.336  
 
 
  
According to Boethius, the syllogism could be both dialectical and demonstrative 
just as the same consequence, e.g. “this is white, therefore it is not black”, could be 
necessary or dialectical sive probabilis.  
 
4.2.5 In their analysis of ‘probability,’ Modists author focused on the semantic 
interpretation of the objective probability proposed by Albert the Great, which 
perfectly befitted their interests in semantic issues as well as their theory of the modi 
intelligendi and significandi.337 On the basis of their idea of the priority of the modi 
essendi over the modi intelligendi, the three modistic thinkers considered the 
Aristotelian account of probability given in the Topics as a mere description based 
on signs and concerned with subjective probability, which however was only 
                                       
336 A.18, f. 25ra. Cf. A.13, I, qq. 11-12, pp. 39-43, IV, q. 5, p. 207; A.20, I, q. 11, f. 15ra-rb. 
337 “Propositio probabilis, ut vult Albertus supra librum istum, est quando in subiecto est aliquod 
signum per quod habilitatur praedicatum inesse subiecto et non necessitatur, sed propositio 
necessaria est quando in subiecto est causa necessaria quare praedicatum sibi inest” (A.20, I, q. 11, f, 
14ra). Perhaps due to the necessity of faithfully explaining the Aristotelian tripartite definition of 
probabilia, in commenting on the Aristotelian definition of probabilia both Angelus of Camerino and 
Simon also offered a gnoseological account of probability, which recalled to mind the explanations 
given by their predecessors: “Ulterius autem est notandum quod triplex est probabile scilicet 
grossum, mediocre et subtile. Grossum tangit <ibi> omnibus, mediocre tangit ibi pluribus subtile tangit 
ibi sapientibus. Vide probabile subtile est adhuc triplex […] ulterius notandum quod circa hoc quod 
hominum cognoscitorum quidam potissime utuntur virtute sensitiva, quidam ymaginativa, quidam 
intellectiva. Sensitiva utuntur rudes ut rustici, unde propter tales dicit omnibus, et dicit etiam omnibus 
propter ignorantiam multorum; multi enim sunt fatui, propter hoc dicit Salomon stultorum infinitus 
est numerus. Propter secundos autem dicit aut pluribus, propter tertios dicit sapientibus” (A.18, f. 25ra). 
Angelus proposed a lengthy elucidation of the subjective and objective notion of probability. His 
account of probability considered ad rem probabile bore many resemblances with Boethius’ 
explanation, despite a terminological difference: Angelus used indeed ‘dispositio’ instead of 
‘proprietas habilitans’. In the explication of subjective probability (“ad illum cui apparet”), Angelus 
made a parallel between the threepartite Aristotelian definition of probability and the three types of 
human knowledge, namely “sensitiva cui est coniuncta ymaginatio, […] cognitiva vel aestimativa vel 
creditiva, […] intellectiva” (A.17, f. 4ra and va, 6vb). 
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secondary in respect to the objective probability. Indeed according to the three 
logicians, a proposition was probable not because it appeared (videtur) so to the 
subject, but rather it was reckoned to be probable since it was intrinsically probable, 
that is because the relation of inherence between the subject and the predicate terms 
of the proposition was not necessary, so that the predicate could inhere in the subject 
or not. Specifically, probability denoted an inherent property of the subject that 
predisposed but did not necessitate the subject to participate in the predicate.338 
Boethius offered a fully-fledged account of the semantic interpretation of 
probability. In a necessary proposition, he claimed, the subject(s) was causally linked 
to the predicate(p) since s possessed a property(q) that necessitated s to partake of p 
and impeded p’s contrary from inhering in s. Accordingly, in virtue of s’ essential 
disposition arising from q, p and s occurred together, e.g. “an opaque body reflects 
the light” was a necessary proposition since ‘opacity’(q) made necessary the 
inherence of ‘to reflect light’ (p) in ‘body’(s) and did not allow s to participate in ‘to 
receive light’ (p’s opposite). In improbable propositions, the subject possessed a 
property endowing it with a disposition to have a predicate contrary to the proposed 
predicated. In the proposition “a murderer loves”, the property ‘to be a murder’(q) 
enabled ‘man’(s) to have ‘to hate’(p’s opposite) rather than ‘to love’(p). In probable 
propositions, instead, the subject’s property very much predisposed (multum 
habilitat) the subject to receive the predicate without however making it necessary, 
so that s was still apt to have q1, which endowed the subject with an aptitude for the 
opposite of p: it was possible to have the case in which s did not occur with p but 
along with p’s opposite. The degree of probability of propositions depended on the 
higher or lower aptitude that s’ property(q) had to participate in p and it was 
measured on a scale spanning from probabilis through magis probabilis to maxime 
                                       
338 “Probabilia: nota quod ista diffinitio probabilis non est data per causam sed per signum quia 
aliquid non dicitur probabile eo quod videtur, sed e converso eo quod est probabile ideo videtur. 
Unde probabilitas causatur non ex nostra visione sed ex quadam proprietate ipsum subiectum ad 
participationem praedicati habilitans et non necessitans, ut si dicatur omnis mater diligit. Ista est 
probabilis et causatur ista probabilitas quoniam in subiecto est quaedam proprietas ut maternitas 
quae habilitat subiectum ad participationem praedicati et quod probabilitas causatur ex 
proprietatibus subiecti huiusmodi ratio est, quia probabilitas est passio propositionis sed passio 
causatur ex principiis intrinsecis” (A.18, f. 25ra). A.13, I, q. 14, pp. 46-49 and the analysis by Ebbesen, 
“Boethius of Dacia”, pp. 153-154. Brito briefly touched upon the issue in his commentary, A.20, I, q. 8, f. 
14ra. 
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probabilis, which however did not coincide with necessary propositions. 
Unfortunately, Boethius did not expand upon the adverb ‘very much (multum)’ nor 
on the comparative and superlative adverbs magis and maxime.339  
 
4.2.6 Perhaps, Angelus de Camerino’s elucidation of the topic of accident concerning 
the inherence of contrary predicates in the subject may shed some light on this 
problem. In his exposition of this topic, Aristotle had distinguished between things 
that happened of necessity, for the most part and by chance.340 Angelus stated that 
this factual distinction stemmed from the various types of relation holding between 
the subject and the predicate. In necessary things, the inherence of the predicate in 
the subject was omnitemporally valid, and it held for every particular instance 
falling under the subject term and it excluded one of the complementary predicates. 
Whilst the predication characterizing things which happened for the most part was 
not omnitemporally valid nor did it hold for every individual denoted by the subject 
term neither did it exclude one of the complementary predicates, although it 
admitted a propensity for one of them:  
 
illud dicitur inesse de necessitate quod est secundum alteram partem 
contradictionis determinate, ita quod ad aliam nulla in subiecto remaneat 
potentia. Illa sunt ut in pluribus quae magis sunt determinata ad unam partem 
quam ad aliam, eveniunt tamen quandoque secundum alteram, et istud dicitur 
contingens natum ut hominem in senectute canescere; et fere omnia naturalia 
sunt talia. Et istorum defectus vocatur contingens ut in paucioribus. Illa dicuntur 
ad utrumlibet quae indifferenter eveniunt secundum unam partem et reliquam 
ut hominem legere et non legere. Unde sumatur ista distinctio? Ista distinctio est 
ipsarum rerum praedicatarum de subiectis. Ex habitudine ergo quam potest 
habere praedicatum ad subiectum potest sumi dictarum rerum distinctio. Haec 
autem habitudo aut est secundum unam partem contradictionis secundum 
universalitatem temporum et suppositorum, et sic est res necessaria; aut non. Si 
non, aut erit res habens talem habitudinem aut habebit habitudinem ad id de 
quo dicitur secundum utramque partem contradictionis secundum 
                                       
339 A.13, I, q. 14, esp. pp. 47-48; IV, q. 5, pp. 206-208, esp. p. 207. 
340 Aristotle, Topics, II.6, 112b1-20. 
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universalitatem temporis et suppositorum, et sic est contingens ad utrumlibet; 
aut non, et tunc aut habebit habitudinem ad subiectum secundum utramque partem 
contradictionis ita tamen quod secundum unam magis quam secundum alteram 
secundum differentiam temporis et suppositorum et sic contingens ut in pluribus, aut 
non sed e converso et sic est contingens ut in paucioribus.341 
 
We could take a step further and connect this semantic explanation of frequency 
with the semantic interpretation of probability, so that probable propositions would 
express temporal frequency: in probable propositions, s’ propensity or potentiality 
for partaking in p, which arose from q, would be actualized in a great majority of 
cases. Thus, the universal proposition “Every mother loves her child” could be 
considered probable even though it had some counter-instances since 
‘motherhood’(q) would make likely the inherence of ‘to love her child’(p) to 
‘mother’(s), whilst still allowing s to have q1 and to receive ‘to hate’(p’s opposite). 
This would then imply that the semantic interpretation of probability would be 
derivative and not primary, since it would eventually be grounded on the proto-
frequentist interpretation of probability.  
In probable propositions, the subject’s capability to possess both q and q1 justified 
the claim that the dialectician could argue in favour as well as against a probable 
proposition when engaged in dialectical disputations (exercitationes): 
 
Bonus enim dialecticus proposita aliqua quaestione statim considerat de quo 
praedicato est, utrum scilicet de accidente vel de genere vel proprio vel 
definitione. Quo viso statim recurrit ad artem in dialectica traditam de 
unoquoque istorum construendo et destruendo, et diligenter circa terminos 
propositae quaestionis considerat proprietates habilitantes subiectum ad 
participationem praedicati et ad oppositum praedicati. Et sic circa omnem 
materiam copiosus erit in argumentis affirmativis et destructivis.342  
                                       
341 A.17, f. 50va. 
342 A.13, I, q. 20, pp. 58-60, here p. 59. Brito made an interesting remark concerning the role played 
by will in solving problems about which the argument put forward had equal probability and we did 
not have rationes magis evidentes et magis eminentes in favour or against one of the two sides of the 
horn: “Dicitur problema de quo neutro modo opinamur quia propositiones probabiles eque difficiles 
quas habemus ad utramque partem non magis credimus uni quam alteri et ideo possibile est quod 
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Moreover, the subject’s openness to have opposite properties q and q1 also accounted 
for the dialectician’s impossibility to produce knowledge, and for the dialectical 
practice to be limited to the doxastic realm. Dialectic could produce only opinion, 
namely the belief that the conclusion proved was true, whilst still admitting the 
possibility that the opposite conclusion could be probable and true too.343  
 
4.2.7 The commentaries of the Modistae revealed the interest of their authors in 
specific issues, which were strictly related to the main tenets of modistic semantics. 
This led Boethius, Simon and Brito to focus on specific passages of the Aristotelian 
treatise, which had been dealt differently by their predecessors, such as in the case 
of the Aristotelian description of logical premises found at the end of the first book 
of the Topics. As we have seen, when elucidating this section, earlier commentators 
expanded upon the relation between logic and the disciplines of the trivium.344 
Angelus de Camerino sided with Albert the Great in commenting upon Aristotle 
and assumed that genaral logic also included poetics, similalry to the quadrivium of 
Gundissalinus.345 In his explanation of the same passage, Simon focused instead on 
Aristotle’s example of a logical proposition, namely “Is the knowledge of opposites 
the same or not?” This general interrogation indeed implied the particular question 
concerning the relation between habit and privation, which was one of the four types 
of opposites enumerated by Aristotle in the eighth chapter of the second book of the 
Topics and in the tenth chapter of the Categories.  
This issue was particularly relevant from the modistic viewpoint, since the 
assumed isomorphism between the epistemological (and semantical) and the 
ontological levels implied the object-directedness of beings of reason (entia rationis)  
towards factual beings. The structural parallel between reality, concepts and 
                                       
aliquo motu proprie voluntatis vel partem magistrorum vel amicorum aliquis magis inclinetur ad 
unam partem quam ad aliam” (A.20, I, q. 38, f. 24va). 
343 A.13, I, q. 14, pp. 46-49. 
344 Aristotle, Topics, I.14, 105b20-25; see supra ch. 3.1. 
345 “Sub logica comprehenduntur omnes propositiones quae fiunt in materia cuius cognitio quaeritur 
propter alterum sicut propositiones poeticae, rethoriche et aliae quae sunt in materia, quae habet 
considerari a scientia quae est pars scientiae rationalis quae logica communi nomine dici consuevit” 
(A.17, f. 25ra). 
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meaning seemed indeed to be weakened by the existence of some intentions that did 
not correspond to any extramental being. This prompted the Modists to elaborate a 
solution for explaining to what real properties (modi essendi) corresponded the 
intentions of privative beings, such as privation.346 Simon explained that the 
privative being derived from the positive one. And in the specific Aristotelian 
example, the same science had to account for both the thing (habitus) and its 
privation by starting from the positive and perfect component of the pair, namely 
the habit, since the knowledge of the negative and imperfect always resulted from 
the knoweldge of the perfect. It was improper therefore to talk about knowledge of 
privative beings such as privation since it was indirect and subordinated to the prior 
knowledge of the positive being.347   
 
4.2.8 The interest of Modist authors in metalogical rather than in logical issues 
explained the presence of many questions which were not directly connected to the 
elucidation of Aristotle’s text or which were not dealt with in depth nor touched 
upon at all in previous commentaries on the Topics. The second book of the Topics 
offered Boethius and Brito the occasion to raise specific questions concerning 
universal quantification: on the semantic properties of the universal quantifier 
‘every’ (omnis), and on its distribution over the individuals falling under the 
common term; on the sufficientia appellatorum/suppositorum, namely the minimum 
number of individuals to be quantified upon (one, three, or none) and on the nature 
of the particular instances over which ‘every’ distributed the subject term – namely 
if on past, present and future referents or only actual supposita; on the existential 
import of universal propositions.348 In his literal commentary on the Topics, Simon 
                                       
346 On this issue, see Marmo, “La topique”, esp. pp. 347-350; cf. also C. Marmo, “Types of Opposition in 
the Postpraedicamenta in Thirteenth-Century Commentaries”, in J. Biard –I. Rosier-Catach, La 
tradition médievale des catégories (XIIe–XVe siècles), Leuven: Peteers, 2003, pp. 85-103. 
347 A. 18, f. 29ra: “Loycae autem propositiones ut utrum contrariorum eadem sit disciplina planum 
est quod sic quia unum se habet in ratione habitus et perfecti aliud in ratione privationi et imperfecti. 
Philosophus enim vult 4° Metaphysicae [scil. V.6 1011b18-19] quod habitus et privatio sunt prima radix 
contrarietatis. Sed quod se habet in ratione privationis et imperfecti cognoscitur per idem quod habet 
se in ratione habitus et perfecti; rerum enim est iudex sui et obiecti primo de Anima dicit et tertio [scil. 
III.6 430b21] eiusdem quod punctum et omnis indivisio cognoscitur per habitum et quia tunc unum 
contrariorum habet se in ratione habitus et perfecti reliquum in ratione imperfecti et privationis et 
quia privatio cognoscitur per habitum ergo etc”. 
348 A.13, II, qq. 1-6; A.20, II, qq. 2-8. Scholars have analysed these issues: Pinborg, Logica, 96-104; S. 
Ebbesen, “Termini accidentales concreti. Texts from the Late 13th Century”, in Cahiers de l’Institut du 
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dealt with that same issues about universal quantification which confronted his 
fellows and which had not been taken into account by masters who had composed 
literal commentaries on the Aristotelian treatise. The difference between these 
commentators’ and Simon’s approaches to the text already stood out in the 
elucidation of the opening line of the Topics, where Aristotle had claimed that the 
main scope of the treatise was to provide a method for arguing about any subject 
proposed (de omni problemate). Both the pluralists and the advocates of the unity of 
the form struggled to explain Aristotle’s preference for the ablative case instead of 
the more suited ‘ad’ plus accusative, which better expressed the end toward which 
the syllogistic deduction was directed. Probably influenced by sophismatic 
literature such as the Distinctiones Sophismatum, Simon pointed out a problem of 
quantification stemming from the syntagm, namely whether ‘every’ distributed 
‘problem’ over the species of problems or over individual problems. The commonly 
held view about this issue, which was endorsed by many 13th century logicians, was 
that properly speaking universal quantifiers distributed the common term over the 
species and not over the individuals. Modistae such as Boethius and Brito held 
instead that the syncategorematic term ‘omnis’, conjoined to a common noun, 
distributed the common noun over all its supposita or particular instances, and Simon 
aligned himself with them: 
 
Ad distributionem igitur tria requiruntur: distribuens et distribuibile et in quod 
fit distributio.349 Istis modis prenumeratis dico quod impossibile est quod fiat 
distributio in speciebus et non individuis et ratio huius est triplex. Suppono 
primo quod hoc signum ‘omnis’ significat quoniam universaliter in secundo 
Perihermenias [scil. 7, 17b13], ergo ‘omnis’ est distributio termini universalis. Sed 
terminus non solum est universalis respectu specierum sed etiam respectu 
                                       
Moyen Âge grec et latin  53 (1986), pp. 37–150; Id., “The man”; C. Marmo, “La topique”; A. M. Mora 
Marquez, “Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito on the Universal Sign “Omnis””, in Logica 
Universalis 9/2 (2015), pp. 193-211. 
349 Similarly to Brito and Boethius, Simon also affirmed that the universal quantifier ‘omnis’ did not 
relate to the subject-predicate relation – as held by many authors such as Peter of Spain, Robert 
Kilwardby and Albert the Great – but that it rather expressed the relation between the quantified 
common noun and its particular instances (supposita). The opinion “quod signum non distribuit 
subiectum in comparatione ad predicatum” was condemned in 1277 by Kilwardby at Oxford; on this 
issue see Marmo, “The Semantics”, pp. 92-93. 
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individuorum, ergo non solum distribuit terminum in comparationem ad 
species sed etiam ad individua. Sed hoc non esset nisi distribueret terminum 
non solum pro speciebus sed etiam pro individuis. Ratio autem secunda est ista: 
quando ad antecedens sequitur consequens, tunc ad consequens distributum 
sequitur antecedens distributum ut ‘omne animal est,350 ergo omnis homo est’; 
sed hoc non est nisi terminus distribueret per speciebus et individuis. Item 
quando duo sunt essentialiter ordinata ita quod unum est superius et prius et 
aliud posterius et inferius tunc ad distributionem superioris sequitur distributio 
inferioris. Hoc autem non esset si fieret distributio solum in speciebus et non 
individuis.351 
 
Simon elucidated the Aristotelian words by adopting the modistic viewpoint and 
claimed that Aristotle’s treatise enabled anyone to argue about every individual 
question put forward by him and not about all species of questions.352 The beginning 
of the second book of the Topics seemed to invite Simon to expand more this subject. 
Indeed the second topic consisted in considering all the subjects to which a predicate 
was universally said to belong or not belong. The Stagirite specified that such 
scrutiny had to be conducted by looking “species by species”, without descending 
to the undefined multiplicity of particular instances. A few lines below, however, 
Aristotle explained that in the topic’s destructing function, the inquiry had to 
proceed from the primitives downwards and that “if no clear result [wa]s reached 
so far in these cases, you should again divide these until you come to those that are 
not further divisible”. In his constructing function, this rule was useful for general 
                                       
350 Vel erit add. ms. 
351 A.18, f. 31ra; cf. A.20, II, q. 10, f. 32vb. 
352 A.18 f. 24va; cf. A.20, II, q. 10, f. 32vb. The anonymous commentator A.9 faced this question and 
his answer went in quite the opposite direction of Simon’s solution: “Ad hoc potest dici ut salvetur 
antiqua distinctio [scil. pro singulis generum vel pro generibus singulorum] quod aliquando fit 
distributio pro singulis generum aliquando pro generibus singulorum semper tamen pro individuis. 
Sed notandum quod contingit considerare singularia dupliciter aut in se aut secundum quod 
uniuntur in suo communi, scilicet in specie vel genere et per talem unionem sumuntur et 
perpetrantur sicut enim genera et species secundum esse quod habent in individuis sunt corruptibilia 
sicut individua sed* e contrario individua secundum quod uniuntur in suo universali sunt perpetua 
sicut universalia dicendo ergo distributionem fieri pro generibus singulorum quando fit distributio 
pro singularibus in materia specierum consideratis et per multiplicationem specierum multiplicatis 
possit praedicta diffinitio sustineri ergo esset intellectus Aristotelis de omni problemate idest de 
omnibus problematibus singulorum secundum quod praedicta singularia uniuntur in suius 
universalibus quae sunt quatuor [scil. quatuor praedicabilia] ut postea videbitur” (A.9, f. 157va). 
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inductions since once the inherence of the predicate in the subject was ascertained 
in all or in the great majority of cases scrutinised, then the disputant was inclined to 
concede the inherence universally.353 Unlike earlier commentators, Simon 
developed a deep explication of this topic, which he classed among the intrinsic 
topics from a quantitative whole, and treated it as a problem of distributio, without 
however expounding upon the restrictio of the supposition of the subject term. 
Consistent with the main tenet of the modistic understanding of the 
syncategorematic term ‘omnis’, Simon rejected the interpretation proposed by some 
unnamed authors who had restricted the scope of the topic to the species, insofar as 
they had interpreted the Aristotelian syntagm “inesse omnibus” in light of their 
view according to which ‘omnis’ distributed the common noun over species alone. 
This opinion, objected Simon, had revealed itself to be erroneous in other 
circumstances, for example when it was applied to solving the sophism “Every 
animal was in Noah’s Arc”, thus leading to the concession that the sophism was true 
if ‘omnis’ divided ‘animal’ into its species and not into the particular instances of the 
species.354 Although the Stagirite’s subsequent specification, namely “considerare 
autem secundum species et non in infinitis”, seemed to favour this interpretation, 
Simon’s exegesis moved in quite the opposite direction. He emphasized instead 
Aristotle’s following words, “ea dividendum usque ad individua”, and explained 
that in this topic the Stagirite meant to specify that if the analysis of the species, 
considered distributive and not collective, did not reveal any counter-instance against 
the inherence of the predicate in the subject, then the scrutiny had to descend to 
particular instances:  
 
Opinabantur Aristotelem velle quod possit fieri distributio in speciebus 
et non individuis, sed hoc est contra Philosophum […] Manifeste autem 
                                       
353 Aristotle, Topics, II.2, 109b13-29; “Alius locus inspicere quibus inesse aut omnibus aut nulli dictum 
est. Considerare autem secundum species et non in infinitis […] si enim in omnibus videatur 
divisionem proferentibus vel in pluribus, concedendum et universaliter ponere aut instantiam ferre 
in aliquo non sic” (AL, p. 32). 
354 Perhaps the source for the opinion held by the unnamed quidam is Peter of Spain, Tractatus, XI.14, 
pp. 204-205; on Peter’s critical target, perhaps a rough interpretation of Roger Bacon, see Alain de 
Libera, “Référence et quantification: Sur la théorie de la distribution au XIIIe siècle”, in A. de Libera 
– A. Elamrani-Jamal – A. Galonnier, Langages et philosophie: Hommage à Jean Jolivet, Paris: Libraire 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1997, pp. 177-200.  
154 
 
Philosophus dicit quod si non est manifesta instantia in speciebus, oportet 
demum considerare usque ad individua.355  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Green Pedersen considered the 13th century tradition of the topics as a continued 
“development along the same line”. He ended the first section of the chapter 
devoted to the 13th century conception of the locus by drawing some strong 
conclusions, one of which conjectured a possible role for the topics in the increasing 
preponderance acquired by the notion of intention in logic: “It is tempting to add, 
however, that the development which leads to the concept of concrete second 
intentions agrees extremely well with the loci, and since they participate in it from 
the first beginnings, we may perhaps assume that the topics has contributed to it 
and to the central position which it occupies in the logic of the 13th century”.  
However, in the light of scholarly research, this continuist view, which merges 
authors from various periods into a coherent picture and overlooks the basic 
divergences, seems hardly tenable.356 Indeed, if one expands the horizon of the 
inquiry to include the intellectual framework and the authors’ philosophical 
orientations, it will emerge the impact of the modified understanding of logic on 
authors’ reflections on dialectic. Once the commentaries on the Topics are historically 
and doctrinally contextualized, Green-Pedersen’s hypothesis actually appears to 
work the other way around. The role of prominence which second intentions 
acquired in logic, especially after the spread of the Avicennian notion of 
‘intentionalistic logic’, contributed to the different developments and refinements of 
the doctrine of the topics, along with the intellectual orientations of specific authors. 
Specifically, the adoption of a more historical approach, which emphasizes both the 
                                       
355 A.18, f. 31ra-rb; cf. A.20, II, q. 10, f. 32vb. 
356 Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, pp. 228 and 240; and Marmo’s criticism of Green-Pedersen’s 
continuist view: Marmo, “La topique”. 
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undeniable points of contact and distance between authors from different decades, 
has disclosed some interesting issues in modistic commentaries on the Topics. 
In opposition to their predecessors’ view, according to which logic was a sermocinal 
science, the Modists considered logic and dialectic as rational sciences dealing with 
second intentions. The modistic doctrine of second intentions was strictly 
intertwined with the general assumption of the isomorphism between the 
ontological, epistemological and semantic levels, which was a further main tenet of 
Modist semantics. 
In particular, the subject-matter of dialectic was the dialectical syllogism, which 
modistic commentators did not understand as structurally – formally or materially 
– different from the other types of syllogism. Their interpretation had indeed a more 
subjectivist tone. Boethius of Dacia, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito 
reduced the differences between the types of syllogisms to the diverse ways in which 
the real properties of things (modi essendi) were conceptualized by the intellect (modi 
intelligendi). Accordingly, the Modist logicians openly rejected the doctrine of the 
plurality of forms proposed by some earlier commentators, just as they refused the 
alternative view of the univocal predication of the simple syllogism over the various 
species of syllogism. They opted instead for the analogical predication of simple 
syllogism, which allowed them to acknowledge that the numerically same syllogism 
could be dialectical and demonstrative, thus paving the way for generations of 
future commentators who shared this view. 
The interest which Boethius, Simon and Radulphus took in semantic issues led them 
to analyse the Topics in a different way from previous commentators and to assign 
more relevance to metalogical questions which were beyond the scope of the mere 
literal explication of the text, and to develop new exegeses of the text, as in the case 
of the notion of probability, of which they offered a semantic interpretation which 
greatly departed from the gnoseological understanding of probabilia, which was 
peculiar to their predecessors. 
Some interpretations proposed by Boethius of Dacia, Simon of Faversham and 
Radulphus Brito were destined to fall into oblivion. Other ideas were instead 
inherited by some 14th and 15th century authors, such as Buridan, the anonymous 
masters who lectured on the Topics at the University of Prague and Cracow at the 
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turn of 15th century, and some 15th century Parisian masters of Arts, whose notion of 
probability echoed that of Boehtius. 
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Chapter Five.  “Legere tenetur libros omnes Topicorum”. The 
puzzling case of the missing English manuscript tradition of the 
Topics. 
 
5.1. Reading and commenting on Aristotle’s Topics. Who read what and where? 
 
5.1.1 “Unde literatus ille nostri temporis vir, magister Radulphus Niger, domini mei 
regis iunioris concurialis, cum Topica Aristotelis et Elenchos versibus glossaret, ait: 
 
Sunt loca, sunt gentes, quibus est mactare parentes, 
Cum mors aut pietas aut longa supervenit aetas.”357 
 
In his Otia imperialia, written at the beginning of 13th century, Gervase of Tilbury 
provided us with the only extant testimony of magister Radulphus’ verse commentary 
on Aristotle’s Topics. Possibly, it was composed by Ralph of Flaix, a Benedictine 
monk active around the mid-12th century, when the Topics had recently been 
rediscovered and Medievals were starting to lecture and comment upon them. Soon 
thereafter, the eight books of the Aristotelian treatise appeared in the first statutes of 
the faculty of arts of the University of Paris, which were drawn up by the Papal 
Legate Robert de Courçon in 1215.358 During this early stage of the Parisian 
                                       
357 Cf. Aristotle, Topics, II.11, 115b22-24 “ubi quidem bonum patrem mactare, ut in Trivallis, 
simpliciter autem non bonum”. The text is quoted by Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle 
Commentaries”, in Traditio 28 (1972), p. 384. Ebbesen proposes to correct “Cum mors aut pietas aut 
longa” to “Cum mos tum pietas cum longa”, so the verse would state: “there are places and peoples 
among whom it is both customary and an expression of piety to sacrifice one’s parents when old age 
come upon them” (S. Ebbesen, “Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical 
Texts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, in C. Burnett,  Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian 
Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin traditions, London: Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 129-
177, here p. 141, fn. 36). 
358 Cf. H. Denifle–A. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Paris, 1889–97, 4 vols, vol. I, p. 
78, n. 20, hereafter abbreviated as CUP; see also G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. An Institutional and Intellectual History, New York: R. E. Krieger, 1975, esp. p. 
138: “The books to be lectured on […] do not give any indication of the state of studies within the 
different arts subjects save for confirming the predominance of dialectic by 1215. They comprised the 
New and Old Logic of Aristotle”; O. Weijers–L. Holtz, L’Enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des 
arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles), Turnhout: Brepols, 1997. Since the Barcelona Compendium, which 
lists questions and solutions collected by an anonymous Parisian master, covers all the books of the 
Topics, the CUP prescription which says to read “quartum topichorum” could not refer to the books 1-
4 of the Aristotelian Topics, as interpreted by Leff, but rather to the four books of Boethius’ De topicis 
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University, the study of logic, and mainly of dialectic, occupied a prominent place, 
as this is attested to not only by the statutary provisions, but also by the famous 
Barcelona Compendium. In this guide for the bachelors’ examination written by an 
anonymous Parisian master of arts, the Aristotelian Topics and Sophistical Refutations 
received the most extensive treatment in comparison to the other Aristotelian 
writings prescribed in the official curriculum.359 The 1252 regulation for students of 
the English-German nation prescribed the reading of the logica vetus and nova, the 
Aristotelian Topics were read along with the first three books of Boethius’ De topicis 
differentiis: “libros Topicorum Aristotelis et elencorum bis ordinarie, et semel ad minus 
cursorie, vel si non cursorie, ad minus ter ordinarie”. The 1255 statutes of the arts 
faculty gave the same indication for bachelors.360 In the 1366 syllabus for the 
Parisian artistae, the list of mandatory readings included the first four books of the 
Topics,361 and this instruction was confirmed by the 1452 so-called reform of 
Cardinal Guillaume d’Estouteville.362 Similarly to Paris, in the regulations of many 
faculty of arts of 15th century universities - both ancient as well as newly founded, 
Aristotle’s Topics were lectured on in undergraduate classes. According to Green-
Pedersen, all eight books of the Topics were read in most of the German Universities, 
alike Krakow. An exception was Köln, where only books I-II, VI, and VIII were 
lectured on.363 In Leuven, according to the 1427 Statutes of the faculty of arts, 
bachelors had to study “libri IV Topicorum”. Nonetheless, this prescription did not 
match with the extant manuscript material originated from the teaching activity, 
since Leuven commentaries are circumscribed to the first two books.364 At Bologna 
                                       
differentis, or perhaps to the fourth book alone. This is confirmed by the extant manuscript tradition 
of Parisian commentaries, which treated the eight books. 
359 “The section reserved for the Topics – the longest the “Student’s Guide” devotes to a particular 
work – occupies almost fourteen of the ninety-nine columns of this compilation” (Lafleur, “Logic”, 
p. 87). 
360 For the 1252 see CUP I, n. 201, p. 228; for 1255 see CUP I, n. 246, p. 277. 
361 CUP III, n. 1319, p. 145; see also W.J. Courtenay, “The registers of the University of Paris and the 
Statutes against the Scientia Occamica”, in Vivarium 31/4 (1991), pp. 13-49. 
362 CUP IV, n. 2690, p. 728.  
363 Statuta Antiqua universitatis Studii Coloniensis de anno 1392, in F. J. von Bianco, Die alte Universität 
Köln und die Späteren Gelehrtenschulen dieser Stad, Köln 1855, Anlage VII, p. 64 and p. 71. The Statuta 
Reformata of 1457 did not modify this disposition.  
364 On Leuven statutes see C. Geudens–S. Masolini, “Teaching Aristotle at the Louvain Faculty of 
Arts, 1425–1500: General Regulations and Handwritten Testimonies”, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-
Scolastica, 108/4 (2016), pp. 813–844 
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the 1405 statutes of the university of medicine and arts prescribed that bachelors 
heard ordinarie the first, second, fourth and sixth books of the Topics.365 In some 14th-
15th century European Studia, however, the Topics were not part of the mandatory 
readings. The 1389 statutes of Vienna did not include them. And in the 1420 
“Collectio materiarum pro baccalaureatus gradu” of Erfurt, written by Master 
Herbordus de Lippia, the Topics were the only work of the logica nova excluded from 
the list. According to the Statutes, in Greifswald (1456), Leipzig (1440, 1483 and 1486) 
and Uppsala the Topics were not among the required books.366  
 
5.1.2  Aristotle’s Topics were read in Boethius’ vulgata translation, which was the only 
complete Latin version of this writing available to Medieval authors.367 In the 
earliest extant 13th century commentaries, it was not uncommon to read the mention 
of an alternative rendition (alia translatio) of the words that the master was 
commenting upon.368 As experts have acknowledged, Boethius used to revise his 
translations. And the Topics were not immune from this editing process, which 
resulted in a double recension of the text done by Boethius. It seems therefore 
probable that the alternatives referred to by the Topics’ commentators were not a 
different version by another translator, but rather amendments of the vulgate 
                                       
365 C.  Malagola, Statuti delle Università e dei Collegi dello Studio Bolognese, Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1888, 
pp. 251-252. The books of the Topics, which were not read ordinarily, could be lectured on 
extraordinarie. A logic teaching program that is very close to the Bolognaise is found in the statutes of 
Florence. 
366 See L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, New York: Columbia University, 
1944, pp. 296-7; A. L. Gabriel, “‘Via antiqua’ and ‘via moderna’ and the Migration of Paris Students 
and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century”, in A. Zimmermann, Antiqui und 
Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im spätern Mittelalter, Berlin-New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1974, pp. 439-483, esp. pp. 467-9; E. J. Ashworth, “Traditional Logic”, in C. B. 
Schmitt – Q. Skinner – E. Kessler, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 143; on Uppsala see A. Piltz, Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the 
Oldest Lecture Notes taken in the Mediaeval University of Uppsala, Uppsala: Inst. f. Klassiska Spraak, 1977, 
pp. 16-24. 
367 In the fifth volume of the Aristoteles Latinus, which contains the Topics, are edited Boethius’ 
translation, then a fragment of the Recensio Altera (Topics IV.2 122a10-b24), which is deemed to be a 
double recension by Boethius himself, and finally the Translatio Anonyma, an anonymous uncomplete 
translation from 12th century.  
368 It seems that Green-Pedersen underestimated this phenomenon; he mentioned only few 
occurrences of commentators’ references to an alia translatio, namely Adenulphus (A.11) and Elias 
(A.14). We could also add Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1), Robertus (A.7), Robert Anglicus (A.10) and 
Walter Burley. 
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redaction coming from the quill of Boethius himself.369 The existence of a twofold 
recension is reflected in the manuscript tradition of the vulgata of the Topics. Indeed 
usually, alternative readings of the words were added interlinearly by the same 
hand which wrote the main text, and eventually they became a part of the textual 
tradition of the treatise. In commenting on the first line of the Topics 
“propositum…est syllogizare”, Robertus de Cilnacobi (A.1) noticed that, insofar as 
Aristotle had assumed two types of dialectical ratiocination, the alternative 
rendition ‘ratiocinari’ suited more to the Stagirite’s mind than the Boethian 
‘syllogiçare’. This alia translatio, which is not found neither in the Recensio altera nor 
in the Translatio Anonyma,370 is present as an interlinear gloss in the Assisi 
manuscript 658, which was written at the beginning of 13th century and contained 
the vulgate Boethian translation of Aristotle’s work.371  
Interlinear glosses did not only supply synonyms for obscure terms, but also 
clarifications of more complex syntagms. When comparing these interlinear glosses 
with the literal exposition of Aristotle’s words, the similarities led to the supposition 
that master’s elucidations of the literal meaning of the text was mainly grounded on 
such interlinear glosses, and that they were gradually integrated by those written by 
the master himself. Either, that masters prepared their course-notes on the 
translation or students took notes on the translation when in class. An example of 
                                       
369 H. Chadwick, Boethius: the consolations of music, logic, theology, and philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1990, p. 137; J. Marenbon, Boethius (Great medieval thinkers), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 
18; L. Minio-Paluello “The Text of Aristotle’s Topics and Elenchi: the Latin Tradition”, in The Classical 
quarterly N.S.V. 49 (1955), pp. 108-118; Id., “Note sull’Aristotele Latino Medievale: XIII. Traduzioni 
‘perdute’ dei Primi Analitici e dei Topici nel codice di Bologna Univ. 4228 del XII secolo”, in Rivista 
di filosofia neoscolastica 52 (1960), pp. 29-45. 
370 “S’agit-il d’une troisième traduction, différente de la traduction anonyme du XIIe siècle ? Je ne 
peux pas répondre à cette question” (Weijers, “Le Commentaire”, pp. 118-119). Weijers raised the 
problem of the Porphyry referred to by Robertus, who wrote “Hoc etiam consonant Porphirio 
exponenti ‘sillogiçare’ sic, dicens quod ‘si’ idem est quod ‘cum’ et ‘logos’ ratio, inde sillogiçare quasi 
conratiocinari, et secundum hoc omnis argumentatio syllogismus dici potest” (ibid., p. 128). Clearly, 
the unknown “Porphirius” should not be confused with the author of the Isagoge. This etymological 
explanation connected to syllogism is present in the Ars Burana and in the Introductiones Parisienses, 
for which see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, pp. 196 and 362. 
371 It corresponds to the ms. 1266 in the catalogue of the Aristoteles Latinus. This manuscript contains 
translations of the logica vetus and nova, the Topics are at ff. 100r-177v. Along with the ms. Clm 16123 
(München, Bayerischestaatsbibliothek, from the end of 12th century), the ms. Conv. Soppr. I.IX.25 
(Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, 14th century) and the ms. 250 (Charleville, Bibliothèque 
Municipale, from the beginning of the 13th century), the Assisi manuscript is one of the most 
important testimonies of the tradition of the Latin translation of the Topics, since it contains manifold 
aliae lecturae and is heavily glossed by different hands; it is available online via the website 
www.internetculturale.it. 
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the interplay between glosses and literal exegeses is provided by interlinear glosses 
of a Balliol College manuscript (B) that contains the translation of the Topics and 
Walter Burley’s Notulae super libros Topicorum (A.29), which follows here:  
 
Aristoteles, intendens dare artem372 seu metodum […] Et est invenire artem per 
quam poterimus sillogizare de omni problemate, id est ad omne problema, ex 
propositionibus probabilibus, et hoc pertinet ad opponentem; et per quam 
poterimus sustinere disputationem nullum repugnans ipsi posito vel prius 
concesso concedendo, et hoc pertinet ad respondentem.373 Ante quam tamen 
tradatur ars sillogizandi aut respondendi est dicendum quid est sillogismus et quae 
eius differentiae […] Ordo intentionis est prius determinare de sillogismo et de 
eius differentiis. Causa huius ordinis est ut primo sciatur quid est sillogismus 
dialecticus, qui est hic subiectum quod primo oportet stabilire.374  
 
But before focusing our attention on the Doctor planus et perspicuus, let us turn our 
attention to the baffling British manuscript tradition of the Topics. 
 
5.2 The curious case of the disappeared British manuscript tradition of the 
Topics. 
5.2.1 In the Oxford curriculum studiorum, logic had the most prominent place. 
According to the 1268 statutes, the Topics were read twice, while the Posterior 
Analytics at least once. The 14th century statutes specified that the Topics were 
                                       
372 Many interlinear glosses have instead viam (brevem) 
373 In marg. 
374 Burley’s words highlighted in bold coincide with the interlinear glosses, written by an early 
French hand and, mainly, by a late 13th-beginning 14th Anglican hand; the text of the Topics is in italics. 
The marginal glosses are from the ms. Oxford, Balliol College, ms. (21). 253, ff. 92r-159v, here f. 92v, 
which was produced in Paris in the third quarter of 13th century; thereafter, I will refer to this ms. as 
(B). Burley’s Notulae have been transcribed from the mss. Città del Vaticano, Vat. Lat. 2146, ff. 113ra-
204va, here f. 113ra-rb; Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, S. X. 2, ff. 118ra-248va, here f. 118ra; and 
Oxford, Merton College, ms. 296, ff. 1ra-92va, here f.1ra. I was not able to check the other manuscript 
preserving Burley’s Notulae, which is at London, Lambeth Palace, ms. 70, ff. 170ra-268va. Green-
Pedersen lists also a fifth manuscript: Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV.Q.3, ff. 124r-174v (Green-
Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 396). This manuscript contains a commentary on the Topics, which does not coinced 
with Burley’s Notulae. And it cannot be a revised version of the Notulae, since the doctrinal content differs 
from Burley’s commentary. A partial transcription of the prologue is provided by Cesalli, “Logique”, pp. 313-
327.  
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lectured upon for one term. And the 1409 and 1431 Statutes included the Topics.375 
Even at Cambridge, Aristotle’s treatise was listed among the books that students 
must have heard before reaching the role of sophista generalis. From written records 
of Cambridge regulations, such as the Old Proctor’s Book (1385ca.), we know that 
the Topics were read during the summer term of the first year, along with the books 
of the logica vetus. The 15th century manuscript 466/573, preserved at the Gonville & 
Caius College, which contained information useful for students, was more precise. 
Here the Topics appeared among the books of the logica nova and it was specified that 
all the eight books were lectured on ordinarie at least twice.376 
The British residual manuscript traditions, however, do not match completely 
with the logic programs codified by the statutes. According to Lohr’s and Green-
Pedersen’s catalogues of commentaries on Aristotle’s writings, specifically on the 
Topics, only a commentary on this text was surely produced in British universities, 
namely Burley’s Notulae, dating from the 1300-1307 and covering the eight books. 
To this work, could be added: 1) an incomplete commentary (Topics, I-beginning IV) 
compounded of dubia, notanda and short pharaphrases appended, which was 
wrongly attributed to Bonaventure (A.4) and which Green-Pedersen supposes to 
have been produced in England around the mid 13th century;377 2) an anonymous 
incomplete commentary in form of sententia on books I-VI (A.23), which Green-
Pedersen hypothesizes to have been produced in England at the very beginning of 
14th century;378 3) a fragment of a text which the manuscript introduced as 
                                       
375 S. Gibson, Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931: for the 1268 
statutes pp. 26,1-6 and 10-19, p. 27,18–22; for statutes before 1350 pp. 33-35; for the 13 February 1409 
statutes, pp. 199,20-201,26; for the10 December 1431 regulations, pp. 233,35-236,27 and p. 234, 14-27. 
On Oxford University in the Middle Age see J. I. Catto –  R. Evans, The history of the university of 
Oxford. Volume II: Late Medieval Oxford, New York: The Clarendon Press, 1992. On the teaching activity 
and the curricula of the Oxford’s Arts Faculty, see: J. M. Fletcher, “The teaching of Arts at Oxford, 
1400-1520”, in Paedagogica Historica, VII,1-2 (1967), pp. 417-454; J. Wheisheipl, “Curriculum of the 
Faculty of Arts at Oxford”, in Medieval Studies 26 (1964), pp. 143-85; J. Weisheipl, “Developments in the 
Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century”, in Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), pp. 151-
75. 
376 M.B. Hackett, The Original Statutes of Cambridge University. The text and its history, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 297-301; D. R. Leader, A History of the University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 89-138. 
377 Anonymous [Ps. Bonaventure], Roma, Collegio San Isidoro, 1/10; see Green-Pedersen, The 
tradition, pp. 226, 383-384. I will use the unpublished transcription made at the beginning of 20th 
century by A. Sirletti. 
378 Green-Pedersen, The tradition, p. 394. 
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containing material “Supra VIII Topicorum” (A.12), which dealt instead with 
obligations.379 To Lohr’s and Green-Pedersen’s list should be added the Notabilia 
Scoti in Libros Topicorum, which consists of elucidations and questions on remarkable 
issues arising from the eight books of the Aristotelian text. The originally doubted 
attribution to John Duns Scotus has been accepted by Pini and Marmo, who 
connected it with Scotus’ teaching activity at Oxford, during the 1290s.380 Thus, from 
the beginning of the 14th century onwards, there are no known or surviving 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics written in England. A similar perplexing 
discrepancy between the information drawn from the university statutes, and the 
extant lectures - which mirror the teaching activity, characterizes also the Italian 
residual manuscript tradition. According to Lohr and Green-Pedersen, only two 
manuscripts preserving writings on the Topics were produced in Italian Universities. 
The one is a sentence commentary, written in the first half of 13th century probably 
at Padua, by the Dominican Gratiadeus de Asculo (A.24). The other is a collection of 
excerpts drawn from the first two books of the Topics compounded by a Bolognaise 
arts master, Iacobus de Placentia (A.25).381 As far as I know, then, there are no 
commentaries on the Topics yet identified382 which were produced by 15th century 
masters teaching in Italian Universities. It is probably not a mere coincidence that 
this lacuna is common to England and Italy. In England and Italy in the 15th century, 
the doctrines of the moderny loyci had a place of prominence. The parva logicalia 
entered the Paduan and the Bolognese Universities, where professors lectured on 
                                       
379 Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 344/540, f. 216ra-219rb, from the last decade of 13th century; see 
Green-Pedersen, The tradition, p. 388. 
380 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Ott. 318, ff. 247ra-296vb, f. 247ra (fol. 
Antiqua 145ra): “Incipiunt Notabilia Scoti super libro Topicorum Aritotelis”; I will refer to this 
manuscript, which should be a copy since it presents some lacunae; on it see A. Maier, “Ein Beitrag 
zur Geschichte der italienischen Averroismus im 14. Jahrhundert”, in Quellen und Forschungen aus 
italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 33 (1944), pp. 136-154; R. Andrews, “The Notabilia Scoti in Libros 
Topicorum: An Assessment of Authenticity”, in Franciscan Studies 56 (1998), pp. 65-75; G. Pini, “Duns 
Scotus’ Commentary on the Topics: new light on his philosophical teaching”, in Archives d’Histoire 
doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 66 (1999), pp. 225-243, esp. pp. 66-67 for the description of the 
manuscript; C. Marmo, “Scotus on Supposition”, in  E. P. Bos, Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited, 
Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2013, pp. 233-257. 
381 Green-Pedersen, The tradition, A.24, p. 394 and A.25, p. 395. 
382 Green-Pedersen’s and Lohr’s lists are confirmed by the census done in the Catalogo di manoscritti 
filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane. 
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texts by English logicians, along with Paul of Venice’s Logica Parva - which were not 
always mentioned in the statutes. 
 
5.2.2 The meagre number of commentaries on the Aristotelian writings produced in 
13th-15th centuries in Britain was a feature common to all the philosophical areas, 
although this phenomenon was more accentuated in logic.383 We could propose 
some explanations which may account for this puzzling gap. As Leader remarked, 
many manuscripts containing texts of late 14th-15th century logicians, along with 
commentaries on the Organon, were copied until 1450ca, at which point they 
continued circulating and were glossed until the end of the century. A case in point 
is the Lambeth Palace manuscript 70, which contained Burley’s Notulae together 
with logical writings from many authors. It was produced in 14th century and then 
bought by Richard Calne during his study at Oxford (1412-1421ca).384 Similarly, the 
manuscript 466/573, which was owned by John Hall and is nowadays housed at 
Gonville and Caius College Library at Cambridge, contained the translations of the 
entire Organon and was “glossed by early anglicana hands”.385 According to 
Thomson’s catalogue, on the shelves of Cambridge libraries there are 8 manuscripts 
containing translations of the Topics accompanied by more or less neat marginal 
glosses, the great majority of which were written by 14th and 15th century Anglican 
hands, while others in Italian hands.386 In Oxford libraries, there are five 
manuscripts containing the Latin translation of the Topics which were glossed by 14th 
                                       
383 Pinborg identified some features common to 13th century English commentaries on Aristotle’s 
Organon – all of them in question-form and contained in only six manuscripts – which differ from 
Parisian commentaries, “although the general character of the problems discussed is much the same”. 
Firstly, English works adopted a terministic language (such as the divisions of suppositio) and an 
extentional approach; then, they were characterized by a higher presence of sophisms and of issues 
related to syncategoremata; finally, they displayed a wider interest in questions about conversion and 
problems related to the consequentiae; see J. Pinborg, “English Logic before Ockham”, in Synthese 40/1 
(1979), pp. 19-42, esp. pp. 31-35; unlike many scholars, Pinborg considered Scouts’ logical 
commentaries to be an outcome of his Parisian activity, ibid., pp. 31-32. 
384 On this ms. see N. R. Ker, Medieval Libraries of Great Britain: A List of Surviving Books, The Royal 
Historical Society: London, 19642, pp. 109-111, 273. 
385 R. M. Thomson, Catalogue of Medieval Manuscripts of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle in British 
Libraries, Turnhout: Brepols, 2011, vol. 1, n. 35; the Topics, until book six, are at ff. 151r-177v.  
386 R. M. Thomson, Catalogue of Medieval Manuscripts of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle in British 
Libraries, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013, vol. 2, n. 12; 31; 35; 36; 37; 42; 64; 135. On n. 31 see Ebbesen, 
“Medieval Latin Glosses”, p. 143; on n. 37, ibid., pp. 168 and 171; on n. 64, ibid., p. 132. Unfortunately, 
I could not see the manuscript.  
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and 15th century Anglican hands.387 One manuscript of the Boethian vulgate contains 
notes in Italian hand;388 the Bodleain library ms. 520 contains sets of propositiones 
drawn from the Topics.389 While the manuscript 57 Fragm. 20-21 of the Brasenose 
College library, which dates from beginning 14th century, includes some 
unidentified questions on Topics VII.5 and VIII.3-10.390 As was customary for 
translations, many of the Oxford manuscript containing annotated vulgatae of the 
Topics were accompanied by interlinear glosses. Some of them were written by the 
hand of the scribe himself and offered literal explanations of words or subdivisions 
of the text. The layout of the folia was organized for receiving scholia, since the large 
lateral margins were factory-divided in columns, which were then filled with 
glosses. Usually, these marginal glosses sketched the content of the corresponding 
section of the text or added some remarks on it.391  
An example of an interesting marginal notandum is found at the beginning of 
the third book of the Topics, corresponding to the first topic, where Aristotle 
mentioned the prudent man (prudens).392 In an Oxford manuscript containing 
Boethius’ translation of the text, which was used as pastedown, we find a continuous 
marginal gloss written by an Anglican hand (perhaps of the mid-14th century), which 
expounded on the division of ethics. The same explanation of the Aristotelian word 
appeared in a marginal scholium of (B). None of the 10 Continental manuscripts 
containing the vulgata of the Topics which I have scrutinized, have a similar marginal 
note. A slightly different account is found in A.4, while Burley’s explanation 
coincides verbatim with the glosses.393 Among the Parisian masters considered in 
previous chapters, only Adenulphus proposed a similar explanation (A.11).394 
                                       
387 Thomson, Catalogue, vol. 1, n. 211, 251 (which covers Top. VIII.8-11); 278; 352 (Top. VIII.12); 389 
(Top. II.8-III.1; IV.4; it was used as pastedown). 
388 Thomson, Catalogue, vol. 1, n. 21. 
389 Thomson, Catalogue, vol. 1, n. 16; it was produced in England in 15th century. 
390 Thomson, Catalogue, vol. 1, n. 221. 
391 For the various layouts and types of scholia see Ebbesen, “Medieval Latin Glosses”. 
392 Aristotle, Topics, III.1,  116a14 (AL, p. 50,14). 
393 The exemplar from which were copied the marginal glosses of ms. Pr. Bk. Cpbd. A.4.12 and ms. 
253 is probably the manuscript of the Notulae, preserved at Merton College, ms. 296, f. 31ra.  
394 “Aliter dicendum quod eligibile <est> circa moralia sed moralis est triplex, yconomica, monastica 
et politica. Per hoc quod dicit prudens tangit yconomicam, quia prudens dicitur qui bene sit se habere 
inter socios et propriam familiam et hoc considerat yconomica. Per hoc quod dicit bonus tangit 
monasticam quia bonus dicitur qui bene sit se ipsum regere et propria virtutem, et hoc considerat 
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Pseudo-
Bonaventure 
(A.4), f. 121 
Burley, Notulae  St. John College, Pr. 
Bk. Cpbd. A.4.12, 
left margin395 
 
Balliol College, m. 
253, f. 109v, 
bottom margin 
In electione ista 
tangit 
<scientiam> 
philosophiae 
moralis 
Notandum quod 
Philosophus in 
isto textu tangit 
scientiam 
moralem 
triplicem.  
 
 
 Notandum quod 
Philosophus in 
isto textu tangit 
scientiam 
moralem triplicem 
Per hoc quod 
dicit vir prudens 
tangit etiam 
yconomicam. 
Per hoc enim 
quod dicit vir 
prudens tangit 
illam partem396 
moralis 
philosophiae quae 
dicitur 
yconomica. 
Sciendum quod 
<per hoc quod> 
dicit vir prudens 
<tangit ill>am 
partem moralis 
<philosophiae 
qua>e dicitur 
yconomica. 
 
 
Per hoc enim quod 
dicit vir prudens 
tangit illam 
partem moralis 
philosophiae quae 
dicitur yconomica. 
Prudens enim 
dicitur ille qui scit 
disponere 
familiae et 
propriae et 
subditis. 
Prudens enim 
dicitur ille qui 
bene scit 
disponere 
familiae proprie et 
sibi subditis et 
<Prudens> enim 
dicitur ille qui <bene 
scit> disponere 
fami<liae proprie> 
et sibi subditis <et 
talis dicitur 
Prudens enim 
dicitur ille qui 
bene scit 
disponere familiae 
proprie et sibi 
subditis et talis 
                                       
monastica. Per hoc quod dicit lex tangit politica quia lex docet regere proprios et civitates et hoc 
considerat politica” (A.11, f. 61vb). 
395 The words between “greater” and “lesser than” were cut when the page was trimmed.  
396 Scientiae add. C 
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talis dicitur 
yconomus seu 
dispensator.397  
yc>onomicus sive < 
dispens>ator.  
 
 
dicitur yconomus 
seu dispensator.  
 
Per hoc quod 
dicit vir bonus 
tangit 
monasticam. 
Et per hoc quod 
dicit bonus tangit 
illam partem 
moralis 
philosophiae quae 
dicitur 
monostica[sic] seu 
ethica398. 
 
 
Per hoc quod dicit 
<bon>us tangit illam 
<partem> moralis 
philosophiae quae 
<dicitur 
m>onostica[sic].  
 
Et per hoc quod 
dicit bonus tangit 
illam partem 
moralis 
philosophiae quae 
dicitur monastica 
seu ethica.  
 
Bonus enim 
dicitur qui bene 
est dispositus in 
anima penes se.  
Bonus enim 
dicitur399 qui est 
bene dispositus 
secundum 
animam et 
secundum 
seipsum.  
Bonus enim dicitur 
<qui>cumque est 
bene dispositus.  
 
Bonus enim 
dicitur qui est 
bene dispositus 
secundum 
animam et 
secundum 
seipsum.  
 
Per hoc quod 
dicit lex recta 
intelligit 
politicam. 
Et per hoc400 quod 
dicit lex recta 
tangit illam 
partem moralis 
philosophiae401 
quae dicitur 
<Et> per hoc quod 
dicit lex <recta> dat 
intelligere istam 
partem quae dicitur 
politica. Politicus est 
ille qui consistit in 
Et per hoc quod 
dicit lex recta 
tangit illam 
partem moralis 
philosophiae quae 
dicitur politica 
                                       
397 Domus add. C 
398 Ethica om. V 
399 Ille add. C 
400 Per hoc ] secundum quod C 
401 Moralis philosophiae ] philosophiae morale C 
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politica quae 
consistit402 in 
regimine rei 
publicae. 
regimine rei 
publicae. 
 
quae consistit in 
regimine rei 
publicae 
 
All the folia of B containing the translation of the Topics present marginal scholia, 
which were written by different hands. A same Anglican hand, from around the 
beginning of 14th century, wrote the glosses that were drawn from Burley’s 
commentary. Considering these data and since it is likely that Burley gained his 
bachelor’s degree from Balliol College, where he was a Fellow from about 1295 to 
1301, we could suppose that the marginal glosses were records taken from Burley 
himself when he was a student. We could also conjecture that these glosses were 
students’ notes, taken during Burley’s lectures at Merton College (1301ca.-1307ca.), 
or that they were directly drawn from the copy of the Notulae, preserved in the 
Merton manuscript. In turn, Burley’s commentary bore many resemblances, often 
literally, to Scotus’ Notabilia. Although he never mentioned Scotus, plausibly Burley 
borrowed some material from his text.403 
 
5.3 Scotus and Burley: an independent English tradition? 
 
Pini and Marmo have provided convincing arguments in favour of the attribution 
of the Notabilia super Topicorum, found in a Vatican manuscript, to John Duns Scotus. 
Probably, this commentary was connected with his lectorate at the Oxford 
Franciscan house, during the 1290s. Walter Burley’s Notulae came soon thereafter, 
plausibly when he was the master of Art at Merton College, in the first decade of 
14th century, and before he moved to Paris around 1307. When leafing through the 
folia of Scotus’ and Burley’s Topics commentaries, their striking literal and doctrinal 
similarities stand out. So much so, that one gets the impression that Burley wrote his 
                                       
402 Consistit ] resistit V 
403 If this text will turn out to not be by the pen of Scouts, the eventual author would be the source of 
Burley, if prior to him. Otherwise, Burley would be the source for the Notabila Scoti. 
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work with Scotus’ Notabilia at his elbow, at times copying entire sections, and at 
other times reshaping or eliminating some passages.404 Despite the affinity in 
content, the two writings differ for their formal arrangement, since Scotus provided 
only the notabilia and dubia, while Burley added the preliminary divisio textus and 
the sententia. This partially justifies the verbosity of the Notulae, along with the 
didactical scope of the work. In order to make Aristotle’s text as intelligible and clear 
as possible for his student, Burley fleshed out his explanation with extended 
examples, some of which he borrowed from natural philosophy.405 
The evidence adduced by Pini and Marmo for establishing the authorship of the 
Notabilia consisted in sixteent quotations of his own commentaries on Aristotle and 
Porphyry, made by the author of the Notabilia– e.g. “cuius causa assignatur super 
Porphyrium”, “de hoc diffusius dictum est in Praedicamentis”. The comparison 
which Pini and Marmo have highlighted between these self-references and the 
corresponding passages in Scotus’ authentic works, has shown a doctrinal affinity 
between the author of the Notabilia and Scotus.406 By likening the Notabilias’ 
references of the Aristotelian and Porphyryan writings to the quotations found in 
the Notulae, it has emerged that from time to time Burley sided with Scotus in 
mentioning some Aristotelian works. Other times, he cited different texts.407 Unlike 
Scotus, the Doctor Planuus and Perspicuus was less self-referential. He mentioned only 
his own commentary on the Categories. This might be justified by the fact that Burley 
                                       
404 That Burley was acquainted with Scotus and with his literary production is confirmed by Burley 
himself as well as by textual evidence. In the last version of his commentary on the Physics Burley 
wrote “audivi in juventute mea a quodam subtilissimo doctore”, although it is more likely that this 
claim should be referred to his Parisian period. Moreover, Burley’s heavy dependence on Scouts is 
attested by some of his writings, e.g. his Quaestiones libri Elenchorum; see A. Uña Juárez, La filosofia del 
siglo XIV: context cultural de Walter Burley, San Lorenzo del Escorial: Biblioteca “La ciudad de Dios”, 
1978, esp. p. 21; M. Von Perger, “Quaestiones libri Elenchorum: Quaestiones XVIII de fallaciis, quae ‘in 
dictione’ nuncupantur Qq. 1-3, 13-18”, in Chaiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 76 (2005), pp. 
159-237, esp. p. 164. 
405 For example, the transcription of Burley’s commentary on the second book of the Topics extends 
to 79 pages, while Scotus’ to less than the one-half, namely 31 pages. In commenting Topics, I.11, 
104b23, “omnia moventur secundum Eraclitum”, Burley expounded on bodies’ simple and mixed 
motion along an entire column.  
406 The complete list is provided by Marmo, “Scotus’ commentary”, pp. 168-170. In presenting the 
parallel passages, I will follow Pini’s account, “Duns Scotus”. 
407 Burley mentioned almost the entire Aristotelian corpus: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior and 
Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, 
Metaphysics, On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics. He also mentioned Grossetestes’ commentary on the 
Posterior Analytics and Averroes. 
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had not yet written his commentaries on the other works he mentioned, when he 
was lecturing on the Topics.  
In the first book of the Topics, Aristotle had defined the four predicables, namely 
genus, definition, accident and property. “A property” (proprium,) he said, “is 
something which does not indicate the essence of a thing but yet belongs to that 
thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it.”408 In his Isagoge, Porphyry had 
sketched four senses of property, the fourth of which defined convertible property 
as what is an accident of a certain species alone, and of all of it and always.409 Scotus 
had reckoned the identity between the Aristotelian and Porphyryan definitions, but 
did not offer a complete explanation for his claim, deferring it to his commentary on 
the Isagoge. Burley quoted Porphyry without however referring to his own 
commentary on it: 
 
Scotus, Notabilia Burley, Notulae 
f. 249ra-b: Proprium est quod non indicat quid 
est esse et conversim praedicatur de re. 410  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Praedicatum convertibile non essentiale, et 
ista <est> definitio. Ubi ‘praedicatum’ est 
genus per aliqua duo differentia, reliqua 
duo sunt sicut <differentiae> appropriantes 
hoc genus huic speciei. Et haec definitio est 
eadem in re definitioni Porphyrii, ut dictum 
C 124ra, V116rb: Proprium autem est.411 
Haec est secunda particula secundae partis 
in qua determinatur de proprio secundum 
suam substantiam et quidditatem. Et primo 
describit proprium, secundo removet 
quaedam a ratione proprii, quae alicui 
possent videri esse propria, quae tamen non 
sunt propria.  
 
 
Describendo ergo proprium dicit quod 
proprium est quod non indicat quid est esse, soli 
autem inest et conversim de re praedicatur, 
idest proprium est praedicatum 
convertibile cum specie non essentiale. Et 
                                       
408 Aristotle, Topics, I.5, 102a18-19. 
409 Porphyry, Isagoge, 4,17-18 (Engl. tr. in Barnes, Introduction, pp. 11-12). 
410 AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 5, p. 10, l. 1 (102a18). 
411 AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 5, p. 10, l. 1 (102a18). 
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est ibi in capitulo de proprio [scil. Scoti 
Super universalis Porphyrii, q. 3].  
 
 
 
Aliquid autem est proprium secundum 
quid aliquando, ut hominem sedere. Vel in 
comparatione ad quid, puta hominem esse 
bipedem in comparatione ad equum. 
sciendum est quod proprium, ut hic 
accipitur, idem est quod proprium 
proprissime acceptum quomodo accipitur 
in libro Porphyrii in quarto modo proprii. 
Exempla ponit Philosophus et patent.  
 
Nemo enim proprium.412 Hic removet 
quaedam a ratione proprii, quae possent 
alicui videri esse propria, scilicet proprium 
quando et proprium ad aliquid. Verbi 
gratia: proprium quando est illud quod 
inest omni et soli pro determinato tempore, 
ut posito quod omnis homo et solus homo 
sedeat nunc, et sic sedere est proprium 
homini quando hoc est pro determinato 
tempore. Proprium ad aliquid est illud 
quod inest omni contento sub una specie et 
nulli contento sub alia specie et illud est 
proprium ad aliquid illi speciei cui inest in 
comparatione ad speciem cui non inest; et 
sic bipes dicitur proprium hominis in 
comparatione ad equum. Sed huiusmodi 
propria, scilicet proprium quando et 
proprium ad aliquid, non sunt vere propria 
quia non predicantur convertibiliter de 
rebus quibus istis modis dicuntur propria. 
 
Subsequently, Aristotle defined genus as “what is predicated in what a thing is of a 
number of things exhibiting differences in kind”.413 In commenting this passage, 
Scotus coped with the question whether the genus was a res or an intentio and 
                                       
412 AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 5, p. 10, l. 5 (102a22). 
413 Aristotle, Topics, I.5, 102a31-32 (in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 170). 
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pushed the solution back to his commentary on Porphyry. Here, he had explained 
that the Aristotelian definition of genus applied to intentions. In the parallel passage, 
Burley did not hint at the problematic issue concerning the referent of the definition 
of genus and having eluded this question, he could also drop any reference to 
intentions: 
 
Scotus, Notabilia Burley, Notulae 
f. 249rb: Genus est quod praedicatur de 
pluribus. 414 Cuius sit haec definitio, rei 
scilicet vel intentionis, et quomodo sit 
intelligenda, dictum est super 
Porphyrium [scil. Scoti Super universalis 
Porphyrii, q. 14.]  
C124ra, V116rb: Genus autem est.415 Haec 
est tertia particula secundae partis in 
qua Philosophus determinat de genere 
secundum suam substantiam et 
quidditatem. Et primo describit genus, 
secundo determinat de generali, quod 
est quoddam reducibile ad genus. 
Descriptio generis quam ponit et 
explanat manifesta est in textu. 
 
In commenting on Aristotle’s doubt as to whether particular instances of the general 
question “of which of the two <things> is the predicate more properly an accident?” 
belonged to the topic of accident or of property, Scotus considered these two 
predicables as intentions applied to things of first intention taken concretely (“illae 
intentiones insunt rebus primae intentionis significatis in concreto”). And invited 
the reader to go through his commentary on Porphyry for a better understanding of 
the issue. Similarly to the previous case, on this occasion too Burley avoided the 
reference to the Isagoge as well as the use of intentionalistic terminology.416  
At the end of the first book, in a passage concerning the second instrument for 
dialectical inquires, namely the scrutiny of the ways in which a term was employed, 
Aristotle gave two pieces of advice. Firstly, to consider whether two items having 
the same name belonged to different genera not subordinated to each other. 
                                       
414AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 5, p. 10, l. 14 (102a32). 
415 AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 5, p. 10, l. 14 (102a32). 
416 Aristotle, Topics, I.6, 102b14-21; Scotus, Notabilia, f. 249va; Burley, Notulae, V116va-vb. 
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Secondly, to inquire if the contrary of the term being scrutinized applied to items 
which fell under different genera not subordinated.417 Scotus and Burley explained 
these prescriptions by referring to the principle found in the Categories according to 
which “the differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the 
other are themselves different in kind”:418   
 
Scotus, Notabilia Burley, Notulae 
f. 253ra: Causa utriusque 
considerationum est quia diversorum 
generum et non subalternatim positorum 
sive generalissimorum sive non, etc; cuius 
causa dicta est in Praedicamentis [scil. 
Super Praedicamenta, q. 10.] 
C136rb, V124vb: Considerare autem et 
genera.419 Secunda consideratio est: si 
propositum sit in diversis generibus 
non subalternis, idest quorum neutrum 
ponitur sub alio nec ambo sub tertio, 
propositum est aequivocum; et ponit 
exempla, quae patent. Causa utriusque 
considerationis est quia diversorum 
generum et non subalternatim positorum, 
sive generalissimorum sive non, diversae 
sunt differentiae et species, ut dictum est 
in Praedicamentis420 ubi positae sunt 
instantiae et solutae. 
 
Burley also followed in the footsteps of Scotus in commenting on a topic of genus, 
which prescribed to investigate “whether the species and the genus fail[ed] to be 
used in relation to an equal number of things”.421 This instruction invited the two 
commentators to ascertain whether the category of relation was itself relative or not. 
Both authors referred to the answers which they had given in their respective 
commentaries on the Categories. Nevertheless, Burley was more generous than 
                                       
417 Aristotle, Topics, I.15, 107a18-19 and 107a32-33. 
418 Aristotle, Categories 3, 1b16-17 (in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 4). 
419 AL, Topica, bk. 1, ch. 15, p. 25, l.3 (107a19). 
420 G. Burley, Tractatus super Praedicamentorum, ed. by A. Conti, pp. 21-23, available online at: 
http://www-static.cc.univaq.it/diri/lettere/docenti/conti/Allegati/WB_praedicamenta.pdf. 
421 Aristotle, Topics, IV.4, 124b15 (in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 210). 
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Scotus. He provided the reader with a detailed response in which he explained that 
the category of relation was the principium referendi in virtue of which relative things 
were said to be relative to each other: 
 
Scotus, Notabilia Burley, Notulae 
f. 272rab: Multa circa hanc materiam 
prolixius dicta sunt <in> libro 
Praedicamentorum, capitulo de 
relatione: quomodo generalissimum 
relationis est relatio et denominative 
dicto ab illo est relativum etc., et cui 
referatur, et de multis aliis quae hic 
perlongum est recapitulare. [cf. Super 
praed., q. 25.] 
C177va: Si autem sit ad aliquid.422 Sed 
adhuc dubitatur quia non sequitur 
species est ad aliquid, ergo genus est ad 
aliquid […] Dicendum quod 
generalissimum in praedicamento 
relationis non refertur, sed est 
principium referendi. Nec aliqua per se 
species in genere relationis per se 
refertur, sed est illud quo aliud refertur. 
Unde hoc nomen relatio est nomen 
generalissimum in praedicamento 
relationis et relatio, quae est genus 
generalissimum, est principium 
referendi hoc commune relativum ad 
suum correlatum. Unde si a. sit genus 
generalissimum in genere relationis et 
b. suum correlatum, eadem est relatio 
ipsius a. ad b. et e converso, et ideo non 
sequitur quod sint duo genera 
generalissima in praedicamento 
relationis, ut dictum est in libro 
Praedicamentorum capitulo de 
relatione.423   
 
                                       
422 AL, Topica, bk. 6, ch. 4, p. 75, l. l1. 
423 Burley, Praedicamentorum, pp. 60-66. 
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5.3.1 Innumerable similar parallel passages of these two texts could be brought as 
evidence for their close resemblance, which is confirmed also by the same approach 
to the Topics in the two works and by their doctrinal affinities. Moreover, the 
writings of the two English masters were characterized by unique features, which 
were absent from Parisian commentaries. This lets us suppose that the Topics 
commentaries of Scotus and Burley did not belong to the continental exegetical 
tradition. The contextual approach displayed in the Notabilia and in the Notulae, 
which was characteristic of terminism, had been replaced by the modistic semantic 
in Parisian commentaries of that period. In  Scotus’ and Burley’s analyses a central 
role was assigned to the doctrine of the suppositio in order to establish eventual 
restrictions to the applicability of the considerationes.424 “While completely absent 
from the Parisian tradition, the position which holds that the predicate of a universal 
affirmative proposition has suppositio confusa tantum is typical of the English 
development of supposition theory [scil. e.g. William of Sherwood and Roger 
Bacon], and Scotus’ use of it confirms his close connection with this tradition”.425 
This affirmation holds true for Burley too. The differences between the Notabilia and 
the Notulae on the one hand, and the commentaries which had been produced in 
Paris on the other hand, emerges from the very first folia. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapter, Parisian commentaries spanning from the end of the 13th to the 
beginning of the 14th century focused on general topics rather than on specific logical 
issues. The two English masters, instead, neither coped with general questions about 
logic and dialectic nor inquired about their scientific status and subdivisions or on 
their relationships with other disciplines. And Scotus spent a mere few lines stating 
that dialectic was inventive, since it aimed at finding the middle term of dialectical 
syllogism, Burley did not touch upon this topic. None of the English masters 
elucidated upon the meaning of methodus, on which almost all Parisian 
commentators had offered the traditional etymological explanation as “brevis via 
quae […] vulgariter semita vocatur”. Nor was this explication found in the scholia, 
written by Anglican hands, which accompanied the Boethian translation of the 
                                       
424 “Scotus’ theory of supposition is clearly linked to the English tradition: suppositio is therefore a 
property that terms have only when they occur in propositions” (C. Marmo, “Scotus on supposition”, 
p. 255).  
425 Marmo, “Scotus on supposition”, p. 244.  
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Topics. All the problems related to the definition of syllogism - on which generations 
of Parisian masters had struggled, passed unnoticed by Scotus and Burley. They 
merely paraphrased the Aristotelian littera, without raising any question. Burley, 
then, offered a gnoseological elucidation of probabilia, which bore resemblance with 
that provided by Pseudo-Bonaventure (A.4) as well as with the subjective 
interpretation of probability proposed by Elias, the anonymous A9 and Robert de 
Cilnacoby (A.1). But the most remarkable difference between the two English 
masters and their Parisian colleagues lay in their treatment of the topics expounded 
in the central books of the Topics. Consistent with their disinterest in metalogical 
issues, the two English masters did not treat the question about the nature of the 
locus and what it was. One would look in vain for a definition of locus in Scotus’ and 
Burley’s commentaries, who seemed to be unaware of the usual definition of locus 
as habitudo terminorum that appeared in almost all the 13th century Parisian 
commentaries. Only Scotus mentioned, en passant, the locus dyalecticus: “locus 
dyalecticus est in consequentia concedenti praemissam et omnes isti loci ponuntur 
principaliter pro evidentia alicuius consequente”.426 Generally, both Scotus and 
even more so Burley acknowledged a marginal if not symbolic role to the Boethian 
topics. The Doctor planuus et perspicuus viewed the topics listed by Aristotle as 
necessary rules for discovering the middle of dialectical syllogism: 
 
Considerationes vero in hoc libro [scil. in Topicis] per quas invenitur medium ad 
terminandum problemata sunt ita necessariae quod numquam possunt deficere 
[…] illa quae docentur hic [scil. in Topicis] non possunt necessario doceri, sed hoc 
est quia multae regulae dandae ad inventionem medii sillogismi dialectici sunt 
ita manifestae quod non potest de eis subtilis ratio faciliter assignari, sed tantum 
possunt exemplariter ostendi. Aliae tamen regulae, quae non sunt ita 
manifestae, possunt per priora declarari.427 
 
In the central books of his commentary, Burley applied the topical rules to various 
consequences in order to understand whether and under what respect these rules 
                                       
426 Scotus, Notabilia, f. 262rb. 
427 Burley, Notulae, bk. I, C121rb, V114va-vb. 
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held and could be inferences licenses. And in carrying out this scrutiny, he adopted 
the necessary-truth preservation as criterion of the validity of consequences: in a 
bona consequentia a false consequent cannot follow from a true antecedent.428 Thus, 
Burley implicitly equated topical precepts, and specifically the maximal proposition, 
to the rules for consequences, of which he had given a list in his Treatise on 
Consequences, written before 1302. Indeed many topical prescriptions coincided with 
the rules for inferences, as can be seen in the case of the topic from contradictory 
opposite and of the rule concerning contradictory propositions: 
 
Notulae Topicorum, C f.151ra, II.8 113b15,  
Quoniam autem oppositiones 
Tractatus de Consequentiis, p. 137, n. 105 
<Consideratio> si velis videre utrum ad 
antecedens aliquod sequatur 
consequens, videas utrum ex 
contradictorio consequentis sequatur 
contradictorium antecedentis. Et si sic, 
tunc ad antecedens sequitur consequens 
et per consequens constructum est 
probleuma; si non, destructum est 
probleuma. 
 
Maxima: in contradictoriis tenet 
consequentia e contrario, hoc est ex 
contradictorio consequentis sequitur 
contradictorium antecedentis. Et iste 
locus tenet constructive et destructive. 
Regula est: in contradictoriis tenet 
consequentia e contrario. Et 
consequentia tenet e contrario quando 
ad oppositum consequentis sequitur 
oppositum antecedentis, sicut ad 
antecedens sequitur conseques.  
                                       
428 Scotus also adopted the necessary truth-preservation criterion. Nevertheless, while discussing the 
invalidity of a specific consequence, Scotus seemed to endorse the containment criterion. He claimed 
that the inference was not valid since the consequent was not understood in the antecedent, therefore 
the antecedent could not be considered the cause of the truth of the consequent: in a valid 
consequence, indeed, the “consequens est de intellectu antecedentis, ergo antecedens est causa 
veritatis consequentis” (Scotus, Notabilia, f. 257ra, 258vb). In commenting on the same passage, Burley 
did not hint at the containment criterion. 
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<Example:> quia animal sequitur ad 
hominem, hoc est quia ista propositio 
‘animal est’ sequitur ad illam ‘homo 
est’, ideo ‘non homo’ sequitur ad ‘non 
animal’, hoc est illa propositio ‘non 
homo est’, sequitur ad illam ‘non animal 
est’ accipiendo ly non utrobique ut est 
negatio pure negans et non sequitur e 
contrario, non enim sequitur non homo, 
ergo non animal est.  
Verbi gratia: ad ‘hominem esse’ 
sequitur ‘animal ‘esse’ ita ad ‘nullum 
animal esse’ sequitur ‘nullum hominem 
esse.’ 
<Notandum;> Circa hanc 
considerationem est intelligendum 
quod potest consideratio ista accipi 
dupliciter, scilicet vel contradictione 
quae est inter propositiones, inter quas 
est proprie et primo consequentia, vel 
potest intelligi de contradictione 
terminorum ratione quorum est 
consequentia inter propositiones. Si 
intelligatur primo modo non est aliqua 
dubitatio quin semper ex contradictorio 
consequentis sequitur contradictorium 
antecedentis, sed non semper ex 
contradictorio antecedentis sequitur 
contadictorium consequentis […] 
Intellectus illius considerationis ipsius 
Philosophi est de contradictoriis 
quantum ad consequentiam, non 
quantum ad praedicationem. 
 
 
5.3.2 Thus, the Boethian tradition of the Topics hardly found room in the Notabilia 
and in the Notulae. Both Burley and Scotus dealt with the various topics presented 
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by Aristotle, and especially those of the second book, in light of the theory of 
consequences, unlike their Parisian colleagues. Let us consider how Parisian and 
English masters approached two logical rules exposed in the second book of the 
Topics. Here, Aristotle had proposed two topical rules applicable to propositions, 
which amounted to the modus ponens and modus tollens: 
 
Look and see in regard to the thing in question, what is such that if it is the case 
the thing in question is the case, or what is necessarily the case if the thing in 
question is the case: if you wish to establish a view inquiry what there is, such 
that if it is the case the thing in question will be the case (for if the former be 
proved to hold, then the thing in question will also have been proven to hold); 
while if you want to overthrow a view, ask what it is that is the case if the thing 
in question is the case (for if we show that what follows from the thing in 
question is not the case, we shall have demolished the thing in question.429  
 
Robert (A.7) analysed this topic in relation to syllogism, and did not deem it to 
provide a general logical rule, but a mere dialectical prescription: 
 
Consequens dicitur de ‘cum’ et de ‘sequens’ cum vero idem est quod simul 
sequens est posterius quare consequens est, simul et est posterius. Sicut aliquis 
potest esse simul tempore cum aliquo et indivisum ab eo secundum tempore, 
tamen posterius est secundum naturam et essentia, sicut risibile simul tempore 
est cum homine et posterius est illo secundum naturam et hoc consequens est 
accidentale. In huiusmodi ergo consequens docet hic ac inspicere quod est simul 
cum aliquo tempore, posterius vero illo secundum naturam. Sic sumitur 
consequens hic. Et sic sumendo antecedens et consequens, manifestum est quod 
non omne medium est antecedens vel consequens et sic patet quod haec 
consideratio non est communis ad omnes alias considerationes. Item patet quod 
non sumitur eodem modo antecedens et consequens et extremum hic et in 
Prioribus, quia in Prioribus sumuntur magis communiter hic vero minus 
communiter. Item antecedens et consequens prout sumuntur in Prioribus sunt 
                                       
429 Aristotle, Topics, II.4, 111b7-23 (in Barnes, Complete works, vol. 1, p. 186). 
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dispositiones medii in comparatione ad extremitates, prout autem hic sumuntur 
sunt dispositiones medii in comparationem ad conclusionem.430 
 
Robert de Cilnacobi (A.1) treated it as a topic from the genus and from the species 
and did not devote any of the five questions concerning the entire particula to this 
consideratio.431 Similarly, Albert the Great too dealt with the modus ponens and 
modus tollens in connection with the topic from the genus and from the species. The 
modus tollens could be used only for denying something, just as with the topic from 
the genus. Similarily, the modus ponens had only an affirming function, just as the 
topic from the species: 
 
Si illud antecedens ostendatur esse, etiam propositum consequens erit; quia ab 
antecedente ad consequens proceditur affirmando sicut a specie ad genus […] si 
ostenderemus illud non esse, quod est consequens proposito antecedenti, 
sequitur etiam quod non erit, et interimentes erimus propositum antecedens; 
proceditur enim a superiori ad inferius negando.432 
 
Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito did not devote any specific question to this 
topic, while Simon of Faversham merely paraphrased Arisotle’s text without adding 
any remark: 
 
Considerandum est in antecedente, si velis construere propositum […] posito 
enim antecedente necessarium est propositum, nam si antecedens ostendatur 
esse, tunc et consequens. Ut ostenso quod homo sit substantia, ostensum est 
quod animal sit substantia. Destructive considerandum est ad consequens, ut si 
antecedens est, tunc erit consequens quia si ostenderemus consequens non 
inesse, tunc distruxerimus propositum.433  
  
                                       
430 A.7, f. 42 vb. A.10 employed the same approach, although he expressed it in few lines: cf. ff. 193ra-
194va. 
431 A.1, f. 107a. 
432 A.2, p. 306b. 
433 A.18, f. 32va. 
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Pseudo-Bonaventure (A.4) adopted a completely different approach to the topics 
and brought the consequences into picture. He raised an objection against each rule 
and in his answer he pointed out that these rules worked in a sentential framework, 
while they were not always valid in a predicative context – which was the context in 
which the counter-instances developed: 
 
Contra primam partem considerationis videtur instantia: quod sequitur, “si sex, 
ergo quatuor”, non tamen si construatur sex esse, sex construetur sex esse 
quatuor; et ita antecedens construetur de aliquo, de quo non consequens. Contra 
secundam partem sic. Quinque sequitur ad sex, non tamen si quinque 
removentur a sex, sequitur quod sex removetur a sex. Et dicendum quod 
consideratio vult, quod ‘si antecedens sit, et consequens’; et non <vult quod> 
‘de quocumque praedicatur antecedens, <et consequens>. Et hoc patet 
inspiciendo literam Aristotelis.434 
 
Scotus and Burley followed in the footstep of Pseudo-Bonaventure in their extensive 
treatment of these loci. The two English masters introduced these topics as topics 
“from the antecedent” and “from the consequent” respectively, whose maxims were 
a) “once the antecedent is posited, also the consequent is posited” and b) “once the 
consequent is denied, the antecedent is denied”.435 Then they raised some objections 
against the validity of these rules. One such objection consisted in a counter-instance 
to b) which run as follows.  
Let us take ‘four’(r) and ‘six’(s). Rule a) is valid: r follows from s, that is ‘s is, therefore 
r is’. Both authors left implicit that a) was valid in virtue of the topic from an integral 
whole to its part, since the relation holding between s and r was that of an integral 
whole to its part. In his Summulae Dialecticas, Roger Bacon had explained that the 
downward argumentation (from whole to part) was valid only affirmatively in 
virtue of the maximal proposition “if the integral whole is, its part is”, while the 
argumentation from the part to the whole was valid only destructively, “if the 
integral part is not, nor the whole is”. And unlike Peter of Spain, he had specified 
                                       
434 A.4, p. 92. 
435 Cf. W. Burley, De Consequentiis, ed. by. N. J. Green-Pedersen, “Walter Burley’s De Consequentiis. 
An Edition”, in Franciscan Studies 40 (1980), pp. 102-166, here p. 133, n. 89.  
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that these maxims were valid omnitemporally only when the part and the whole 
were compared to each other in relation to existence.436  
Rule b), however, is not valid: it did not follow ‘r is not, therefore s is not’. For 
example: take the subject terms r and s, and the predicate p ‘to be greater than five’, 
and the inference ‘s is p; therefore, r is p’. If b) was valid, then ‘r is not p; therefore, s 
is not p’ followed. But since in this case the negation of the consequent ‘r is not p’ did 
not imply the negation of the antecedent ‘s is not p’ – six indeed is greater than five! 
–, then b) did not hold. And, Scotus remarked, the topic from the whole to its part 
functioned in a similar fashion: it could not be applied in arguments in which the 
predicate inhered in either the whole or the part.  
The general pattern of Burley’s and Scotus’ answers coincided. They rejected the 
objection since it missed the target, being concerned with predication. In fact, it was 
directed against the relation between terms, while the rules a) and b) concerned the 
logical connection between sentences. The two English masters agreed that properly 
speaking the term consequence “est inter propositiones”, and Burley added that 
“inter terminos non est consequentia proprie”.  
Within a propositional frame, b) was valid omnitemporally. In fact, the impossibility 
for the consequent to be false being that the antecedent is true (“antecedens non 
potest esse verum sine consequente”)437 was a basic rule for  simple consequences, 
which were grounded on the assumption that “ex vero numquam sequitur falsum”.  
However, if b) was applied to terms, then its validity was not absolute. The two 
English masters pointed out that a consequence could hold in virute of its terms in 
two different ways. And in specifying this, Burley introduced an elaborate 
distinction between the types of consequences holding in virtue of their terms, which 
paralleled some rules of his treatise On Consequences as well as some passages of his 
treatise On the purity of logic, in both its short and long versions.  
                                       
436 R. Bacon, Summulae Dialectices, III.3. It should be noted that while Peter of Spain called this topic 
“from the universal whole/from the genus”, Roger specified that “isti loci nomine communi 
appellantur locus a toto universali, et locus a parte subiectiva. Quando tamen genus ordinatur pro 
medio dicitur locus a genere, et solum locus a toto est,quando autem ordinatur species pro medio, 
dicitur locus a specie; dicitur tamen communiter quod solum est affirmando, et ideo solum locus a 
parte”.  
437 Cf. Burley, Tractatus p. 115, n.9.  
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Firstly, Burley said, b) was omnitemporally valid in those consequences that held in 
virtue of two terms alone, namely in virute of the relation between subjects, such as 
inferences from an inferior to a superior affirmatively, e.g. ‘man runs, animal 
runs’.438 Secondly, when the consequence held in virtue of three terms, namely on 
the basis of the relation between two subjects and one predicate, then b) was valid 
temporally. E.g. in inferences from the integral whole to its part or from the superior 
to the inferior affirmatively, like “Browny is risible, thus man is risible”:439  
 
Dicendum quod consequentia non est inter incomplexa sed solum inter 
propositiones et in illis semper destructo consequente destruitur antecedens. 
Quamvis enim quandoque tenet consequentia ratione terminorum, tamen inter 
terminos non est consequentia proprie. Consequentiarum vero quae tenent 
ratione terminorum quaedam tenet ratione duorum terminorum tantum et in 
talibus semper tenet consequentia respectu cuiuscumque praedicati, cuius est 
consequentia in qua arguitur ab inferiore ad superius affirmative. Quaedam 
vero tenet ratione trium terminorum, cuius est consequentia a toto integrali ad 
eius partem et a superiori ad inferius affirmando. Talis enim consequentia non 
valet respectu cuiuscumque praedicati, sed respectu talis praedicati respectu 
cuius unum non potest poni sine altero. Et ideo dicitur talis consequentia tenere 
ratione trium terminorum quia tenet tam ratione praedicati quam ratione 
subiectorum.440 
                                       
438 Cf. Burley, Tractatus, p. 116, n. 17. 
439 Cf. Burley, Tractatus, p. 116, n. 20 and 25, p. 142, n. 117-118. In the long version of his De puritate, 
Burley labelled these consequences as formal consequences holding in virtue of the forma 
incomplexorum: “A formal inference is of two kinds: one kind that holds by reason of the form of the 
whole structure. Conversion is such an inference, and syllogism and so on for other inferences that 
hold by reason of the whole structure. Another kind is a formal inference that holds by reason of the 
form of incomplex terms. For example, an inference from an inferior to a superior affirmatively is 
formal, and nevertheless holds by reason of the terms. Thus, for an inference to hold by reason of the 
terms can happen in two ways, either because it holds materially by reason of the terms, or because 
it holds formally by reason of the terms – that is, by the formal reason of the terms” (Walter Burley, 
On the Purity of the Art of Logic. The Longer Treatise, in, Id., On the Purity of the Art of Logic. The Shorther 
and the Longer Treatises, trans. by P. V. Spade, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2000, p. 173). 
440 Burley, Notulae, C. 147ra-rb; cf. Scotus’ parallel passage: “Ad quod dicendum quod consequentia 
primo est inter propositiones et in illis semper destructo consequente destruitur antecedens. Quando 
tamen est consequentia ratione terminorum, ut a toto integrali ad partem et a superiori ad inferius, 
et illa tenet respectu unius predicati respectu cuius unum non potest poni sine altero, sed respectu 
unius predicati quod extraneatur uni et convenit alteri non tenet. Destructo ergo consequente, ut 
quaternario, respectu illius praedicati respectu cuius sequitur ad senarium, ut resepctu huius quod 
est esse destruitur et senarius sed non consequuntur se respectu huius quod est excedere quinarium” 
(Scotus Notabilia, f. 258vb). 
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5.3.3 In the following topic, Aristotle prescribed to analyse any question about the 
predicable ‘accident’ by considering the time involved in it, in order to detect 
possible incongruities. And among the examples he gave, was the statement, with a 
Platonic flavour, “knowing is remembering”. It contained a temporal discrepancy 
since ‘to remember’ concerned the past, while ‘to know’ extended to present and 
future.441  
In commenting upon this topic, Robert (A.7) did not take into account the maxim, 
but he rather discussed the examples given by Aristotle, trying to reconcile the view 
of knowledge as reminiscence with the Aristotelian epistemology.442 Albert the 
Great too focused more on the epistemological content of Aristotle’s example than 
on the prescription itself. Similarly to Simon of Faversham, Boethius of Dacia took 
as starting point Aristotle’s words that “est recordari praeteritorum, scire autem 
praesentium et futurorum” for inquiring “utrum contingit scire futura”.443  
Instead, Pseudo-Bonaventure (A.4) took into account the connection between 
modality and time. He raised an objection against the topic starting from the 
Aristotelian definition of necessary as that what cannot be otherwise, given in the 
Metaphysics (V.5, 1015a35-b9). If what inheres in something secundum tempus changes 
secundum tempus, then nothing of what inheres in something secundum tempus 
inheres in that something necessarily. The commentator (A.4) found a solution by 
applying the distinction between simple and absolute necessity:   
 
Necessitas <quaedam est> simpliciter et <quaedam est> absolute. Et haec est 
supra omne tempus, et necessitas quaedam temporalis, eo quod solum habet 
necessitate in tempore, quae, quia temporalis est, ideo se potest habere aliter 
quam se habet. Et de hac loquitur hic, sicut patet per sua exempla.444 
 
Scotus and Burley focused on the topical precept and considered it in light of the 
rules for consequences. This topic, they stated, consisted in considering whether the 
                                       
441 Top. II.4, 111b24 (AL p. 38,1). 
442 A.7, f. 43ra. 
443 A.13, II, q.20, pp. 146-148; A. 18, f. 32va. 
444 A.4, p. 92. 
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antecedent was true without the consequent, in which case the consequence would 
be invalid. Burley specified that this rule held only for simple consequences, while 
it was not applicable to the ‘as-of-now’ consequences. In saying that, he introduced 
the distinction between simple or natural, and ‘as-of-now’ or accidental 
consequences:445 
 
Si ponatur aliquod consequens sequi ad aliquod antecedens videndum est an 
antecedens posset aliquo tempore esse verum consequente non existente vero in 
eodem tempore. Et si non, sequitur quod consequentia est bona, et si sic, 
sequitur quod consequentia non valet. Et hoc intelligenda sunt de consequentia 
simplici et non de consequentia ut nunc […] Dico ergo quod in illa dissonantia 
debet referri ad mensuras antecedentis et consequentis, sic quod si pro aliqua 
mensura ponatur veritas antecedentis pro qua non ponitur veritas consequentis, 
tunc consequentia non valet quia universaliter est verum de consequentia 
simplici. Si autem illa dissonantia secundum tempus intelligatur de 
praedicatione, non de consequentia, ita quod sic intelligitur: si praedicatum et 
subiectum dissonent tempore vel compositio implicita in subiecto et compositio 
principalis dissonent tempore tunc propositio est falsa […] Ideo pro illo est 
intelligendum quod si illud dictum Philosophi applicetur ad praedicationem 
debet sic intelligi quod ad veritatem cuiuslibet propositionis affirmativae 
requiratur quod subiectum et praedicatum uniantur pro aliqua eadem mensura 
indivisibili, sed non requiritur quod utrumque extremum pro eadem mensura 
adaequata mensuretur.446 
 
                                       
445 For this distinction see the first of the general rules of inference in Burley, On the purity. Long 
treatise, p. 147. 
446 Burley, Notulae, C. 147rb-va. Cf. Scotus, f. 259rb: “Amplius ad tempus. Istud potest esse pro 
documento ad videndum inutilitatem alicuius consequente(sic!) et est si consequens dissonet 
tempore ab antecedente hoc est si antecedens posset esse pro aliquo tempore pro quo consequens 
non sit, non si antecedens mensuretur aliquo tempore a consequente, ex quo patet solutio huiusmodi 
instantiae, sequitur: est compositum ex contrariis ergo corrumpetur quia et hic est dissonantia in 
tempore quo mensuratur compositio antecedentis et commensuratur compositio consequentis sed 
pro nullo tempore potest antecedens poni pro quo non potest consequens poni. Si autem ista regula 
applicetur ad predicationem et arguatur hanc esse falsam compositum ex contrariis corrumpetur quia 
predicatum et subiectum dissonant in tempore, intelligendum quod oportet ipsa in omni 
propositione ad veritatem propositionis pro aliquo eodem tempore uniri sed non oportet utrumque 
in se eodem tempore mensurari. Potest enim intelligi compositum ex contrariis sumptum pro 
tempore preterito et corrumpi pro futuro uniri pro hoc nunc  ergo oportet unionem extremorum 
intelligi pro eodem tempore sed neque oportet ipsa extrema in se intelligi sic”. 
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It is significative that Burley, who was not afraid of being repetitive, did not give 
any definition of these two types of consequences, thus seeming to take for granted 
that his audience was already acquainted with the terminology and the notions 
mentioned. And it is also remarkable to note the unexplainable absence of any 
reference to the ‘doctrine of the middle’, which would have instead been in its proper 
place in this context. In the section on enthymematic consequences in his Treatise on 
Consequences, Burley had stated the rule according to which valid consequences held 
in virtue of a middle, which was a proposition. A valid simple consequence was 
omnitemporally valid and it was granted through an intrinsic middle, which was 
necessary since it was the cause of the consequent following from the antecedent, 
e.g. the inference ‘man is, therefore animal is’ was licensed by the medium ‘every 
man is an animal’. A valid ‘as-of-now’ consequence was validated through an 
extrinsic middle which was contingently true.447  
  
5.4 Pseudo Bonaventure (A.4), the forerunner of English Commentators. 
 
Burley’s Notulae disclosed points of contact with the commentary (A.4), which was 
wrongly attributed to Bonaventure. The incomplete Pseudo-Bonaventurian 
commentary consisted in many short questions to which some notanda could be 
appended; at times, short paraphrases were inserted between the questions. Unlike 
the strict dependence that we remarked between the Notulae and Scotus’ Notabilia, 
the general approach to the questions and their arrangement varied significantly in 
Burley’s and Pseudo-Bonaventure’s writings. The similarities between them were 
circumscribed to the use of the same examples, arguments, counter-instances or 
notanda. An outstanding case is found at the beginning of the second book of the 
topics, where Aristotle warned about some viciousness that may occur in 
formulating dialectical problems. One such problem involved the incorrect use of 
language, such as to “call objects by the names of other objects”.448 Burley explained 
                                       
447 Burley, Tractatus, pp. 141-142, n. 116-117. On this doctrine, which was typical of English authors 
in the first half of the 14th century, such as Burley and Ockham, see Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, 
pp. 281-284; on Burley in particular, see Stump, Dialectic, p. 174. 
448 Aristotle, Topics, II.1, 109a27-31 (in Barnes, Complete Works, vol. 1, p. 182). 
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that in this context Aristotle did not expound upon barbarism and solecism, since 
they fell in the field of inquriry of the grammararian rather than the dialectician. The 
same remark is found in the Pseudo-Bonaventure’s text. To my knowledge, he and 
Burley were the only 13th century commentators, who mentioned barbarism and 
solecism in this place:449 
 
Burley, Notulae, C. 140rb Ps. Bonaventure (A.4), p. 74  
De aliis autem vitiis 
cuiusmodi sunt 
barbarismus et 
soleocismus quia primo et 
principaliter peccant 
contra congruitatem quam 
dialecticus supponit non 
determinat hic 
Philosophus. 
Item. Cum vitium sit uti barbarismo et solecismo, 
sicut et transsumptione, propter quid est ita quod 
iuxta haec non assignatur aliquod peccatum circa 
problemata, sicut iuxta transumptionem […] 
Ad aliud: quod barbarismus et soloecismus sunt 
vitia circa orationem et principia orationis, 
secundum quod a grammatico consideratur 
quaerente circa ea congruitatem; logicus autem 
supponit congruitatem: et propterea huiusmodi 
vitia non determinat hic Philosophus. 
 
In his treatment of the topics, Pseudo-Bonaventure employed the doctrine of the 
appellatio. The author seemed to oscilate between the use of appellatio and suppositio, 
and did not use the standard terminology for the various types of  suppositio, which 
was expounded for example in Bacon’s Summulae and in Sherwood’s Introductio. 
Strikingly, the commentator A.4 seemed to adhere to an alternative “system for 
classifying reference that combine[d] reference and signification” which has been 
found sketched in an anonymous commentary from mid-13th century on the Prior 
Analytics. Even more noticeably is the fact that the exposition of this theory in 
                                       
449 In discussing the topic from privative opposites (Top. II.8, 114a8ssq). the Ps-Bonaventure referred 
to an objection raised by Averroes: “Item respondet Averroes dicens, quod quamvis album et nigrum 
sint contraria species, tamen albi et nigri non sunt contraria, et species ipsae destruuntur per 
medium” (A.4, p. 104). The same objection, abridged, is found on a marginal gloss of the Magdalen 
College manuscript Lat. 187, ff. 85-158, which was written by an Anglican hand (1st half 14th century): 
“Nota: secundum Averrois quod quamvis album et nigrum sint contraria species, tamen albi et nigri 
non sunt contraria”. I did not meet this reference to Averroes in the commentaries, which I have 
scrutinized. 
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Pseudo-Bonaventure’s commentary coincides verbatim with that of the anonymous 
commentator of the Prior Analytics, who attributed the autorhisp of this system to 
some unspecified ‘Magni’.450 According to this doctrine, an appellative noun such 
as ‘homo’ had a primary and secondary significatum. The primary significate of an 
appellative noun was the form or quality and it could be considered in two ways: 1) 
the significate was separated from its particular instances (appelllata), e.g. the subject 
term ‘homo’ in the sentence “homo praedicatur de pluribus hominibus in eo quod 
quid <est>” signified a form or quality; 2) the significate was instantiated and 
multiplied in particular instances, e.g. ‘homo’ within the sentence “Sortes est homo, 
Plato est homo”. The secondary significate was an aggregatum and it could also be 
considered in two ways: I) the significate was detached from individuals (contra 
appellata), e.g. ‘homo’ in “Homo definitur hac oratione, animal rationale mortale” 
signified the species; II) the significate was instantiated in matter, e.g. ‘homo’ in 
“Homo currit” signified the species insofar as it was embodied in individuals. “The 
Magni adapted the old dictum ‘The subjects are such as the predicates permit’ to 
their purposes by interpreting it to mean ‘The subject term stands as required by the 
predicate term, in respect of ‘mode of subjecting’, for the primary or for the 
secondary significate provided its doing so is compatible with having the predeicate 
in question. Similar considerations of compatibility decide whether the significate of 
the subject term should be taken to be mode 1 [and I] or mode 2 [and II]”.451 Pseudo-
Bonaventure applied this doctrine to solving the sophisms “Homo est dignissima 
creaturarum” and “Piper venditur hic et Romae”, which were distinctive of English 
logic: 
 
Hoc nomen ‘homo’ habet duplex significatum, scilicet primum et secundum. 
Primum significatum est forma sive qualitas, secundum significatum est 
aggregatum. Gratia primi significati sunt duo modi diversi: potest enim 
considerari, aut secundum quod est absolutum a suis appellatis, ut hic “Homo 
                                       
450 S. Ebbesen, “Early Supposition Theory (12th-13th centuries)”, in Histoire Épistemologie Langage 3/2 
(1981), pp. 35-48, here p. 45. Ebbesen conjectures that the Magni could be a group of Dominicans. On 
this theory as well as for the transcription from the anonymous commentary in ms. Cambridge 
Peterhouse 36, see ibid., pp. 45-48.  
451 Ebbesen, “Early Supposition”, p. 46. 
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praedicatur de pluribus hominibus in eo quod quid <est>”; praedicatum enim 
in hac propositione convenit formae sive qualitati ita quod non appellatis. Alio 
modo consideratur ista forma, in quantum multiplex et inest singularibus, et sic 
stat hic “Sortes est homo, Plato est homo” et in consimilibus. Similiter autem 
potest secundum significatum, quod est aggregatum, dupliciter considerari. Aut 
in quantum assignatur contra appellata, et sic stat hic “Homo definitur hac 
oratione animal rationale mortale”. Aut in quantum est significatum in materia 
et sic stat hic “Homo currit.” Secundum iam narrata igitur est haec vera “Homo 
est species” sive ly ‘homo’ stet pro primo significato sive pro secundo. Duplex 
enim est descriptio speciei: scilicet “Species est quae praedicatur etc.”, item 
“Species est quae subicitur generi”. Et utroque istorum modorum est haec vera 
“Homo est species” et primo modo stat ly ‘homo’ pro primo significato eius, 
secundo modo pro secundo. Et universaliter tenendum quod, quando aliquid 
praedicatur de nomine appellativo, si patitur praedicatum ipsum nomen 
appellativum, quod subicitur stare pro primo signficato, stabit et sic; si non, sed 
exigat quod stet pro secundo significato, stabit et sic. Et forte haec est intentio 
Boetii dicentis “Talia sunt subiecta qualia permiserint praedicata”. Hoc enim 
verum est quantum ad modum subiciendi, non enim ita quod praedicatum 
coarctet subiectum quantum ad appellata.452 Et ita patet quod cum dicitur 
“Piper venditur hic et Romae”, ly ‘piper’ stat pro secundo significato pro primo 
eius modo [scil. 2].453 
 
The view endorsed by Pseudo-Bonaventure, perhaps “just one several abortive 
attempts to create a unified theory of signification and reference”, soon fell into 
oblivion. The connection with such a doctrine confirms Green-Pedersen’s dating of 
the commentary A.4 to the mid-13th century ca. This early dating accounts for the 
differences which separate it from the later writings of Scotus and Burley. Unlike the 
two masters, in commenting on the first book, Pseudo-Bonaventure dealt with 
metalogical issues concerning the epistemic status of logic and dialectic, their 
subdivision in inventive, and judicative. He also inquired into the nature of 
syllogism. In his exposition, he approached those issues differently than his Parisian 
                                       
452A.4, pp. 145-146. Cf. with Ebbesen, “Early Supposition”, pp. 47-48. 
453 A.4, pp. 146-147. 
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colleagues. Another point of divergence between the forerunner A.4 and Burley and 
Scotus was the treatment of the loci. Pseudo-Bonaventure, indeed, still assigned a 
role to the Boethian topics, although he massively used the consequences, which had 
not yet become predominant over the loci. Thus, in this early commentary, the 
Boethian tradition of the topics was still vivid. And his  view of a not completely 
‘formalized’ logic or dialectic, allowed Pseudo-Bonaventure to acknowledge the 
possiblity of a formally valid inference that was dialectically invalid.454 
Furthermore, it gave him the freedom to deal with issues which were not technical, 
such as whether good and evil, in intelligences, were contrary or privative opposites, 
and to answer that       
 
Item: intelligentiis est plus et minus de bono et tamen nihil mali est ibi omnino 
et sic videtur quod prior propositio est falsa […] Ad aliud: quod bonum et 
malum, sicut ex saepe dictis patet, non opponuntur intelligentiis contrarie, sed 
privative. Ex hoc videtur aut quod intelligentiae prius fuerint malae, aut aptae 
natae ut possent fuisse malae; quod concedi potest secundum fidem, quamvis 
fortasse hoc sit contra Aristotelem.455 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As can be drawn from the statutes of thirteenth century arts faculties, Aristotle’s 
Topics were listed among the mandatory texts for the undergraduate curriculum, 
along with the other writings that formed the logica nova. All of this university 
activity around these required texts produced many commentaries. At times, 
however, the information drawn from university prescriptions does not seem to 
provide a completely reliable picture of the teaching practices of the time. This 
                                       
454 “Quod talis illatio est necessaria, et quia non est manifesta, ideo apparet opponentem manifestare 
similitudinem illius principii ad omnia alia principia eiusdem speciei, qua visa et concessa a 
respondente potest opponens inferre universale. Et nisi hoc concederetur a respondente non possent 
sic inferre; quamvis tamen illa illatio per se sit necessaria eo quod dialectica illud quod est ad aliud 
est, ex iis patet quod in tali argumentatione aut est locus a simili aut a pari” (A.4, bk. III, Utrum 
universale inferatur ex particulari et qualiter, p. 142). 
455 A.4, bk. 3, pp. 139-140. 
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indeed is the case with the Oxford residual manuscript tradition: the extant lectures 
we can examine do not match completely the official university regulations. 
According to catalogues, only three commentaries were produced in England from 
the mid-13th century to the begininng of the 14th century: the incomplete 
commentary attributed to Bonaventure (A.4), Scotus’ Notabilia and Burley’s Notulae 
– the latter of which was the last testimony of the English tradition of the Topics.  
From his comments on the Aristotelian text, Pseudo-Bonaventure seemed to 
have endorsed the semantic of the ‘Magni,’ namely a “system for classifying 
reference that combine[d] reference and signification”, which constituted an 
alternative to the standard doctrine of suppositio. The Pseudo-Bonaventurian 
commentary dealt with metalogical issues concerning logic and dialectic, which 
were perhaps the most problematic topics of his age. Moreover, in dealing with the 
Aristotelian topics, Pseudo-Bonaventure employed the appellatio and sophisms, the 
Boethian topics beside the consequences. In this early commentary, the Boethian 
tradition of the topics walked hand in hand with the doctrine of consequences, 
which in the short term would have become predominant.  
Pseudo-Bonaventure’s work discloses some literal similarities with Burley’s 
commentary on the Topics. Despite these affinities, however, Burley’s Notulae 
represented a further step in the English tradition of the Topics, along with Scotus’ 
Notabilia. These two later works are representative of a mature phase. They 
disregarded general issues about logic, which had interested Pseudo-Bonaventure, 
and still caught the attention of Parisian commentators. Scotus and Burley preferred 
to focus on specific logical problems. Moreover, in both the Notabilia and the Notulae 
we find at work a fully-fledged doctrine of the suppositio, along with the rules for 
consequences, which the two masters employed in their treatment of the topics listed 
in the central books of the Topics. Thus, the Boethian tradition of the Topics remained 
in the background in the Notabilia and in the Notulae. While Scotus had still left scant 
room for the Boethian topics, Burley dealt with the topics, and especially those of 
the second book, in light of the theory of consequences. Burley indeed seemd to 
implicitly equaparate topical rules, viz. the maximal proposition, to the rules for 
consequences.  
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Some passages of the commentaries of Pseudo-Bonaventure and Burley bore 
resemblance with marginal glosses of the Topics. Particularly, the expositio textus of 
Burley’s Notulae, along with other specific remarks, filled the margin of the Balliol 
manuscript, which contained the Boethian translation of the Topics. Similarly, other 
manuscripts, which preserved the Latin text of the Aristotelian Topics, were glossed 
by 14th and 15th century Anglican hands. Perhaps, also such marginal scholia should 
be considered, and studied, as the outcome of the academic activities of masters and 
students. They could aspire to receive a place within the English tradition of the 
Topics. This tradition has emerged as characterized by specific features, strictly 
connected to terministic logic. The interest in technical, logical issues and the 
contextual approach, the use of the suppositio, the presence of sophism and the focus 
on consequences were peculiar to English commentaries. In contrast, continental 
commentaries were walking along a different path.456  
 
 
 
  
                                       
456 Strickingly, Green-Pedersen has not remarked the dissimilarities between A.4 and Burley’s 
Notulae on the one hand, and Parisian comentariers on the other hand: “The only British commentary 
from the period, the Omne quod (A.4) is not far from the Parisian standpoints” (Green-Pedersen, p. 
226). 
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Chapter Six. A new perspective: John Buridan on the Topics. 
 
6.1 Buridan on the subject matter of dialectic.457 
 
6.1.1 According to the manuscript tradition, in the first half of 14th century the Topics 
were less commented upon in Paris classrooms than during the second half of 13th 
century. The 14th century opened with the Quaestiones of Radulphus Brito, which 
closed the epoch of the modistic approach to the Topics. In the first half of the century 
Durandus de Alvernia compounded his commentary in form of sentence, which 
seemed “somewhat old-fashioned for its period”.458 And John Buridan lectured on 
the Topics, presumably at the beginning of his teaching activity.459 His Quaestiones 
Topicorum discloses the influence of modistic commentaries, especially that of Brito’s 
Quaestiones, in his dealing with various issues, such as the questions devoted to the 
nature of syllogism or to the syncategorematic term ‘omnis’.460 Despite some points 
of contact between the Modists’ and Buridan’s commentaries, Buridan’s work 
adopted a completely different attitude toward the text, which was determined by 
his nominalistic semantic.  
Unlike his predecessors, Buridan did not address general questions about logic and 
dialectic in the first book of his commentary, which covers one-third of the entire 
work. Yet, from his prologue to his Summulae de Dialectica, we know that he 
considered dialectic an art rather than a science. In the opening question of his 
                                       
457 On John Buridan, see B. Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur 
Rezeption seiner Theorien in Europa des späten Mittelalters, PhD diss., University of Berlin, 1985, 2 vols; 
J. Zupko, John Buridan. Portrait of a 14th-Century Arts Master, South Bend (IN): University of Notre-
Dame Press, 2003; G. Klima, John Buridan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; J. Biard, Science et 
nature. La théorie buridanienne du savoir, Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 2012. 
458 Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 393. 
459 This set of Quaestiones seems to be the outcome of Buridan’s earlier teaching activity recorded by 
a student and preserved in different versions in five manuscripts, all produced in Middle or Eastern 
Europe in the 15th century. The Buridanian paternity has been cautiously accepted by Green-
Pedersen, and no scholar has questioned this: N. J. Green-Pedersen, “Introduction”, in J. Buridanus, 
Quaestiones Topicorum, ed. by N. J. Green-Pedersen, Turnhout: Brepols, 2008 (hereafter abbreviated as 
QT), pp. ix-xxi. See also Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, pp. 392-393, A.21.  
460 According to Mora-Márquez, there are some “passages in John Buridan’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics that can be seen as a continuation of Boethius’ and Brito’s treatment of ‘every’” 
(Mora-Márquez, “Boethius”, p. 194).  
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Quaestiones Topicorum, Buridan originally dealt with the conventional issue 
concerning the subiectum adaequatum of the Topics and of dialectic in general. The 
Picardian abandoned the view, held by all commentators of the 13th century, both 
anonymous and famous, such as Albert the Great and Boethius of Dacia, according 
to which dialectical syllogism was the proper subject (subiectum adaequatum) of 
dialectic. Buridan asserted that the proper subject was instead dialectical 
argumentation, as declared by Aristotle himself at the beginning of the book. Here 
the Stagirite had stated that the main purpose of the treatise was to find a method 
for producing deductions (syllogizare). And Buridan interpreted the terms syllogizare 
and syllogismus not in the technical sense related to the Analytics, but as dialectical 
argumentation. And his view was adopted by Marsilius de Inghen some years later, 
in his Abbreviatio libri Topicorum.461  
Buridan argued that argumentum/argumentatio was not the same as nor 
coextensive with syllogism. Only demonstrative and dialectical syllogism were 
arguments, since they proved their conclusions:  
 
De ratione syllogismi dialectici et similiter demonstrativi est probare suam 
conclusionem et facere fidem de ea […] de ratione syllogismi simpliciter non est 
probare suam conclusionem, sed inferre eam ex praemissis in consequentia necessaria 
[…] Unde dico non omnem syllogismum esse argumentum, sed bene omnem 
syllogismum dialecticum et omnem syllogismum demonstrativum.462 
 
These words recall to mind the distinction between inferring and probative 
syllogisms, a distinction adopted mainly by the advocates of the plurality of forms 
and which was mentioned in modistic commentaries. 
 
6.1.2 However, before focusing our attention on dialectical argumentation - on how 
Buridan understood this in his Quaestiones Topicorum and on how it fits into his view 
                                       
461 Buridanus, QT, book I, q. 1, pp. 8 and 11. Marsilius of Inghen, Abbreviatio libri Topicorum, 
Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek 3161 (18.31, Aug. 4°), ff. 187va-190vb, here f. 187 va. I wish 
to thank Mr. Christophe Geudens, who kindly provided me with his transcription of Marsilius’ 
Abbreviatio and most kindly allowed me to make use of it.  
462 Buridanus, QT, I, q. 4, p. 25, emphasis added. Cf. also Buridanus, SD, 6.1.4: “Syllogismus invenitur 
extra capacitatem argumentationis”. 
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about dialectic - it may be useful to take a glance at the more general notion of 
argumentatio. What exactly is an argumentatio for Buridan? As we have seen, Boethius 
and then Peter of Spain had defined an argument as the “ratio rei dubiae faciens 
fidem”.463 At the beginning of the fifth tract (De locis) of his Tractatus, Peter of Spain 
had understood the ratio of the argument as the middle term that proves the 
conclusion (“medium probans conclusionem”). Commenting on this passage, 
Buridan rejected Peter’s interpretation, probably because it would have limited the 
range of dialectically valid forms of argumentation to syllogism. Buridan closely 
followed Boethius. At the beginning of the sixth treatise of his Summulae de Dialectica 
devoted to the Topics (De locis), he emphasized the difference between argument and 
argumentation. An argument (argumentum) was the mental process (ratio) through 
which the mind of the agent was compelled to concede his more or less firm assent 
to the hitherto doubted or unknown conclusion, whereas argumentation 
(argumentatio) was the vocal process that spelled out the mental process: 
 
Argumentum et argumentatio differunt sicut processus mentalis et processus 
vocalis. Argumentum enim est processus in mente, quo mens ex praemissis 
mentalibus sibi notis cogitur concedere conclusionem sibi prius ignotam vel 
dubiam […] Argumentatio autem est processus vocalis exprimens et explicans 
significative praedictum processum mentalem.464 
 
A few pages later, he provided us with some hints about the essential features of the 
argumentatio:  
 
                                       
463 Buridanus, SD, 6.1.2, in Johannes Buridanus, Summulae de locis dialecticis, ed. by N. J. Green-
Pedersen, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013 (hereafter abbreviated as Buridanus, Locis), pp. 8-9. 
464 Buridanus, Locis, 6.1.2, pp. 8-9. Since for our purposes the difference between the mental and the 
vocal level is not fundamental, I will use interchangeably the terms argument/argumentum and 
argumentation/argumentatio. In his De Topicis Differentiis Boethius had clearly distinguished between 
argumentum and argumentatio: “Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem […] est vis sententiae 
ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione […] argumentum quidem virtus vel mens argumentationis sit 
atque sententia”. The argumentatio was the “elocutio argumenti […] per orationem argumenti 
explicatio”. On Buridan’s distinction between argumentum and argumentatio as mental and vocal acts, 
see Zupko, John Buridan, p.  
84; J. Biard, “Le lieu de la croyance: le traité sur les Topiques de Jean Buridan”, in Biard–Mariani-
Zini, Les Lieux, pp. 359-383; Biard, Science et nature, pp. 212-219. 
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Ad argumentum vel argumentationem requiritur cum necessitate vel probabilitate 
consequentiae quod consequens probetur per antecedens. Ad hoc autem quod sit 
huiusmodi probatio oportet quod antecedens sit notius consequente; aliquando 
autem fiunt syllogismi, inductiones, enthymemata vel exempla ex antecedente 
aeque vel magis dubio quam sit consequens, vel etiam ex antecedente evidenter 
falso ad conclusionem evidenter falsam […] Et constat quod ibi nulla est 
conclusionis probatio, ideo tales syllogismi vel inductiones etc. non sunt 
argumenta neque argumentationes.465 
 
From these lines, argumentatio emerges as a complex concept, a Janus pointing in two 
directions at the same time. Its logical face looked at the objective relation or 
entailment466 holding between an antecedent and a consequent of a reasoning or 
consequence, and at the various valid forms under which formally valid 
argumentations fall. And the epistemological face looked at the probatio conclusionis, 
                                       
465 Buridanus, Locis, 6.1.4, p. 11 (emphasis added). Klima’s English translation of this passage 
overlooks the fundamental word probabilitate (“an argument or argumentation requires not only the 
necessity of the consequence but also the proof of the conclusion, so that the consequent should be 
proved on the basis of the antecedent” (SD, p. 394)). The oversight of this word could lead to what I 
believe is an incorrect interpretation of Buridan’s notion of argumentation that considers exclusively 
necessary inferences. 
466 In the above passage (Buridanus, Locis, 6.1.4, p. 11), the term consequentia means the entailment, 
which is also expressed through the term illatio in the Quaestiones. In the Middle Ages, argumentatio 
and consequentia were polysemantic terms and it is difficult to determine their meaning without 
referring to the discussion and the matter at hand. Therefore, I will try to disambiguate them when 
they occur, providing what I suppose is their meaning in the context under analysis. For example, 
the term consequentia:  
1) can signify the inferential link that confers the inferential force to the consequence, thus it is a 
synonym of illatio;  
2) can be employed as a synonym of conditional proposition, as in the Tractatus de consequentiis 
(hereafter TC), 1.3; 
3) can mean an assertoric inference, and it is an argument (see Buridanus, SD, 8.5.2).  
In his SD, 7.4.5 Buridan explained that consequence was said in two ways: a) consequences that are 
hypothetical propositions, more precisely conditionals, and that were not argumentations; and b) 
consequence having an assertoric form; they were argumentations (see also SD, 5.1.3). Here Buridan 
seems to distinguish between consequences and conditional propositions (see P. King, 
“Consequence as Inference: Mediaeval Proof Theory 1300–1350”, in M. Yrjönsuuri, Medieval Formal 
Logic: Obligations, Insolubles, and Consequences, Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001, pp. 117-145). G. Sundholm listed four meanings of the medieval notion of 
consequentia, which covered four modern notions: 1) conditional; 2) consequence; 3) causal 
grounding; 4) inference. Except for the third meaning - causal grounding, Sundholm’s list appears to 
match Buridan’s notions of consequentia and argumentatio: 1) conditional: this might correspond to the 
consequentia insofar as it is a conditional proposition; 2) consequence: this could be akin to Buridan’s 
illatio; 4) inference: this should amount to the probatio. See G. Sundholm, ““Inference versus 
consequence” revisited: inference, consequence, conditional, implication”, in Synthese 187 (2012), pp. 
943-956, here p. 946; see also Sundholm’s articles about the issue, mentioned in Sundholm, “Inference 
versus consequence”.  
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or proof of the conclusion, namely the process that performed a transfer of certainty 
and knowledge from the premises to the conclusion, at the end of which a fides was 
produced in the agent, whose body of knowledge was therefore increased.  
 
6.1.3. Since the notion of argumentatio could be analysed from these two autonomous 
vantage points, consequently its validity could be evaluated on different bases. From 
the perspective of the consequentia/illatio, or entailment, the formal validity of the 
argumentatio was established according to: 1) the truth-preservation criterion: this 
was a necessary but not sufficient requirement for a valid consequence and was met 
by both formal and material consequences; 2) the logical criterion of substitution 
(SC), according to which a formal consequence was valid (bona) iff  
 
in omnibus terminis valet retenta forma consimili. Vel si vis expresse loqui de vi 
sermonis, consequentia formalis est cui omnis propositio similis in forma quae 
formaretur esset bona consequentia, ut: Quod est A est B; ergo quod est B est 
A.467 
 
If the illatio/consequentia was necessaria, then it underwrote a formally valid reasoning 
that satisfied the substitution criterion (SC) and which “formaliter et de necessitate 
concludit”, such as syllogisms, conversions and equivalences. If the 
illatio/consequentia was probabilis/probable it underwrote a formally invalid 
reasoning, which could be non-formally (e.g. materially) valid, like material 
consequences. 
 
6.1.4 From the standpoint of the probatio, or proof, an argumentation was valid if it 
satisfied the epistemological “probativeness” criterion (PC), which took into 
account: 1) the epistemic status of an argument’s premises: the premises should be 
either more know or more probable (notiores) than the conclusion; 2) the evidentness 
of the argument’s inferential link: the agent should be able to recognize if the 
                                       
467 TC, 1.4; cf. also SD, 1.6.1. On Buridan’s theory of consequences see E. A. Moody, Truth and 
Consequence in Medieval Logic, New York-Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953; C. Dutilh Novaes, 
Formalizing Medieval Logic: Suppositio, Consequentia and Obligationes, Berlin: Springer, 2007, pp. 79-144; 
Klima, John Buridan; Zupko, John Buridan; King, “Consequence as Inference”. 
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consequentia underwriting the argumentation was necessary or probable. This 
capability relied on the agent’s acquired competences, such as his logical knowledge, 
as well as on his natural and artificial skills.  
Probative argumentations, then, differed according to the higher or lesser degree to 
which they satisfied the probativeness criterion (PC):  
I) Demonstratio/demonstration: it was an argumentation that perfectly met the 
criterion (PC); it had the highest degree of certainty since: I.a) its premises were 
known scientifically, that is they were true and were reckoned to be such; I.b) the 
necessary inferential link was evident; I.c) the agent’s assent to the conclusion was 
qualified as scientia.  
II) Dialectical argumentation: it met the probativeness criterion (PC) only partially 
since: II.a) its premises appeared to be and were believed to be true, but the agent 
was not certain about their real truth-value, since the proposition opposite to the 
accepted premises could be true too; II.b) it produced a less certain and still doubtful 
assent that qualified as opinio.  
For example, the syllogism “Every b is a; every c is b; therefore, every c is a” was a 
valid illatio, but it was not an argumentation. Whilst the syllogism “Every mortal 
rational animal is risible; every man is a mortal rational animal; therefore, every man 
is risible” was an argumentation, more precisely a demonstrative argumentation. 
 
6.1.5 Argumentations differed in kinds through the interplay of the substitution 
criterion (SC) and of the probativeness criterion (PC). A reasoning could satisfy:  
1) the substitution criterion alone (SC): a formally valid reasoning – namely a bona 
consequentia such as conversions, obversions, equivalences, or fallacious syllogisms 
– was an argumentum/argumentatio from the logical viewpoint. Despite its logical 
validity, such reasoning could not be qualified as argumentum or argumentatio in the 
specific meaning of the term given the above definition of Locis 6.1.4, since it did not 
produce any fides or knowledge in the agent;  
2) the probativeness criterion alone (PC): a persuasive but formally invalid reasoning 
– such as enthymemes, inductions, examples, and all probable reasoning validated 
through topical maxims – could be qualified as argument(ation) from the 
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epistemological viewpoint. These probationes were dialectical argumentations and 
produced opinio in the agent;  
3) the substitution as well as the probativeness criteria (SC & PC): 3a) dialectical 
syllogism: it met the substitution criterion fully (SC) and the probativeness criterion 
imperfectly (PC), since its premises were not necessary and true, but only probable; 
it produced opinio; 3b) demonstrative syllogism or demonstratio: it was perfectly 
necessary and perfectly probative, thus it produced an undoubted assent in the 
agent, namely the scientia or knowledge. 
The two criteria should not be conflated nor confused, since they have distinct and 
complementary functions.468 The probativeness (PC) seemed to be prevailing over 
the substitution criterion (SC) for discriminating between a valid argumentation and 
reasoning that was not an argumentation. Indeed, as declared in the above definition 
of argumentum/argumentatio, the scope of the argumentation was to produce belief 
(facere fidem) in the agent about something doubted. Within Buridan’s epistemology, 
the fides seu credulitas was the assent by which the subject believed that a proposition, 
namely the conclusion, was true or that things were as that proposition signified. On 
the bases of its degree of certainty, the assent added to the proposition was qualified 
either as scientia or as opinion. And insofar as it was a probatio, such reasoning 
produced the agent’s assent (or fides) to the hitherto doubtful proposition or 
conclusion. 
                                       
468 In his discussion of dialectical or topical arguments and topics, Zupko highlighted the novelty of 
Buridan’s epistemical approach to the doctrine of topics and acknowledged that arguments or 
argumentations, insofar as they were probationes or proof, had to satisfy the epistemic “criterion of 
plausibility or evidentness (evidentia)”: “for such a proof to occur it is required that the antecedent 
should be better known [notius] than the consequent”. However, along with almost the majority of 
Buridan’s scholars (exceptions being J. Biard, H.U Wöhler and J. Ashworth, who admitted that in SD, 
8.4.1 Buridan acknowledges arguments that are not valid “soit formellement, soit matériellement”, 
but did not go any further nor differentiated explicitly between the probatio’s and illatio’s validity 
criteria), Zupko conceived of arguments and argumentations as necessary inferences, and provided 
as evidence Klima’s English translation of a passage from the Summulae (see supra fn. 465), which did 
not translate the Latin ‘probabilitate’. Perhaps the missing of this word could have caused the 
hermeneutical trouble encountered by Zupko when he compared the passage of the Summulae with 
the QT, I, q. 16, in which it was said that the dialectical argument did not infer necessarily: “But the 
term ‘argumentation’ turns out to be ambiguous” (Zupko, John Buridan, p. 85). In my view, this claim 
is true, but the ambiguity does not follow from inconsistencies about the necessity or not of argument, 
rather from the possibility of taking into account the notion of argumentation from a double vantage 
point. For Wöhler seeWöhler, pp. 169-170; for Ashworth’s claim see E. J. Ashworth, “Le syllogisme 
topique au XVIe siècle: Nifo, Melanchthon et Fonseca”, in Biard–Mariani-Zini, Les Lieux, pp. 408-430, 
here p. 413. 
200 
 
 
6.2 Argumentatio  in Buridan’s Quaestiones Topicorum: illatio and probatio.  
 
6.2.1 Consistent with the notion of argumentatio provided in the Summulae, Buridan 
offered a logical as well as an epistemic picture of argumentatio perfecta in question 
16 of his commentary on the first book of the Topics. The logical aspect of 
argumentatio was expounded through formal and logical features, such as the 
necessity of the entailment. And its epistemic side was elucidated in terms of 
probatio, which implied intentional and psychological requirements as fides, certitudo, 
evidentia: 
 
Argumentatio dicitur perfecta vel (1) quantum ad illationem conclusionis vel (2) 
quantum ad probationem conclusionis; aut argumentatio dicitur perfecta, vel (1) 
quia consequentia, qua infert suam conclusionem, est necessaria, vel (2) quia 
perfecte probat suam conclusionem.469 
 
Buridan then briefly sketched the different kinds and degrees of perfect 
argumentation considered from the perspective of the probatio, or proof of the 
conclusion, as well as of the illatio, or entailment. A valid illative argumentation (1) 
could be: 1.1) imperfect: such as conversions, equivalences and subalternations; 1.2) 
perfect: reasoning having syllogistic form. Perfect illations were bipartite in: 1.2.1) 
non evident: the second and third figures of syllogism; 1.2.2) evident: the first four 
modes of the first figure syllogism, which concluded directly and were the only 
perfectly necessary as well as evident deductions.470 This inner articulation of the 
illative arguments into imperfect and perfect, partly matched the classification of 
the different kinds of formal consequences that appear in the opening lines of the 
third book of the Tractatus de consequentiis.471 
                                       
469 Buridanus, QT, I, q. 16, p. 66, emphasis and numeration added. 
470 Buridanus, QT, I, q. 16, pp. 66-67; for the evidentness: SD, 8.4.4.  
471 TC 3.1.3 and 3.1.16-17. The wider classification of formal consequences elaborated in TC 
comprehends also consequences by interchange of some term between finite and infinite, 
consequences holding by virtue of a conjunct from a conjunction or a disjunction from one of the 
disjuncts, and, furthermore, by adjoining a proposition to a conditional proposition, as well as by 
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6.2.2 In the context of an inquiry about dialectic, it is more interesting to focus on 
how Buridan dealt with the notion of argumentatio from the angle of the proof or 
probatio. Although in the commentary on the Topics we do not find the Boethian 
definition of argumentatio given in the Summulae, still this stayed in the background 
and was presupposed. In the Quaestiones too, the probative or convincing 
argumentation emerged as the reasoning which brought the agent an epistemic gain. 
A probative argumentation, indeed, elicited a transfer of evidentness and certitude 
from the premises to the doubtful conclusion, in virtue of which the agent assented 
more or less firmly to the hitherto dubious proposition. In order to produce fides in 
its conclusion, such reasoning had to meet some special intentional requirements. 
Firstly, it should start from dialectical or demonstrative propositions or premises, 
which were better known – either with or without formido that the opposite was true 
– and more certain and more evident than both their opposites as well as their 
conclusion. Secondly, the argument’s inferential link, whether it was necessary or 
probable, should be correctly known by the agent.  
A reasoning that satisfied the epistemological probativeness criterion (PC) 
could be either a perfect proof or a dialectically convincing argumentation. For 
example, someone knew that the sun heated, but he doubted whether it produced 
fire through its light, since he could not figure out nor imagine how this would 
happen. However, it could be proved and known through a demonstrative 
argumentation such as “Everything that burns sets the combustible on fire and that 
which sets the combustible on fire generates fire; the sun burns and inflames; 
therefore, the sun produces fire”. The premises of this demonstration were evident 
in virtue of experiences (ad sensum) with concave mirrors. Also, the inferential link 
(consequentia) was evident, “therefore this syllogism produced knowledge of the 
conclusion, and was a demonstration”.472  
The substitution criterion (SC) seemed to be insufficient and inadequate to evaluate 
the validity of the probatio, since a probative argumentation could indifferently have 
                                       
analysing syncategoremes and by division, and, finally, those holding on account of the formal 
impossibility of the premise or the formal necessity of the conclusion.  
472 SD, 8.7.8, p. 748 (Klima’s translation of the syllogism runs as follows: “Everything that burns and 
inflames something combustible and flammable can produce fire, but the sun burns and inflames 
something combustible; therefore, the sun can produce fire”).  
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a necessary or probable consequential relation: even though a probatio did not yield 
a necessary conclusion, still it could be convincing, as the argument: “He does 
penance; therefore, he sinned”. Despite the fact that it did not hold necessarily, since 
someone can do penance although he did not sin, this argument was considered a 
convincing one.473 The probatio, then, failed to achieve its task when it did not 
produce a more or less firm assent of the agent to the conclusion. This failure could 
be due to a bad choice of the starting points, as happens with premises that were 
either plainly false or less or equally known than the conclusion they had to prove.474 
For example, the syllogism “Every animal is a stone; every piece of wood is an 
animal; therefore, every piece of wood is a stone” was a valid illatio, but was not a 
probatio since it started from evidently false premises.475 
 
6.2.3 Thus, for the probatio and its validity an important role was assigned to 
subjective circumstances, such as the different cognitive states of the same agent at 
different times, of diverse agents at the same time or at different times. Evidence for 
the epistemological connotation of the probatio emerged from Buridan’s original 
answer to the question raised in Modistic commentaries on the Topics of whether the 
same syllogism could be at the same time dialectical and demonstrative.476 As we 
                                       
473 Buridanus, Locis, 6.4.17, pp. 82-83 (SD, pp. 455-456). A necessary entailment was required for a 
demonstration; however, the necessity of the entailment was a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for its validity, whereas necessity was not essential to dialectical argumentation. 
474 In SD, 8.4.2 Buridan said that even if someone had a demonstration available in utterance as well 
as in his mind, the probatio might fail – that is the person did not “believe on their bases [scil. the 
premises] the conclusion” – because the person did not believe the premises. And he did not believe 
the first indemonstrable principles because 1) of his bad nature (he was “malus”); or 2) of his lack of 
experience; or 3) his “voluntas libera” determined him not to believe self-evident first principles; or 
4) his “consuetudo audiendi falsa” could prevent him from believing them. Buridan stated that 
dialectical argumentation could fail in producing a stable opinion about one side of the question, and 
instead generated a weak opinion, “propter apparentem probabilitatem rationum alterius partis”. 
475 QT, I. q. 4, p. 25. 
476 QT, I, q. 3, pp. 17-22. Unlike the Modistis, Buridan did not admit to the analogical predication of 
the simple syllogism. The Picardian master addressed the question of whether the same syllogism 
could be demonstrative and dialectical, in his SD, 8.4.2 and in the Quaestiones in Analytica Posteriora, 
I, q. 32. On this topic see S. Eebbesen, “Proof and its Limits According to Buridan, Summulae 8”, in 
Z. Kaluza–P. Vignaux, Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe 
siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1984, pp. 97-110; R. Pasnau, “Medieval Social Epistemology: Scientia for Mere 
Mortals”, in Episteme, 7 (2010), pp. 23–41; E. Karger, “A Buridanian reponse to a fourteenth century 
skeptical argument and its rebuttal by a new argument in the early sixteenth century”, in H. 
Lagerlund, Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, Leiden-Boston: E.J. 
Brill, 2010, pp. 215-231; J. Biard, Science et nature, pp. 143-182; C. Grellard, “Science et opinion dans le 
Quaestiones super Analyticorum Posteriorum de Jean Buridan”, in J. Biard, Raison et démonstration. Les 
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have seen, usually authors differentiated between dialectical and demonstrative 
syllogisms on the basis of their different matters, namely of their necessary or 
probable premises. Buridan accepted this distinction, but reformulated it in the light 
of his epistemology and ontology. In doing so, he sided with Boethius rather than 
Aristotle, since Boethius had indeed assigned a basic role to the subject’s assent in 
epistemic processes. Indeed, the Boethian definition of argument as the reason that 
produces <firm> belief in the hearer about a doubtful issue, implied a psychological 
activity of the subject involved.477 
According to Buridan, the necessary premises of demonstrative syllogisms were 
propositions which were known by the subject, namely which were firmly believed 
with certainty and evidentness. Whereas dialectical or probable propositions were 
those to which the subject assented, but less firmly and more doubtfully, since they 
could turn out to be false and its opposite proposition could be true. Thus, the most 
important element for discriminating between demonstrative and dialectical 
premises was not logical – i.e. premises’ truth-value – but intentional and 
psychological (penes maiorem vel minorem certitudinem): it was the higher or lower 
degree of certainty of the agent’s assent to the premises. The different cognitive 
states of the agent or of the agents also influenced his/their capability to correctly 
evaluate the inferential force of the consequence, which underwrote the syllogism.  
Let us take for example the case that at time t1 the cognitive agents x and y are in 
different states, respectively epistemic and doxastic, about the propositions p that 
make up syllogism s and about the necessary consequence c, that confers the 
inferential force to s. Since p and c appear as merely opinable to y, accordingly s 
appears as a dialectical syllogism to y. However, in virtue of the higher competences 
or experience of x, p and c are known with certitude by x. Consequently, s is known 
to be a demonstrative syllogism by x.478  
                                       
commentaires médiévaux sur les Seconds Analytiques, Turnhout: Brepols, 2015, pp. 131-150, esp. pp. 138-
149. 
477 Buridan was very close to Boethius, and this is not surprising: “It is quite remarkable how well 
acquainted Buridan is with De differentiis Topicis, which seems to have been falling out of use in his 
time” (Buridanus, Locis, p. xv). Perhaps, he was also acquainted with Radulphus Brito’s commentary 
on the De topicis differentiis. 
478 “Omnino consimilis syllogismus in me et in te est in me demonstratio et non in te (dico ‘omnino 
consimilis’ quantum ad formam syllogisticam, et quantum ad propositiones, quoad formam earum, et quantum 
ad terminos)” (SD, 8.4.2, emphasis added). 
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The same holds for a single cognitive agent, but at different times. Indeed Buridan 
acknowledged that the cognitive agent x could have different degrees of belief about 
s’ components, namely p and c. At time t1, x is in the doxastic state, hence 1) x deems 
p and c to be merely probable; thus 2) s appears a dialectical syllogism to x. While at 
time t2, after having acquired further proofs or experience, x reaches an epistemic 
state. Accordingly, x reckons 1) p and c as necessary and 2) s as a demonstrative 
syllogism.479  
This perspectivism is consistent with the Buridanian nominalist, or token-based 
semantic and ontology, since it shows that for Buridan there did not exist a type-
demonstrative syllogism nor a type-dialectical syllogism. Moreover, such 
perspectivism seems to support the hypothesis that for Buridan probative 
arguments, both dialectical and demonstrative, were not evaluated according to the 
substitution criterion (SC), but on the grounds of the epistemological criterion of 
probativeness (PC)480.  
The syllogism(s) “All rational mortal animals are risible; all men are rational mortal 
animals; therefore all men are risible” could be reckoned as both demonstrative, if 
its premises and the consequence were judged necessary, or dialectical. Buridan 
pointed out that in this latter case, the dialectical syllogism held in virtue of a 
dialectical maxim: “est dialecticus ex eo, quod tenet per una maxima dialecticae, 
scilicet per illam, quicquid praedicatur de definitione, etiam praedicatur de 
definite”. Thus, in the Buridanian view of dialectic, the tradition of the topics, 
specifically the Boethian tradition, was still present. And the loci preserved their 
function as warrants for dialectical arguments:  
 
in demonstrationibus, quae sunt syllogismi integri ex praemissis per se notis vel 
per alios syllogismos sufficienter probatis, non oportet quaerere maximas nisi 
                                       
479 Buridan admitted also the opposite dynamic, namely that the cognitive agent could move from an 
epistemic to a doxastic state, thus losing his acquired knowledge. And may be cause from the 
deterioration of his cognitive faculties and skills. 
480 “A proof is a syllogistic molecular proposition in an individual’s mind producing knowledge in 
an individual’s mind”, in modern terminology “only tokens exist, not types” (S. Ebbesen, “Proof and 
its Limits”, p. 98). 
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praemissas illorum syllogismorum; concludunt enim ex se gratia formae. Ideo 
non indigent alia probatione virtute cuius valeat consequentia.481 
 
 
6.2.4 Buridan elaborated upon a graduated concept of probative argumentation that 
was fully consistent with his nuanced concept of knowledge - from the weaker or 
equivocal to the stronger and proper meaning of scientia - as well as with his notion 
of graded necessity. And demonstration was best suited to disciplines that were 
considered fully-fledged sciences insofar as they met all the requirements for the 
highest degree of scientificity, that is necessity, certainty, evidentness.482 A 
demonstrative syllogism was a probatio simpliciter perfecta, namely an argumentation 
producing certain and evident knowledge (scientia) of the conclusion starting from 
certainly known and evident premises. The different kinds of demonstrative 
syllogisms – demonstration in general, strictly and most strictly speaking – mirrored 
the different ways of interpreting the words “knowledge of the conclusion” (scientia 
conclusionis) as communiter, proprie and maxime proprie. While the astronomer used 
demonstrations communiter dictae, the geometer used demonstrations proprissimae et 
mansivae.483 However, Buridan also admitted a more relaxed notion of probative or 
convincing argumentation, namely the dialectical argumentation, whose perfect 
forms were dialectical syllogism, induction, enthymeme and example. If these four 
kinds of arguments were considered only according to the substitution criterion 
(SC), then induction, enthymeme and example were formally invalid and needed to 
be reduced to syllogism.484 If, however, they were addressed from the dialectical 
vantage point, then syllogism, induction, enthymeme and example were on the 
same level, since they were all perfect dialectical probationes:  
 
                                       
481 Buridanus, Locis, 6.3.1, p. 31. 
482 QT, I, q. 16, p. 67. 
483 See SD, 8.7 and 8.8; in 8.7.5 Buridan offered the example of two demonstrations used in arts, 
namely the “syllogismus artis” and that “prudentialis”. 
484 QT, I, q. 16, p. 68; cf. Buridanus, Locis, 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 for the reduction of the three aforementioned 
argumentations to syllogism. Similar claims are found in his Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, II, qq. 19-
22. 
206 
 
Quod aliquam conclusionem esse probatam et notificatam intelligitur dupliciter: 
uno modo quod tantum sit probata, quod virtute talis propositionis ille, cui est 
probata et notificata, assentiat ei sine formidine de opposito; alio modo potest 
probari sic, quod non sic ei tantum probata, quod assentiat ei sine formidine, 
bene tamen tantum quod assentiat ei cum formidine, hoc est, quod de ea habeat 
opinionem, licet non scientiam […] Quod aliqua conclusio sit probata in tantum, 
quod ei assentiatur, licet cum formidine, et hoc per inductionem secundum 
praedicata per accidens, non oportet fieri inductionem seorsum in omnibus 
singularibus, sed quod in pluribus hoc sufficit […] Ex his sequitur, quod aliud 
requiritur ad inductionem in demonstrativis et aliud in dialecticis seu <aliud> 
ad generandum assensum sine formidine et aliud ad generandum assensum 
cum formidine.485 
 
 
Hence, none of the four types of dialectical argumentations had priority over the 
others486 nor did any of them need to be reformulated as a formally valid argument, 
that is, as a syllogism: 
 
Licet in genere argumentationis simpliciter ista tria bene reducantur ad 
syllogismum tamquam imperfecta ad perfectum, tamen non in genere 
argumentationis dialecticae. Unde omnes illae quattuor argumentationes 
syllogismus, inductio etc. sunt aequaliter perfectae argumentationes 
dialecticae.487 
 
Although dialectical argumentations did not produce an undoubted, but only a less 
intense knowledge of the conclusions, for the aims of dialectic they were perfect 
                                       
485 QT, II, q. 2, pp. 81-83. 
486 QT, I, q. 16, pp. 67-8; Buridan conceives of dialectical argumentations as non necessary inferences 
in many places in his SD, e.g. 8.4.4. 
487 QT, I, q. 16, p. 69. Despite the many affinities, Buridan’s QT should not be considered a mere 
distillation of the sixth treatise of the Summulae. Indeed, there are slight but important differences, as 
it is the case for the discussion of the various kinds of dialectical argumentation. In the Locis, the four 
kinds of dialectical argumentation are not at the same level and Buridan accepts Boethius’ reduction 
of the species of dialectical argumentations from four to two, performed by subsuming the example 
under the induction, insofar as the example can be considered an incomplete induction, and of the 
enthymeme under the syllogism, since it is an incomplete syllogism. 
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since they provided dialecticians with a reliable type of knowledge, the opinio, and 
with persuasion:  
 
Li argumentatio vel dicitur […] de his, quae licet non de necessitate inferant 
conclusionem nec faciunt notitiam evidentem simpliciter de conclusione, sed 
bene persuasionem probabilem et opinionem. Isto ultimo modo capiendo 
‘argumentationem’ argumentatio dialectica dicitur argumentatio.488  
 
6.2.5 Prima facie, the differentiation between illative and probative argumentations 
seemed akin to the distinction between formal and material consequences, which 
was found in many of Buridan’s writings and mainly in the Tractatus de consequentiis 
(1.4 and 3.1).489 And the different kinds of formal consequences therein described, 
partly agreed with the description of illative argumentation (1) sketched in the 
Quaestiones Topicorum. However, the overlap between consequences and 
argumentations was not complete, for it did not hold with regard to probative 
argumentations and material consequences.  
In the Tractatus de consequentiis, Buridan had distinguished between formal and 
material consequences on the basis of the substitution criterion (SC), which was a 
formal criterion for validity.490 Simple and ‘as-of-now’ material consequences were 
                                       
488 QT, I, q. 16, p. 68, emphasis mine. A similar idea was found in Buridanus, Locis, 6.4.17, on the 
“Locus a communiter accidentibus”, pp. 82-83; Ibidem, 6.5.6, “Locus a maiore”, pp. 104-105, where 
dialectical topics were qualified as “secundum probabilitatem facientes opiniones vel persuasionem”; 
see also the “Locus a causa efficiente”, p. 67, where Buridan mentioned the “loci probabiles aut 
persuasivi”, as well as the “Locus a transsumptione”, in which he mentioned “argumenta dialectica 
et persuasiva”. See also SD, 8.4.1 and 8.4.2: “In omni demonstratione infertur conclusio ex praemissis 
necessario et gratia formae, quod non requiritur ad argumentationem dialecticam […] Quod autem 
dialectici et rhetores utantur plurimis rationibus quae non sunt necessariae et formales consequentiae est per 
se manifestum […] ‘Omnis demonstratio est syllogismus ... et caetera’. Et hoc est quia nulla aliarum 
specierum argumentationis est necessaria et formalis consequentia, sicut dictum fuit in principio 
tractatus de Locis Dialecticis”. In his Quaestiones on Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.8, the Picardian masters 
described the peculiarity of the entailment of dialectical argumentative patterns: “Non enim exigitur 
ad dialecticam argumentationem quod ex tali antecedente sequitur tale consequens necessario et 
inevitabiliter, sed sufficit quod ut <in> pluribus” (emphasis mine). This way of understanding 
dialectical argumentation bore similarities to Boethius’ arguments that are “probabilia vero ac non 
necessaria”, to which “facile quidem animus acquiescit, sed veritatis non tenit firmitatem” such as “if 
she is a mother, she loves her child” (Boethius, De topicis differentiis, bk. 1, 1180D).  
489 See also SD, 1.6.1 and the Quaestiones in Analytica Priora (II, q.19). 
490 In the TC Buridan said that formal and material consequences were valid consequences, the formal 
one holding in virtue of its form, which consisted of its syncategorematic terms. Whilst a material 
consequence was that to which “non omnis propositio consimilis in forma <quae formaretur> esset 
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formally invalid consequences; or, alternatively, they did not hold formally. 
Nevertheless, they were non-formally valid consequences since they held 
materially: material consequences, such as induction, enthymeme, and example, 
“tenent solum gratia materiae [scil. the categorematic terms]”; and they needed to 
be reduced to formally valid consequences to be evident.491 Despite some 
similarities between dialectical arguments and material consequences, it did not 
seem possible to conflate material consequences and probative arguments. The 
validity of formal and material consequences was indeed evaluated according to the 
(formal) substitution criterion (SC), while convincing argumentations were 
considered to be valid or invalid apart from the necessity of their consequential link. 
The validity of probative arguments, indeed, emerged to be judged through the 
informal criterion of the probativeness (PC), which could not be reduced to the 
formal validity criterion (SC).492  
If material consequences were tantamount to probative arguments, it would be 
arduous to harmonize the priority Buridan accorded to formal consequences - such 
as syllogisms over material consequences - with Buridan’s claim that dialectical 
argumentations (namely syllogism, induction, enthymeme and example) were all on 
the same level. And many difficulties would arise in connection with demonstrative 
and dialectical syllogisms. Indeed, both had a syllogistic form, thus they were formal 
consequences logically speaking. However, epistemologically they were both 
probative argumentation, thus they would be at the same time formal and material 
consequences. The problem then would have been to determine whether 
demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms held materially, insofar as they were 
probative argumentations and hence material consequences. Or rather if they held 
in virtue of their form, since they were formal consequences too. Moreover, it should 
                                       
bona consequentia, vel, sicut communiter dicitur, quae non tenet in omnibus terminis forma consimili 
retenta” (TC 1.4).  
491 TC, 1.4.4 and TC, 3.1. 
492 The autonomy of these two criteria permitted one to evaluate the same argument according to 
two different approaches, logical and epistemological, and this scrutiny could arrive at divergent 
conclusions. For example, an equivalence was said to be valid from the logical perspective (bona 
consequentia), but invalid from an epistemological viewpoint. Moreover, the set of valid probative 
arguments was thus enlarged to comprehend formally valid reasoning, like demonstrative and 
dialectical syllogisms, as well as reasoning invalid on formal grounds, such as enthymemes or 
examples. 
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be explained how a demonstrative syllogism could be reduced to a formal 
consequence, a procedure which was required for any material consequence. And 
furthermore, why this reduction should be operated: indeed, a demonstrative 
syllogism unlike any material consequence, was evident by itself. In addition, from 
the logical viewpoint a syllogism was just a formally valid argument, whereas from 
the epistemological vantage point, syllogisms differentiated in perfect 
argumentation and dialectical argumentation respectively. Moreover, the same 
syllogism (“consimilis forma”) could be both dialectic and demonstrative at the 
same time for different agents.  
 
6.3 Buridan’s dialectic and its legacy. 
 
6.3.1 Buridan’s approach to dialectical argumentation which he developed in the 
Quaestiones Topicorum stimulates interesting reflections. From a “logical” and 
methodological viewpoint, the disentanglement of dialectical and logical necessity 
potentially enlarged the area of competence of dialectic, and blurred the frontiers 
between dialectic and rhetoric. Indeed, it permitted dialectic to focus not only on 
dialectical syllogism, but also allowed for theoretical analysis on the status, role and 
value of formally invalid but probatively valid argumentations (probationes), which 
were later qualified as consequentiae probativae tantum.493 Traditionally, this kind of 
probable reasoning, whose premises merely supported the conclusion, was 
relegated to rhetoric. The notion of ratio probabilis seemed to have undergone 
modifications in Buridan’s way of handling it, since he used the term ‘probabilis’ for 
qualifying not only doxastic premises, but also the inferential relation holding 
between the premises and the conclusion of arguments. If it is true that “medieval 
philosophers, not just mediaeval logicians, recognized in practice that the 
consequence provides the inferential force of an argument”,494 a claim that seems to 
                                       
493 See Ashworth, “Le syllogisme topique au XVIe siècle”, p. 412. 
494 King, “Consequence as Inference”, p. 126, and few lines below “Given true premises and a valid 
inference, of course, the result is a sound argument; nothing but the consequence can play the role of 
the latter”. 
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find some corroboration in Buridan’s terminology,495 then the consequentia probabilis 
underwrote probable arguments. But unlike the consequentia necessaria it did not 
preserve the truth nor it did hold in all circumstances. Whence, it was labelled as 
probable an argument that fell short of necessity496 and that, nevertheless, was 
dialectically valid.  
 
6.3.2 Unfortunately, in the above passage of the sixteenth Quaestio Buridan did not 
provide his readers with any example of a consequentia probabilis nor of a ratio 
probabilis, therefore we have to look to his other works to elucidate these notions. A 
good place for such references are his Summulae.497 An interesting remark is found 
in the fourth chapter of the seventh treatise (7.4.5), where Buridan dealt with the 
fallacy of the consequent. Within this discussion, Buridan expanded upon the notion 
of consequence, which could be either a conditional sentence or an argument, and 
its bipartition into false and true consequences. An example of a probable and 
rhetorical consequence or argument (consequentia probabilis et rhetorica) was “if he is 
an adulterer, then he is well-groomed.”498 The non-necessary entailment between 
the antecedent and the consequent of dialectical arguments was also acknowledged 
in the Quaestiones in Rhetoricam, in which Buridan affirmed that for the validity of 
such argumentative patterns it was required that the consequent followed from the 
antecedent not necessarily and inevitabiliter, but merely in most of cases (ut <in> 
                                       
495 At times Buridan spoke of “locus probabilis consequentiae” and “locus necessariae 
consequentiae”, and in QT I, q. 16 he said that an illative argumentation was perfect since the 
consequence, through which it concluded, was necessary (“quia consequentia, qua infert suam 
conclusionem, est necessaria”). 
496 Buridanus, Locis, 6.1.4 (ed. Klima pp. 394-5): “Multi sunt syllogismi qui nullatenus sunt 
argumentationes, nam ad argumentum vel argumentationem requiritur cum necessitate vel 
probabilitate consequentiae quod consequens probetur per antecedens, ut patet per definitionem 
argumenti”. Boethius qualified as “probable” not premises, but arguments. 
497 Especially the sixth treatise on the locis. For example, the treatment of the loci from the efficient 
cause and its effect, which were not “to be deemed to be necessary; because of that, however, they 
should not be dismissed, since it is enough for them to be probable or persuasive” (Buridanus, Locis 
6.4.10, p. 67, English translation is mine). Or the analysis of the loci from “concurrent accidents”, some 
of which were grounded on a locus probabilis consequentiae (Ibid., 6.4.17, p. 82). 
498 SD, 7.4.5; here Buridan spoke of consequentiae probabiles et rhetoricae. In their discussions about the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent, Aristotle and, later, Peter of Spain, had explicitly assigned this 
kind of consequence to the field of rhetoric: Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b8-13; Peter of 
Spain, Tractatus, VII.158, p. 171.  
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pluribus). Therein, the Picardian master offered an example of a probable argument 
based on length: 
 
Non enim exigitur ad dialecticam argumentationem quod ex tali antecedente 
sequitur tale consequens necessario et inevitabiliter, sed sufficit quod ut <in> 
pluribus. Ponamus ergo quod Socrates taxillator existens et communiter* 
errabundus de nocte fuerit in domo Platonis et inspexerit unum fardellum, et 
iste fardellus per furtum ablatus sequenti die inveniatur in domo Socratis ostio 
clauso et Socrate habente clavem. Concludetur probabiliter quod Socrates 
fardellum furatus est. Antecedente enim sic circumstantiato existente vero, 
consequens ut in pluribus esset verum unde tanta esset probabilitas istius argumenti 
quod iudex poneret Socratem in tormentis. Possibile est tamen quod Socrates 
ista nocte cubuit in taverna Roberti de mane in lecto inventus et quod ostium 
domus erat clausum ut Socrates non posset ipsum aperire qua[…]tur probare 
probabiliter quod Socrates fardellum non est furatus.499 
 
These examples testify to the semantic slipping of the term probabilis, from the 
premises alone to the quality of the entailment and to the argumentation itself, 
which in turn might be connected with the modification in the notion of probability 
introduced by the Modists. Indeed Buridan’s notion of probability seemed to 
embrace not only the endoxic or epistemic conception, but also the semantic and 
protofrequentist conception according to which probability relies on objective 
features of the world.500 
 
6.3.3 All this had epistemological implications. As noticed above, probable 
argumentations produced a less intense knowledge of the conclusion than 
demonstrations. The probable premises of dialectical arguments were not known 
but merely opined: the agent assented to them cum formidine and infra latitudinem 
                                       
499 I. Buridanus, Quaestiones in Rhetoricam (hereafter abbreviated as QR), 1.8, in E. B. Preben-Hansen 
(ed)., accessed April 28, 2016, http://www.preben.nl/BuridanRH.pdf. 
500 For Buridan a proposition is probable since it is in itself more evident than its opposite, and this 
evidence produces an intentional and subjective compelling that induces philosophers to accept it: 
“Per hoc autem, quod dicitur probabilis omnibus vel pluribus etc., differt ab illis propositionibus, 
quae non possunt convenienter assumi ad probandum aliquid propter hoc, quod non sunt 
evidentiores quam earum oppositae” (QT, I, q. 14, p. 60). 
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certitudinis et evidentiae simpliciter. Accordingly, dialectical argumentations did not 
produce scientia but mere opinion about the conclusion, and they engendered 
persuasion.501 These claims about dialectic found justification in Aristotle’s 
definition of dialectical problems and dialectic’s utilities given in the Topics, which 
committed dialectic to know and act:502 
 
primo enim Topicorum dicit Aristoteles problema dialecticum speculationem 
esse contendentem ad electionem vel fugam quantum ad activam vitam et ad 
veritatem vel scientiam quantum ad speculativam; idcirco bene dictum est 
“sicut dux est salvator exercitus, sic ratiocinatio cum eruditione est dux vitae”, 
scilicet humanae, tam contemplativae, id est speculativae, quam activae.503 
 
In virtue of its instrumental function, dialectic could play an important heuristic role 
in many disciplines. Along with demonstrations in general dialectical 
argumentations could serve those sciences, such as physics or natural philosophy, 
which did not demand scientia strictly speaking, but only communiter and large 
scientia for they produced a less rigorous kind of knowledge or opinion.504 Even 
though it was commonly acknowledged that dialectic produced opinion and that it 
dealt with ethical issues, these claims now acquired a different, heightened 
significance against the background of Buridan’s philosophy and subdivision of 
sciences. Their importance and originality could be fully understood only within the 
Buridanian epistemological and psychological framework. Strictly related to 
dialectic’s applicability to ethical questions was its commitment to seeking probable 
persuasion (persuasio probabilis). Its achievement perfectly legitimated the acceptance 
with full rights of induction of enthymeme and example amongst dialectical 
arguments. Unlike many medieval logicians, in the above passage of question 16 
Buridan did not directly associate informal techniques of persuasion with rhetoric: 
enthymemes and examples fell primarily under the domain of dialectic and 
                                       
501 Cf. SD, 8.4.1.  
502 Aristotle, Topics, I.2, 101a33-35 and I.11, 104b1-2.  
503 SD, Prohemium. 
504 Moreover, dialectical argumentations such as induction and example were useful for stating the 
first principles used in natural philosophy, such as that all pieces of coal are hot (see SD, 8.5.4 and the 
parallel passages in SD, 6.1.4 and in Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, II, qq.19-20).  
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secondarily under rhetoric.505 And this squared with Buridan’s view according to 
which rhetoric, along with poetry, was a part of dialectic.506  
As docens, dialectic could speculate about both formal and informal modes of 
reasoning, and could teach us how to construct necessary as well as contingent 
arguments. With regard to the utens, Buridan’s claims elevated the ‘probatio’ to the 
level of the ‘illatio’ in those cases in which the argumentation was ordered towards 
producing knowledge. Rather than the illatio, it was instead the probatio that proved 
more apt, useful and employable for constructing proofs in many disciplines. 
Buridan’s distinction between different ways of considering argumentations 
expanded the range of valid argumentations, for it bestowed upon probable 
arguments the same degree of validity as the necessary arguments, at least from the 
epistemological angle. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Quaestiones Topicorum of John Buridan constitute a rupture in the reception of 
the Aristotelian Topics and, more generally, in the understanding of dialectic. All the 
13th century commentators of the Topics agreed in considering dialectical syllogism 
the subject-matter of dialectic and the Topics. Buridan broke this continuity and 
assigned the dialectical argumentation to be the object of study of dialectic and the 
Topics. And in so doing, he fused the Boethian tradition of the Topics with the 
Aristotelian. Buridan indeed read the opening lines of the Topics in the light of 
                                       
505 On the use of enthymemes in rhetoric see Quaestiones in Analytica Priora, II, q. 22. 
506 Buridanus, Locis, 6.5.9, p. 111. In the prologue of his Quaestiones super Ethicorum, Buridan proposes 
the idea of a double logic or dialectic, namely the general logic or dialectic (simpliciter), teaching us 
how to know a hitherto doubtful truth, and a special logic subordinated to dialecticae simpliciter, 
namely the dialectica moralis “quae docet modum, quo simul et dubium et verum invenitur, et 
appetitus sic afficitur et disponitur, ut determinet vel non impediat intellectum ad concedendum 
conclusum”. Buridan connected this moral dialectic with the instrumental part of moral philosophy. 
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1, 1354a1 “Rethorica assecutiva dialectice est”. On the relationship between 
dialectic and rhetoric brefore Buridan see Marmo, “Suspicio”; J. Biard, “Science et rhétorique dans 
les Quaestions sur la Rhétorique de Jean Buridan”, in G. Dahan–I. Rosier-Catach,  La Rhétorique 
d’Aristote, traditions et commentaires de l’Antiquité au XVIIe siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1998, pp. 135-152; D. Lines, 
“Sources and Authorities for Moral Philosophy in the Italian Renaissance: Thomas Aquinas and Jean 
Buridan on Aristotle’s Ethics”, in J. Kraye–R. Saarinen, Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, pp. 7-29. 
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Boethius. Accordingly, he interpreted the Stagirite’s claim that the dialectical 
method expounded on in the Topics was useful for being well equipped with 
syllogismoi as saying that the treatise dealt with dialectical argumentation in general, 
not with dialectical syllogism alone. And by introducing the notion of argumentatio, 
he was making room to assign an active role to the loci in dialectical reasoning. 
Within the Buridanian framework presented above, argumentatio emerged as a 
complex concept whose different meanings Buridan kept seperate. The logical facet 
of argumentatio was the illatio, whilst its epistemological facet was the probatio. The 
proof included demonstrative syllogism and dialectical argumentations.  
To acknowledge dialectical argumentation, and not dialectical syllogism alone, as 
the object of study of dialectic entailed an extension of the field of inquiry of this 
discipline unto non-formal and informal arguments. Dialectically valid arguments 
were arguments apt at producing opinio and persuasio probabilis, and they could 
indifferently be formally valid arguments or informally valid. Persuasion, indeed, 
was often achieved through rhetorical tools rather than merely logical techniques or 
tools, through examples rather than through syllogisms. All this inclined dialectic 
more toward cognitive psychology than towards pure logic. 
Buridan’s innovation about the subject-matter of the Topics did not have a wide 
reception and remained a minority option besides the common view. Indeed in the 
14th century, Marsilius of Inghen and Hartlevus de Marca alone held this view. And 
in the following century, only the anonymous masters of Prague and Cracow (A.39-
40, A.43), along with a Leuven commentator (A.48), adopted this Buridanian 
innovative opinion. Despite the restricted support it received, Buridan’s view about 
dialectic and the Topics took fruitful root in some minds, and provided some 
commentators with a theoretical (and epistemological) foundation for taking 
discussions about dialectic to the next level. As happened in Cracow.  
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Chapter Seven. In Albert’s or Buridan’s long shadow? Reading 
Aristotle’s Topics in Fifteenth century schools. 
 
7.1 15th century schools of thought and the Topics. 
More than in the previous epochs, in the 15th century the intellectual history 
intersected with educational and institutional history, and the exegetical work of 
commentators reflected that interplay. Indeed, the commentaries on the Topics 
produced throughout the various decades in several Universities, often but not 
always reflected the philosophical trends prevailing therein. And in their turn, the 
different intellectual orientations of Universities were usually strictly connected 
with statutary prescriptions. As is reasonable, the adherence to a specific school of 
thought influenced the understanding of Aristotle’s work and often provided 
commentators with peculiar exegetical backgrounds. This clearly appears, for 
example, in the replies that 15th century commentators on the Topics offered to the 
question concerning the subject matter of the Topics, and, more generally, of 
dialectic. Usually, indeed, these answers reflected intellectual milieu of the 
University. Mainly, but not exclusively, Realists authors, who adopted a more 
formal or logical approach to dialectic, responded that this discipline dealt with 
dialectical syllogism, namely with a formally valid reasoning. For authors 
influenced by Buridanism, their overall philosophical orientation led them to 
endorse an epistemological rather than a mere logical approach to the issue and to 
focus their attention on the probatio rather than on the illatio. Accordingly, they held 
that the object of study of dialectic was dialectical argumentation. Thus, they 
allowed dialectic to study and make use not only of dialectical syllogism, but also of 
induction, enthymeme and example, and more generally of formally invalid 
arguments. This view not only expanded the spectrum of dialectical argumentative 
strategies, but it also provided the theoretical framework for developing a 
distinction between illatio and probatio and for allowing room for arguments that 
were not merely illative nor illative and probative, but only probative. 
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As we have seen, in his description of the questioner’s task at the opening of the first 
book of the Topics, Aristotle had affirmed that the treatise considered dialectical 
deduction:  
 
Propositum quidem negotii est methodum invenire a qua poterimus syllogizare 
de omni problemate ex probabilibus […] Primum igitur dicendum quid est 
syllogismus et quae eius differentiae, quatinus sumatur dialecticus syllogismus; 
hunc enim quaerimus secundum propositum negotium.507 
 
15th century commentators interpreted differently the general meaning and the 
individual words of this sentence. Some understood negotii to mean “dialectical 
science”,508 while others as “operatio intelligibilis”.509 Many borrowed Albert’s 
metaphorical exegesis of methodum as a “short and compendiary way”. However, 
what is more notewothy for current purposes, is the interpretation they offered of 
the terms syllogizare (συλλογίζεσθαι) and syllogismus (συλλογισμὸς), which directly 
indicated the subject matter of the Topics and related to the more general question 
regarding the object of inquiry (the subiectum adaequatum or attributionis) of dialectic. 
Although 15th century commentaries on the Topics often offered standard analysis 
and did not offer elaborate reflections, their exegeses of the above sentence were 
                                       
507 Aristoteles, Topica, 1.1 100a19-24, AL, p. 5, ll. 7-8, (emphasis added). 
508 This exegesis was proposed by Arnoldus de Tongern (Reparationes libri Thopicorum Arestotelis, in 
Id., Epitomata sive reparationes logicae veteris et novae Aristotelis iuxta viam et expositionem […] Alberti 
doctori Magni […] ad utilitatem et uberiorem profectum scolarium ac artium Baccalauriorum bursam 
Laurentii vulgo appellatam, Coloniae 1496, fol. Si-ii (hereafter A.44)); Gerardus Henrici de Harderwijk 
(Commentaria in octo libros Topicorum, in Id., Commentaria in quattuor libros nove logice secundum 
processum burse laurentiane Coloniensis ubi doctrine Alberti magni peripateticorum veracissimi interpretis 
sectatores propagatoresque fidelissimi, Coloniae 1493 (hereafter abbreviated as A.64); Petrus de Rivo, 
Lectura super libros Topicorum I-II, G= Greifswald, Bibliothek des Geistlichen Ministeriums, 34. D. IX, 
ff. 134ra-148rb; O= Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Ms. Magdeburg 227, ff. 322ra-362rb (hereafter 
abbreviated as A.52a); Georgius Bruxellensis, Logica magistri Georgii insert textu Bricoti, Paris 1493, 
(hereafter abbreviated as A.56); Anonymous, Circa primum Topicorum, (Frankfurt am Main, 
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, ms. Praed 47, Circa primum Topicorum, ff. 
144ra-162ra and ms. 63, Circa inicium primi libri Topicorum, ff. 372ra-414va (corresponding to Green-
Pedersen’s catalogue A.45); this anonymous commentary in question-form draws upon Albert the 
Great’s exposition, at times quoting or summarizing Albert’s text literally). 
509 Lambertus de Monte Domini (Copulata pulcerrima in novam logicam Aristotelis […] secundum viam 
preclarissimi philosophi ac fundatissimi logici sancti Thome Aquinatis quorum frequens exercitium est apud 
magistros in florentissimo studio Coloniensi bursam montis regentes, Coloniae 1493, (hereafter A.68)); 
Johannes Versoris (Quaestiones super libros Topicorum, in Id., Super omnes libros nove logice, Köln 1494 
(Repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967; hereafter A.35)). 
. 
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interesting since they usually revealed the philosophical orientation of an author. 
Which, in its turn, involved peculiar epistemological, metaphysical and logical 
frames. What exactly did “dialectical deduction” mean?  If the authors aligned 
themselves with the Realist trend and more specifically with Albert the Great, who 
was the only continental ‘Realist’ author to comment on the Topics before the 15th 
century, they answered that the proper object of dialectic was dialectical syllogism. 
For those commentators influenced by Buridan510 and his followers, dialectical 
argumentation was the proper object of the study of dialectic. 
 
7.2 Parisian Masters and the Topics.511 
 
7.2.1 After the ending of the “saeculum Buridani”512 (ca. 1370-1400) and from the 
beginning of the 15th century, Realism gradually gained the advantage in Paris. 
During the “desolation of the University of Paris” (1407-37), Johannes de Nova 
Domo was the pioneer of the Albertist trend, and famous masters such as John 
Versoris advocated Realist views. From the 1440s to the 1474 condemnation of 
nominalism, however, the “via moderna” was still allowed along with the “via 
antiqua”. After 1481, the “via Nominalium” was admitted again, and nominalist 
professors taught along with Albertists, Thomists and Scotists. 
                                       
510 On Buridan’s influence in Europe see Michael, Johannes Buridan, pp. 321-398. 
511 See A. B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities. Their Development and Organization, London 1975 (and 
the bibliography mentioned there). On the Parisian Wegestreit see A. L. Gabriel, “‘Via antiqua’ and 
‘via moderna’”, pp. 457-48; Z. Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinaux à Paris. Nominalistes et Réalistes aux 
confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles, Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina, 1988; Id., “Les débuts de 
l’Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne)”, in M.J.F.M. Hoenen–A. De Libera, Albertus Magnus und der 
Albertismus: Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters, Leiden–New York–Köln: Brill, 1995, pp. 
207–295; Id., “La crise des années 1474-1482: l’interdiction du nominalism par Louis XI”, in M.J.F. 
Hoenen–J.H.J. Schneider–G. Wieland, Philosophy and learning: universities in the Middle Ages, Leiden – 
New York – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1995, pp. 293-327; Id., “Les étapes d’une controverse. Les nominalistes et 
les réalistes parisiens de 1339 à 1482”, in A. Le Boulluec, La controverse religieuse et ses formes, Paris: 
Cerf, 1995, pp. 297-317. 
512 In a document produced in 1425 at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Cologne, the period at 
the end of the 14th century, during which Buridan’s doctrines prevailed at Paris university, is labelled 
the “saeculum Buridani”. According to Kaluza (“Les étapes d’une controverse”, p. 307), Buridan’s 
influence ended when Peter of Ailly left the chancellery, in 1395, while Michael (Johannes Buridan, p. 
328) postpones the end-date to 1410ca. For the text of 1425 document see F. Eherle, Der 
Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der 
Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreits, Münster 
in Westf.: Aschendorff Verlag, 1925, pp. 281-285, esp. p. 284. 
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According to Green-Pedersen’s catalogue, nine 15th century manuscripts containing 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics produced by Parisian masters - anonymous as 
well as famous - are extant. Authors seemed to draw widely on the same exegetical 
tradition, share common ideas and influence each other in different ways, even 
though it is hard to determine exactly the interactions and relations among their 
writings or to tell how much impact a particular author had on another. Indeed, at 
times commentators just followed the common argumentative line; at other times 
they reshaped and adapted works from colleagues. Normally, these writings were 
included in sets of commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon and the majority of them 
covered only the first four books of the Topics, as prescribed by the Statutes. 
Typically, commentaries dating from the beginning to the third quarter of the 
century were in question-form, whilst those written in the last quarter were 
paraphrases accompanied by dubia and responses.  
 
7.2.3 The first known Parisian 15th century work was the Quaestiones Topicorum of 
the obscure Iohannes Sucket, which already exhibits the basic characteristics 
common to almost the totality of writings on the Topics produced at the Parisian 
University during the 15th century.513 At the very beginning Sucket treated the 
customary issue about the epistemological status of dialectic “sive Thopica”, and 
offered a standard analysis of the matter at hand. He accepted the literal 
interpretation of the opening lines of the Topics proposed by “omnes antiqui 
expositores”, and accordingly he claimed that dialectical or topical syllogism was 
the proper subject of the dialectica docens. He also sided with his predecessor in 
emphasizing the dissimilarities between dialectic and rhetoric, which differed in 
virtue of their scope and of their diverse argumentative strategies. Dialectic aimed 
at producing “fides” and opinion in theoretical issues and it used syllogisms and 
inductions, the syllogism being more perfect than the induction. Whilst rhetoric was 
                                       
513 I. Sucket, Quaestiones Topicorum, Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, 2° Cod. 342b, ff. 128ra-
143va (hereafter A.38). The manuscript containing this question-form commentary was copied by 
Arnoldus Simonis from Den Haag in 1429, when he was a student in Paris in 1429; see C. Lohr, 
“Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi-Myngodus”, in Traditio, 27 
(1971), pp. 251-351, esp. p. 285; Green-Pedersen, The tradition, pp. 402-403, A.38. Similar ideas are 
found, for example, in Johannes Hannon (Hanno(t), Hennon)’s questions on the Topics, which were 
written in 1480ca. 
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concerned with practical questions, consequently it made use of enthymemes and 
examples, since these were more apt at producing persuasio 
 
Habitudines locales possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo in re et absolute, 
et sic eas considerat metaphysicus. Alio modo possunt considerari secundum 
quod sunt confirmative argumentorum et hoc dupliciter. Primo modo 
secundum substantiam, et sic eas considerat Boecium et non fecerit Rethoricam 
distinctam a dyalectica, quia secundum substantiam eaedem sunt maximae 
argumentorum rethoricorum et dyalecticorum. Secundo modo possunt 
considerari quantum ad substantiam et usum sive applicationem, et isto modo 
consideravit Aristoteles. Et quia diversimode applicantur argumentis 
dyalecticis et rethoricis, ideo fecit distinctas scientias diversimode vero quia in 
dyalectica utitur sive procedit<ur> per syllogismum et inductionem. In 
rethorica vero per enthymema et exemplum. Similiter etiam in dyalectica circa 
universalem* materiam indifferenter* et in rethorica circa personam* 
rationalem* et actus ipsius. Sic etiam quia in dyalectica ut in pluribus quantum 
ad speculabilia, sed in rethorica magis quantum ad practica moralia. Postremo 
in dyalectica quantum ad generandum fidem et opinionem in potentia 
cognitiva, sed in rethorica quantum ad persuasionem et favorem sue partis et 
ad indurationem* partis adverse.514 
 
The general framework of Sucket’s exegesis of the text was Realist, and neither the 
terminology employed nor the pro and con arguments proposed betrayed any 
influence of Buridan. Albert the Great’s interpretation of Aristotle’s text constantly 
appeared in the background of Sucket’s commentary, even though perhaps Sucket’s 
acquaintance of Albert’s ideas was not derived from a direct reading of the Doctor 
Universalis.   
 
7.2.4 According to Green-Pedersen, Sucket’s commentary was used by John 
Versoris, whose text on the Topics was “by far the most wide-spread one from the 
15th century”. Versoris’ work was part of a set of commentaries on the whole 
Aristotelian corpus of logical writings and it should have been composed around the 
                                       
514 A.38, I, q.3, f. 128rb; cf. also I, q. 12, f. 133ra-rb. 
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1430s or 40s.515 On the basis of the textual evidence found at the beginning of the 
Topics, Versoris thought of dialectical syllogism as the object of study of dialectic 
“sive thopica”. In his description of the dialectica docens, he exhibited a doctrinal 
congruence with Aquinas’ view on logic. Versoris indeed considered dialectic to be 
a rational science whose subject was the being of reason (ens rationis), namely 
dialectical syllogism, and whose role it was to direct the intellect. And he sided with 
Albert the Great in considering the distinction between syllogisms as analogical.516 
Similarly to Sucket, Versoris too pointed out that dialectic was tied-up with 
producing opinion, while rhetoric was tied-up with persuading the hearer. In order 
to reach their different goals, these disciplines used different kinds of arguments: 
induction and syllogism belong to dialectic, enthymeme and example to rhetoric.517 
Approximately from the same period we find another question-form commentary, 
which exceptionally covered the first six books of the Topics and was included in a 
manuscript containing commentaries on Aristotle’s logic, dating from 1442. The 
scribe assigned the authorship of the commentary on the Posterior Analytics to Peter 
Richeri and it is not unlikely that Peter might be the author of all the commentaries 
on Aristotle’s logical works contained therein.518 His commentary on the Topics 
seems to heavily draw from Albert the Great’s paraphrases. Albert was named more 
than once, and his text was re-elaborated upon and reshaped to accommodate the 
question format. Peter’s argumentations proceeded along the same lines as Sucket, 
Versoris and many other authors of his age. He agreed with them that the subject of 
dialectic was dialectical syllogism, as Aristotle himself had said at the beginning of 
                                       
515 Green-Pedersen supposes that the original work covered only books from one to four and that the 
questions on the last four books are not from the pen of Versoris: Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 
322 and pp. 400-401, A.35. On Versoris see O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: 
textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500): J (à partir de Johannes D), Turnhout: Brepols, 2003, Vol. V, pp. 170-176, 
esp. p. 170; P. Rutten, “Secundum processum et mentem Versoris: John Versor and His Relation to the 
Schools of Thought Reconsidered”, in Vivarium 43 (2005), pp. 292–336; Wöhler, Dialektik, pp. 174-180. 
516 A.35, book I, q. 1, fol. i4ra-rb.  
517 Ibid., 4rb-va. 
518 Petrus Richeri, Quaestiones super libros Topicorum, Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Canon. Misc. 486, 
ff. 116ra-144vb (hereafter abbreviated as A.37). Peter was master of Arts in Paris, three times rector 
of the Parisian university (in 1436, 1441 and 1443), and then became master of theology, in 1451. See 
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 402, A.37; O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: 
textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500): P, Turnhout: Brepols, 2007, Vol. VII, pp. 223-5; T. Sulllivan, Parisian 
Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373-1500: A Biographical Register, Vol. 2. The Secular Clergy, Leiden: Brill, 
2011, pp. 474-475. 
221 
 
the book. A point of Peter’s exposition deserves a special mention. Unlike his 
colleagues, Peter offered a rather unusual and lengthy, although not original, 
elucidation of the Aristotelian definition of probabilia (ἔνδοξα). The Parisian master 
indeed proposed a slightly modified version of Albert’s subjective or 
epistemological-endoxical probability along with Boethius of Dacia’s semantic 
interpretation of probability. By reshaping Boethius’ definition, Peter affirmed that 
a probable proposition was that “in cuius subiecto est proprietas habilitans ipsum 
ad praedicatum participandum, non tamen necessitans, quia propositio talis est cum 
formidine de opposito”.519 
In this gallery, Randulphus Boissel’s work, written in Paris in 1454 fitted 
perfectly.520 In his question-commentary on book I-IV of the Topics, he argued that 
dialectical syllogism was the subject-matter of dialectic, by advancing trite 
arguments in favour of his view. In the first question, which concerned the issue of 
whether dialectic was a real science separated from the other disciplines belonging 
to logic, Randulphus departed from his Parisian colleagues on one point. Within the 
frequently raised dubium concerning the differences between Aristotle’s and 
Boethius’ thopicae - which implied the question about the relation between dialectic 
and rhetoric - Boissel made an interesting claim which had a Thomistic flavour. Like 
almost all of the commentators, he affirmed that dialectical syllogism and induction 
were the dialectical instruments for producing opinio. But unlike his colleagues, he 
endorsed the Thomistic view that rhetoric “assecutiva est dyalecticae”, as stated in 
the first line of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and that enthymeme and example were used in 
rhetoric for generating suspicio.521 
                                       
519 A.37, I, q.2, f. 117va-vb, here 117va. 
520 According to Sullivan, Ra(n)dulphus Boissel (or Boyssel) obtained his licence in theology in 1465 
and was magistratus in the following year; he “upheld the realist position in the matter of future 
contingents”. According to Green-Pedersen, Boissel’s commentary on the Topics is an adaptation of 
Versoris’ text, especially books II to IV. The only copy of his work is the manuscript Conv. Soppr. E. 
6. 997, fol. 179ra-208va, preserved at Florence National Library. Sulllivan, Parisian Licentiates, p. 95; 
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 407, A.47. 
521 “Rethorica tamen ut ipse in principio suae Rethoricae [scil. Rhet. I.1 1354a1] dicit assecutiva est 
dyalecticae quia id quod considerat dyalecticus universaliter, rethor considerat particulariter. ‘Unde 
sillogismus rethoricus generat suspicionem, dyalecticus vero opinionem certiorem suspicionem’ ideo 
rethorica assecutiva dyalecticae ex parte finis assignatur etiam ex parte instrumenti quia rehtorica 
utitur emptimemate et exemplo, et dyalectica sillogismo et inductione” (f. 180ra-rb). On suspicio and 
persuasio in connection to rhetoric see Marmo, “Suspicio”. 
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In the third quarter of the 15th century, a group of authors, some more known than 
others – the former including Christianus Foliot, the latter including Thomas Bricot 
and Peter Tartaretus – commented upon the Aristotelian Organon and the first four 
books of the Topics. Their paraphrastic commentaries, which were integrated with 
dubia and questions, did not introduce any significant innovation. Thus, the fifteenth 
century closed as it opened.  
 
7.3 The University of Cologne: Realism and the Topics.522  
7.3.1 At the end of the 14th century, the University of Cologne had a Buridanian 
orientation and this intellectual setting was reflected in the commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics written by Hartlevus de Marka (†1390), who was magister regens 
and the first rector of that University, in 1389. After his studies in Prague, and his 
teaching activity in Vienna and Heidelberg, Hartlevus moved to Cologne (1388ca), 
where he may have written his Quaestiones on the Topics. His presence and teaching 
activity in Cologne might render plausible the dating of his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics to this period, as suggested by the colophon at the end of the Erfurt 
manuscript whic preserves Hartlevus’ commentary.523 From the very beginning 
                                       
522 According to the 1389 statutes of the Arts’ Faculty, Buridan’s Summulae were lectured on for a 
period of 3 months (cf. Von Bianco, Die alte Universitaet Köln, appendix VII, pp. 66-67 and 71). The 
influence of Buridan on Cologne University was due to the fact the Cologne statutes were modelled 
on those from Paris University, which at that time had a Buridanian setting: see Kaluza, “Les débuts”. 
The secondary literature on Cologne University in the 15th century is vast, more bibliographical 
references can be found in: A. L. Gabriel, “‘Via antiqua’ and ‘via moderna’”; G.–R. Tewes, Die Bursen 
der Kolner Artisten-Fakultat bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Köln-Weimar-Wien 1993; M.J.F.M. 
Hoenen “Via antiqua and Via moderna in the fifteenth century: doctrinal, institutional, and church 
political factors in the Wegestreit”, in R. L. Friedman–L. O. Nielsen, The medieval heritage in early and 
modern metaphysics and modal theory, 1400-1700, Dordrecht: Springer, 2003, pp. 9-33; C.H. Kneepkens, 
“How to prepare for a BA in the Late Middle Ages: Reparationes or Study Aids for Logic”, in L. 
Cesalli–N. Germann– M.J.F.M. Hoenen, University, council, city. Intellectual Culture on the Rhine (1300-
1550), Turnhout: Brepols, 2007, pp. 63-95, (hereafter abbreviated as Kneepkens, “How to prepare”). 
523 “Et sic est finis huius questionis; Deo laus. Expl. Quest. quatuor libror. top. lecte a mag. Hart. de 
Marcka in studio Coloniensi, finite et complete a. D. M° CCCmo XCmo ipso die b. Gregorii pape hora 
4° post meridiem” (Erfurt/Gotha, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek, ms. 4° 270, fol. 117va, cf. 
W. Schum, Beschreibendes Verzeichniß der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt, Berlin, 
1887, p. 514). Hartlevus’ commentary covers the books I, II, VI, and VIII, which according to Green-
Pedersen (The Tradition, p. 90), were the only books prescribed in the statutes of the Faculty of Arts 
of Köln. This, however, does not constitute compelling evidence, since it is possible that this 
commentary was the outcome of Hartlevus’ teachings in the 1380s either in Wien, where the 1390 
statutes did not actually prescribe the reading of the Topics, or in Hiedelberg, both of which were 
nominalistically oriented Universities. On Hartlevus see: C. Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle 
Commentaries”, in Traditio 24 (1968), pp. 149-245. Hartlevus’ question-form commentary on the 
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Hartlevus’ commentary exhibited a clear Buridanian exegetical background. This 
plainly emerged from general clues, such as the terminology used and the basic 
epistemological framework (i.e. the frequent use of Buridan’s differentiation 
between the scibilia propinquum, remotum and remotissimus). And more specifically, 
from the views Hartlevus’ endorsed on specific issues, like his ideas about dialectic. 
The preliminary question that Hartlevus approached in his work, namely whether 
dialectical syllogism was the subiectum adaequatum of the Topics and of dialectic in 
general, was ubiquitous to almost all the 15th century commentaries on Aristotle’s 
work. Hartlevus answered that the adequate subject (subiectum attributionis) of the 
Topics and, more generally, of dialectic was dialectical argumentation (argumentatio 
dialectica) and not dialectical syllogism alone 
 
Licet omnis sillogismus dialecticus sit argumentum probabile, non tamen e 
contra omne argumentum probabile est sillogismus dialecticus […] nam multa 
sunt argumenta probabilia tenenda per locos dialecticos quae non sunt 
sillogismus dialecticus.524  
 
7.3.2 Buridan’s influence did not last long at Cologne. Here, since the first decades 
of the 15th century, Realism (or via antiqua) had gradually become more important. 
After the 1425, Realism, in its Thomistic and Albertist variations, prevailed over the 
other philosophical trends and finally was the only permitted philosophical school, 
although some documents testify for the existence of the Nominalist school until the 
1440s.  
One of the main exponent of Cologne Albertism was Heymericus de Campo, who 
commented on all the books of Aristotle’s Organon as well as on the Topics. In his 
Compendium Philosophiae Aristotelis, having completed the paraphrases of the first 
chapter of the Topics, Heymericus posed some doubts arising from Aristotle’s text. 
The first dubium concerned the subject matter of dialectic. In his answer, Heymericus 
summarized Albert’s opinion and stated that dialectic dealt with dialectical or 
                                       
Topics, see Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 397, A.30. I used the ms. Augsburg, Staats-und 
StadtBibliothek, 4° 68, f.163ra-206vb. 
524 A.30, f. 164ra. Even if we read “argumentum”, I suspect we should read “argumentatio” instead, 
since it fits perfectly not only with commonly used terminology, but also with Hartlevus’ view. 
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topical syllogism, which started from probable premises and relied on maximal 
propositions and common intentions, rather than on appropriate middle terms,525 
and that dialectic produced opinion, hence it was also called syllogismus probativus 
vel opinionis. 
At the end of the century, Realism was still the dominant philosophical trend at 
Cologne University. At that time, the Albertist bursa Laurentii and the Thomist bursa 
Montis produced their own commentaries on the whole Aristotelian corpus of logical 
writings. Their commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics displayed similar formal features 
and exhibited common sets of arguments, even though differently disposed. Despite 
the well-known disputations and the differences between Cologne Albertists and 
Thomists about the epistemic status of logic and its subject matter526, the Cologne 
commentators agreed that dialectical syllogism was the proper subject (the subiectum 
attributionis) of the Topics and that dialectic was the sub-part of logic concerned with 
dialectical syllogism. They acknowledged that dialectic was both docens, namely it 
was the resolutive science dealing with dialectical syllogism, and utens, in as much 
as it is used as a tool for other disciplines527. This implied that Cologne realist-
oriented commentators interpreted the “syllogizare” of the opening lines of the 
Topics in its technical sense of formally valid deductive argument, which produced 
opinion starting from its probable premises.  
 
                                       
525 Heymericus de Campo, Compendium Philosophiae Aristotelis, Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. B, F. 
VI. 6, ff. 47va-48ra: “Primum <dubium> est de subiecto, titulo, ordine et utilitate huius scientiae […] 
Subiectum huius scientiae est syllogismus thopicus sive dyalecticus, qui alio nominetur sillogismus 
probativus vel opinionis eo quod ex probabilibus concludit opinionem […] Secundum <dubium> est 
de hoc quod dicitur ‘propositum huius negocii est invenire methadum’ an haec scientia sit inventiva 
[…] Solutio secundi sic, quia docet regulas et principia a quibus cuiuslibet scibilis potest inveniri 
aliqualis notitia sive fuerit principium sive principiatum vel id* est quando secundum formam suae 
cognoscentis* contineatur in virtute notificativa maximarum et intencionum communium medii 
dyalectici eo quod ille intenciones fundantur secundum transcendencia entis analoyci et suorum 
accidencium, sed scienciam latentem seu sepultam in virtute aliquorum principiorum ad manifestam 
reducere noticiam est invenire igitur hec sciencia dicitur in textu*”. 
526 Cf.  M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae (Cologne 1494) 
as a Source for the Late Medieval Debates between Albertistae and Thomistae”, in Documenti e studi 
sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 4 (1993), pp. 307-344; Id., “Late medieval schools of thought in the 
mirror of university textbooks: the Promptuarium argumentorum (Cologne 1492)”, in M.J.F. Hoenen, 
Philosophy and Learning, pp. 329-369, esp. pp. 349-355; Kneepkens, “How to prepare”. 
527 A.44, fol. Si-ii; A.64, fol. Ai-ii; A.68, fol. i-ii. 
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7.4 At Leuven University: Teaching the unteachable.  
 
7.4.1 Cologne University highly influenced the newly founded University of Leuven 
(1425). Indeed, the first generation of Leuven Masters was recruited from Cologne, 
and Leuven modelled its own rules on the statutes of Cologne. In the earliest Leuven 
statutes the Nominalist philosophical program was officially interdicted and the 
reliable authorities who were recommended were exponents of the via antiqua, such 
as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.528  
In the middle of the 15th century, Peter de Rivo, one of the most eminent intellectual 
figures at Leuven University, lectured on Aristotle’s Topics at the pedagogy, or Arts 
College, of the Castle. As emerges from a preliminary survey of his work, it seems 
that Peter obeyed the university statutes, since his commentary did not exhibit any 
nominalist features and showed a certain acquaintance with Albert the Great’s 
explanation, and with the view of the Albertists. According to Rivo, the scientia 
thopica was the inventive part of logic, it was bipartite into docens and utens and 
comprehended sophistry and dialectic. Sophistry was useful for avoiding self-
contradiction in disputes, whilst dialectic had an active role in producing probable 
knowledge about things, “syllogizare de omni problemate”.529 Rivo directly 
addressed the question of whether syllogism or dialectical argumentation was the 
subject matter of the Topics and of dialectic. His answer relied on the different kinds 
of subjects of logic, which were commonly acknowledged by Albertists.530 The 
proper subject of the Topics and dialectic, Rivo claimed, was the argumentatio, whilst 
the subiectum dialecticae principaliter intentae was dialectical syllogism, which was 
therefore the main or rather the only subject considered by Aristotle in his book and 
in dialectic.531 Interestingly, Rivo endorsed the semantic interpretation of 
probability, which bears more resemblance with Boethius’ of Dacia account than 
                                       
528 See the article C. Geudens–S. Masolini, “Teaching Aristotle at the Louvain Faculty of Arts, 1425–
1500: General Regulations and Handwritten Testimonies”, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 108/4 
(2016), pp. 813–844. 
529 A.52a, I, ch. 1, G134ra, O322ra-rb. 
530 For the differences between the “subiectum attributionis”, “communitatis” and “principalitatis” 
see Kneepkens, “How to prepare”, pp. 77-78. 
531 A.52a, I, ch. 1, G135ra-135va, O324ra-325ra. 
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with Albert’s definition. Although Rivo had an Albertist background,532 he 
departed from Albert’s view that the inference of dialectical syllogisms was secured 
by the topics: 
Contingit enim eamdem propositionem esse necessariam et probabilem quia 
aliquo subiecto ipsius inest aliqua proprietas habilitans ipsum ad praedicatum 
et sic est probabilis <propositio>. Sed magis intrinsece inspiciendo invenitur 
causa necessitans ipsum subiectum ad praedicatum quomodo est necessaria 
<propositio>. Syllogismus ergo assumens talem propositionem ut est necessaria 
est demonstrativus et assumens eam ut probabilem est dialecticus. Nec 
syllogismus dicitur dialecticus quia firmatur per locum dialecticum sicut 
praetendit argumentum.533 
 
By acknowledging the dialectical syllogism as the subject matter of the Topics and 
by denying an active role to the loci, Rivo limited dialectic exclusively to formally 
valid deductive arguments based on probable premises.  
 
7.4.2 However, a different picture emerges from some later commentaries on 
Aristotle’s Topics resulting from the teaching activity of masters of different 
pedagogies. This is especially so in the cases of Hugo de Dordraco’s 1468-69 lectures 
at the pedagogy, or College, of Lily, and some fragments of the 1476-77 lecture on 
the Topics, given at the pedagogy of the Pig by either Andreas de Alchmaria or Petrus 
de Mera or Theodoricus Messaych.534 Despite the fact that nominalist teachings 
were still officially banished from the Leuven Faculty of Arts, these writings appear 
to have been permeated with Buridanism. It is difficult to determine if the authors 
had direct access to the works of Buridan or of any of his followers (such as Marsilius 
                                       
532 A. 52a, I, ch. 1, G135ra-vb, O325va-vb: “<5> Quod est probabile semper est probabile, sed quod 
videtur nobis uno tempore non videtur alio tempore, ergo probabilia male notificatur per videri […] 
Ad quintum […] secundo dicitur quod in definitione probabilium ‘videntur’ non dicit actum sed 
aptitudinem. Et est sensus ‘quae videntur’ idest apta sunt videri quia scilicet subiecto probabili inest 
aliqua proprietas ratione cuius sibi videtur esse attribuendum praedicatum non tamen necessario et 
evidenter, sed probabiliter, ut matri inest proprietas quaedam non necessitans sed habilitans ipsam 
ad diligendum filium et ita probabile est quod mater diligit filium licet hoc etiam nulli actu videatur”. 
533 A. 52a, I, ch. 1, G136ra, O326ra-rb. 
534 I would like to thank Christophe Geudens, for providing me with his transcriptions of the 
commentaries produced in Leuven in the years 1469 and 1482, and, moreover, for allowing me to 
make use of them in this article. Mr. Geudens will provide a more detailed analysis of them in his 
upcoming PhD dissertation. 
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of Inghen, who commented on Aristotle’s Topics, or Albert of Saxony); or rather, if 
they encountered the main tenets of Buridan’s philosophy, especially his logic, 
through intermediary sources, such as the commentaries produced in, and then 
imported from, Eastern European Universities, such as Prague, Krakow or Erfurt.  
Hugo de Dordraco’s detailed question-based commentary on the Topics exhibited a 
clear Buridanian exegetical and epistemological framework, even though it did not 
reflect his conception of dialectic’s proper subject. According to him, dialectic was 
the knowledge whose remote subject (scibile remotum) was dialectical syllogism. 
Although he endorsed this view, Hugo regarded as plausible the alternative opinion 
according to which the subject of dialectic was the argumentatio dialectica and its 
essential constituents (or partes subiectivae), were dialectical syllogism and induction. 
According to Hugo, the tenability of this (anonymous) opinion hinged on the 
relation of subalternation holding between logic and dialectic and between their 
respective subject matters. Since logic dealt with argumentation in general, therefore 
dialectic - which was subalternated to logic and whose proper subject was contained 
in the proper subject of the subalternating science (logic) - should study dialectical 
argumentation.535 In his analysis of the epistemological status of dialectic, Hugo did 
not limit himself to the standard explanation of the ambivalent status of dialectic as 
docens and resolutiva on the one hand, and as utens and inventiva on the other. In fact, 
his discussion expanded upon the different meanings of scientia, upon the criteria 
governing the hierarchical ordering of disciplines, and upon the differentiation of 
the objects of knowledge (the scibilia). How was it possible for dialectic to have as its 
scibile dialectical syllogism - which was an accidental being, if Aristotle denied the 
possibility of there being a science of accidental being?536 The question itself was not 
                                       
535 Hugo de Dordraco, Quaestiones super libros Topicorum, Cambrai, Bib. mun., 860, ff. 195r-222v 
(hereafter named as Hugo, Quaestiones Topicorum), fol. 195v: “Quaeritur: Quomodo consideratur hic 
inductio, utrum principaliter aut minus principaliter. Dicendum quod minus principaliter, quia nec 
est subiectum, nec pars subiectiva subiecti. Alii tamen imponunt argumentationem dyaleticam esse 
subiectum istius scientiae. Dicunt inductionem dyaleticam hic considerari principaliter, quia est pars 
subiectiva argumentationis dyaleticae et istud potest probabiliter dici, quia in principio logice dicitur 
quia argumentatio secundum se est subiectum totius logice et sic videtur (dicendo* consequenter 
dictis) esse dicendum quod argumentatio simpliciter dicta est subiectum libri Priorum et 
argumentatio dyaletica est subiectum istius libri. Nec illi dicunt subiectum istius scientie esse 
sillogismum dyalecticum, dicunt consequenter dictis; nec ponunt sillogismum subiectum totius 
logice, sicut aliqui faciunt”.  
536 Hugo, Quaestiones Topicorum, fol. 196r. 
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new and Hugo’s solution was not particularly original. Nevertheless, it was quite 
interesting since it revealed both the epistemic value assigned by Hugo to dialectic, 
as well as his acquaintance with nominalist doctrines. Indeed, the author’s answer 
relied on the theory of the threefold objects of knowledge (a theory peculiar to 
Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen),537 as well as on Buridan’s modes and degrees of 
perseity, especially on the differentiation between absolutely perseity (simpliciter) and 
per se with qualification (secundum quid).538 Hugo proposed and rejected two 
alternatives to solve the problem, which depended on a different understanding of 
per accidens, and consequently on how accident was opposed to per se. According to 
Hugo, it was possible for an accidental being to be the remote object of knowledge 
(scibile remotum), whilst it could not be the proximate or immediate object of 
knowledge (scibile propinquum). The scibile propinquum, indeed, was the 
demonstrated conclusion, and accordingly it was necessary and per se absolutely 
speaking, therefore it could not be an accidental being. On the contrary, the scibile 
remotum, which was the subject of the demonstrated conclusion, i.e., a science’s 
subiectum attributionis, had a relative or second mode of necessity and perseity. 
Indeed, it was necessary and per se only with qualification (secundum quid), namely 
only by assuming the constancy or existence of the subject (posita constantia subiecti, 
that corresponds to Buridan’s stante significatione). And this was the case of 
dialectical syllogism with respect to dialectic.539 Hugo’s opinion perfectly suited the 
notions of subalternating and subalternated disciplines, accepted by the Leuven 
master. According to this view, a subalternating science/knowledge had neither an 
                                       
537 Buridan and Marsilius acknowledged three different scibilia, namely the “scibile propinquum”, 
“remotum” and “remotissimum”. Hugo, however, speaks only of an immediate object of knowledge, 
the scibile propinquum which is the conclusion of a demonstration and is necessary and per se, and 
of a remote scibile which is the subject (thus it is a term) of the demonstrated conclusion: “scibile 
propinquum in qualibet scientia est conclusio demonstrationis et illa debet esse necessaria et per se, 
sed scibile remotum in qualibet scientia est subiectum conclusionis demonstrationis sive subiectum 
attributionis quod idem est” (Hugo, Quaestiones Topicorum, fol. 196r). 
538 See for example Buridanus, SD, 8.6.2-3; Id., Quaestiones in Analytica Posteriora, I, q. 12; Id., 
Quaestiones in Metaphysicen, VI, q.3. 
539 Hugo, Quaestiones Topicorum, fol. 196r: “De ente per accidens non potest aliquid per se dici 
simpliciter tamen bene secundum quid, posita scilicet constantia subiecti. Verbi gratia de homine 
albo nichil per se potest dici simpliciter, et ergo ista non est necessaria simpliciter: homo albus est 
albus. Tamen bene potest aliquid dici de homine albo secundum quid per se et necessario et ita ista 
est necessaria: homo albus est albus secundum quid, posita scilicet constantia subiecti. Unde ista 
potest esse falsa: homo albus est albus, quia si nullus homo albus sit ipsa est falsa; ipsa tamen est 
necessaria secundum quid, posito scilicet quod homo albus sit”. 
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accidental scibile propinquum nor an accidental scibile remotum, and it could be 
properly qualified as science/knowledge (vera scientia), since it met the requirements 
for science listed by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. And a subalternated 
science/knowledge, such as dialectic, was considered a science/knowledge only 
large or improperly and could deal with accidental being. Indeed its subject matter 
was derived from a specification of the subalternating science’s subject through an 
accidental difference.540 In Hugo’s epistemology, dialectic was considered a science 
in its own right, even though it did not meet the higher standards of scientia required 
for the few verae scientiae. It was sufficient for dialectic to fulfil the less strict scientific 
criteria required for all the disciplines whose subjects did not have absolute necessity 
and perseity, such as natural or moral philosophy. Thus, on the one hand Hugo’s 
conception of dialectic seemed to signify a development in comparison to the view 
of his colleague and predecessor Peter de Rivo. On the other hand, however, his idea 
about the subject matter of dialectic seemed to leave no room for discussing and 
developing a less strict notion of dialectical argumentation, since induction, 
similarly to enthymeme, example and dialectical loci, were not subjective parts of the 
subject matter of dialectic and were assigned to unimportant minor roles. 
 
7.4.3 The influence of Buridan appears even more pronounced in a 1477 commentary 
on the first two books of Aristotle’s Topics, ascribed to one of the pedagogy of Pig’s 
Professors, either Petrus de Mera or Andreas de Alchmaria or Theodoricus 
Messaych.  Though scholars are unsure which one actually produced the 
commentary,541 based on the only surviving folio commenting on the first book, the 
author seems to have taken aboard Buridan’s opinion according to which the subject 
matter of dialectic was dialectical argumentation, whose four subjective parts were 
dialectical syllogism, dialectical induction, dialectical enthymeme and dialectical 
example.542 The unknown commentator proposed and decidedly dismissed two 
                                       
540 Hugo, Quaestiones Topicorum, fol. 196r-v. It is worth noting that Hugo did not differentiate between 
subalternation and subordination. 
541 Andreas de Alchmaria, Petrus de Mera, Theodoricus Messaych, Edinburgh, Univ. Lib., Ms. 205 
(Laing Ms. 149), ff. 182ra-187rb, book I, ff. 182ra-183ra (hereafter named as A.48). See Green-Pedersen, 
The Tradition, p. 407, A.48.  
542 A.48, I, f. 182ra: “Utrum notitia octo librorum thopicorum Aristotelis sit scientia [...] Praesens 
notitia habet omnia requisita ad scientiam, ergo est scientia. Antecedens patet quia habet subiectum, 
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alternatives. The first was Boethius’ view, which conceived of dialectic as dealing 
with dialectical topics. The second was upheld by Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas, who were recommended in the University statutes as reliable authorities. 
However, the anonymous author eschewed the widespread idea that syllogism was 
the proper subject of dialectic, since it limited dialectical inquiry to syllogism alone 
and excluded other species of argumentation such as enthymeme and induction. The 
solution favoured by our Professor was not ascribed to any precise author, but could 
be easily traced back to Buridan.543 The Leuven Professor reckoned that assigning 
dialectical argumentation as the proper object of discussion of dialectic would 
apparently contradict Aristotle’s own words at the opening of the Topics, which 
constituted a strong argument in support of the most common view, endorsed too 
by Albert and Aquinas. However, this apparent inconsistency could be resolved in 
two ways. Either by reading Aristotle’s mention of dialectical syllogism as indirectly 
including the whole ‘argumentatio’, of which syllogism constituted but a part. Or 
by interpreting Aristotle’s words as referring to the subiectum principalitatis of 
dialectic, and not to its subiectum attributionis.544 More interesting is the 
commentator’s answer to another difficulty arising from his view, namely that 
nowhere in the text did Aristotle explicitly mention dialectical argumentation, which 
was supposed to be the subject matter of the Topics and, more generally, of dialectic. 
Despite the lack of direct references to it, the commentator suggested that the 
Stagirite might have implicitly alluded to the argumentatio dialectica in the first lines 
                                       
quod est argumentatio dialectica, principium, quod est procedere ex probabilibus, passionem, quae 
est esse generativam opinionis, et partes subiectivas, quae sunt sillogismus dialecticus, inductio 
dialectica, enthymema dialecticum et exemplum dialecticum; consenquentia tenet quia per 
Philosophum Primo Posteriorium”. 
543 A.48, I, f. 182vb: “Quaeritur: quid est subiectum huius scientiae. Pro quo sciendum est quia circa 
istam materiam sunt tres distinctae opiniones, quarum prima est ipsius Boetii dicentis locum 
dialecticum esse subiectum [...] Secunda est opinio ipsius Alberti et doctoris sancti puta Thomae, et 
est quod sillogismus dialecticus est hic subiectum [...] Et confirmat hanc opinionem ex dictis 
Philosophi in primo istius libri, in quo dicit quod considerandum est quid est sillogismus et quae eius 
divisio. Licet tamen praesens opinio sit magis usitata et communior, non tamen in se <est> sufficiens; 
quare ratione huius insufficientiae venit reprobanda. Insufficientiae eius pate<n>t quia sicut 
possumus arguere dialectice <et> sillogistice, ita etiam enthomatice [sic] et inductive, cum ergo 
quaedam reperiuntur argumentationes dialecticae et sophisticae sic etiam quaedam reperiuntur 
argumentationes enthimematicae et inductivae [mss. dialecticae]. Si iam praesens scientia esset de 
sillogismo dialectico tantum, tales argumentationes non continerentur sub subiecto quae tamen in rei 
veritate sub ipso dicunt continere [...] Tertia est opinio pro nunc tenenda, quod argumentatio dialetica 
est hic subiectum”; see Geudens–Masolini, “Teaching Aristotle”. 
544 A.48, f. 182vb. 
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of his work, when he spoke of the ‘methodum’. In this context the anonymous 
Leuven commentator offered his unconventional interpretation of method: it 
signified dialectical argumentation, since through it dialectical arguments could be 
produced, whether they were syllogisms or other kinds of reasoning.545 His 
originality fully emerged a few lines later, where he openly refused to accept the 
conventional interpretation of ‘syllogizare’ as connoting syllogism in its technical 
sense of illative argument, and prefers to interpret ‘syllogizare’ from the viewpoint 
of the probatio: “Dicendum quod sillogizare non capitur proprie in proposito, ut 
scilicet est actus sillogismi, sed ipsius argumentationis, ut scilicet idem sit quod 
sillogismus faciens arguere*”. The 1477 commentator legitimated his preference for 
the view that dialectical argumentation was the subject of dialectic, on the basis of 
the relation existing between dialectic’s subject matter and the proper subject of the 
science of the Prior Analytics, the scientia de argumentatione, and, more generally, on 
the basis of the relation between these disciplines. But what was the kind of 
relationships holding between dialectic and the science of the Prior Analytics? Was 
dialectic subalternated or subordinated to it?546 The answer to this question might 
prove useful in determining the level of scientificity of dialectic and its place in the 
hierarchy of sciences. Unfortunately, the commentator offered an ambivalent 
explanation which relied on the twofold understanding of ‘argumentatio dialectica’. 
If taken significatively, then it was an accidental being (insofar as it was 
compounded); and consequently dialectic was subalternated to the more general 
science of argumentation. If, however, ‘argumentatio dialectica’ was taken 
                                       
545 A.48, ff. 182vb-183ra: “Arguitur: Aristoteles in praesenti libro nullam facit mensionem de 
argumentatione dialectica ergo non est ponenda hic subiectum […] Dicendum quod licet Philosophus 
non facit aliquam mensionem de ea explicite, bene tamen implicite innuit de ea esse determinandum 
et hoc in prohemio huius primi intendit ‘Propositum quidem negocii methadum est invenire a qua 
poterimus sillogizare de omni problemate ex probabilibus’. Si per hoc enim quod dicit ‘methadum’ 
quamdam innuit argumentationem dialecticam, quia argumentatio dialectica est methadum illa per 
quam possumus ‘sillogizare’ idest arguere ‘de omni problemate ex probabilibus’ et istud sufficit”. 
546 Subalternation differs from subordination insofar as the subalternated science’s subject differs 
from the subalternating science’s subject through an accidental difference. In the case of 
subordination we have a specification of the subordinated science’s subject through a specific 
difference, so that the subjects of subordinating and subordinated sciences fall under the same genus. 
As the anonymous commentator underlines, just as the subject of the subordinating science is not an 
accidental being, so too subordinated science’s subject cannot be an accidental being, and therefore 
the subordinated discipline is properly science (“dicitur scientia proprie dicta sicut vult Philosophus 
Primo Posteriorum”), which is not the case for the subalternated discipline.  
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circumlocutive, that is, it was considered as a whole, then it was no more an accidental 
being and as such it fell under the same genus of argumentatio. Accordingly, dialectic 
was subordinated to argumentation’s science.  
 
7.4.4 The 1469 and 1477 commentaries disclose an increasing influence of Buridanian 
doctrines on the Leuven masters, leaving one to suspect a further development in 
the later commentary of Petrus de Thenis, which culminated with his lectures of the 
academic year 1481-1482 at the Pedagogy of the Lily - the same Pedagogy as Rivo.547 
But the analysis of Petrus’ work is disappointing, since it marked a shift in the 
opposite direction: it appears to take a step back from Rivo’s Albertism (or, better, 
Realism), rather than developing a step forward. Peter’s explanation at the 
beginning of the Topics did not offer any deep or interesting insight on the matter at 
hand, rather it merely deployed some of the customary arguments supporting his 
view that dialectical syllogism was the proper subject (subiectum attributionis) of 
dialectic proprissima.548 
 
7.5 The University of Cracow: Buridan’s heritage in Poland.549 
7.5.1 In the first half of the 15th century, Buridanism was the main philosophical 
trend in many universities of Central and Eastern Europe, such as those at Vienna, 
Leipzig, Erfurt and Cracow. Buridan’s ideas spread in the renewed Studium Generale 
of Cracow through the migration of students and masters, especially German, who 
after the Decree of Kutna Hora (1409) left Prague for Cracow. These scholars brought 
with them manuscripts containing not only Buridan’s works, along with those of 
                                       
547 On the 1481-2 collegedictaten on logic, preserved in the manuscript Cambrai 964 (862), ff. 82r-93v, 
see Geudens–S. Masolini, “Teaching Aristotle”. 
548 Peter exposed the first two books of the Topics and commented in question form on the first book, 
while questions on the second book are ascribed to Henricus de Gandavo (see Geudens–S. Masolini, 
“Teaching Aristotle”; see also Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 413, A.58): Petrus de Thenis, Saint-
Omer, Bibliothèque d’Agglomération, ms. 585, fol. 77r-88v, 263r-279v, here fol. 263r. Further evidence 
of the distance between Peter and his predecessor who lectured in the 1469 and 1477, is given by 
Peter’s view on the division of sciences, which rests on a realist oriented epistemology, rather than 
on a Buridanian epistemology which understands science (or knowledge) as the subject’s firm assent 
to a proposition. 
549 For Cracow Albertism see M. Markowski, “Albert und der Albertismus in Krakau”, in 
Zimmermann, Albert, pp. 177-192. 
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Nicholas Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, but also commentaries 
on Aristotle’s works produced at the Czech University, which were highly 
influenced by Buridanism.550 As Mieczysław Markowski has shown in his 
numerous works on the Polish University, during the 15th century different 
philosophical trends followed one another. At the turn of the century, the Buridan’s 
direct influence was overwhelming, even though it blended with the Prague and 
Parisian Nominalism of the Buridanian School. Between the 1410s and the 1420s the 
via moderna paved the way for the via communis, in which the main nominalistic 
orientation was enriched by doctrines of the likes of Albert the Great and the Modists 
Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito. The via communis lasted until the mid of the 
century. The 1460s was a transition period, during which Buridanism’s supremacy 
was rivalled by the via antiqua, which made its first appearance at this time. Since 
the last quarter of the 15th century, Buridanism no longer held its place of 
prominence, yet without completely fading. Indeed from this period, the via antiqua 
became the prevalent though not exclusive intellectual orientation, and 
consequently this last phase of Cracow philosophy could be better qualified as 
eclectic. The works of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Versoris received 
great attention, and subsequently they were flanked by the writings of John Duns 
Scotus  
Significantly, these periods were marked by different approaches to dialectic, and 
accordingly, by the different roles assigned to demonstrative and dialectical 
argumentations. Indeed, even though during the entire 15th century professors 
                                       
550 On the 1400 reformation of Cracow studium generale, which is considered as a new foundation 
after the first in the 1364, see A. Goddu, Copernicus and the Aristotelian Tradition: Education, Reading, 
and Philosophy in Copernicus’ Path to Heliocentrism, Leiden: Brill, 2010, pp. 14-15 and the bibliographical 
indications there provided. On students’ and professors’ migration from Prague after the Decree of 
Kutna Hora (1409), see: Z. Kaluza, “La crise”, esp. pp. 298-308; P. De Vooght, L’hérésie de Jean Huss, 
Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1975, 2 vols , vol. 1, pp. 110-118; F. Smahel, “The Kuettenberg 
Decree and the Withdrawal of the German Schools from Prague in 1409: a Discussion”, in History of 
Universities 4 (1984), pp. 153-166. M. Markowski, “Logik und Semantik im 15. Jahrhundert an der 
Universität Kraków”, in Medievalia philosophica polonorum 21 (1975), pp. 73-80; Id., “Formy 
argumentacji w teoretycznych i praktycznych dyscyplinach filozoficznych na Uniwersytecie 
Krakowskim w XV wieku” in Biuletyn Biblioteki Jagiellońskiej 41 (1991), pp. 27-61; Id., “Dialektische 
und rhetorische Argumentation an der krakauer Universität im 15. Jahrhundert”, in K. Jacobi, 
Argumentationstheorie, pp. 577-587. Unfortunately, I could not consult the important volumes edited 
by M. Markowski in the Dzieje filozofii średniowiecznej w Polsce, namely the volume one (Logika, 
Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskic, 1975) and two (Metodologia Nauk, Wroclaw: Zakład 
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976). 
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commonly admitted four kinds of argumentations, namely syllogism, induction, 
enthymeme and example during the entire 15th century,551 the value and importance 
they bestowed upon them varied throughout the century. During the Buridanian 
phase and the following predominance of the via communis, dialectic and its forms 
of argumentation gained prominence in the theory and methodology of sciences. 
Their supremacy originated from the Buridanian epistemological framework. 
Indeed the commentators from Cracow acknowledged as sciences not only those 
disciplines satisfying the highest standards of scientificity - the scientia proprie dicta - 
but also those disciplines that met more relaxed scientific requirements - the scientia 
communiter dicta. They accorded the very scientific status and the highest importance 
to the sciences communiter dictae, namely natural and moral philosophy. Since these 
disciplines dealt with merely accidental items, which happened communiter or ut in 
pluribus, they needed forms of argumentation tailored specifically to their contingent 
objects of knowledge. Therefore, the fourfold types of dialectical argumentations 
(probationes) – such as dialectical syllogism, induction, example and enthymeme – 
were considered more suitable as heuristic tools than demonstrative syllogism. And 
dialectic, along with metaphysics, was considered the most important discipline in 
virtue of its wide-ranging applicability. Dialectic’s probable reasoning could serve 
many other sciences, such as moral and natural philosophy, laws and medicine, 
metaphysics and theology. The prominent position held by dialectic in the hierarchy 
of sciences was mirrored in the curriculum of studies. In fact, the only logical work 
lectured on at the M.A. degree level was Aristotle’s Topics, which was viewed as the 
book par excellence concerned with techniques for producing less rigorous reasoning 
appropriate to less rigorous sciences. Around the mid 15th century, the University’s 
intellectual frame of reference changed, thus entailing profound epistemological 
modifications. These modifications had an effect on the acknowledged values and 
hierarchical ordering of sciences in general, and on the importance of dialectic in 
particular. Professors no longer accorded the very scientific status to less rigorous 
disciplines, which, therefore, gradually lost their importance in favour of more 
                                       
551 Interestingly, authors, especially the Realists, openly connected these four kinds of 
argumentations to Aristotle’s Topics, per es. Piotr Aurifaber: “Notandum secundum Philosophum 
primo Topicorum: quattuor sunt genera argumentorum, scilicet inductio, syllogismus, enthimema et 
exemplum” (quoted in Markowski, “Formy”, p. 42, fn. 106). 
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certain disciplines, which were sciences proprie dictae. Consequently, dialectic started 
being superseded in its alleged supremacy by the logic of Aristotle’s Analytics, the 
so-called sciences priorica and posteriorica. Proportionately, the dialectical 
argumentation or probatio saw its pre-eminence vanishing, since commentators 
focused their attention on necessary inferences. Finally, demonstrative or apodictic 
syllogism replaced the probatio as the most accredited heuristic tool: indeed 
demonstration facit scire, whereas dialectical reasoning produces mere opinion.552 
According to Markowski, this new intellectual climate could explain the absence of 
commentaries from Cracow on Aristotle’s Topics in the last quarter of the 15th 
century.553 Once Realism became the dominant intellectual trend, professors 
commented on all the books of Aristotle’s Organon except the Topics.  
If, at a theoretical level, dialectic and its various forms of argumentation received 
more or less attention, at a practical level it seems that the role of the dialectica utens 
did not undergo significant changes throughout the different intellectual phases of 
Cracow University. Indeed during the entire 15th century Aristotle’s Topics served to 
prepare the students at Cracow for participation in academic disputes, providing 
them with practical argumentative strategies to be used in such contexts.  
7.5.2 In the first half of the 15th century, professors at Cracow produced sets of 
questions on the eight books of the Topics, which exhibited the peculiar intellectual 
trend at Cracow called via communis. Despite this, however, in these question-
commentaries Buridanism stood out as the main exegetical background and 
provided the general philosophical framework. The Quaestiones Cracovienses554 
                                       
552 On the basis of Markowski’s Logika, Goddu does well to highlight the effect of these intellectual 
shifts on the theory of argumentation: “In the early period up to 1460 Cracow masters characterizes 
logic as a practical, rather than speculative, science that achieved primarily probable conclusions […] 
masters devoted more time to dialectic than to demonstration […] The former [scil. before the 1449 
reform at the Faculty of Arts] preference for dialectical argumentation gave way gradually to certain, 
necessary inferences, at first in the re-emergence of syllogistic demonstration and then around the 
1469 in the development of the logic of consequences”; after the 1475 reform Cracow Universities 
characterized for an eclectic philosophical trend: “there was no violent anti-dialectical reaction but 
greater emphasis on the logic of consequences and demonstrative syllogism. Despite this shift, 
however, masters continued to quote the definitions and views of their nominalist predecessors” 
(Goddu, Copernicus, pp. 72-74). 
553 Markowski, “Formy”, p. 33. 
554 The so-called Questiones pragenesium (hereafter abbreviated as A.43) survive in a single copy so far 
identified, the ms. 684 of the Jagellonian Library in Cracow. It is a “reportatio lectionum in 
Universitate Pragensi confectus”, dating to the first half of the 15th century; see M. Markowski– S. 
Wlodej, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum quae in Bibliotheca Iagellonica 
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heavily relied on and borrowed from commentaries imported from Prague to 
Cracow. A comparison between the Quaestiones Cracovienses and the cognate so-
called Quaestiones Pragensium shows their close affinity. Which is not a circumscriber 
to their general organization, namely the kinds of questions asked and the 
arguments proposed therein, but extends to the authorities named, such as Buridan 
and Marsilius of Inghen, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito, Albert the Great, 
Richard Billingham and the master Rupertus.555 However, the masters at Cracow 
elaborated upon the Prague questions, by adding their own comments and remarks.  
The opening questions of the redaction of the Quaestiones Cracovienses analysed 
presently, concerned the standard issues about the epistemological status, unity, and 
subject matter of dialectic, more precisely of the dyalectica docens.556 On the basis of 
the fourfold meaning of science proposed by Buridan, but slightly modified, the 
anonymous Cracow commentator affirmed that dialectic was a science. Precisely, it 
was a science communiter dicta, namely it was a steadfast assent to a necessary 
demonstrable proposition.557 Relying on the opening lines of Aristotle’s work, the 
                                       
Cracoviae asservantur, Ossolineum, 1974, pp. 35-36; Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, pp. 404-405, A.43. 
The so-called Quaestiones Cracovienses or Puncta Thopicorum are preserved in four manuscripts of the 
Jagellonian Library, whose contents present variations: 
1) ms. 1903, dating to the 1460: “Expliciunt Puncta Thopicorum reportata per P. de C. in Bursa 
Philosophorum sub a.D. M°CCCC sexagesimo” (see Markowski–Wlodej, Repertorium, pp. 78-89); 
2) ms. 2006, written in 1448, f. 1v: “Liber magistri Stanislai de Brzeziny scriptus per eundem, alia 
manu: datus Librarie Artistarum, f. Iir: Johannes de Ostresowo(?), … Dominicus de Legnicz, Johannes 
Wonycz […] Explicit: Et per magistrum Jacobum de Gay empta aput maystrum Stanislaum de 
Brzeziny protunc rectorem scole ad s. Stephanum in Cracovia pro 1 marca cum sex grossi, 1448” (see 
Markowski–Wlodej, Repertorium, p. 87); 
3) ms. 2008, written in 1460, f. 1r: “Mathie liber ad magistrum Kazuchowsky” (see Markowski–
Wlodej, Repertorium, pp. 88-89); 
4) ms. 2094, dating around the 1450; I will refer to this manuscript in the following pages, containing 
the “Disputata Thopicorum librarie universitatis”, hereafter abbreviated as A.36 (see Markowski–
Wlodej, Repertorium, p. 108). 
On the so-called Quaestiones Cracovienses see also M. Markowski, Burydanizm w polsce w okresie 
przedkopernikanskim. Studium z Historii filozofii I nauk scislych na uniwersytecie krakowskim w XV wieku, 
Wroclaw-Warszawa –Krakow, 1971, pp. 317-321; Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, pp. 401-402, A.36. 
555 Master Rupertus should be Robertus Anglicus (A.10), see for example the quotation at A.36, f. 
12rb, which coincides with A.10, f. 184rb. 
556 A.36, I, qq. 1-4; q. 1, f. 1ra: “Per dyalecticam intelligitur hic habitus scientificus docentem ex quibus 
et qualibus debet fieri argumentatio dyalectica” and f. 2ra: “Tertio modo dyalectica capitur pro habitu 
scientifico docente ex quibus et qualibus debent fieri argumentationes dyalecticae et talis dyalectica 
est scientia sic capitur in proposito. Et ergo quod dicitur quod dyalectica generat opinionem, ibi 
intelligitur quod Philosophus capit dyalectica primo modo [scil. pro argumentatione procedente ex 
probabilibus] non autem tertio modo”. Cf. with A.43, I, qq. 1-5, ff. 2ra-5vb. 
557 A.36, I, q. 1, f. 1ra: “Secundum Buridanum scientia capitur quatuor modis […] Tertio modo scientia 
capitur ut est assensus firmus alicuius veri necessarii demonstrabilis notitia non curando an 
speculativa vel practica. Etiam non curando an sit de causis secundis vel primis. Isto modo principia 
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commentator affirmed that dialectic was concerned with the same object as the 
Topics, namely the ‘argumentatio dyalectica’, and that its task was to ‘facere 
argumenta dyalectica.558 Examined from the twofold perspective of its subject 
matter (ratione obiecti) and its purpose (ex parte finis), dialectic could be considered in 
two different ways.  From the viewpoint of its subject of study (ratione obiecti), there 
were two main opinions on the subiectum attributionis of dialectic. The first view was 
held by Radulphus Brito, according to which the subject matter (subiectum 
attributionis) of dialectic was dialectical syllogism, and this view rested on the literal 
interpretation of the opening lines of the Topics. The second view, according to which 
dialectic dealt with dialectical argumentation, was held by Buridan, Marsilius of 
Inghen and the “via communis”.559 The anonymous commentator endorsed this latter 
view too. For him dialectic was the discipline whose most remote proper subject 
matter (scibile remotissimum) was dialectical argumentation and what related to it, 
such as dialectical predicates or topics 
 
                                       
non sciuntur quia sunt indemonstrabilia et sic scientia non distinguitur contra artem nec contra alios 
habitus intellectuales. Quarto modo scientia capitur ut est assensus firmus alicuius veri necessarii 
speculativi demonstrabilis notitia. Isto modo scientia distinguitur contra alios habitus intellectuales. 
Modo tunc responditur ad secundum suppositum quod dyalectica est scientia capiendo scientiam 
tertio modo et non quarto modo”. The reference is to Buridan’s SD, 8.4.3. 
558 A.36, I, q. 3, f. 4rb: “Scientia dyalectica differt* ab aliis tribus [scil. priorica, posteriorica et elencica] 
tam penes obiecta quam penes fines. Primo penes obiecta quia istae scientiae quatuor habunt diversa 
obiecta, quia obiectum dyalecticae sive libri thopicorum est argumentatio dyalectica, ut sic […] 
Secundo modo differt penes fines eo quod finis dyalecticae est posse arguere de omni problemate vel 
alio modo posse ponere conclusionem sine omni repugnantia. Et hoc videtur textus dicere in puncto: 
‘Nihil dicemus repugnans’. Vel tertio modo quod finis dyalecticae est facere argumenta dyalectica. 
Sed finis posterioricae scientiae est facere argumentationem demonstrativam procedentem ex 
necessaris; sed elencicae <est facere> argumentationem sophisticam procedentem ex aparentibus; 
sed prioricae finis est facere argumentationem in communi quoad illationem”. In that same question, 
we find addressed the further question of whether dialectic differed from logic - understood as the 
scientia priorica of the Prior Analytics dealing with the illatio - and whether dialectic is subordinated or 
subalternated to logic. The anonymous commentator answers that the priorica and dialectic are parts 
of the whole ‘logic’ (“Non differunt sicut partes a suo toto, ut dictum est, sed sicut partes eiusdem 
totius, eo quod scientia priorica et dyalectica sunt partes totius logicae”) and that dialectic 
subalternates accidentaliter to the priorica, since its subject matter, the dialectical argumentation, is 
accidentally subalternated to the argumentatio in communi. 
559 A.36, I, q. 4, f. 5ra-rb: “Utrum argumentatio dyalectica sit subiectum praesentis scientiae. 
Responditur quod sic. Pro quaestio nota: de subiecto praesentis scientiae sunt duae opiniones. Una 
Britonis, quae dicit quod sillogismus dyalecticus sit subiectum [scil. A.20, I, q. 6, f. 13ra], sicut patebit 
in prima ratione. Alia est opinio Marsili et Biridani, qui dicunt quod argumentatio dyalectica est hic 
subiectum, eo quod Philosophus hic non determinat solum de sillogismo dyalectico, sed etiam de 
qualibet specie argumentationis, sicud de argumentatione entimematica et exempli”. Strikingly, 
Albert the Great was not listed along with Brito as upholder of the view according to which dialectical 
syllogism was the subject matter of the Topics and of dialectic.  
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Est scientia considerans de argumentatione dyalectica practice tamquam de scibili 
remotissimo principaliter in speciali vel de aliquo per se pertinente ad ipsam 
prout huiusmodi; dicitur prima practice ad excludendum ipsam metaphysicam, 
quia licet considerat de argumentatione dyalectica, tamen hoc est speculative; 
dicitur de scibili remotissimo propter grammaticam, quia licet considerat de 
argumentatione dyalectica practice quia de conclusionibus quae possunt esse 
conclusiones dyalecticae tamen hoc est ut scibile propinquum, sed non 
remotissimum. Dicitur principaliter in speciali propter logicam totam quia licet 
considerat de argumentatione dyalectica, tamen hic est in communi et non 
specialiter.560  
 
Against this opinion could be put forward Brito’s textual argument – namely, 
Aristotle’s words at the beginning of the Topics –, which, however, the anonymous 
commentator did not deem to be compelling. Indeed, dialectical syllogism could be 
a subject of dialectic, but it could not be its proper subject, since dialectical forms of 
reasoning exceeded the mere syllogistic form: dialectica syllogism was just a species 
within the wider genus of the dialectical argumentation. Moreover, at the beginning 
of the Topics Aristotle might have meant to signify the genus ‘argumentatio 
dialectica’ by naming one of its species, namely dialectical syllogism 
  
Brito dicit quod syllogismus dyalecticus esset subiectum et hoc probavit per 
textum [scil. Top. 1.1 100a 19-24], modo igitur dicitur quod syllogismus 
dyalecticus est subiectum praesentis scientiae, sed tamen non est adaequatum 
subiectum praesentis scientiae, eo quod non omnia considerata habent 
attributionem ad hoc subiectum. Modo non est inconveniens eiusdem scientiae 
esse plura subiecta, quorum unum est adaequatum et alterum non, sed ad 
probationem*: ibi dicunt quia quod Philosophus ponit speciem pro genere, 
sillogismum dyalecticum pro argumentatione dyalectica. Vel aliter: textus non 
dicit ‘hunc enim solum quaerimus’, sed dicit ‘hunc enim quaerimus’ ita quod 
                                       
560 A.36, I, q. 2, fol. 4ra. The anonymous commentator accepted what he presented as the standard 
definition of dialectic ratione obiecti (“Dyalectica est scientia considerans de argumentacione 
dyalectica vel de aliquo per se pertinente ad ipsam prout huiusmodi”).  
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textus vult quod in ista scientia quaerimus syllogismum dyalecticum, sed tamen 
non solum dyalecticum sed etiam alias argumentationes.561 
 
In this discussion about the object of the study of dialectic, an important element 
deserved to be emphasized. The view endorsed by the Cracow commentator about 
probative argumentations represent a development of the Boethian  argumentum, of 
the dialectical form assigned to dialectical syllogisms by Parisian ‘pluralists’ and of 
Buridan’s probatio. The anonymous Cracow master claimed that the essential feature 
of the argumentatio was its being probative:  
 
Argumentatio diffinitur sic: ‘Argumentatio est argumenti per orationem 
explicatio’, ut dicit Petrus Hispanus. Et propria passio istius subiecti est esse 
probativum instrumentaliter suae partis scilicet conclusionis sive consequentis. 
Et ibi ‘probativum’ capitur prout differt contra demonstrativum: et additur 
‘instrumentaliter’ propter intellectum, eo quod intellectus probat conclusionem 
principaliter. Sed argumentatio dyalectica sic diffinitur: argumentatio 
composita ex antecedente probabili et consequente.562  
 
However, this explanation of the notion argumentatio differed from Buridan’s. The 
Picardian master had differentiates between the illatio and the probatio. The species 
of probatio were the demonstratio and dialectical argumentation. By contrast, the 
anonymous commentator seemed to implicitly understand this definition of 
argumentatio as concerning dialectical or probable argumentation alone, and to 
disassociate the demonstratio from the probatio. Consequently, the demonstratio not 
only did not belong to the domain of the probatio, but also appeared opposed to it. 
After all, the probatio generated opinio, while the demonstratio produced scientia - as 
                                       
561 A.36, I, q. 4, fol. 5va; cf. A.43, I, q. 5, f. 6ra: “Nota: Brito et antiqui ponunt ly syllogismus dialecticus 
pro subiecto, sed Buridanus ly argumentatio dyalectica et Marsilius et postius* secundum 
communem viam ponitur argumentatio dyalectica quam syllogismus dyalecticus. Et Brito allegat 
textum ad hoc in principio [scil. Top. 1.1 100a 19-24] et communiter exponentes dicunt quod 
syllogismus dyalecticus quaeritur tamquam causa materialis vel subiectum. Sed potest dicere ad 
textum quod est subiectum praesentis scientiae, sed non adaequatum quia non solum determinatur 
de syllogismo dyalectico, sed de omni argumentationi dyalectica, sicut sive sit exempla sive 
enthymema. Etiam: textus non dicit ‘hunc solum quaerimus’ sed dicit ‘hunc quaerimus’”. 
562 A.36, I, q. 4, f. 5rb. 
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was made explicit in the Quaestiones Pragensium.563 This passage seemed to imply 
that the domain of the probatio was coextensive with that of dialectic and, 
accordingly, that the term probativus properly attached to dialectical or probable 
argumentations alone. In his discussion of the differences between dialectic and 
sophistry, the anonymous commentator qualified the probativeness of an 
argumentation in terms of a (positive) refutation procedure. An argumentatio 
probabilis which aimed at proving the contradictory of the proposition upheld by the 
respondent.564 This claim was perfectly consistent with the main purpose of 
dialectic. Indeed from the vantage point of its scope (ex parte finis/penes finem) 
dialectic was defined as the discipline teaching how to produce or refute a dialectical 
proof.  The anonymous commentator found textual support for this affirmation in 
the opening lines of the Topics as well as in the second chapter of the first book, in 
which Aristotle had presented the three utilities of dialectic, namely “ad 
exercitationem, ad obviationes, ad secundum philosophiam disciplinas”. The 
anonymous commentator’s explanation of dialectic’s usefulness for training people 
reflected the general attitude of the Cracow professors towards dialectic as utens and 
the role they accorded to it:  
 
Ipse Philosophus in principio textus ponit primam utilitatem istius sciencie [scil. 
Top. I, 2, 101a27 ‘ad exercitationem’] et est ista: quod ipsa dyalectica docet 
persuadere de omni problemate tam in iure quam in medicinis, eo quod ipsa 
dyalectica potest formare suas premissas et conclusiones ex omnibus terminis. 
Et licet Buridanus in principio Physicorum in conclusione tertia et quarta dicat 
quod sola methaphysica potest formare conclusionem ex omnibus terminibus, 
                                       
563 A.43, I, q.5, f. 6ra: “Contra: omne subiectum debet esse dissimile, sed argumentatio non est 
dissimilis, ergo. Bene responditur* quia si diffinitur, tunc sic: ‘argumentatio est argumenti per 
orationem explicatio’ et illud* concordat* cum* argumentationi et non argumento; sed argumentum 
est ‘ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem’. [add. in marg. Aliqui dicunt quod propria passio argumentationis 
est illatio probativa consequentis existente*]. Et passio propria dyalecticae est esse probativum 
instrumentaliter sui partis, scilicet conclusionis; et ‘probativum’ debet sumi ut differt contra 
demonstrativum, scilicet ut generat opinio quia demonstratio generat scientiam”. 
564 A.36, I, q. 3, f. 5ra: “Scientia dyalectica considerat de argumentatione probabili et quaelibet talis 
est elencicus; arguitur: argumentatio probabilis est argumentum probantem conclusiones oppositae 
ipsius respondentis, igitur sequitur quod est elencus […] Nota: scientia dicitur esse elencica 
dupliciter: uno modo quia considerat de elenco positive. Isto modo dyalectica est elencica ut 
argumentum probat. Alio modo quia est de elenco privative. Isto modo dyalectica non est elencica”; 
cf. A.43, I, q. 4, f. 5rb-va. 
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tamen dyalectica etiam potest, sed diversimode, quia methapysica 
demonstrative, sed ipsa dyalectica probabiliter, sic quod docet invenire medium 
ad unumquodque problema.565  
 
Along with Buridan, this commentator acknowledged that dialectic should produce 
not only opinion, but also persuasion. Dialectic provided the dialectician with 
argumentative patterns for addressing problems arising in all sciences: the dialectic 
method could be applied to many disciplines having different degrees of certainty. 
The problem, then, was to harmonize this applicability of dialectical reasoning, 
which produced mere opinion, with the claim that sciences, whether communiter or 
proprie dictae, did not proceed dialectically, but only through the scientific process of 
demonstration required for scientific knowledge. The anonymous commentator 
solved the doubt by affirming that a science could legitimately use a scientific as well 
as probative method: the scientific value of the dialectical method was thus 
recognized. The demonstrative procedure was required in order to obtain certain 
knowledge; whilst dialectical argumentation was more apt at producing non-
necessary conclusions and a less rigorous knowledge: 
 
Processus est duplex: qui scientificus solum sit, et in tali processu semper 
proceditur demonstrative eo quod scientia est habitus communis per 
demonstrationem acquisitus. Alius est probativus, et in tali aliquis procedit 
dyalectice. Et isto modo Philosophus multotiens in libris suis probat 
conclusionem, prima per argumenta dyalectica et postea demonstrative. Et ergo 
dicitur quod nulla scientia procedit dyalectice, verum est processu scientifico 
sed non processu probativo. Sed quod dicitur in scientia est sic procedendum 
sicut scientia generatur hoc est processu scientifico.566   
                                       
565 A.36, I, q. 5, f. 5vb. This passage has no parallels in the A.43. 
566 A.36, I, q. 1, f. 3va: “dicitur duplex scientia de* quo* unius generis scibilis. Uno modo secundum 
considerationem: isto modo dyalectica est unius generis scibilis eo quod est unius subiecti et non 
plurium non convertibilium. Secundo modo hoc ad applicationem: isto modo dyalectica non est 
unius generis scibilis et Philosophus addit ‘determinati generis scibilis’ et sic ipse talem vult quod 
dyalectica non est applicabilis solum ad unam scientiam, sed ad plures. […] Processus est duplex: qui 
scientificus solum sit, et in tali processu semper proceditur demonstrative eo quod scientia est habitus 
communis per demonstrationem acquisitus. Alius est probativus, et in tali aliquis procedit dyalectice 
et isto modo Philosophus multotiens in libris suis probat conclusionem prima per argumenta 
dyalectica et postea demonstrative. Et ergo dicitur quod nulla scientia procedit dyalectice, verum est 
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In the first half of the 15th century, Cracow University represented one strand of the 
Buridanian heritage, perhaps the most fruitful strand, even more than Prague, 
through which the Polish University received it. The Cracow professors seemed to 
have taken seriously the role that Aristotle assigned to dialectic. At Cracow, indeed, 
this discipline was used for the “intellectual training” of students, in order to make 
them able “to easily argue about the subject proposed”. Dialectic was also 
advantageous for “the philosophical sciences”, especially for the sciences communiter 
dictae, for which the probative process was thought to be more suitable than the 
demonstrative method. It is not a mere coincidence, then, that ethics and natural 
philosophy flourished in Cracow at the same time that dialectic reached its peak, 
during the first half of the 15th century.  
Moreover, dialectic was also valuable for “casual encounters”, so that students, after 
having taken into account “the opinions held by most people”, could disagree with 
or give their assent to such arguments “on the ground not of other people’s 
convictions but of their own, shifting the ground of any argument”567 that appeared 
to be improbable. Aristotle’s words call to mind the words, written by an eminent 
student of Cracow University. In the prefatory epistle of his De Revolutionibus 
Orbium Caelestium, Copernicus defended his intrepid hypothesis on the basis of the 
uncertainty of and contention about the thesis commonly advocated by 
philosophers and astronomers:  
 
Those who know that the consensus of many centuries has sanctioned the 
conception that the earth remains at rest in the middle of the heaven as its center 
would, I reflected, regard it as an insane pronouncement if I made the opposite 
assertion that the earth moves. Therefore I debated with myself for a long time 
whether to publish the volume which I wrote to prove the earth’s motion […] I 
was impelled to consider a different system of deducing the motions of the 
universe’s spheres for no other reason than the realization that astronomers do 
not agree among themselves in their investigations of this subject […] For a long 
                                       
processu scientifico sed non processu probativo. Sed quod dicitur in scientia est sic procedendum 
sicut scientia generatur hoc est processu scientifico”. 
567 Aristotle, Topics, I. 2, 101a25-37, p. 168. 
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time, then, I reflected on this confusion in the astronomical traditions concerning 
the derivation of the motions of the universe’s spheres. I began to be annoyed 
that the movements of the world machine, created for our sake by the best and 
most systematic Artisan of all, were not understood with greater certainty by 
the philosophers, who otherwise examined so precisely the most insignificant 
trifles of this world. For this reason I undertook the task of rereading the works 
of all the philosophers which I could obtain to learn whether anyone had ever 
proposed other motions of the universe’s spheres than those expounded by the 
teachers of astronomy in the schools. And in fact first I found in Cicero that 
Hicetas supposed the earth to move. Later I also discovered in Plutarch that 
certain others were of this opinion […] Therefore, having obtained the 
opportunity from these sources, I too began to consider the mobility of the earth. 
And even though the idea seemed absurd, nevertheless I knew that others before 
me had been granted the freedom to imagine any circles whatever for the 
purpose of explaining the heavenly phenomena. Hence I thought that I too 
would be readily permitted to ascertain whether explanations sounder [firmiores 
demonstrationes] than those of my predecessors could be found for the revolution 
of the celestial spheres on the assumption of some motion of the earth.568 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the 15th century universities in which the via antiqua provided the intellectual 
setting for masters and scholars, commentators on Aristotle’s Topics considered 
dialectic as that part of logic concerned with dialectical syllogism. And they assigned 
a place of prominence to syllogism, if not the only place, among the different forms 
of reasoning, such as enthymeme and induction. Thus, their inquiries do not exceed 
the domain of formal logic. The only exception we encountered was the anonymous 
                                       
568 N. Copernicus, On the Revolutions, book 1, Engl. tr. by E. Rosen, Baltimore and London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1992, pp. 4-5. On Copernicus’ education at Cracow University and his 
connection with topical strategies, see Goddu, Copernicus. 
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1477 Leuven commentator, who committed himself to Buridan’s opinions, despite 
the official interdiction on Buridan’s writings. 
The 15th century Parisian commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics written by 
professors of different philosophical orientations did not disclose any doctrinal 
tendency. The Parisian masters had an aseptic approach to the Topics that 
eventuated in tired and lethargic commentaries in which a given amount of 
knowledge was transmitted without noteworthy innovation nor compelling insights 
in dialectic and its subject matter. When one examines the folia of these 
commentaries, one gets the impression that the arguments were crystallized as time 
progressed. So that eventually they became neutral, and detached from the original 
intellectual setting in which they had been elaborated on. Indeed, despite the 
commentators’ inclinations toward Albertism, Thomism, Scotism or Nominalism, 
their writings on the Topics exhibited a common Realist orientation and a standard 
argumentative line. Realism, and mainly that of Albert the Great, was the only actor 
on the Parisian scene, Buridan and his followers were completely absent.  
Merely flipping through commentaries on the Topics produced at Cologne in 
the 15th century, confirms the impression that no significant insights could be found 
therein and that no notable scholarly developments on dialectic or the Topics 
occurred during the century, for commentators teaching at the end of the century 
rested on the standard opinions of their predecessors. 
The works produced at Leuven in the second half of the 15th century testify to 
the relevance of the philosophical orientation of the commentators in elaborating 
upon more or less interesting speculations about dialectic. The commentaries of 
Petrus de Rivo’s and Petrus de Thenis’ offered pat answers to trite questions which 
were widespread among realist authors. Whilst the works influenced by 
Buridanism, such as that of Hugo’s, and the 1477 Questions, developed long and 
interesting reflections on dialectic, which often also mentioned the alternative 
opinions, along with the arguments sustaining them, and why these interpretations 
should be rejected. Particularly interesting were the 1477 Questions. Its anonymous 
author claimed that dialectic was concerned with dialectical argumentation, 
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whether syllogism or a different kind of reasoning. Accordingly, he emphasized the 
epistemological import of dialectical argumentations. 
 Moving toward Eastern Europe, and Cracow in particular, the importance of 
the commentators’ philosophical orientation emerges even more clearly. In the first 
half of the 15thcentury, Cracow offers an example, perhaps the best, of the impact of 
Buridanism both on the interpretation of Aristotle’s Topics, and more generally, on 
the role and value assigned to dialectic, both as docens and usive, and to its 
argumentative strategies. It is not a mere coincidence that during the decades in 
which Buridanism and the via communis marked the intellectual setting of the 
Cracow Universities, dialectic flourished therein and gained a place of prominence 
among the philosophical disciplines. The Cracow commentators focused their 
theoretical analysis on the probatio rather than on the illatio. They did not speculate 
on the logical properties of necessary inferences, such as apodictic syllogisms or 
consequences. Rather they expanded upon less rigorous kinds of argumentation, 
namely induction, enthymeme and example - on their epistemological value and 
their applicability to the scientia communiter dicta. The Cracow commentators seemed 
to have exclusively associated the notion of probatio with the dialectical method, thus 
departing from Buridan. The Picardian master indeed had a wider understanding 
of probatio, which also included the scientific or demonstrative process. Whereas the 
Cracow commentators sided with Buridan in acknowledging that the scope of 
dialectic was not limited to the production of a less certain and rigorous kind of 
knowledge (opinio): dialectic should also produce persuasion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Having walked along the path of dialectic under the guide of Aristotle’s Topics, we 
would surely do well to look back and weave together all the various threads we 
have encountered along the way. This will help us ascertain whether the method I 
have adopted herein has offered a positive addition to Green-Pedersen’s 
reconstruction.  
In these chapters I have analysed several commentaries on the Topics from various 
epochs and places. I have focused our attention on the possible influences of the 
different views about logic and logical doctrines on the different approaches to the 
Topics that these commentators employed. The main outcome of this scrutiny is the 
identification of two different and authonomous exegetical traditions, namely 
British, and continental or Parisian.  
The few extant British commentaries on the Topics, dating from the mid to the turn 
of the 13th century, reflect the influence of the main trend in British logic at that time, 
namely terminism. The commentaries of Pseudo-Bonaventure (A.4), John Duns 
Scotus and Walter Burley, are characterized by the contextual approach, the constant 
presence of sophisms, and the adoption of the doctrine of the appellatio/suppositio in 
the treatment of the loci. Moreover, the analysis of the loci was even more conducted 
through the rules of consequences. In this scenario, the Boethian tradition of the 
topics, which was still lightly present in Pseudo-Bonaventure’s work, could not find 
any room for application, and was destined to make way for the doctrine of 
consequences.  
All these typical traits considered together, are not found in commentaries 
written in Paris during the 13th-15th century. The continental tradition is marked out 
by different varying features, which often mirrored major doctrinal changes, e.g. the 
substitution of a paradigm of logic with another. On the basis of the commentaries 
analysed, which however do not cover all the extant continental writings on the 
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Topics, it has been possible to identify four main stages in the Parisian reception of 
Aristotle’s Topics.  
In the earlier phase (1230/40ca.-1270ca.), during which terminism was the 
main trend and logic was considered a scientia sermocinalis, the opinions of 
commentators were polarized. On the one hand are advocates of the plurality of 
syllogistic forms – such as Robert (7), Robertus Anglicus (10), Adenulphus de 
Anagni (A.11) and Albert the Great (A.2). The doctrine of the double form could be 
considered as an attempt by these authors, especially Robert (A.7), to reconcile the 
new Aristotelian tradition of the topics with the Boethian one, in which the topics 
served as inference licenses for enthymemes. The role of warrants of the topics, 
however, was hardly tenable in the Aristotelian syllogistic topica. In authors such as 
Robert (A.7) and Albert the Great the distinction between logical and dialectical 
forms and matters was carried to the extreme. By discriminating between logical and 
dialectical forms, these commentators also discriminated between the logical and the 
dialectical validity of reasoning. And, more generally, betwen the formal and the 
epistemological understanding of logic and dialectic: logic studied the rules for 
drawing necessary inferences, whilst dialectic was committed to producing beliefs 
about the conclusion. On the other hand, we can group together masters who are 
placed in the Aristotelian tradition of the Topics exclusively, such as Robertus de 
Cilnacobi (A.1), Elias (A.14) and the anonymous A.9. They did not admit any formal 
differentiation between syllogisms, and accordingly, they could hardly assign any 
active role to the topics in dialectical raesoning.  
 The beginning of the second phase (1270ca.-1300/10ca.) coincided with the 
spread of both the Avicennian ‘intentionalistic logic’, which viewed logic as a scientia 
rationalis, and Aquinas’ paradigm that subdivided logic according to the three acts 
of reason. It was in this intellectual milieu that there developed modistic logic, or 
better semantic, which introduced a novel approach to the Topics. Boethius of Dacia, 
Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito departed from the literal exegeses of their 
predecessors. They took the Topics as the starting point for any inquiry about general 
questions which were not always related to Aristotle’s words. In modistic 
discussions, the topicsremained in the background. 
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The third phase (mid-14th century) was predominated by the figure of John 
Buridan, whose ideas were later upheld by Marsile of Inghen and Hartlevus de 
Marka. In his Quaestiones Topicorum, the Picardian master placed himself out of the 
tradition of his 13th century predecessors, by denying that the object of study of 
dialectic and the Topics was dialectical syllogism, and by affirming that it was 
dialectical argumentation instead. Dialectical argumentation was a type of probatio, 
which in its turn was the epistemological facet of the argumentum/argumentatio – the 
other being the logical face or illatio. In his understanding of the probatio, Buridan 
explicitly connected himself to the Boethian notion of argumentum/argumentatio, 
since the probatio aimed at producing a more or less certain belief in the cognitive 
agent, just as the Boethian argument did. This view, along with the assumption of 
dialectical argumentation as the subject-matter of dialectic, allowed Buridan to 
subsume some types of arguments which had been relegated to a minor role, such 
as induction, enthymeme and example, under the sphere of dialectically valid 
reasoning. 
The last phase extended throughout the entire 15th century. Parisian 
commetaries on Aristotle’s Topics from this period did not disclose their authors’ 
doctrinal tendency, but merely showed a common Realist orientation and 
argumentative line.  
The story of the Topics in 15th century, however, did not end in Paris. By considering 
the historical and institutional contexts of the various European Universities, which 
often determined the Universities’ intellectual setting, I have attempted to show that 
the commentary tradition of the Topics during the 15th century is not such “a sad 
story”,569 after all. The most interesting reflections we have met along the way were 
developed by authors influenced by Buridan or Buridanism, such as the ‘outlawful’ 
Leuven commentator (A.48), the Prague masters and their colleagues in Cracow.  
But having come all this way, we can, in closing, wonder whether the 
question, raised by Jennifer Ashworth concerning the impact of humanistic dialectic 
on the development of informal argumentation in the 16th century,570 could be 
                                       
569 Green-Pedersen, The Tradition, p. 328; accepted by Ebbesen, “The Theory”, p. 29. 
570 “How far logic was rhetoricized, and how far humanist dialectic, or any other type of sixteenth-
century logic, was concerned with probabilistic and informal argumentation”, where ‘informal’ are 
the arguments “acceptable but not deductively valid […] To conclude, if we mean by the rhetoricizing 
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reformulated and posed to our Topics’ commentators. How far and how seriously 
were the commentators of the Topics concerned with probabilistic and informal 
argumentation that nowadays pertains to philosophical logic? Did any of these 
commentators develop interesting reflections on dialectic? In other words, did these 
authors conceive of dialectic “as a sub-part of logic which studies dialectical 
syllogisms as presented in Aristotle’s Topics”571 or, rather, did they think of dialectic 
as possibly dealing with a wider subject than dialectical syllogism alone, such as 
dialectical argumentation and, accordingly, non-deductively valid forms of 
reasoning?  
My research has highlighted the presence of the Boethian tradition of the topics 
alongside its Aristotelian counterpart. The presence of the Boethian topics was 
attested to by the demarcation between the logical and epistemological facets of 
reasoning. This demarcation was expressed through the distinction proposed by 
Parisian ‘pluralists’ between inferring and proving syllogisms, or through the 
Buridanian separation between the illatio and the probatio. Both the Parisian 
‘pluralists’ and Buridan and his followers described the probative side of reasoning 
in connection to the Boethian definition of argument. Thus, they characterized the 
proving argumentum in terms of cognitive psychology. The proving argument did 
not consist in the mere correct application of logical rules of inference, which yielded 
a necessary conclusion, but it was a reasoning that engendered a belief in the subject. 
                                       
of logic that material from rhetoricians came to be included in logic texts, this is certainly the case. 
How far the material absorbed included informal persuasive devices is another matter”, in E. J. 
Ashworth, ”Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries”, in Handbook of the History of Logic, 
ii: Medieval and Renaissance Logic, ed. by D. M. Gabbay – J. Woods, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008, p. 609-
644, here p. 632 and p. 639.  
571 Ibid., pp. 633-635: “If we now ask what counts as dialectic and whether it differs from logic, two 
main answers are possible. One can regard ‘logic’ and ‘dialectic’ as merely two names for one 
discipline, or one can regard dialectic as a sub-part of logic which studies dialectical syllogisms as 
presented in Aristotle’s Topics […] A third answer, based on the discussion of dialectical invention 
by Rudolph Agricola, is that dialectic focusses not on the dialectical syllogism, but on Topical 
discourse and debate, and hence, according to Jardine and others, is a part of logic primarily 
concerned with persuasive techniques and informal argumentation, that is, with non-deductive 
strategies […] More usually, however, if an argument was labelled as ‘probable’ this had to do, not 
with the replacement of a strict logical relation between premises and conclusion by some other 
relation, but with the epistemological status of the premises [….] This reading is, of course, based on 
the belief that Aristotle’s reference to ‘syllogism’ in the Topics is to be taken as a reference to a 
particular kind of formally-valid deductive structure […] On this interpretation, dialectic is clearly a 
sub-part of logic, or, for those who preferred the term ‘dialectic’ to the term ‘logic’, dialectic in the 
narrow sense is a part of dialectic in the broad sense”. 
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And the topic, especially the locus maxima propositio, was the warrant for the transfer 
of belief from the premises, which were more known and believed than the doubted 
conclusion, to the conclusion itself. Thus, in commentaries written by Parisian 
‘pluralists’, Buridan and his followers, the dialectical reasoning was not limited to 
the dialectical syllogism, which differed from the other types of syllogisms only in 
virtue of the epistemic state of its premises.  For these authors influenced by 
Boethius, the dialectical reasoning was a topical reasoning, which differed from the 
formal reasoning since it started from different points, applied diverse rules, and 
produced different results. This ‘epistemological’ unedrstanding of the dialectical 
reasoning allowed commentators to enlarged the spectrum of dialectical reasoning 
and to expand upon less rigorous kinds of argumentations, namely induction, 
enthymeme and example.  
Upon inquirying into the Medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, we can 
surely conclude that for various commenators dialectic, dialectical reasoning and 
topical argument often represented the epistemological aspect of medieval logic 
which lived side by side with the formal aspect. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix lists the commentators of Aristotle’s Topics mentioned in the various 
chapters. Along with the author’s name – when available – I added the reference 
number of Green-Pedersen’s catalogue of Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics572 and 
commentators’ views on the subject matter of dialectic. 
 
13TH CENTURY. 
AUTHOR ORIGIN, 
DATE 
SUBJECT OF THE TOPICS  
A.1, Robertus de Cilnac(h)obi 
(Kilwardby (?))  
Paris, 1240s Dialectical syllogism 
A.2, Albertus Magnus Würzburg, 
1264-7 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.4, Anonymous (Pseudo-
Bonaventure) 
British, mid-
century 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.7, Robert Paris, 1230s-40s Dialectical syllogism 
A.9, Anonymous Paris, 1250s Dialectical syllogism 
A.10, Robertus Anglicus Paris Dialectical syllogism 
A.11, Adenulphus de Anagnia Paris, 1260s Dialectical syllogism 
A.13, Boethius de Dacia Paris, 1270s Dialectical syllogism 
A.14, Elias Paris, 1270s Dialectical syllogism 
A.17, Angelus de Camerino Paris, 1290s Dialectical syllogism 
A.18, Simon de Faversham Paris, 1280s Dialectical syllogism 
A.20, Radulphus Brito Paris, 1290s-
1300 
Dialectical syllogism 
Iohannes Duns Scotus Oxford,  1290s Dialectical syllogism 
 
14TH CENTURY. 
AUTHOR ORIGIN  SUBJECT OF THE TOPICS 
AND OF DIALECTIC 
A.21, Iohannes Buridanus Paris, 2nd 
quarter 14th ce. 
Dialectical argumentation 
A.29, Gualterus Burlaeus British, 1300-7  Dialectical syllogism 
A.33, Marsilius de Inghen Paris, 3rd 
quarter 14th ce. 
Dialectical argumentation 
A.30, Hartlevus de Marca Cologn (?), 
1380s 
Dialectical argumentation 
                                       
572 See Green-Pedersen, The Tradition¸ pp. 382-417. 
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15TH CENTURY. 
AUTHOR ORIGIN  SUBJECT OF THE TOPICS 
AND OF DIALECTIC 
A.35, Iohannes Versoris Paris, 1430s-40s Dialectical syllogism 
A.36, Anonymous Cracow, 1440s-
60s 
Dialectical argumentation 
A.37, Petrus Richeri Paris, 1442 Dialectical syllogism 
A.38, Iohannes Sucket Paris, 1429 Dialectical syllogism 
A.42, Heymericus de Campo Cologne, 1420s-
30s 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.43, Anonymous Prague, end 
14th-1st quarter 
15th ce. 
Dialectical argumentation 
A.44, Arnoldus de Tongern Cologne, 1490s Dialectical syllogism 
A.45, Anonymous Mainz, 1460s-
80s 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.47, Ra(n)dulphus Boissel (or 
Boyssel) 
Paris, 1454 Dialectical syllogism 
A.48 and A.53, Petrus de Mera or 
Andreas de Alchmaria or 
Theodoricus Messaych 
Leuven, 1476-
77 
Dialectical argumentation 
A.50, Hugo de Dordraco Leuven, 1468-
69 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.52, Iohannes Hannon (or Iohannes 
Magistri) 
Paris, 1470s Dialectical syllogism 
A.52a, Petrus de Rivo Leuven, 1450s Dialectical syllogism 
A.55, Christianus Foliot Paris, 1474 Dialectical syllogism 
A.56, Georgius Bruxellensis & 
Thomas Bricot 
Paris, 1490s Dialectical syllogism 
A.57, Petrus Tartaretus Paris, 1490s Dialectical syllogism 
A.58 e A.60 , Petrus de Thenis Leuven, 1481-
82 
Dialectical syllogism 
A.64, Gerardus Henrici de 
Harderwijk 
Cologne, 1494 Dialectical syllogism 
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